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Introduction 
“I can resist everything except temptation” 
Oscar Wilde  
 
 
In general, any study of corruption starts with the observation of situations which 
provide temptation for people to disregard the norms and rules, to which they should comply, 
and misuse entrusted public power for private gain. The power abuse is as old as humanity 
itself and has many faces and shapes. Corruption is one variety. The common definition of 
corruption in the literature so far was not reached because of its complexity which, according 
to Kim
1
, includes numerous political, administrative and socially deviant behaviours. They all 
result from violation of legal and social norms and expectations. The fight against corruption is 
one of the highest priorities on the international agenda. The United Nations (UN), the 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), Council of Europe with 
Group of States against corruption (GRECO), Transparency International, are some of the 
many that fight corruption as their main or supplementary goal. Based on their active work, 
numerous documents and rules, that contain results of various practices and approaches around 
the world, were enforced. Their main goal is to assist countries in improving the fight against 
corruption and countries signatories are expected to implement them as part of the domestic 
legal and institutional system. However, the results of these moves are questioned in the 
literature. The main argument is that countries around the world vary and the “one size fit all” 
approach cannot provide the desired outcome because it does not take into account specificities 
of a certain country or countries. In general, countries are divided into developed, developing 
and transitional and each of them, as well as the formal, also has different informal institutions. 
The required international anti-corruption unification applies to formal rules but that is usually 
only one side of the story. The other is the implementation which in general depends on 
informal institutions whose change requires time. The analysis in this research focuses on post-
socialist, transitional countries
2
 and their fight against corruption. One remark which is 
important to make here is that this research only uses the term post-socialist country(ies) 
although in the literature this term is used interchangeably with post-communist country(ies). 
The explanation for this use is that none of the countries observed in this study reached the 
level of communism, which according to Marx should come after the socialism as its better 
version. Fortunately they stayed socialist for the whole period of existence.  
 
The Aim of this research  
 
Transitional or post-socialist countries are those who are emerging from a centrally 
planned market to an open one. The process of transition started with the collapse of the 
socialist regime and raised many questions regarding the changes in economic and legal 
                                                          
1
Kim, J. Y. (1998): “Corruption in Socialist and Capitalist Countries” in Sampford, C. and Preston, N: Public 
Sector Ethics: Finding and Implementing Values, The Federation Press/ Routledge, pp.91-101 
2
The two terms transitional and post-socialist countries are used here interchangeably.  
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institutions. The International community provided assistance and advice on many aspects 
which mainly pointed to the solutions applied in developed, capitalist societies. However, the 
results achieved are subject to the debate in the literature but the general claim is that they are 
not as they were expected to be. As previously stated, the main task of transitional countries is 
building market institutions in order to lower transactions costs and to develop trustful relations 
and transactions. This should increase the division of labour, the number of mutually beneficial 
transactions and the social welfare. The approaches towards the achievement of this goal 
encountered many obstacles of which the widespread corruption was one. The focus on 
eliminating it appears a logical step because corruption undermines trust and increases 
transaction costs, and as such decreases social welfare. Again, the search for the solution ended 
with the signing and implementing into domestic laws international anti-corruption regulations. 
By means of this move, transitional countries expressed willingness to address corruption 
which is particularly important having in mind their socialist history in which corruption was 
either denied or covered up. However, recent research on the results achieved in this field 
appear unimpressive. Moreover, they claim non-existence of the correlation between the 
conventions ratified and corruption lowering, pointing to the enforcement problems as one of 
the main reasons for the failure. 
One of the main arguments for the undesirable results is that conventions are designed 
according to the recommendations and best practice in fighting corruption gained mainly from 
the developed countries which have a different informal institutional setting and which appears 
crucial for successfully combating corruption. One interesting anecdote, regarding that which 
took place on the border of two transitional countries, Serbia and Bulgaria, might illustrate the 
point better. Shortly after Bulgaria became a member of the European Union, one Serbian bus 
driver had to transfer a group of tourists from Serbia to Sofia. At the border between the two 
countries, a Bulgarian customs official refused to let the bus to continue its trip, insisting that 
he should be adequately stimulated, in euros preferably, in order to allow tourists to enter the 
country. After the prudent explanation of the bus driver that Bulgaria is now a member of the 
EU where bribery and corruption does not exist, he received a very clever answer from the 
customs official: “Bratko3, this is not a bribe or corruption, this is tradition.” This funny 
anecdote highlights the corruption as a very complex social phenomenon with substantial 
influence on society. Its understanding and perception largely influences the enforcement of 
formal norms. One of the prominent scholars in the domain of corruption, Rose-Ackerman
4
 
explains that corruption is a very complex problem and cannot be attacked in isolation and it is 
not sufficient to apply criminal law to it. A policy maker, therefore, should, besides enacting 
anti-corruption laws, “attract notice and public support”. 
Therefore, the problem of combating corruption in countries in transition is the main 
topic of this thesis. The main claim here is that these countries have idiosyncrasies which 
should be taken into account in designing successful anti-corruption policies. For instance, 
                                                          
3
Bratko in Slavic languages means buddy, pal. 
4
Rose-Ackerman, S. (1999): Corruption and Government: Causes, Consequences and Reform, Cambridge 
University Press, p. 226 
Ana Jakovljević, LL.M 
11 
 
OECD
5
 depicts the situation of some ex-soviet countries which recently adopted modern codes 
of ethics for civil servants. These codes include the values promoted by the international 
community. However, civil servants see them as “old fashioned propaganda” and as such they 
are not an effective tool for corruption prevention. Therefore, the research will look closely at 
the dominant anti-corruption model repression-prevention-transparency, in order to observe to 
what extent and in which way it might be applied in the case of transitional countries in order 
to improve corruption combat. Since corruption is a very broad concept it is not feasible to 
discuss all its aspects in one research stream. The focus here is on public administration and 
civil servants employed within it. 
 
Scope of the research 
 
Public administration is one of the most important institutions in a country since its 
work affects the everyday life of its citizens. Therefore its proper functioning is essential for 
the state’s performance. However, corruption in administration sends the signal that the state is 
not able to adequately address peoples’ needs. In transitional countries, during their socialist 
past, public administration had a very important role. This role came from the fact that since 
the private market did not exist the state was the only employer and service provider. This 
division, besides civil administration, included the state owned companies as well. They were 
all obliged to follow the dictate of the Socialist/Communist Party. This was particularly true for 
public administration which in essence behaved as a service to the Party. In this environment 
there was not much space for high standards of professionalism and impartiality. On the other 
hand the failure of the state to provide economic abundance, which was promised at the 
beginning of the regime’s establishment, increased repression towards its citizens even more 
which was the dominant modus operandi since its establishment. With this formal institutional 
setting, people developed a special mentality necessary to survive. Part of that mentality is also 
the attitude towards corruption, which was not perceived as something bad and was tolerated 
within the system.  
The collapse of socialism introduced the new institutions and new values which 
substantially differ from the old ones.  People were expected to comply with the new rules and 
to change their behaviour. This process of transition had different paths in transitional 
countries. Some of them in general perform better than others. This also applies to fighting 
against corruption and the situation in that sense is described by the Transparency International 
Corruption Perception Index. TICPI provides the rank of the countries regarding corruption. 
However, since it refers to the general perception of corruption in the whole country, an 
additional indicator, Global Corruption Barometer
6
, also developed by Transparency 
International, focuses on the corruption in public administration. The institutions covered are: 
political parties, parliament/legislature, military, NGOs, media, religious bodies, 
business/private sector, education system, judiciary, medical health, police and public 
officials/civil servants. The data set created for this measurement constitutes the answers to 
                                                          
5
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (2008): Fighting Corruption in Eastern Europe and 
Central Asia, OECD, 2008, pp.41-59 
6
Data available at: http://www.transparency.org/gcb2013/in_detail/ 
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various questions posed, and their aggregate values are calculated. Here the responses to 
question number six in the questionnaire are observed since they address the perception of the 
corruption in the civil service for 2013(marked as GCB Q6 2013). These results are compared 
to the results of TICPI for 2013.The two rankings go in different directions. In the TICPI scale 
1 stands for highly corrupt country while 10 is the grade of the “cleanest” one. In the GCB 
scale 1 represents “not corrupt at all”, while 5 stands for “extremely corrupt”. What could be 
seen from the Graph I below, is that even though transitional countries have different level of 
corruption perception on a general level (TICPI), the perception of corruption in the civil 
service is very similar (GCB). This means that among all presented countries, in the majority 
of them civil service is perceived as corrupt. 
 
Graph I: TICPI and GCB of post-socialist countries 
 
Therefore, this research will look at the current status of public administration in post 
socialist countries, the problems which they are facing and finally, it will try to provide 
solutions and suggestions for the improvement of corruption combat. The focus here will be on 
civil servants, and not appointed individuals, and on an administrative type of corruption. In 
this research the term civil servant is in some cases used interchangeably with public 
employees, although in general the latter category is broader than the former. This is done 
because they both in essence are obliged to serve public interest and have similar legal 
obligations. Therefore, some claims made apply to both categories.  
 
Research Questions 
 
As mentioned above, this thesis aims to look at the current status of the applied 
dominant international model repression-prevention-transparency and its effects on combating 
corruption in post-socialist countries. It also aims to recommend the possible ways to improve 
Ana Jakovljević, LL.M 
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the elimination of corruption. In essence this is a positive analysis with normative implications. 
Therefore, the main research question in this thesis is:  
 
What is the optimal enforcement design of anti-corruption policies for combating 
corruption in the public administration of post-socialist countries?   
 
In order to answer this question the thesis is structured according to the Bain/Mason
7
 
paradigm. This paradigm structure-conduct-performance (S-C-P), is widely used in economic 
analysis of industrial organizations. The elements have the following meaning. Structure 
represents the relatively stable economic and technical dimensions of an industry that provide 
the context in which competition occurs. Conduct is the actor’s choice of key decision 
variables and refers to behaviour, policies and strategies. Finally, performance is broadly 
defined as social performance which results from the structure and conduct. This approach has 
been used so far in political science
8
, and it is considered appropriate to be used here. Its 
concrete application in this thesis is as follows. The structure here refers to the structure of 
public administration in post socialist countries, its institutional setting and values promoted. 
The idea which will be explored here is that the structure of the administration influences the 
presence of corruption. In that respect, the hope is to detect the type of administration for post-
socialist countries which will curb corruption. Conduct in this context includes individuals, 
more precisely civil servants, who work for the administration. Their behaviour will be the 
centre of attention because of its direct connection to the level of corruption. The aim here is to 
define which types of conduct are negatively correlated to corruption. Finally, if the 
appropriate structure is in place and people’s behaviour is coordinated to a certain equilibrium, 
the performance of a country regarding combating corruption will improve accordingly.  
The paradigm structure-conduct performance is divided among the chapters of which 
each of them has its sub-research question which should be answered. Regarding the structure 
the sub-research question is: What is the optimal structure of public administration in post-
socialist countries for improving corruption combat? For the analysis of conduct the two sub-
research questions are asked. First: How the preferences of civil servants should be 
targeted/coordinated in order to achieve the optimal level of combating corruption in public 
administration of post-socialist countries? And second: How constrains should be imposed in 
order to achieve the optimal level of corruption combat in the public administration of post-
socialist countries? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
7
See: Bain, J. S. (1968): Industrial organization, New York: Wiley 1968 and Mason, E. S. (1939): “Prices and 
production polices of large-scale enterprises, American Economic review, March 1939, 29, pp.61-74 
8
See: Myerson, R. B. (1995): “Analysis of Democratic Institutions: Structure, Conduct and Performance”, The 
Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol.9, No.1,Winter, 1995, pp.77-89 
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Methodology 
 
In order to answer the research questions, this thesis adopts a multifaceted analytical 
approach. The dominant methodology applied is the Law and Economics
9
or more precisely 
economic analysis of law. The Law and Economics approach uses the Rational Choice Theory 
as its basis and sees an individual as a rational self-maximiser who makes the choice among the 
available opportunities to acquire the desired values in the best way. This economic approach 
is further applied in the analysis of various non-market social institutions. One of them 
includes public and political institutions. The analyses in this domain are run under the veil of 
Public Choice Theory
10
 which observes citizens and politicians/bureaucrats within the scope of 
the principal-agent model. This model states that the principal entrusts certain power into the 
hands of an agent according to the mutual agreement. However since the agent is better 
informed than the principal about the subject matter, the information asymmetry is usually 
created which provides an agent with the factual power over the principal. This, as a 
consequence has the possibility for abuse. Concrete application of the model to the public and 
political institutions means that citizens are the principals who entrusted the power to the 
politicians and bureaucrats. These agents usually abuse this power for private gain. More 
precisely, Pubic Choice theory sees the agents in this relationship as rational self-maximisers 
who should be controlled by the principal by various means.   
One of the types of abuse of entrusted public power for a private gain is corruption. It is 
no surprise that the dominant approach in the economic analysis of corruption lies in the 
application of the principal-agent model in the main international anti-corruption strategies. 
These strategies call for increased criminalisation of acts of corruption as a mean of 
disciplining the falling agents. This in practice made the Deterrence theory the main point of 
the analysis in cases of corruption. This theory is seen in the law and economics literature as 
the fundamental economic theorem of crime and punishment
11
. However, deterrence 
mechanisms, besides so far showing very modest achievements in the domain of combating 
corruption, might be very expensive for society and many of the countries around the world, 
such as transitional, usually have scarce resources. As such they are in need of the anti-
corruption framework which would cost society less and provide more benefits. Therefore, 
another important economic concept in this thesis is the notion of efficiency. Efficiency means 
that a certain mechanism is effective in reducing social harm but at the same time it achieves 
that at the lowest possible costs.  
It was mentioned earlier that a dominant pure economic approach towards combating 
the corruption did not provide the expected results. This in a way raises a question mark 
regarding the neo-classical economic model and the individual as rational-self maximiser in it. 
Corruption is predominantly but not exclusively an economic issue. It includes many aspects 
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which are context dependent and as such deserve attention. Some economists include the 
broader social context in the economic analysis of a society. For instance, Arrow
12
 claims that 
“the interpersonal relationships are needed as part of our collective organization, for our mutual 
improvement”. This organisation should regulate the efficient allocation of scarce resources 
through the competition and the application of a price system. However, some things, such as 
trust, loyalty and similar values cannot be priced and they call for “something more than the 
market”. This is the area in which government steps in with nonmarket methods of controlling 
and directing the economy and society. Furthermore, Arrow argues that besides the 
government “another set of invisible institutions “the principles of ethics and morality” play an 
important role. During the evolution process, societies developed some kind of implicit 
agreements, which are either essential to the society’s survival or at least contribute to its 
efficient functioning. The strongest argument for this claim lies in the fact that societies with 
low levels of economic development actually have lack of trust among their citizens. 
Therefore, according to Arrow, individuals are always faced with the conflict between their 
individual desires and society’s demands. He says that “one’s social and one’s political 
attitudes must always reflect a certain degree of compromise with one’s individual point of 
view”. Social action is only possible with cooperation and agreement because each individual 
in decision making sees different values as important. Therefore, Arrow claims that “social 
demands may be expressed through formal rules and authorities or they may be expressed 
through internalized demands of conscience”. The only problem with the social agreement is 
that they are harder to change compared to individual decisions. 
 Following these arguments the analysis of corruption in transitional countries demands 
the observation of broader social context than the one covered by the narrow neoclassical 
economic model. During the socialist past the economy and society of transitional countries 
were based on a non-market resource allocation and these governing rules created various 
models of human behaviour, different from the usual one in capitalist societies. This specific 
evolution of post-socialist societies required a closer look at the Cross Cultural 
Communication field of study and Public administration theory in this study. When all aspects, 
which are considered relevant to this thesis, were taken into consideration, the Law and 
economics Deterrence approach for law enforcement was accompanied by the Cooperative 
enforcement approach. Therefore, the combination of both is seen as a means that could 
possibly improve the combat of corruption in post socialist countries.  
Finally, the Case study methodology is used in combination with the Grounded Theory. 
The goal of conducting a case study here is to provide the image of the “black box” of public 
administration in one of the post-socialist countries. Since some of the aspects discussed in this 
thesis are not easy to observe due to its intangibility and the process of change, the chance of 
providing a closer look at the matter was seen in the methodology of the case study analysis. 
However, since some of the claims made are new and should in the future be explored further, 
the Grounded theory method is the only one applicable keeping in mind the whole context in 
which the research was conducted, and which is elaborated on in detail in the Chapter 5.  
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Scientific and societal relevance 
 
From a societal point of view this study aims to provide the optimal anti-corruption 
enforcement mechanism which will in the case of post-socialist countries in particular achieve 
a reduction in corruption and help in fostering economic growth. Keeping in mind that current 
policies, even though synchronised with the international ones, do not provide the desired 
outcome, an alternative should be found. Societies with widespread corruption see the use of 
criminal sanction as the main method which will reduce corruption. However, they are mainly 
ignorant about the costs which this method, especially imprisonment, incurs for society. It is 
therefore important to first introduce this fact to people and secondly to create the mechanism 
which will incentivise them to comply with the law voluntarily and not only because of the 
threat of the punishment imposed. The changing of the “mental model” is crucial in this case 
and with the anti-corruption policy design suggested in this thesis, this might be achievable. 
 From a scientific point of view it is interesting to observe how certain aspects, which in 
cases of corruption are analysed separately, interrelate. Corruption is a very complex social 
phenomenon and includes a variety of aspects which at the same time might be the causes but 
also the consequences. This in a way creates a vicious circle from which is not always easy to 
find an escape. Combining the various elements and approaches, the policy implications from 
this study are perhaps able to offer one for post-socialist countries.  
 
Content structure 
 
This study is structured within six chapters. Chapter 1 provides the identity cards of 
two important issues and basic terms which are the subject of the analysis in this research. The 
first one is corruption. The elements of the analysis provided are definitions, typology and 
types of corruption. Then the existing anti-corruption framework is described. It is first 
discussed from its theoretical basis and then its concrete application in terms of international 
instruments and anti-corruption strategies defined accordingly in countries around the world. 
The second issue discussed is transitional countries. First, the meaning of the process and its 
characteristics are provided and then the problem of corruption. This chapter discusses the 
failures of dominant anti-corruption policies in transitional countries and in particular the 
specificities of these countries which are considered important for a design of effective anti-
corruption policy.  
Following the structure-conduct-performance paradigm Chapter 2 starts with the 
positive analysis of the anti-corruption strategies which target the public administration 
structure in order to reduce corruption. Since they provide mixed and, in many cases 
unsatisfying results, a closer examination is made of the types of public administration 
organisation in capitalist, socialist and transitional societies. Simply speaking, the aim of this 
description was the provision of the path through which transitional countries are moving from 
the socialist to the capitalist state organisation. Beside the structure of the formal, “hardware” 
institutions, human capital is seen as an important “software” structural aspect. Therefore the 
literature on Public Service Motivation is presented accordingly.  
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Chapters 3 and 4 belong to the second element of the paradigm, conduct. Chapter 
3discusses ways of regulating human behaviour and introduces the anti-corruption pyramid. It 
further discusses its first two elements: propensity for corruption-culture and transparency and 
accountability. The aim of this chapter is to target people’s preferences and provide the 
mechanisms for their coordination towards the desired equilibrium. Regarding culture, three 
different types are considered relevant in the context of corruption combat improvement in 
post-socialist countries. These types are: universalism/particularism, individualism/collectivism 
and power distance. Regarding transparency and accountability first, its general relevance and 
characteristics are described and second, their context in socialist and post-socialist societies.  
Chapter 4 discusses the last two layers of the anti-corruption pyramid, more precisely 
the constraints that should be imposed upon the behaviour of civil servants in order to improve 
corruption combat. The chapter first presents the specificities of the corrupt act regarding its 
detection and the motives which lie behind its commitment. Based on these characteristics the 
two additional pyramids are introduced. Disciplinary and criminal anti-corruption pyramids 
which need to be applied based on the different characteristics of the types of bribery defined. 
Both pyramids apply the law and economics arguments regarding the optimal design of 
enforcement policies.  
 Chapter 5 presents the case study of the Republic of Serbia. It first provides the 
arguments for pursuing this study, and then it gives the basic facts about history, anti-
corruption framework and results hitherto achieved in corruption combat. The second part of 
the chapter starts with a discussion on the research area and methods applied. It continues with 
the case study method in general and its application in a concrete case. Finally, it provides the 
results and their interpretation. 
Chapter 6 summarizes the findings, provides concluding remarks and identifies venues 
for further research. 
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Chapter 1: Corruption and transition identity cards 
“Corruption is authority plus monopoly minus transparency”                                                                                                                 
Unknown 
 
1.1. Introduction 
Although a very old phenomenon, corruption became the centre of attention in last two 
decades for various reasons. One of them is the collapse of centrally planned, socialist 
countries. As already mentioned in the introduction, the research topic of this thesis is 
corruption in transitional countries and therefore this chapter describes the main terms, 
definitions, and problems which will be analysed and discussed throughout the whole research 
trajectory. Determinants, definition, typology and types of corruption, its effects and the 
reaction of the international community to achieve effective combat will be presented in the 
first part. The second part will describe transitional countries, their idiosyncrasies, and results 
achieved hitherto in the fight against corruption.  
1.2. Corruption 
1.2.1. Corruption overview 
 
1.2.1.1. Determinants, definition, typology and types of corruption 
 
The term corruption comes from the Latin word rumpere which means to break. This 
phenomenon is well known throughout history and has been the subject of debates since the 
creation of the first states. However, the increased interest in it in modern times was expressed 
in the last few decades in the voluminous work of social science research. There is a dispute 
among scientists about the reasons for this increase but it seems that a common conclusion is 
not reachable. Tanzi
13
 lists several arguments that might serve as an explanation. He claims 
that the end of the Cold War stopped the political hypocrisies and reviled political corruption. 
In the past, centrally planned economies did not focus on the corruption as an important issue 
due to the lack of information or reluctance to initiate any discussion on that topic. 
Nevertheless, the situation changed after the collapse. The increased number of democratic 
governments with free and active media made corruption no longer taboo and an available 
subject for discussion. Furthermore, globalization created the platform for comparison between 
the countries and increased international interest in it. This resulted in the active involvement 
of nongovernmental organizations, such as Transparency International, in an attempt to create 
anticorruption movements all around the world. International financial institutions, such as the 
IMF and the World Bank, also substantially contributed to the movement together with 
empirical studies which pointed out the costs of the corruption to society. Besides this, Tanzi 
further argues that the corruption phenomenon increased in recent decades and culminated in 
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the 1990s due to three main reasons: 1) the growing role of the governments which provided 
bureaucracies with broader deciding powers, 2) the growth of international trade and business 
which increased the bribe opportunities and 3) economic changes in many countries, especially 
in transitional ones, caused the misuse of some mechanisms, such as privatization, which lead 
to the increase in corruption.  
All these aspects presented brought into a play a deeper analysis of causes, factors and 
effects of corruption which will be to a certain extent presented in the next section. Here some 
basic features of the phenomenon are explained. Besides all the analysis and research done 
until now, the discussion about the definition of corruption is still very vivid. Many authors 
have discussed corruption by focusing on different aspects of it, and yet the agreement on a 
precise definition of corruption has not been reached.
14
 This is explained by the fact that many 
different forms of corruption exist and it is very difficult to formulate one definition which will 
fit them all. Mishra
15
 claims that the multi-dimensional and context specific nature of 
corruption makes the attempt at creating an inclusive definition difficult. However, useful 
working definitions adopted by many authors define corruption as “misuse of public office for 
private gains”. The definition is used by the international and nongovernmental institutions, 
such as the World Bank and Transparency International, in their voluminous and influential 
work on corruption. It is important to point out that it will be used in this thesis as well. Since 
corruption includes a variety of human acts, whose common characteristic is illegality and 
therefore latency, the broad scope of different acts sometimes complicates their classification. 
However, the literature agrees over some typologies, classifications and types of corruption.
16
 
There are three important typologies of corruption. The first one includes public and 
private corruption, defined on the basis of a misuse of power in different sectors. Public 
corruption is a misuse of public office for personal gain and includes a variety of human 
behaviours. Private corruption, on the other hand, occurs between individuals in the private 
sector. The second typology refers to administrative and political corruption. While 
administrative corruption is the corruption that influences the implementation of policies and 
rules, the political corruption on the other hand, influences the formulation of laws, regulations, 
and policies. The research subject of this thesis is in the domain of administrative corruption, 
more precisely corruption of civil servants. Finally the third typology includes grand and petty 
corruption. Grand corruption involves substantial amounts of money and usually high-level 
officials, while petty corruption involves smaller sums and typically more junior officials. 
Grand corruption involving public officials is referred to as kleptocracy. 
Literature also makes some classifications regarding the essence of the relationship 
among the parties involved in corruption transactions. One classification is based on the 
consent of the parties to indulge in corruption. According to this criterion there is corruption 
with consent, which is in essence agreement among the parties and corruption without consent- 
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extortion, in which a person uses his position or office to obtain money through coercion or 
threats. Extortion is the unlawful use of one's position or office to obtain money through 
coercion or threats. Another classification, here called “legal” and “illegal”, is based on the 
level of violation of the law made, or nature of the basic motives for the corrupt deal. Some 
deals are made in order to “speed up the process”, while others are made to obtain a certain 
right by violating legal norms. This type of corruption is described in detail in the fourth 
chapter of this thesis.  
The most common types of power abuse include bribery, nepotism, embezzlement, 
fraud, clientelism and conflict of interest.
17
Bribery is an offer of money or favours to influence 
an official. It may come in the form of a fixed sum, a certain percentage of a contract, or any 
other favour or money in kind. Usually it is paid to a state official or business person who can 
make contracts on behalf of the state or business or otherwise distribute benefits to companies 
or individuals, businessmen and clients. Occasionally, the concept of bribery could be hidden 
under the mask of terms such as kickbacks, gratuities, sweeteners, commercial arrangements, 
hush money, pay-offs, and milking. Nepotism is another common form of power abuse which 
occurs when officials favour relatives or close friends (cronyism) for positions in a decision-
making authority. This type of favouritism is a result of the natural human tendency to give 
preferential treatment to friends and families, and occurs in both public and private sectors. 
Clientelism is characterized by "patron-client" relationships in which relatively powerful and 
rich "patrons", political candidates, promise to provide relatively powerless and poor "clients" 
with benefits, such as jobs, protection or infrastructure, in exchange for votes. Embezzlement is 
the fraudulent appropriation of money or property by a person entrusted to safeguard the assets 
in another's interests while fraud involves the use of deception, trickery and breach of 
confidence to gain some unfair or dishonest advantage. Finally, a conflict of interest occurs 
when someone, such as a public official, has competing professional obligations or personal or 
financial interests that would influence the objective exercise of his duties. 
The description of various types and classifications of corruption provided above, 
clarifies the difficulties related to defining corruption. In resolving the corruption riddle 
researchers try to follow the patterns of creativity of humankind when exercising corrupt 
transactions with the main goal of finding possible solutions for corruption eradication 
improvement. The starting point for many of them is the attempt to measure the level of 
corruption in a specific country. However, this raised many questions of which the most 
important one concerns to what extent the measurement of something secret and hardly 
observed could be achieved and with what level of exactness. The next section endeavours to 
provide some answers, information and insights on this issue. 
 
1.2.1.2. Measurement of corruption 
 
Measurement of corruption appears to be one of the challenging topics in scientific 
research. As previously mentioned, corruption is secret and latent and parties engaged in these 
acts have no incentives to reveal them. Thus answering the question on how to measure 
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something that is not easily detectable appears to be difficult. The theory on corruption 
employs different indicators for its measurement but each of them raised a debate in the 
literature. For instance some authors, such as Philp and Brown
18
, claim that certain indicators 
show no correlation to a specific definition on corruption which implies that the value of a 
certain indicator depends on the definition of corruption. Furthermore, this means that prior to 
any use of an indicator its scope should be clarified. More precisely, it should be clearly 
defined what an indicator measures: is it concentrated on a particular type of corruption or does 
it represent the general one. Begović19 stresses also the importance of the purpose of the 
concrete index use. According to him, two cases could be distinguished, one in which the 
indicator is used for analytical purposes in empirical research and the other one is operative, 
used for enacting some operative decision. Both of these indicators need to have certain 
characteristics. The former one should be reliable and robust while the latter should be precise, 
unambiguous and indisputable from the interpretation point of view and focused on the goals 
set.  
In general, the indicators that are used to describe a particular phenomenon could be 
divided into two categories, objective and subjective. UNDP
20
 report defines objective 
indicators as those which leave no room for subjective judgement because they are based on 
the undisputed facts. On the other hand subjective indicators are based on the perception of its 
examinees about corruption in a given country. Keeping in mind the secret nature of corrupt 
business as well as its illegality, it is difficult to formulate the objective indicator for measuring 
corruption. That is the main reason for using the subjective indicators in the analysis of 
corruption, such as perception and experience. People are usually reluctant to talk about their 
experiences in corruption due to the possibility of being penalized for engaging in such an 
activity and therefore, the most common way of analysing corruption is through perception. 
However, Arndt and Oman
21
 and Rose and Mishler
22
 point out that this method has a couple of 
drawbacks. These indicators may not be reliable in the assessment of long-term trends and 
changes because some of their aspects are difficult to capture. Most of the indicators do not 
always align with the view of ordinary people because of their skewness towards the business 
community. Finally, they tend to measure perception of corruption rather than its causes. All 
these drawbacks imply that the use of subjective indicators might be problematic in the case of 
comparison of corruption level between the countries.  
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Perception for measuring corruption is used in the two main methods applied: surveys 
and expert’s review. In the case of surveys, there are three possible samples that could be used 
for the analysis: business people, households and civil servants. Begović23 claims that each of 
these samples has its own advantages and disadvantages but the most exploited one is the 
sample of businessmen. The less used one is the sample of households and finally the sample 
of civil servants shows very little usage. In addition to surveys, perception of corruption could 
be expressed by the experts and that perception automatically assumes the competence of the 
indicator. However, he points out that this method is also accessible to criticism.  
Besides the above-mentioned categorization of indicators, the theory uses an additional 
one, the categorization of indicators in terms of original and composite. Knack
24
 explains that 
original indicators are based on individual research regardless of its method, survey or expert’s 
evaluation. Table 1.1 shows the individual indicators developed by international institutions. 
For example, the World Bank Investment Climate Assessment indicator is based on business 
people surveys while the Global Corruption Barometer, developed by Transparency 
International, uses surveys of households as a source for the index. 
 
Table 1.1: List of individual indicators of corruption 
Indicator Source Number of states included 
World Bank Investment Climate 
Assessment 
Business people 
Survey 
79 world countries 
World Economic Forum 
-  Competitiveness Report 
Business people 
Survey 
80 world countries 
IMD (Institute for Management 
Development)  
Business people 
Survey 
49 world countries 
EBRD and World Bank BEEPS Business people 
survey 
24 transitional countries 
Gallup International in the name of 
Transparency international 
Business people 
survey 
21 transitional countries 
PricewaterhouseCooper  
Opacity Index 
Business people 
survey and experts  
34 world countries 
International Crime Victim 
Survey 
Households survey  
World Values Surveys Household Survey  
Global Corruption Barometer 
(Transparency International) 
Household Survey 62 world countries 
Economist Intelligence Unit 
(EIU) 
Experts opinion 115 world countries 
Freedom House 
Nations in Transit 
Experts opinion 27 transitional countries 
International Country Risk Guide 
(ICRG) 
Experts opinion 140 world countries 
World Market Research Centre 
(WMRC) 
Experts opinion 122 world countries 
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World Bank Country Performance and 
Institutional Assessment (CPIA) 
Experts opinion 83 countries members of IDA 
Columbia University State Capacity Survey Experts opinion 121 world countries 
Source: Begović, “Ekonomska analiza korupcije” (Economic Analysis of corruption), pp. 277 
 
 On the other hand, composite indicators are usually created by a combination of 
different individual and Knack points out three motives for this combination. The first one is 
that the individual indicators could be defined for certain purposes and is therefore too narrow. 
The second motive lies in the attempt to reduce measurement errors. Finally, the third motive is 
the desire to cover a larger number of countries. The two most famous composite indicators are 
the Transparency International Corruption Perception Index (TICPI), originated by 
Lambsdorff
25
, and the Control of Corruption Index (CCI)
26
 developed by the World Bank 
Institute, more precisely by Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi
27
. The detailed remarks regarding 
the calculations of these indicators are provided by Knack
28
 and for TICPI particularly by 
Galtung
29
. It is important to stress here that the Transparency International Corruption 
Perception Index (TICPI) is mainly used in this research due to its widespread application in 
numerous empirical research trajectories. On the basis of the perception of business people and 
experts who live in the examined country, it ranks countries on the scale from 0 (highly 
corrupt) to 10 (very clean) and includes 177 countries.
30
 According to Lambsdorff
31
, the goal 
of CPI is to provide data on perceptions of corruption because there is no polling method which 
combines “perfect sampling frame, a satisfactory country coverage, and a fully convincing 
methodology to produce comparative assessment”. The actual levels of corruption cannot be 
determined directly and therefore the perception is the only option left but it is not without its 
shortcomings. It might be biased due to various reasons such as cultural background of 
respondents.  In addition to TICPI, the Global Corruption Barometer is used for the issues 
related to civil service. This indicator is developed by Transparency International, and as said 
earlier, it measures perception of households of corruption in public administration.  
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As previously mentioned, the variety of corrupt acts makes construction of one 
indicator, which will capture the multidimensional character of corruptions, very difficult and 
therefore all existing indicators are biased towards a specific type of corruption. For instance, 
CCI measures corruption in the public and private sector while TICPI includes only the former. 
Although not perfect, these indicators could be very useful as the starting point of the 
corruption analysis in a particular country or countries. They, to a certain extent, reflect upon 
the real field situation and should be taken as important signals for stakeholders engaged in 
combating corruption.  
 
1.2.2. Anti-corruption framework 
 
1.2.2.1. Theoretical debate  
 
Corruption is mainly described negatively in the literature although some authors share 
the opinion that it might create positive effects.
32
 Leaving these discussions aside, this section 
provides insights into the prevailing opinion in the literature that corruption is harmful to 
society. The negative effects of corruption are shown in numerous studies and analyses. 
Discussing causes of corruption Tanzi
33
lists the ones which are considered the most dominant 
such as: regulations, taxation, provision of goods and services below market price, quality of 
bureaucracy, public sector wages, penalty systems and transparency. Rose-Ackerman
34
 
classifies them into the three categories: those who equate supply and demand, incentive 
payments for bureaucracies, and finally, cost reducing bribes.  However, Lamsdorff
35
 points to 
the difficulty of distinguishing between causes and consequences of corruption because the 
causal arrow very often goes both ways. On the other hand, Abed and Gupta
36
 connect 
corruption with economic growth, poverty, public finances/expenditures, provision of social 
services, income inequality, (foreign) investments, and anti-corruption strategies.
37
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Describing corruption, Tanzi
38
 explains that “…corruption reduces public revenue and 
increases public spending… contributes to larger fiscal deficits, making it more difficult for the 
government to run a sound fiscal policy…. increase income inequality because it allows well-
positioned individuals to take advantage of government activities at the cost of the rest of the 
population…” He further claims that corruption distorts markets and the allocation of resources 
which reduce economic efficiency and growth. There are a couple of reasons for this outcome: 
1) with corruption the ability of the government to impose the necessary regulatory controls 
and inspections for correcting market failures is reduced; 2) the incentives are distorted; 3) 
corruption is in essence arbitrary tax with high welfare costs; 4) the fundamental role of 
government in the areas of contract enforcement and protection of property rights is distorted 
by corruption; 5) finally, because it reduces the earning potential of the poor, corruption is 
likely to increase poverty. Cooter and Schaefer
39
 describe corruption as termites in a house that 
undermines the foundation of economic growth, which further results in low expenditure to 
combat corruption and together with poverty this forms a vicious circle.  
Numerous authors
40
 have shown the statistically significant correlation between 
corruption and economic growth. However, the direction of this correlation remains an open 
question. More precisely, it is not clear if the low level of corruption induces growth or is it the 
other way around.  Although considered very important the discussions in this area in which 
economic growth is seen as the main cure are criticized by some authors. Rose-Ackerman
41
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says that they simplify the phenomenon of corruption which is a “symptom that state/society 
relations operate in ways that undermines the fairness and legitimacy of the state”. Measures of 
economic growth are insufficient when it comes to the effectiveness of the public sector and 
the quality of state/society relationships. Therefore, Rose-Ackerman
42
 stresses, that only by 
looking at the “…fine structure of the political and economic system…” one can understand 
the way corruption operates and attack it where it has the worst effects. Although corruption 
might be caused by culture and history it is above all an economic and political problem, which 
produces inefficiency and unfairness in the public benefits and costs distribution. It signals that 
the structure of the state does not channel private interests effectively and shows no concern for 
public interest. Tanzi
43
 and Lamsdroff
44
 share this view by saying that corruption could be 
reduced only if the way of government operation is changed and for meaningful corruption 
assessment institutional preconditions, which facilitate corrupt transactions, should be taken 
into account. However, the total elimination of corruption from society is, according to Tanzi
45
, 
unrealistic because even if it would be achievable it would be too costly. He explains that an 
optimal level of fighting corruption would be reached when the marginal social costs of the 
fight would be equal to its marginal benefits and therefore the level of corruption will remain 
above zero in all countries. 
Therefore, the question of how to fight corruption arises. Rose-Ackerman
46
 claims that 
“corruption is an archetypal topic for students of Public choice theory”. This theory, developed 
by economists, aims to apply economic discipline not only to the market issues but to the other 
disciplines which deal with various aspects of human behaviour.
47
 Therefore Public choice 
theory sees politicians and bureaucrats as rational self-maximisers. Under the veil of this theory 
corruption is studded as an agency or principal model. Its first application goes back to Rose-
Ackerman
48
, who states that corruption, although a legal category, has consequences for the 
economic analysis of the agent’s behaviour. After this application the principal-agent model 
became the standard of analysis to many economists, such as Jain
49
, Klitgaard
50
, etc. An 
agency relationship arises when two individuals enter a relationship in which one individual 
relies on another to carry out certain actions on his behalf. The actions of the agent affect the 
principal’s payoff particularly in the case of conflict of interest or in situations not regulated by 
the contract. Regarding this relationship, the agent is usually better informed than the principal. 
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Bearing in mind the asymmetry of information problem, the principal tries to put an incentive 
scheme in place to induce optimal action by the agent. Tirole
51
 expanded this model to include 
another agent-supervisor in his early work on collusion in organizations including that within 
issues on corruption.   
The agency structure is equally used for the analysis of political as well as 
administrative corruption. However, keeping in mind that this research focuses on 
administrative corruption, some crucial points are presented here. Rose-Ackerman
52
  claims 
that keeping in mind specific characteristics of bureaucracy, e.g. secure jobs and low ability to 
suppress investigations, it should be easier to change its structure. However, the change is not 
omnipotent and in some cases cannot replace necessary morality and integrity. Regarding legal 
regulations and penalties, she claims that the setting of maximum fines and jail terms may deter 
only petty corruption. If the legal system aims to play an effective role, it should be designed in 
a way that expected penalties depend upon the gains of corrupt transactions of both parties and 
marginal expected penalties must exceed marginal expected benefits. On the other hand, 
expected penalties depend on the probability of detection and conviction which could be 
improved by a financial incentive system for reporting an act, such as a bounty scheme. 
However, Rose-Ackerman stresses that this approach is not without difficulties. People who 
might want to report corrupt deals are usually involved themselves, proving the wrongdoer’s 
guilt also imposes additional obstacles and finally, police and prosecution might express a low 
level of engagement in combating corruption. Given all these situations, even a sophisticated 
sanctioning strategy will have a modest deterrent effect. Keeping in mind that the legal system 
might experience limitations, she points out that structural reforms of the system must play a 
central role. Since legalized bribery is not an option for various reasons, the variety of less 
drastic structural remedies should be considered, such as: reduction of discretional powers by 
the simple rules, an increased number of thorough inspections and audits, the introduction of a 
competitive relationship between bureaucrats, and finally, the implementation of personal 
policies for changing official behaviour. Mishra
53
 employs this framework in analysing the 
phenomenon of corruption in hierarchical bureaucratic structures. He claims that corruption 
within the organization affects its performance and distorts the incentive scheme in place. 
Therefore the optimal incentive scheme and the organizational structure of bureaucracies are 
closely related. If corruption lies inside hierarchies the only adequate check would be by an 
external agency whose honesty has to be impeccable otherwise it could only lead to additional 
corrupt organizations. This could be achieved by various means such as: income disclosure 
norms for public agents, clear guidelines for decision making, reduction of disclosure powers, 
effective engagement of honest individuals employed in the organization by preventing them 
from being passive or becoming corrupt, and careful design of recruitment polices and a 
promotion scheme.  
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The voluminous research on corruption made corruption visible and recognizable 
globally as an important issue which demands special attention and treatment. This move 
influenced some international and nongovernmental institutions to actively engage in 
supporting countries in combating corruption. The next section presents the main international 
actors together with their activities in this field.  
 
1.2.2.2. International Actor’s engagement 
 
The recognition of corruption as one of the problems with major consequences 
convinced the international community to take the necessary steps to ensure the improvement 
of its. Rose-Ackerman and Carrington
54
 explain that a wide range of international institutions, 
such as international financial institutions, civil society groups, treaties, etc., are engaged in 
controlling corruption either as a main goal or as a complement to the primary activity. The 
range of activity of these institutions goes from carrying out concrete reform programs for 
strengthening government capacity, through training of domestic officials, journalists and civil 
society to identify and publicize corruption, and finally, to monitoring of financial flows and 
business deals. They categorize the institutions, which play an important role in fighting 
corruption, into four types. The first type includes the aid and lending organizations, more 
precisely International Financial Institutions (IFIs) such as the World Bank and bilateral 
donors. They act in accordance with two goals: economic growth and poverty alleviation and 
maintenance of integrity and legitimacy of their government structure. These organizations, 
besides sponsoring governance and anti-corruption projects in member states, try to avoid 
corruption in their own programs. The second type of organization is mainly interested in civil 
and criminal law enforcement by catching and punishing offenders and resolving commercial 
disputes. They do not, in general, have specific development or poverty alleviation agenda. The 
OECD’s engagement belongs to this group. The third type is composed of diverse types of 
international non-profit institutions who have anti-corruption and good government agenda. 
Although without an official role within states or internationally, their legitimacy is drawn 
from their integrity and convincing arguments. Their way of operating is varied. Some work 
through franchises in the form of local chapters (Transparency International), some cooperate 
through standard-setting and monitoring process (Extractive Industries Transparency 
Initiative), some gather and organize country level data (Global Integrity), while others expose 
corruption and other wrongdoing (Global Witness). Civil society groups in this case operate as 
pressure groups which aim to introduce corruption to their reform agenda but also to place 
domestic reform efforts into an international context by publicizing their positive and negative 
results. Finally, the fourth type includes international business firms which ally with some of 
the non-profit groups in order to control corruption in the business world.  
Rose-Ackerman
55
 makes another classification of the international organizations 
according to the chosen strategies for combating corruption. The international actors fall into 
three broad categories: information provision, international frameworks and domestic reform 
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projects. The range of their engagement goes from those who receive some support from 
domestic actors, those who depend on the voluntary participation of the states and, finally those 
who put efforts into reforming a state’s internal methods of operation. Table 1.2 combines 
these strategies together with the goals set. 
 
Table 1.2: International Initiatives to Combat Corruption 
                       Goals   
Strategies     
Growth & Poverty 
Alleviation 
Government 
Legitimacy 
Efficient 
International 
Markets 
Information Provision A B  
International Institutions  C D 
Anti-Corruption programs E F  
Source: Rose-Ackerman and Carrington, “Anti-Corruption Policy: Can International Actors Play a Constructive Role?”, p. 15 
 
Describing this classification further she says that information provision strategy aims 
simply to aid domestic policy makers by providing information regarding corruption and leaves 
the final decision regarding its usage to them. This category covers cases A and B in the table. 
In actions to control corruption, international institutions can supplement domestic anti-
corruption efforts but with no intervention in domestic practices. This, in a way, is achieved 
when countries ratify a treaty or join some cooperative effort by which they commit to 
pursuing anti-corruption policies. However, countries do this on a voluntary basis as part of 
their international responsibilities. There are two types of international bodies who are 
involved in this action: one that coordinates and supplements local anti-corruption efforts and 
others who resolve cross-border commercial disputes with corruption allegations. In general, 
this type includes cases C and D in the above table. Here it is necessary to point out that the 
research interest of this thesis is the law making of the former type of organization and its 
impact on the fight against corruption in countries in transition. The international laws within 
the scope are elaborated on later in this section. Finally, the third category includes the most 
intrusive forms of international intervention, such as aid and lending programs which explicitly 
ask for corruption to be limited. Funders in these cases intervene to support government 
reforms by two means: directly, by supporting specific programs or indirectly, through policy-
based landing. Designing and monitoring of programs are supported by non-profit 
organizations and media which keeps anti-corruption issues on the IFIs agenda. However, 
international actors cannot force the governments to be honest and free of corruption. In the 
table, these cases are presented by letters E and F.  
As mentioned earlier the subject of this research is the effect of the regulations adopted 
by international institutions in order to facilitate member countries in fighting against 
corruption. The description of the most influential ones is further provided. In the process of 
transformation from a socialist to a capitalist society, transitional countries had to adapt their 
legal systems to new circumstances and they achieved that by transplanting various laws and 
regulations into the domestic system. They also ratified anti-corruption conventions which are 
presented here. However, ratification does not necessarily mean the full implementation and 
the effects of adopted conventions are discussed in the next section.   
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One of the most globally influential conventions is The United Nation Convention against 
Corruption (UNCC)
56
, which came into force on December 14, 2005. It represents a 
comprehensive and multidisciplinary approach which aims to prevent and eradicate corruption. 
The United Nations recognized that corruption poses serious problems and threats to the 
stability and security of societies, it undermines the institutions and values of democracy, 
ethical values and justice and jeopardizes sustainable development and the rule of law. 
Therefore it cannot be treated as a local matter but a transnational phenomenon that affects all 
societies and economies. The Convention focuses on measures that should be applied in the 
public and private sector for fighting corruption, making suggestions to member states on 
implementing effective, coordinated and anti-corruption policies. Chapter II of the convention 
covers preventive measures which countries have to fulfil according to their international 
obligations. Articles 5 to 14 regulate among other aspects the establishment of a preventive 
anti-corruption body or bodies, improvement of the rules of operations of public sector which 
promote efficiency, transparency and objective merit criteria, adoption of codes of conduct for 
public officials, appropriate systems of procurement, public reporting, and measures relating to 
the judiciary and prosecution services. It also includes suggestions on private sector corruption 
as well as the manner of inclusion of these within society in the prevention of it. The main 
body of the Convention, more precisely Chapter III, is dedicated to criminalization and law 
enforcement in terms of corruption. Table 1.3 shows the list of mandatory and non-mandatory 
offences that should be criminalised. In the area of criminalization it classifies the acts of 
corruption such as bribery, embezzlement, trading in influence, abuse of positions, bribery in 
the private sector and a few others. In terms of law enforcement it tackles, among others, 
immunity and jurisdictional privileges, discretional legal powers, procedures for removing, 
suspending or resigning of accused public official, the protection of witnesses, experts and 
victims and special authorities. 
 
Table 1.3: List of acts in which criminalisation is required by the conventions 
Convention Mandatory offences for 
criminalization 
Non mandatory offences 
UNCC Bribery of national public officials Bribery of foreign public officials and officials 
of public international organizations  
(bribing by) 
Bribery of foreign public officials and 
officials of public international organizations 
(bribing to) 
Trading in influences 
Abuse of function 
Embezzlement, misappropriation or other 
diversion of property by a public official 
Illicit enrichment 
Bribery in the private sector 
Laundering of proceeds of crime Embezzlement of property in the private sector 
Obstruction of Justice Concealment 
Source: UN convention against corruption 
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In order to promote, in an effective manner, the rapid entry into force of the Convention, 
the UN General Assembly requested the Secretary-General to designate the United Nations 
Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC). It should serve as the secretariat for and under the 
direction of the Conference of the States Parties of the Convention, which is by the Convention 
defined as the main mechanism for implementation of the Convention (Article 63). UNODC 
created two documents important for the implementation of the Convention: the Technical 
Guide to the United Nations Convention against Corruption
57
and UN Guide on Anti -
Corruption Policies
58
. Due to its comprehensiveness the Convention serves as an umbrella for 
all other international legal documents that address different issues and aspects of corruption.  
 Another influential international convention targets the area of bribing in international 
business transactions, including trade and investment. The Organization for Economic Co-
Operation and Development (OECD)
59
 recognized the seriousness of this problem since the 
bribery appeared as a widespread phenomenon in this area which raises serious moral and 
political concerns undermining good governance and economic development and distorts 
international competitive conditions. The result of this awareness was the Convention on 
Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions which 
was adopted in 1997. The convention regulates only the “active bribery”, meaning the offence 
committed by the person who promises or offers the bribe, as opposed to “passive bribery”, 
and the offence committed by the official who receives the bribe. The monitoring of the 
implementation of the Convention is delegated to the OECD Working Group on Bribery in 
International Business Transactions, whose main tasks are the receipt of notifications and other 
information submitted by the Parties and regular reviews of steps taken by the countries in the 
process of implementation. The OECD has developed guidelines and recommendations in 
order to assist the parties of the Convention in the full implementation of it. One of these 
documents is Good practice guidance on implementing specific articles of the Convention on 
combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions as well as 
Good practice guidance on internal control, ethics, and compliance.  
An important set of conventions against corruption is adopted under the auspices of the 
Council of Europe. In 1999 the Council established The Group of States against Corruption 
(GRECO)
60
  in order to monitor member states’ compliance with the organizations’ anti-
corruption standards. GRECO’s objective is to improve the capacity of its members in fighting 
against corruption by monitoring their compliance with the Council’s anti-corruption standards 
through a dynamic process of mutual evaluation and peer pressure. It helps to identify 
deficiencies in national anti-corruption policies, prompting the necessary legislative, 
institutional and practical reforms. GRECO also provides a platform for the sharing of best 
practices in the prevention and detection of corruption. The Council of Europe monitors the 
implementation of two conventions on corruption, the Criminal Law Convention on Corruption 
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and its Additional Protocol and the Civil Law Convention on Corruption, two 
recommendations
61
 and one resolution
62
. GRECO evaluation procedures involve the collection 
of information through questionnaire(s), on-site country visits which enable evaluation teams 
to solicit further information during high-level discussions with domestic key players, and 
drafting of evaluation reports. Table 1.4 provides a list of acts which should be criminalised by 
the convention in the domestic system of the member countries.  
 
Table 1.4: List of acts in which criminalisation is required by the conventions 
Convention Mandatory offences for criminalization 
GRECO  Active bribery of domestic public officials 
Passive bribery of domestic public officials 
Bribery of members of domestic public assemblies 
Bribery of foreign public officials 
Bribery of members of foreign public assemblies 
Active bribery in the private sector 
Passive bribery in the private sector 
Bribery of officials of international organisations 
Bribery of members of international parliamentary assemblies 
Bribery of judges and officials of international courts 
Trading in influence 
Money laundering of proceeds from corruption offences 
Account offences 
Participatory acts 
Source: Criminal Law Convention on Corruption 
 
Last but not the least, the most important set of rules for transitional countries lies 
within the framework of the European Union (EU) since the majority of them at the beginning 
of the reform process set joining it as the main goal. In an attempt to reduce all forms of 
corruption, the European Union (EU) issued the Communication from the Commission to the 
Council, the European Parliament and the European Economic and Social Committee on a 
comprehensive EU policy against corruption
63
. The document reviews EU progress in 
combating corruption and defines areas in which further steps should be taken. This document 
summarizes the legal documents on fighting corruption that the EU has produced so far and the 
instruments for tackling it. The Communication adopts the definition of corruption used by the 
United Nations' Global Programme against Corruption and in conclusion it sets out the 
principle elements of a future EU anti-corruption policy. It also explains the need to agree on 
common definitions of offences and common penalties and to elaborate on a multidisciplinary 
EU policy. Key elements here are the ratification of European and international anti-corruption 
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instruments, the monitoring of their implementation and the fight against corruption in the 
private sector. In the area of cooperation agreements and external aid programmes, the 
Commission is currently reviewing its framework agreement, its specific financing agreements 
and tender documents in order to insert anti-corruption clauses. The Communication also 
explains the view of the European Commission which is in favour of accession to a number of 
instruments originating from other international bodies. The aim is to take account of the 
activities that already exist, in order to avoid duplication, and to ensure that measures already 
existing in the EU have the same mandatory character in other international organizations since 
the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), the Council of Europe 
and the United Nations have already produced their own conventions on corruption.  
The description of the anti-corruption international acts aimed at providing the legal 
framework in which countries, signatories of the conventions, operate in combating corruption. 
Their success in implementing conventions and law enforcement are still the subject of various 
debates. This research, however, focuses on transitional countries and their idiosyncrasies 
which affect enforcement of the anti-corruption laws based on these conventions. Before this 
analysis, the next section provides the debate in general on anti-corruption strategies adopted 
around the world under the influence of the international community and its act.     
 
1.2.2.3. Anti-corruption strategies 
 
Theoretical discussions on corruption and activities of international actors have a 
significant impact on the creation of anti-corruption strategies which set the system of 
incentives necessary to encourage rule abiding and discourage self-interested agents and their 
opportunistic behaviour. McCusker
64
 claims that these strategies mainly include reduction of 
the scope of corruption through policy change, increasing the costs of corruption via external 
monitoring and sanctioning, creating a system which induces self-restraint including rewards 
for non-corrupt behaviour or for its reporting. The general claim is that prevention should be at 
the forefront of anti-corruption reforms, with the stress on long term interventions in order to 
strengthen the systems and controls, together with the promotion of transparency, 
accountability and informed citizenship
65
. Further deterrence, through effective law 
enforcement, has the essential role of breaking cycles of impunity and, therefore, many 
countries enforced anticorruption laws as a first and necessary step in combating corruption. 
Punishing corrupt individuals in addition has a preventive role because it discourages potential 
offenders from engaging in corrupt activities. Within this structure the majority of countries 
adopted laws (civil, criminal, specific anti-corruption), implemented comprehensive legal 
reforms as well as international instruments recommended by various institutions, such as the 
World Bank and Transparency International.  
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Messick and Kleinfeld
66
, discuss the structure of the anti-corruption laws which should 
be tailored according to the enforcement capacity of a particular country supported by other 
legal reforms. The main issues in this process, according to them, relate to the judicial system 
and its capacity, competences and accountability and the characters of law enforced by the 
agencies, more precisely their clarity, precision and simple application. Transparency 
International (TI) in Sourcebook
67
 suggests also some guiding principles for the design of anti-
corruption policies. These principles include: punishment of both active and passive bribes, 
respect for human rights during the prosecution of corruption cases, protection of whistle-
blowers, application of the reverse burden of proof principle in trial cases of corruption, 
strengthening the bilateral and multilateral relations of countries in terms of legal assistance in 
dealing with corruption, monitoring of the implementation of anti-corruption laws should be 
carried out by civil society, and, finally, regular revision of the anti-corruption laws with the 
main goal of removing loopholes and unanticipated problems. Summarizing the common 
elements of anti-corruption programs and strategies around the world, McCusker 
68
 concludes 
that best practice shows that strategy should be holistic but focused. It should also construct a 
set of incentives to encourage rule-abiding behaviour and an independent anti-corruption body 
in charge of its implementation which is the crucial key to ultimate success. Finally, anti-
corruption strategies cannot operate successfully within a vacuum but should rely upon the 
engagement of a wide range of participants.  
However, the dominant approach in anti-corruption policies design described above 
came under the criticism of the New Institutional Economics. Lambsdorff and Nell
69
 claim that 
societies are continuously engaged in the discipline of corruption of its civil servants and 
politicians and in combating this they use three approaches: repression, prevention and 
transparency. The first approach, repression includes draconic penalties and attempts to 
achieve higher probabilities of detecting corrupt acts. Although this approach has its merits 
they question its leading position in the future because “of a very likely event of decreasing 
marginal gains and increasing marginal costs”. This will further produce an outcome in which 
criminals are less deterred by higher penalties and absolute integrity becomes more expensive. 
The second approach focuses on prevention which, according to Lambsdorff and Nell relates to 
incentives and ethical training. Ethical training has some good aspects, such as better 
communication of conflicts of interest and developing of a transparent atmosphere and it will 
be an important issue in coming years. However, it is also costly and time consuming and it 
may serve to camouflage the true intent and interests of bureaucracy. Finally, the third 
approach is transparency, which they describe as an “overarching principle with latent 
benefits”. Transparency represents an immense potential for corruption reduction, although the 
                                                          
66
Messick, R. E. and Kleinfeld, R. (2001): “Writing an Effective Anticorruption Law”, World Bank, Washington, 
DC. Available at: https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/11362 
67
Transparency International Source Book 2000: Confronting Corruption: The Elements of National Integrity 
System, Available at: http://archive.transparency.org/publications/sourcebook 
68McCusker, R. (2006): “Review of anti-corruption strategies”, Australian Institute of Criminology, April 2006, 
available at: http://www.aic.gov.au/publications/current%20series/tbp/21-40/tbp023.aspx 
69
Lambsdorff, J. G. and Nell, M. (2006): “Corruption: Where We Stand and Where To Go,” in Kreutner, M. (ed.): 
The Corruption Monster: Ethik, Politik und Korruption, Vienna, 2006. Available at: 
http://www.icgg.org/downloads/Corruption%20-20Where%20we%20stand%20and%20where%20to%20go.pdf 
Ana Jakovljević, LL.M 
35 
 
administrative costs of increasing it are limited. However, this principle might be “fine-tuned 
in the future”. Concluding the critics of dominant anti-corruption approach, repression-
prevention-transparency, Lambsdorff and Nell suggest that other approaches should be 
explored. They should implement the measures which will promote betrayal among corrupt 
parties, destabilize corrupt arrangements, disallow contracts to be legally enforced, and impair 
the operation of corrupt intermediaries. Although traditional approaches to anti-corruption 
certainly have their merits it is questionable “whether they should be the guiding principles for 
future reform measures”. In this context, an asymmetric design of sanctions, coupled with 
exemption from punishment, appears to be a promising avenue for future (legal) reform.  
Discussing the set of conventional strategies for fighting corruption: increasing 
penalties and level of monitoring, increasing transparency and accountability in the decision-
making process, Ogus
70
 claims that they might not be sufficiently effective in the countries 
where judicial and law enforcement systems are themselves affected by it. Usually, these 
countries do not have enough resources available for monitoring the officials or “macro” 
approach to corruption combat is lacking. He claims that “classic approaches to constraining 
corruption usually advocated in Western industrialized societies often prove to be futile”. 
Therefore, it is necessary to provide an adequate institutional design, which should limit the 
opportunities for corruption or make them less profitable. Ogus
71
 suggests that for designing 
the best regulatory regime for these countries, it should be checked whether they could be 
implemented regarding traditional, customary law and the institutional setting in a particular 
country. He explains that regulatory goals and principles should be more effective if 
internalized as social norms because community disapproval is usually more effective than 
conventional penal or administrative sanctions in inducing compliance. To some extent similar 
arguments were raised by McCusker 
72
 who points out that “one-size fits all” approach to anti-
corruption strategies is no longer acceptable or practicable, because anti-corruption reform 
should be unique to every country. The existing strategies usually have numerous intrinsic 
weaknesses. One of them is over-reliance on the judiciary, police and financial sector without 
taking into account that in many countries such institutions are weak and corrupt themselves. 
Furthermore, political will is recognised as a key driver necessary for systematic change in any 
given country and therefore anti-corruption efforts need to be recognised by governments as 
priorities. These governments should receive assistance in the developing of appropriate policy 
recommendations as well as its implementation. 
This section provided reader with general information on the corruption, the first 
important aspect of this research. It described its definition(s), calcifications, and measurement. 
It also stressed the importance of corruption in the present times, its consequences and 
reactions induced around the world to enable combat against it. The next section of this chapter 
introduces another key aspect of the research which is related to transitional, post-socialist 
countries. It includes its description, problems regarding corruption, unique challenges that 
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these countries meet and finally, for a better illustration of the topic, presentation of the 
situation regarding corruption in some of them. 
 
1.3. Transitional countries and corruption 
 
1.3.1. Transition and its characteristics  
 
Transitional countries are the post-socialist countries which are in the process of 
transformation, from a centrally planned economy, based on the dominance of state property 
and bureaucratic control, to an open, free-market one, based on the market deregulation and the 
dominance of private property.
73
 In these countries - which include the former republics of the 
Soviet Union, and the countries of the Central, Eastern and South-Eastern Europe China, 
Mongolia, Vietnam,
74
 - the lives of around 1.65 billion people are affected by the process
75
. 
Transitional countries are distinguished from developing countries by a couple of aspects. 
Roland
76
 claims that they have generalized state ownership, strong state power, 
“overindustrialization”, a relatively high level of human capital and economic development and 
a low initial income inequality. The problem of institutions’ functioning is the main inquiry in 
transitional economies. Society distorted by the collapse of the old regime attempts to find the 
solution for the problem by looking into other countries and modelling social institutions 
accordingly. In the later stages of socialism the general opinion was that old system should be 
replaced with a different regime, whose institutions would promote on the one hand prosperity 
and increased wealth for the citizens and on the other supress the rent-seeking activities. 
However, what kind of institutions can achieve this goal is the main question. A great deal of 
theoretical and empirical work witnesses the efforts of scientists, researchers and politicians in 
answering these questions.  
Roland
77
 explains that at the beginning of transition, policy advice was derived from the 
Washington consensus
78
 which advocates price liberalization, tight monetary policy and 
balanced budgets for stabilizing macroeconomy and, finally, privatizing state-owned 
companies for inducing profit-maximizing behaviour. This approach to the economic reform, 
called “Big Bang” or “Shock therapy”, inspired by the neoclassical theory, was widely 
supported by the international financial organizations and famous economists. It influenced 
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substantially the economic policies of the majority of transitional countries. Apart from China, 
Hungary and Slovenia, almost all other transitional countries applied the “Big Bang” strategy.  
However, Roland
79
 explains that this approach implemented in the case of transitional 
countries revealed important shortcomings: 1) the results of liberalization did not yield a 
positive supply; 2) a major unpredictable fall in output took place; 3) organized crime 
developed faster than markets in some countries; 4) stabilization attempts and soft budget 
constraints of enterprises proved unsuccessful in various countries and finally, 5) mass 
privatization mainly led to massive asset stripping and plundering by insider managers. These 
experiences, on the other hand, contributed to the reinforcement of the institutional perspective, 
also known as the “Gradualist approach”, which emphasizes the importance of institutions in 
developing successful capitalist economy. Roland explains that this approach had more support 
in academic but not in the international policy circles at the beginning of transition but over 
time it dominated the scene. The most prominent example of this approach is the case of China 
which never followed the recommendations of the Washington consensus
80
. In the process of 
transformation from socialism to capitalism it is necessary to take into account the existing 
starting point because defining only the end objectives might lead to unexpected outcomes. 
Roland claims that simple coping and imitation of the institutions of the other countries, 
without taking into consideration the situation in the field, provides no guarantee that positive 
ends would be reached. Therefore besides economic factors some other factors such as, 
geographical, historical or particular institutional context usually play an important role. 
Norgaard
81
 explains that specificities of transitional countries, such as strong bureaucracy 
systems, stronger social response to social inequalities produced by social and ideological 
legacies of the socialist era as well as the weakly developed civil society, might have an impact 
on the reform course. In addition, “the vastly overgrown and outdated industrial sector, 
complete absence of a private sector and associated social groups and entrepreneurial 
mentalities” should also be considered important for this performance.  
This became clear in the later stages of transition because the theoretical knowledge in 
achieving the listed changes in transitional countries was missing and, therefore, resulted in 
many surprises. Roland
82
 concludes that in the end this picture shows that economists were not 
well prepared to face the tasks imposed by transition. A large number of coordination problems 
among economic agents in this case was not taken into account which imposed the difficulties 
in predicting the selections as well as the reasoning of the decisions made regarding the 
multiplicity of implied equilibria. In order to keep social cohesion and still implement the 
reforms, the broader support for reforms among the population is necessary. This further means 
that besides the adoption of adequate laws for protection of private property, fighting 
corruption and similar activities, “the condition of law enforcement, reform of the organization 
of government, and the development of self-enforcing social norms that foster 
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entrepreneurship, trust, and respect for legality and commitment…“83 should be taken into 
account. Instead of using the revolutionary metaphors and tabula rasa view, concepts spread 
among the shock therapy proponents which did not produce the expected results, the existing 
institutions should be used to prevent distortions in society while developing the new ones.  
Pejovich
84
 defines institutions as “legal, administrative and customary arrangements for 
repeated human interaction” with the major function of enhancing the predictability of human 
behaviour. The prevailing institutional framework in a society consists of both formal and 
informal rules. Formal rules are constitutions, statutes, common laws and other governmental 
regulations which are externally enforced and define the political, economic and protection 
system. Informal rules have their origins in the experiences, traditional values, ethos, religious 
beliefs, ethnicity and other factors that influence the subjective perceptions individuals form to 
interpret reality. Norgaard
85
 claims that evolutionary economics focuses on the ability of agents 
in adapting to institutional settings change and does not accept the assumption of the economic 
actor as fully rational and fully informed. In neo-institutional theory, North and Thomas
86
 
focus on formal and informal institutional barriers to change claiming that effectiveness of any 
radical scheme, because any change of formal institutions and rules will inevitably clash with 
the informal aspects of institutions. The importance of the institutions is perhaps best explained 
by Coase
87
 who stated that when it is costly to transact, institutions matter. In post-socialist 
regimes, rules that govern the creation of an open market should be established. Therefore, 
those institutions and the organisational structure which arose and evolved to minimise the 
transaction costs associated with the running of political and economic systems are the ones 
which should be identified and implemented
88
.The replacement of the institutions in 
transitional countries was mainly done by legal transplanting of the rules proven to be effective 
in the capitalist states, especially the EU rules and regulations. Regarding legal transplants 
Watson
89
 explains that whenever society faces the need for change and progress, it reaches for 
more successful law structures from another country and implements them into its own legal 
system as a “legal transplant”. In the coming sections legal transplants in the domain of anti-
corruption law are analysed and discussed. 
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1.3.2. Transition and corruption 
 
1.3.2.1. Corruption in transitional countries  
 
Discussing corruption Abed and Gupta
90
 claim that the disintegration of the command 
structure in post-socialist regimes triggered some of the “…most chaotic economic, political 
and social changes in modern history…”. Lack of accountable governance systems and the rule 
of law in socialist countries resulted in rent seeking, corruption and thievery, partially visible 
after the collapse.  Roland
91
states that corruption is one of the three important issues raised in 
post-socialist countries, besides the unofficial economy and private contracting under the weak 
law enforcement. Nowak
92
provides two reasons for the centrality of corruption in transitional 
countries. One lies in the wide range of impacts which socialist governments left on legitimacy 
and credibility. This created a specific attitude, summarized in the expression “if you are not 
stealing from the state, you are stealing from your family”, which may still prevail. Another 
relates to the privatisation process by which state properties went to private hands. Socialist 
states entered the process of transformation with different legacies which should be taken into 
account when it comes to tackling corruption. Nowak explains that the extraordinary scale of 
corruption in transitional countries could be seen in two ways: optimistic and pessimistic. The 
optimistic view claims that visibility of corruption is a sign of progress because after the 
decades of living in the totalitarian system in which public interest was constantly misused for 
private, the citizens of post-socialist states can now distinguish more clearly between the two. 
The pessimistic view on the other hand, claims that fundamental changes in society just 
confirmed the worst fears associated with the change to the market based and democratic 
system. Olson
93
 stresses the specificities of socialist countries which contribute to the 
widespread corruption. In the market economy, based on private property and good 
institutions, actors are motivated due to selfish reasons to abide by the laws and discourage 
their violation. In contrast, in the “market contrary” economy, to which the socialist system 
belongs, the private property share was very small and resulted in the absence of a self-interest 
mechanism which should prevent theft of public goods and help the government in 
apprehending it.  
Faced with the problem described above, transitional countries, in many aspects of their 
reform, took necessary steps to change the state structure. As mentioned earlier, they replaced 
the old system with the new one by translating laws and regulations from the developed 
capitalist states. Table 1.5 shows the facts about the transitional countries regarding the EU 
status, since many of the countries pursued reforms under the umbrella of the EU regulations, 
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and dates of the ratifications of international anti-corruption instruments, by which countries 
bind themselves to adjust their anti-corruption legal frameworks according to the convention’s 
recommendations. The next section discusses the analysis of the literature on the results 
achieved regarding combating corruption. 
 
Table 1.5: Overall picture of international anti-corruption activities of transitional countries 
Country EU status UN 
convention 
OECD 
conv. 
GRECO 
Bulgaria Member (2007) 2006 1998 Criminal law (2001) 
Civil law (2000) 
Croatia Member (2013) 2005 - Criminal law (2000) 
Civil law (2003) 
Check Republic Member (2004) 2013 2000 Criminal law (2000) 
Civil law (2003) 
Estonia Member (2004) 2010 2004 Criminal law (2001) 
Civil law (2000) 
Hungary Member (2004) 2005 1998 Criminal law (2000) 
Civil law (2003) 
Latvia Member (2004) 2006 - Criminal law (2001) 
Civil law (2005) 
Lithuania Member (2004) 2006 - Criminal law (2002) 
Civil law (2003) 
Poland  Member (2004) 2006 2000 Criminal law (2002) 
Civil law (2002) 
Romania Member (2007) 2004 - Criminal law (2002) 
Civil law (2002) 
Slovakia Member (2004) 2006 1999 Criminal law (2000) 
Civil law (2003) 
Slovenia Member (2004) 2008 2001 Criminal law (2000) 
Civil law (2003) 
Montenegro Candidate 
(2010) 
2006 - Criminal law (2002) 
Civil law (2008) 
Serbia Candidate 
(2012) 
2005 - Criminal law (2002) 
Civil law (2008) 
FYROM Candidate 
(2005) 
2007 - Criminal law (1999) 
Civil law (2002) 
Albania Potential 
candidate (2004) 
2006 - Criminal law (2001) 
Civil law (2000) 
BiH Potential 
candidate (2000) 
2006 - Criminal law (2002) 
Civil law (2002) 
Belarus - 2005 - - 
Georgia - 2008 - Criminal law (2008) 
Civil law (2003) 
Moldova - 2007 - Criminal law (2004) 
Civil law (2004) 
Russia - 2006 2012 Criminal law (2006) 
Civil law (----) 
Ukraine  - 2003 - Criminal law (2009) 
Civil law (2005) 
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1.3.2.2. Hitherto results achieved in fighting corruption 
 
The majority of transitional countries found and still find EU membership to be a good 
opportunity, helpful in building institutions necessary for development. By joining the EU 
acceding countries hope to increase economic integration with Western Europe, to provide 
long term economic growth and to raise living standards closer to the EU average. This could 
be achieved through the opportunities which membership brings: accession to the single market 
which includes benefits arising from free trade within it, free movement of capital which 
creates opportunities from foreign direct investment, free movement of people which expands 
the labour market and competitive pressure. Furthermore, most accession countries stand to be 
net recipients of income from the EU programmes, such as common agricultural policy and 
social cohesion and regional funds. This also includes some potential macroeconomic 
advantages, one of which is monetary policy coordination with the European Central Bank
94
. 
In the accession process the institutional system has to be replaced by the new one. This further 
means that the requirements of the European Union should be implemented into the law of an 
acceding country.  However, this legal transplanting does not always stand for success. The 
literature on legal transplants shows that in order to be successful this transplanting should be 
pursued in a certain way. In the analysis of the effects of legal transplants Berkowitz et al.
95
 
show that if the borrowing of legal structures is not taking place from a country with a similar 
legal heritage, substantial investments should be made in terms of legal information and 
training prior to the adoption of a law. This is necessary for the domestic agents who can 
enhance their familiarity with the imported law and make an informed decision about how to 
adapt the law to local conditions. 
Regarding corruption, transitional countries followed the trend set by the international 
community and joined the rest of the world in ratifying important anti-corruption instruments 
in order to confront corruption, one of the important problems, which hampers the reform 
process. However, this approach is not without critiques. Lambsdorff 
96
 stresses that current 
anti-corruption activities are mainly based on some of the best practices implemented without 
knowing “to what extent such approaches can claim global validity”. He claims that anti-
corruption must go deeper in order to understand conflicts and the country’s system of norms. 
Graph 1.1 shows the Transparency International Corruption Perception Index for the EU 
member states for the year 2013. A closer look at the graph shows that even though the post 
socialist countries which are now part of the EU made substantial progress in the reform 
process, they still lag behind the western capitalist states regarding corruption. They are mainly 
located in the second part of the Graph.  
 
 
 
                                                          
94
For further information see the EU website: 
http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/enlargement/ongoing_enlargement/l14536_en.htm 
95
Berkowitz, D., Pistor, K. and Richard, J. F. (2003): "Economic development, legality, and the transplant effect," 
European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 47(1), pages 165-195 
96
Lambsdorff, J. G. (2007): The Institutional Economics of Corruption: Theory, Evidence and Policy, Cambridge 
University Press, p. 228 
Ana Jakovljević, LL.M 
42 
 
Graph 1.1: EU countries and TICPI for 2013 
 
Source: TI website 
 
On the other hand, the second Graph, Graph 1.2, shows, besides the EU member states, 
TICPI 2013 for other transitional countries, those on the way to EU membership but also those 
who do not have such goals on their political agendas. However, they all, generally, have the 
improvement of the fight against corruption as one of the priorities in the reform strategies. It is 
visible from the graph that regarding corruption the EU post-socialist member countries rank 
better compared to the others. However, the average score for all these countries is 46 on the 
scale of TICPI which goes from 0 to100. This implies that work should be done regarding 
combating corruption in the countries which are emerging from a socialist to a capitalist 
system. The following discussion aims to point out the shortcomings of the existing approach 
to fighting against corruption which will be used as the starting point for the analysis and 
suggestions on improving the fight against corruption combat in transitional countries.  
 
Graph 1.2: Transitional countries and TICPI 2013 
 
Source: TI website 
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Rousso and Steves
97
 claim that a comprehensive anti-corruption approach to combating 
corruption, adopted by transitional counters, has three aspects: one which includes the  
introduction of new or amended law in order to reduce rent seeking opportunities for public 
officials; another aspect includes cooperation with other governments in the fight against 
corruption. Finally, the third aspect refers to the implementation of a set of legal documents 
which create anti-corruption programs, such as: a concept document, anti-corruption law, anti-
corruption plan and monitoring mechanisms. The justification for the adoption of these 
programs is twofold: on one hand they aimed to develop an integrated framework for policy 
and institutional reforms, and on the other, key domestic and international stakeholders wished 
to launch a process which can build consensus on strategy for fighting corruption and hold 
government accountable for its implementation. However, they point out that despite the rapid 
growth of anti-corruption programs around the world, there is very little research on their 
effectiveness in reducing corruption and their impact on the government and its commitment to 
anti-corruption efforts. Russo and Steves observed 26 transitional countries for the 2002-
2005period in order to measure the intensity of anti-corruption activity and its short-time 
impact in reducing the levels of administrative corruption. Their study shows that integrated 
anti-corruption programs, legislative reforms introduced to reduce the scope of corruption and 
membership of anti-corruption conventions are not associated with the reduction of 
administrative corruption.  
Another analysis regarding the effects of the adoption of anti-corruption conventions in 
transitional countries was carried by Michael
98
. He questions the impact of this move in the 
countries of Central and Eastern Europe with the remark that instead of the commonly 
expressed approach “let’s regulate”, the cost benefits analysis should be used as a guide. He 
claims that both qualitative and empirical studies fail to find any significant correlation 
between the adopted anti-corruption legislation and more detections and prosecutions related to 
corruption. One of the questions that Michael analyses relates to the enactment of anti-
corruption legislation by the executive agencies of Central European and Former Soviet 
countries. He found that anti-corruption law shows under-effectiveness due to the lack of 
implementation by the agencies in charge. There are two explanations for this situation: first, 
development and application of legal principles of civil servants’ accountability in CEE 
countries remain less advanced, compared to developed OECD ones, due to difficult and costly 
access to the law; second, the design of provisions in the conventions rarely take into account 
political or economic costs induced by its implementation. It is, therefore, more important to 
regulate correctly than to under or over regulate and to create compatible incentives which 
would be followed by civil servants. The incentives structure should allocate liability to civil 
servants to reduce their engagement in corrupt situations and to motivate them to report 
corruption in the workplace.  
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Another aspect which Michael points out is that conventions impose increased 
criminalization as one of the important means in corruption combat, which comes from the 
common practice among developed OECD countries with effective judicial systems. On the 
contrary, for the countries with a weak judicial system, such as transitional ones, this 
criminalization creates serious problems for their successful prosecution. Criminal cases 
require extensive and expensive investigation by the police or prosecutor’s office and the only 
appropriate anti-corruption regulation should assign jurisdiction over corruption cases to “the 
least cost, highest-benefit jurisdiction”. To achieve this, administrative sanctions against 
corruption should be applied, based on the balance of probabilities standard for successful 
conviction. This approach can provide greater deterrence than a stronger criminal standard 
which requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt. In this context, criminal investigation and 
prosecutors should be part of corruption cases in CEE countries, only when “the benefits to 
society of treating the case as crime exceed the costs”.  Table 1.6 shows that each level of 
jurisdiction corresponds roughly with the harms accompanying each type of corruption –relate 
offence. 
 
Table 1.6: The harms and standard of evidence required for corruption remedies 
 Evidence 
requirement 
Types of remedies Advantages 
Managerial 
(defined in Agency’s law or 
Code) 
Suspicion of 
corruption 
Written warning, 
reassignment, pass to 
administrative or criminal levels 
Failure to prosecute 
opens to administrative and 
criminal liability 
Administrative 
(defined in Administrative 
Law) 
Balance of 
probabilities  
Warning, reassignment, 
fine, firing 
Failure to detect large 
number gives administrative 
court liability, contributory 
factors/accessory to a crime 
Civil 
(defined in Civil Code) 
Depends on 
legal tradition 
Payment of damages and 
compensation 
Address economic 
harms, provides for 
deterrence that jail time does 
not 
Criminal 
(defined in Criminal code) 
Beyond a 
reasonable doubt 
Fine, censure, prison If criminal prosecution 
does not succeed (because of 
corruption in judiciary), then 
rely on two other levels to 
obtain partial prosecution 
Source: Michael, “Issues in anti-corruption law: drafting implementing regulations for anti-corruption conventions in Central 
Europe and the former Soviet Union”, p.282 
Finally, Michael stresses that the anti-corruption programs analysed are grossly 
underfinanced in all the ex-socialist countries examined and do not follow an incentive based 
approach, leaving corruption fighters with few incentives to do their job. Therefore, they 
should be designed to strike a balance between a more clear definition of methods for 
implementing regulation and constraints which regulations pose on an agency’s staff in 
performing corrupt acts.  
Recent analysis on the same topic but from a target compliance prospective was made 
by Batory
99
 in which she points out that instead of asking what is wrong with the letter of the 
law the analysis should focus on some of the reasons why those who should comply with the 
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law fail to do so. She suggests that anti-corruption interventions should be more oriented 
towards raising awareness among target groups, they have to take into account existing social 
norms and should rely on positive incentives rather than increasing penalties. Although some 
surveys describe legal framework of Poland, Hungary and Romania as strong, corruption 
remains “widespread and persistent problem in the CEE EU member states”. Looking for the 
reasons Batory mentions that the problem of implementation is evident and the variety of 
possible causes, discussed in the literature, could be detected, such as: lack of political will, 
legacies of past regimes, adoption of the anti-corruption laws aimed only to pleas the EU so 
after the accession they became “the world of dead letters”. However, she criticizes this 
approach saying that by exclusively focusing on the failures of governments and public 
administrations, only one part of the story is presented. The other part includes citizens who 
deal with the state. The main objective of the literature on target compliance is why target 
groups act or fail to act according to the goals of a particular policy. If more light would be 
shed on this aspect, the better policy interventions could be designed. Using Hungary for the 
study case, Batory approaches the target compliance problem through two dimensions. The 
first dimension relates to the incentive structure and shows that while penalties are in place for 
a high number of corruption-related crimes, all the other elements of credible deterrence are 
missing such as: weak incentives for corruption reporting or lack of information crucial for 
detection. The second aspect includes analysis of normative motivation and results in the 
explanation that credibility of law makers and implementers is weak for imposing binding 
norms on society. Therefore, it is of no relevance that most people condemn corruption, 
evidence around them does not motivate them to abstain from corruption. Policy implications 
from this analysis point in three directions. First, legislation should be better communicated 
and its targets actively informed. Second, incentives should also include carrots and not only 
sticks. Finally, the legislation which is not synchronized with social norms should be reversed 
or terminated.  
 The articles presented in this section stressed the problems of transitional countries in 
performing anti-corruption policies. They also pointed in the direction of further analysis in 
this thesis. The coming section introduces the idiosyncrasies of countries in transition which 
are, according to the author of this research, considered as unique challenges which create 
obstacles for effective anti-corruption combat. Their addressing and analysis should improve 
the understanding of transitional countries and their specificities important to be taken into 
account for any serious reform.  
 
1.3.3. Unique challenges of TC 
 
 The socialist regime had its specificities expressed in the institutional and mind sets of 
the people who lived under it power. The importance of the institutions is widely discussed in 
the literature. North
100
 explains that they present the rules of the game in a society or, 
“humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction”. They structure incentives in 
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human exchange and shape the evolution pattern of society which is crucial for understanding 
historical change. The institutions are composed of formal written rules as well as unwritten 
codes and as such create the framework for human interaction. North stresses that formal rules 
follow official policies and they can change overnight while, on the other hand, informal rules 
embodied in customs, tradition and codes of conduct are more resistant to it. “Ideas and 
ideologies matter” and the level of their importance show the institutions. The mental construct 
of the individuals is shaped by the ideas and ideologies which they use to interpret the world 
around them and make choices. Denzau and North
101
 claim that individuals with common 
cultural background share(d) mental models (SMM) which give them the sense that “they have 
an intellectual understanding of it with a set of concepts and language which makes 
communication easier”. Therefore, ideas matter and their evolution and way of communication 
are in essence a manner of developing useful theory which aims to shed light on our 
understanding of the performance of societies through history and in the present times. In line 
with the theory of mental models is the research conducted by Ariely et al.
102
. Their study, by 
comparing Germans from the East and West, tests whether the economic and political system 
from the past has an impact on people’s willingness to cheat for personal gain. The results 
show that socialism “has a lasting impact on citizen’s basic morality”. Authors provide a 
couple of reasons grounded in the characteristic of socialism. First, the merit-based work was 
not rewarded and made no opportunities for people to accumulate the wealth. Second, 
socialism failed to provide “functional public system or economic security”, even though it 
declared its existence was intended to serve people which “eroded the value citizens placed on 
honesty”. Finally, the structure of the political and economic system made people “work 
around official laws and cheat to game the system”. After all these claims a closer look at the 
socialist system is necessary. This section will present the historical aspects of the institutional 
setting of transitional countries and resulting consequences.  
 
1.3.3.1. Institutional design of socialism 
 
 Although the idea of socialism has a history which goes back further than the 19
th
 
century, it received full attention when systematized by Karl Marx. The common claim is, 
according to, Boettke
103, that Marx’s analysis was rather a critique of capitalism than real 
assessment of the nature of socialism. However he claims that the fundamental point is that 
Marx did not avoid examining a socialist theory, but he advocated a particular method, a 
positive one, to social theory. By criticising a capitalist society he revealed “the main features 
of socialist society”. Baradat104 lists three of them as basic: (1) public ownership of production, 
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cooperative or nationalized; (2) a social welfare system, in which society cares for its members 
in need; (3) the intention of abundance, equality, and sharing that will free people from 
material want. The third one, the so called “socialist intent”, is required for the creation of an 
authentic socialist state because it is aimed to set people free from the condition of material 
dependence. This “happy state of affairs”, characterized by abundance of goods for all, will 
cause a “profound change in people’s beliefs, attitudes and conducts” because they do not need 
longer to compete with one another and therefore will become more human and noble. 
Cooperation rather than competition will dominate and that will lead to a new era of greater 
productivity and an improved lifestyle. The final results of this change will be the abolition of 
private ownership and disappearance of class differences which in sum heralds the 
establishment of new social order. As mentioned above, Marx did not invent the socialism but 
his theory of “scientific socialism”, which postulates “laws of human motivation and conduct” 
– economic determinism and dialectic materialism – completely dominated the socialist 
movement. However, Baradat
105
 explains that Marxism had a variety of uses, different and 
sometimes contradictory interpretations of which four major settings are: the Soviet Union, 
Yugoslavia, China and Cuba.  
 In practical terms, what came out as a result of the implemented socialist idea 
Boettke
106
 define as “an example of a theoretically impossible utopian dream”. In the analysis 
of Soviet-style socialism he claims that the institutional demands of the regime were 
inconsistent with the attainment of its goals, increased productivity and the moral improvement 
of mankind. Therefore, the unintended consequence of utopia implementation was “the Soviet 
reality of political oppression and economic deprivation”. Soviet-style socialism is described as 
a political and economic monopoly which created a loyal caste of bureaucrats who benefited 
from maintaining the system and did not take care about public interest and consumer well-
being. Boettke further stresses that “the main objective of bureaucratic action was not to 
increase economic productivity per se, but rather to increase the rents and perquisites 
available”. Instead of planned cooperation, economic competition was replaced by the 
bureaucratic one and according to that the resources were allocated according to the political 
rationales rather than the economic ones with corresponding waste as a consequence. However, 
in the Soviet system waste was not treated as a bad act unless it did not meet the output targets. 
Furthermore, consumer demand was not part of the state’s company plans and calculations. 
However, this system, which Boettke
107
 calls “the unintended by-product of attempting to 
implement the Marxian dream and the institutional legacy of that attempt”, stayed in place for 
over sixty years. Its long life is explained through a couple of factors such as accumulated 
surplus of inherited natural resources, internal imperialism, expressed through collectivization, 
and external colonization of Eastern Europe after the Second World War, as well as the 
existence of the illicit markets through the system and the use of world prices in the allocation 
of scarce natural resources.  
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 Although the economic reality was far from the illusion of a rationally planned 
economy, the Socialist/Communist Party did not give up on its ideology which made “the 
Soviet people live a lie”. This false reality was protected in order to legitimate the revolution 
and the Party and the major function of the economic bureaucracy was to maintain the illusion 
of the achieved tremendous economic growth. Parallel to the official economy a de facto 
economy existed fulfilling the gaps created by the failures of the official one. This means that 
“illicit market transactions attempted to correct for the long queues and poor quality of 
consumer goods found in the official state stores”108. On a practical level this opened the floor 
to side payments, such as barter or bribery, for various goods and services required.
 Besides the double economic activity, duality was present in political, cultural and 
intellectual life and aimed to break the official system and establish an alternative order.  
 However, the officials were aware of these threats and employed various means to keep 
people in fear. Boettke
109
 stresses that throughout history much of the Soviet people lived in 
the reality of constant fear caused by arbitrary political terror exercised by the Party and the 
secret services. Political opponents of the regime were either physically liquidated or sent to 
labour camps. The best illustration of the common practice might be the case of Vera 
Wollenberger
110
, an intellectual in the socialist East German. Becoming a dissident her normal 
life was gone because she was harassed and spied upon by the Stasi (the East German Secret 
Police), fired from her work and imprisoned for her political activities. When in 1992 the 
Stasi’s secret files were opened, Vera discovered that her husband had betrayed her. Like all 
other secret police in socialist regimes, the Stasi developed an extensive information network 
made of secret police agents, friends, neighbours and family members of the people under 
surveillance
111
. Therefore the dissident activity in Eastern Europe was rare and consent to the 
socialist Party rule was expected behaviour.  
 In the article about Samizdat literature
112
, Grzybowski
113
 discusses its role in the 
publicizing of the abuse of legal processes against dissidents in the Soviet Union. He claims 
that the political aim of Samizdat was the struggle for the realization of individual and human 
rights through protests against the regime’s practice aimed to force it to respect Soviet laws 
despite their imperfection. It was also a “reaction to the disappointed high hopes of Soviet 
intellectuals” because the Soviet press was censored and sided with the regime and it either did 
not report the important events or it published untrue information. The Samizdat materials 
reveal that in politically sensitive cases the guarantees of fairness and legality were not 
respected and in preventing publicity of the trials the officials employed two techniques. One 
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was by controlling the audience in the court rooms by putting the agents of the secret service or 
police there and preventing even relatives from being at the trial. This technique also included 
the misrepresentation of the facts by the press.  The other was very broad interpretation of the 
criminal codes covering any act which might be dangerous for the regime, even though it was 
not criminalized.  
 A clear example of this practice was verbal delict. Krsmanović114 explains that although 
the constitutions of socialist countries in many cases guaranteed the freedom of speech and 
citizen’s right to make suggestions and participate in conducting public affairs, in reality they 
were limited by other laws and regulations and their broad interpretation. Basically, any 
opinion which deviated from the official criteria could be subsumed under the criminal code 
provisions such as: “hostile propaganda”, “betrayal of the country”, “call for the rebel”, 
“distribution of false news”, “insult of public officials” and “ endangering the sovereignty and 
independence of the state”. Besides imprisoning the people convicted for the above listed 
crimes, Krsmanović claims that another technique was used as well by socialist regime. It 
included the declaring insane of dissidents and hospitalizing them in mental institutions. This 
as consequence ensured their discretion and deprivation of any future expression of opinion. 
All the oppression measures resulted, according to Pipes
115
, in individuals withdrawing into 
private worlds, trying to be invisible in some sense and therefore the abandoning of any idea of 
independent public activity and concern about public affairs. This image does not correspond 
to the initial intention of the new kind of human being. The next section looks in more detail at 
the character of the people who lived under the socialist regime. More precisely, the homo 
sovieticus is presented.  
 
1.3.3.2. Homo sovieticus 
 
For the description of the phenomenon of homo sovieticus the quote “the road to hell is 
paved with good intentions” appears to be applicable116. The idea of socialism aimed to create 
a new kind of men and during Soviet times this man, according to Zinovyev117, was meant to be 
a hero, a new superman. This Uomo Universale is a part of the collectivity that incarnates the 
rationale of progression, social justice and equality. As previously stated, the socialist man is 
non-egoistic and cooperative and he creates and lives in the world better than the one that 
capitalist society provides. A closer look at the system provides an image in which “all citizens 
are equal” and everybody is entitled to the same amount of goods regardless of the individual 
efforts and contribution. This practically means that the state guaranteed free access to all to 
education, employment (the official data on unemployment were not available), health care and 
housing providing as such a life without existential problems. It also tolerated poor work ethic, 
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petty theft of common property or its misuse, and any kind of similar behaviour. In return the 
state expected from its citizens not to interfere in public life. Economically speaking the 
incentives for individual improvement and achievements were distorted and resulted in the 
demoralization of the people, disintegration of values and finally moral corruption
118
.  From all 
that is stated above it appears that the Utopian dream, defined by Marx and other socialist 
thinkers, was proven to be impossible to realise by the average human being. Therefore, during 
the time the homo sovieticus, from an originally positive concept, acquired many negative 
characteristics. Living under the indoctrination, suppression and deprived from any kind of 
social power he became, according to the literature
119
, an irresponsible being with low self-
esteem and with a lack of knowledge about his own purpose. The failure of the system, 
expressed in a low living standard, high coercion and plenty of lies, substantially contributed to 
this development.  
After the collapse of socialism, the homo sovieticus concept gained another meaning 
associated with the inability of people to make a sudden break and take distance from the 
previous regime. More precisely, it refers to the inability to replace the totalitarian mentality 
for a democratic one. This change put people into the situation in which they received freedom 
and became responsible for their lives, but the lack of skills necessary for achieving this goal 
was still present
120
. Tischner
121
 writes that homo sovieticus is “the syndrome of post-
communist form of escape from freedom” who is not a socialist but the client of socialism. He 
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describes him as an individual incapable of taking any responsibility in making life decisions 
and therefore he looks for the force which will organize his life by setting up the framework in 
which he can operate. There are three factors that shaped him: work, power and self-dignity. 
Attitude towards work was shaped by top-down regulation of the economy. Work was 
perceived as “free creativity’, it guaranteed material stability to everyone by stable employment 
which did not depend on individual effort or input. This devalued work in the sense that people 
could not get satisfaction from it or it encouraged intellectual development and the acquiring 
new skills. All these reasons led to the break in work ethics and caused various pathological 
attitudes. The first one was “learned helplessness”. It meant that people were unable to make 
long-term plans and they did not see themselves as legitimate social agents because the whole 
social machinery was managed by alien and hostile groups. This attitude developed the 
tendency to blame others for personal failures and bad decisions, giving them power and 
responsibility over life. The “others” are the authorities and all “higher up” in the hierarchy. 
Tischner points to one important characteristic of homo sovieticus. He describes him as a 
person who “cannot tell the difference between his own interest and the common interest”122. 
Related to the attitude towards the work is a second pathological behaviour called “amoral 
familism”. It includes the existence of informal networks of family and friends in the 
community to which the main rule that anything good for me and my relatives is positive 
regardless of its consequences for society is applied. Finally, “the culture of quasi-activity” is 
the third phenomenon related to work factor. It includes any activity whose only purpose is to 
give the impression of achieving a specific goal. This attitude was present both on the high and 
everyday life levels. Its typical expression was the establishment of all sorts of decorative 
bodies, such as commissions, working groups, expert bodies, with the sole purpose of making 
an impression of a serious approach to the problem’s resolution.  
 Power is the second important factor listed by Tischner. Homo sovieticus defines 
himself regarding some dominant power over which he would like to take control and 
participate in it. However, this participation is perceived through the possession of the 
authority and its exercise with the sole purpose of acquiring privileges and access to scarce 
goods. Finally, the third factor, the sense of dignity of homo sovieticus was supported by the 
state’s providing material stability and giving the feeling of security. This feeling was very 
unique and strove for egalitarianism which in practice did not mean the availability of 
opportunities to everyone.  It actually limited the possibility of any individual rising above the 
generally accepted level of mediocrity. This as a result lowered the standards because 
everybody was entitled to a guaranteed supply of commodities regardless of personal qualities 
and work performance. All factors combined, according to Tischner, made homo sovieticus a 
person with two faces and behaviours: one regarding public life and state and the other one 
regarding private life which in literature is called “value dimorphism” or “doublethink”. This 
behaviour led to opportunistic behaviour, ethical relativism, cynicism and disrespect for 
fundamental legal rules and norms of social life. It created a “Deceptive Man”.
123
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For the sake of the truth it should be stressed that some authors, like Tyszka124, think the 
phenomenon of homo sovieticus in post-socialist transformation received too much attention 
and could not be “blamed” for all failures and such claims are classified as “ideologically 
biased”. Tyszka admits that there are mental legacies of communist days present, but does not 
identify them as main obstacles of the economic reform of post-socialist societies. However, in 
view of this two remarks can be made. The first one refers to the scope of his analysis. He 
discusses the phenomenon in the context of Polish society, disregarding its effects in other 
post-socialist countries. The second remark is that Tyszka does not make the distinction 
between the private and public sector, which operate according to different rules, and therefore 
disregards the possibility that the homo sovieticus mentality left different traces in these two 
areas.  The assumption of this thesis is that it is more likely that the socialist mind setting is 
more rooted and persistent in the public sector, more precisely public administration, than in 
the private, entrepreneurial one. Therefore, the characteristics of homo sovieticus are 
considered important in defining anti-corruption policies for the prevention of corruption in the 
administrative sector of post-socialist countries. On the other hand the Tyszka’s argument that 
the institution and its setting and development are important in the process of change is 
considered important and will be elaborated on in one of the next chapters of this thesis. To 
complete the analysis of (post)socialist societies, a crucial ingredient has to be elaborated upon. 
This ingredient is considered essential for the functioning of market based democratic societies 
and it is called social trust. Its history and effects are presented in the following section. 
 
1.3.3.3. Trust 
 
Discussion about the best way to reform countries in transition among shock therapists 
and gradualists was presented earlier in this chapter. Here will be presented a necessary 
precondition for the establishment of efficient institutions, social trust, which according to 
Kornai et al.
125
 is disregarded in the discussion by both.  The design of the socialist system and 
its consequences to societies initiated various discussions in the literature among which the one 
about trust appears to be crucial for many aspects relevant to the transition process. Uslaner 
and Badescu
126
 say that trust leads people to believe that besides their differences they belong 
to the same moral community. It also makes them more willing to deal with different people 
keeping at the same time a high standard of honesty and fairness which provide the foundation 
for a rule of law and for policies that benefit the less fortunate.  
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However, transitional countries face a specific situation caused by the change of the 
social system.  In order to better understand the requirements of this change we have to go one 
step back and look closely at the socialist system, its characteristics and legacies. Traps
127
 
claims that “totalitarian, propagandist, rent-seeking centrally planned socialism” left unique 
and lasting effects on trust. Soviet-style socialism had, according to him, stronger and more 
significant negative effects than other authoritarian regimes because of a few reasons: it had 
massive and extensive interference by the party in the creation of wealth, constant propaganda 
which could never be realized, lack of economic incentives, supressing of personal freedom, 
lack of privacy and hidden corruption. Successful democracy requires a major level of trust and 
therefore transitional countries should first increase the trust rather than setting up complex 
institutions which cannot function without trust. Lovell
128
 describes socialism as a paradoxical 
system which on one side was dedicated to overcoming alienation by establishing a better 
society based on mutual trust and at the same time destroying it among people as well as their 
beliefs in the government. Instead of devotion to common good it raised egoism and narrow 
self-interest and instead of wealth, it created material and spiritual poverty, and active mistrust 
in the institutions of government due to official hypocrisy and corruption. Rothstein
129
 claims 
that during the Soviet-style socialism state institutions were severely discredited among the 
people. Therefore, any kind of dishonest behaviour towards them was accepted and praised. 
Social capital could be produced and destroyed by the way the state organises its public 
institutions intended to implement public policy. When in interaction with public institutions 
people care not only about the outcome but also about the fairness of the procedure used as 
well.
130
 Institutional design is therefore a central element for generating trust and honesty. 
Ledeneva
131
 explains that in order to overcome the difficulties of life under the socialist 
regime, people established dense networks of informal connections but some of these practices 
continued after the collapse of socialism. 
 Rose-Ackerman
132
 says that in transitional countries the two trust networks are 
competing, one called “reciprocal trust” created during the socialism and the other called “trust 
in rules” or confidence in new institutions that should operate in a fair and impartial manner. 
She claims that in this case personal links may hamper the reform. Cook et al.
133
 explain that 
trust networks are crucial under the conditions of uncertainty, because they provide a more 
secure transaction environment. The transactions which are likely to occur firstly are among 
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those who know each other well. This further creates closed groups with clear boundaries 
which include insiders and exclude outsiders. The conditions for trade are hardly optimal under 
these conditions. Corruption may lead to this type of closed-association of trade.  
The harmfulness of corruption was already described in the previous sections. Here it is 
important to stress its link with trust and its effects on the countries in transition. Uslaner and 
Badescu
134
 state that corruption stands in direct opposition to trust. It mocks the rules of 
honesty and fairness providing advantages to certain people that others do not have. Corruption 
within the institutions results in lost faith in government. Not surprisingly with a high level of 
trust corruption is low. In societies where corruption is low people see themselves as honest, 
trust each other and their governments which results in strong legal systems being in place. 
These well-ordered societies depend upon a shared sense of justice. On the other hand, in post-
socialist societies people see corruption everywhere; they lose faith in people and in public 
institutions. This is the product of socialist regimes which created much distrust from the 
above. People do not believe that any equitable system of justice exists. The authoritarian 
regime tried constantly to turn citizens against each other by asking them to report their friends 
and family which made interpersonal trust too risky and made people operate in very small 
circles. Uslaner and Badescu claim that in post-socialist countries corruption is something 
public officials are involved in. When ordinary people engage in corrupt deals, they are just 
getting by because they need to due to unfair treatment. Therefore, small-scale dishonesty is 
“good corruption”, based on the expectation of reciprocity. With little trust in one another 
people will treat corruption as “just another transaction” without any moral disapproval 
attached to it. Socialism left a strong legacy in the CEE countries. When socialism collapsed, 
instead of trusting open market civil society, the authoritarian state was replaced by “apathetic 
society” where people neither trust each other nor government. New capitalist businessmen 
were old socialist managers, some became rich and many, ordinary people became poorer than 
ever. This economic inequality caused a loss of faith in the new institutions and other people 
which in the end brought more corruption instead of less.  
To repair this situation Mishler and Rose
135
 claim that trust must be earned, more 
precisely, performance based trust should be developed. Institutions should provide some 
reasonable measure of individual and collective good in order to be accepted by the citizens. 
This is important because of the legacy of the regime in which “citizens are accustomed to hold 
government responsible for both macroeconomic conditions and individual welfare”. Mishler 
and Rose
136
 further explain that aggregate corruption has the strongest effect on interpersonal 
trust which means that the more the institutions are corrupt the less trust there is in other 
people. The only way to increase trust in this situation is to improve government performance. 
It should respond promptly and effectively to public priorities, “rooting out corrupt practices”, 
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protecting citizens’ freedom and implementing economic policies which will a better material 
future for the country. Finally, Mishler and Rose
137
 extended their analysis to the political 
consequences of trust. Changing to some extent previous claims they claim that cultural aspects 
of trust should be incorporated into the institutional concept of rebuilding trust because the 
evaluation of political and economic performance is culturally conditioned. Therefore, culture 
matters not only to institutional performance because social capital and institutional trust 
contribute to democratic values.  
An interesting analysis, which adds to the description of post-socialist societies, was 
made by Csepeli et al. 
138
.They point to the aspects of transition which are very closely related 
to trust. They study attitudes to economic actors in terms of rich and poor people in transitional 
countries. Since the rich personify success, attitudes toward them could tell a lot about the 
society’s economy as well as people’s attitude towards social relations. The economic 
syndrome of social lack of confidence is reflected in the suspicion of the rich and successful. 
This suspicion can further degenerate into envy and suspicion of any outstanding achievement. 
Examination of envy emerges mostly in dilemmas of distributive justice. It is particularly 
interesting for the analysis of post-socialist countries. After the collapse of socialism people 
expected that a market based economic system would rapidly improve their working and living 
conditions. However, the expected change brought recession costing millions of jobs, low real 
wages, erosion of purchasing power of pensions, benefits and allowances. In socialism people 
were accustomed to secure employment and livelihood and it is not a surprise that in the 
transition they felt “that enrichment and success for some came at the expense and through the 
failure of others”. This was a safety cushion for those who ended up as losers in the transition. 
They also succumb to envy together with a low level of self-confidence and self-respect. The 
rapid change during the transition confused and disturbed peoples social orientation and when 
looking at justice, trustworthiness and confidence people recognize corruption, 
untrustworthiness, injustice and undeserved enrichment by the new elite. Therefore, Csepeli et 
al. claim that success and wealth in transitional countries is mainly accompanied by “moral 
disapproval, presumptions of dishonour, dishonesty and injustice”. These attitudes also show 
peoples perception towards the existing economic mechanisms. In the West, success and 
wealth are perceived as results of successful mobilization of individual resources while a 
market economy is perceived differently in the East. The rich become wealthy not based on 
hard work or merit but as an outcome of harmful economic and social conditions while the 
work and achievements of ordinary people are not adequately appreciated, recognized and 
compensated. Authors divide envy into two types: particularized envy, which arises from 
intensified competition and generalized envy, which makes people envious of everything and 
everybody. Envy is in psychology explained as a trait which increases personal satisfaction and 
excuses bad performance. In the case of transitional countries it is not directed against real 
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persons, opponents or achievements, it is rather the manifestation of personal failure and 
disappointment in the political system in which they have no trust. 
To conclude this discussion, the setting of the last regime left the post-socialist 
countries with a legacy of lack of trust in people but also in the government. A significant 
contribution to this trust erosion was made by corruption. Because corruption undermines trust 
and increases transaction costs, and thereby decreases social welfare, it should be fought 
strongly. However, new market based institutions could not be effectively established without 
the citizen’s trust. The process of transition created winners and losers. In many cases the 
differentiation between the two put the majority of people in the second group which made 
them develop certain psychological mechanisms which in the end generate lack of trust in the 
reforms. Scholars suggest that this situation should be overcame by careful building of trust, 
which should be earned, and consequently it will lead to the full operation of new, market 
based, institutions and lowering of corruption.  
 
1.3.3.4. Another possible approach to combating corruption 
 
The postulates of Public choice theory and the principle-agent model dominate the anti-
corruption strategies and tools designed at international level and as such adopted by countries 
around the world. It is discussed earlier in this chapter that this option did not provide 
satisfactory result in transitional countries. The studies earlier showed why in practical terms 
the one size fits all model is not successful. This section looks into the alternative theories 
which aim to find the solution for the failures of Public choice theory.  
Persson et al.
139
 claim that systemic corruption in many countries cannot be tackled 
with the principle-agent model because systemic corruption in its essence represents rather a 
collective action problem
140
and as such has different characteristics from those stipulated by 
the agency model. More precisely, it is crucial for this aspect regarding the expectations of 
corrupt behaviour of other individuals in society. If corruption is expected behaviour it is less 
likely that the principle-agent techniques of monitoring and punishing will be effective due to 
the lack of incentivised actors for their enforcement. In sum, Persson et al. claim that where 
corruption is the rule rather than the exception it is likely that one is facing a collective action 
problem rather than a principle-agent one. Therefore, instead of fixing the incentives one 
should aim to “change the actor’s beliefs about what all other actors are likely to do” in the 
sense that all expect fair play. The authors claim that in the cases of systemic corruption the 
whole system needs to be tilted from one type of value such as: particularism or limited access 
order, to another which presents the opposite of the former: universalism or open access order. 
Authors conclude that “the question of how revolutionary changes in institutions can be 
achieved” was not discussed in the literature. Therefore, beside monitoring and sanctioning 
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sound anti-corruption policy should include shared expectations about the honesty of other 
people.
141
 
Miller
142
and Karklins
143
 describe people in the post-socialist system as trapped in the 
paradox in which they condemn corruption but on the other hand they participate in it. One of 
the explanations is that they expect that all others will engage in corruption as well. The 
suggestions for shifting the equilibrium of social values from a socialist to a capitalist one 
relevant for combating corruption are discussed later in this thesis. The next section provides a 
closer look at the post-socialist countries which are the main subject of this thesis.  
 
1.3.4. Closer look at transitional countries (TC) 
 
1.3.4.1. Corruption in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe 
 
 Soviet-type socialism dominated throughout the socialist world and included besides 
the Soviet Union, countries of Central and Eastern Europe. Some of these countries were the 
first to enter society change and started reforms. Among them are Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia, 
Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Hungary all of whom in 2004 became members of the 
EU. However, earlier in this chapter it was shown that besides significant progress these 
countries still have certain problems to resolve and corruption is one of them. This section in 
the analysis of corruption will focus on four countries which are considered representative of 
the group of Soviet-countries style whose transition was mainly successful, Visegrad countries 
(V4)
144.
 
After the crash of socialism and its institutions the concept of looking at socialist 
countries as a coherent group became less adequate. It appeared that the socio-cultural, 
historical and economic backgrounds of the post-socialist societies are rather different. 
However, despite this difference a consensus has been reached that for analytical reasons 
concerns clustering the four Visegrad countries (V4) against two other post-socialist sub-
regions – the Baltic States and South-Eastern Europe – is legitimate.145 Within these three 
groups there are countries with different EU membership status but in general the still common 
problem of corruption. The latest report of TI on V4 on corruption risks shows that these 
countries are more consolidated democracies than the other Central and Eastern European 
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countries and measured with the average Democracy Index Scores
146
 are closed to Western 
Europe. However, regarding corruption, although the average Corruption Perception Index 
(CPI) of the V4 countries is somewhat higher than the Central and Eastern European mean 
score, “…the region lagged far behind the EU 15 member states…”. This also confirms the 
result of Eurobarometer survey
147
 which finds that 87% of citizens in the V4 region think that 
corruption is a major problem in their country. This fact is explained by the change of the 
situation before and after the accession of V4 countries to the EU. Namely, during the process 
of accession the EU had significant influence over the acceding countries which were eager to 
accomplish all requirements with the main goal of getting into the “club”. However, the “stick 
and carrot” approach, which worked well before the EU expanded, proved to be less powerful 
after new countries joined the Union. According to the EU rule transfer literature and 
Dimitrova
148
, there are significant setbacks in many areas in the region because there are no 
effective tools to influence countries that are already members of the EU. Therefore, besides 
many similarities, variability is also present in the region. For example, while the V4 countries 
were more or less homogeneous in their economic development paths during the first fifteen 
years of transition, after the EU accession each country started to follow different economic 
strategies.
149
 
In the analysis of the corruption in transitional countries Transparency International 
recognizes that they may experience unique difficulties in the creation and/ or application of 
National Integrity System (NIS)
150
. NIS is a comprehensive measure for assessing a country’s 
anti-corruption efficacy sector by sector in corruption combat. It evaluates key ‘pillars’ in a 
country’s governance system, both in terms of their internal corruption risks and their 
contribution to fighting corruption in society at large. The pillars include: the legislative branch 
of government, executive branch of government, judiciary, public sector, law enforcement, 
electoral management body, ombudsman, audit institution, anti-corruption agencies, political 
parties, media, civil society and business. All these institutions can be classified into three main 
categories: Government, Public Sector and Non-Governmental institutions. Regarding these 
aspects it is recognized that transitional countries, aside from being inherently weak, may also 
have inherited bureaucracies which lack many of the regulatory institutions necessary for a 
modern state and economy to function, as well as the mechanisms required to ensure that 
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accountability is in place. By using NIS assessment, TI creates the picture of problems, 
achievements and the best practice relevant for the countries examined. The problems of the 
V4 countries are summarized in the Table 1.7. 
 
Table 1.7: List of weakest institutions in V4 region 
Weakest Institutions in the V4 Region 
Czech Republic Public Administration Prosecution  
Hungary Political Parties Business  
Poland Civil Society Business  
Slovakia Law Enforcement Judiciary Prosecution 
Source: Transparency International, “Corruption Risks in the Visegard Countries”, p. 15 
  
 This section illustrates the challenges which more advance transitional countries face in 
combating corruption. The next section describes briefly the countries of South-Eastern 
Europe, more precisely countries of the Western Balkans and particularly former Yugoslavia. 
Yugoslavian socialism had specific characteristics comparing to the rest of the socialist world. 
Here some general aspects will be shown but the detailed analysis will be provided in Chapter 
5 of this thesis which as a case study analyses the Republic of Serbia, one of the ex-YU 
countries.  
  
1.3.4.2. Corruption in the countries of the Western Balkan Region  
 
 In the group of South Eastern European countries are the countries of the Western 
Balkan region
151
. Like the majority of transitional states, they also followed the pattern of 
change by accepting the standards of the EU, aiming to become full members. Countries of this 
region have a different situation regarding the EU membership. The scale goes from member 
status or a step away from it, through the status of a candidate country and a potential candidate 
aims to show the progress of each of them in transitional process (see Table 1.5). However, in 
the reports of the European Commission, issued every year, on the progress made in the 
process of European Union accession, corruption is listed as one of the biggest causes of 
underperformance of transitional countries in building new institutions in society. 
152
 
 A large portion of the Balkan countries make up the countries of the Socialist Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY). SFRY was unique among the other socialist countries and its 
socialist path. Baradat
153
 explains that uniqueness came from the implementation of “its own 
Marxist movement” and the creation of government without the aid of Soviet troops. Claiming 
that there are “many different paths to socialism”, in 1948, Yugoslavian president Josip Broz 
Tito “withdrew from the Soviet orbit”. He further made significant innovations, allowing some 
capitalism, introducing workers’ self-management, introducing decentralization in some other 
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aspects and advocating for neutrality and cooperation with the Western countries. Although 
different in some aspects these countries more or less faced the same situation regarding the 
corruption problem.  
As shown in Table 1.8, the patterns of fighting corruption are very similar with slight 
differences in measurement of the corruption, except Slovenia which joined the EU in 2004. 
The column TICPI for 2013 presents the relevant numbers for each of the countries discussed. 
All countries have ratified UN and GRECO conventions. Their progress in corruption combat 
is measured by the European Commission periodically through the reports which describe the 
strong and weak points of each country regarding the anti-corruption framework in play. 
Besides the progress made in the area of corruption combat the reports show that further 
improvements are required. The citations from the relevant reports for the each country are 
provided in the Table.  
 
 
 
Table 1.8: Western Balkan countries overview 
 TICPI for 2013 EC report 
2013 
Bosnia & Herzegovina  42 “…is at an early stage in the fight against 
corruption…”154 
FYR of Macedonia 43 “…corruption remains prevalent in many 
areas and continues to be a serious problem…”155 
Montenegro 44 “…Corruption remains prevalent in many 
areas and continues to be a serious problem…”156 
Croatia 48 “…implementation has still to demonstrate 
sustainable results…”157 
Serbia 42 “…the implementation of the legal 
framework and the efficiency of anti-corruption 
institutions need to be improved…”158 
Slovenia 57 “…corruption in a broader sense is a serious 
concern…”159 
Romania 43 “…needs to be maintained small-scale 
corruption…”160 
Bulgaria 41 “…weak and uncoordinated response to 
what is a systemic problem throughout the public 
administration…”161 
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Albania 31 “…corruption remains a particularly serious 
problem which will require determination 
and concerted efforts to address…”162 
 
 
 
1.4. Conclusion  
Corruption is today marked as one of the serious issues which produce many negative 
effects in the societies in which its level is high. It has many faces and forms and it is not easy 
to present it by a single definition or approach. Sometimes it is not clear to distinguish what are 
the causes and what are the consequences since the causal arrow often goes both ways. With 
globalization the discussion of corruption was placed high on the international agenda. 
International and nongovernmental institutions took an active role in order to help countries in 
corruption combat. Within the framework repression-prevention-transparency they created 
various rules and regulations which countries ratified and committed themselves to implement 
them. Among these countries are transitional, post-socialist countries as well. 
Emerging from the centrally planned to the open market economy turned out not to be 
an easy task for ex-socialist countries. Confusion at the beginning of the process on the right 
strategy that should be implemented revealed the complexity of the process. The problems 
were numerous but corruption was referred to as one of the biggest. Many of the transitional 
countries set the EU membership as the main goal which should help in overcoming the 
obstacles to the reform process. During the accession they transplanted many laws and 
regulations adjusting their social systems, at least formally, to the ones from the Western 
world. The same pattern was followed for corruption combat. All international conventions and 
recommendations were ratified but, according to the various analyses, these steps did not 
provide the outcomes as expected. The main argument for this failure is that regarding the 
international regulation “one size cannot fit all” and the transitional countries have 
idiosyncrasies which ask for a different approach than the one offered. The specific 
institutional setting of socialism created a specific mentality of the people who lived under this 
regime. From the original idea of creating an Uomo Universale, homo sovieticus turn out to be 
its antagonist whose characteristics are difficult to remove overnight. The repression of the 
previous regime left the strongest impact on trust which appears to be low in post socialist 
countries. The research shows that people do not trust others but they do not trust government 
and public institutions as well. Therefore, the problem of the enforcement of anti-corruption 
law does not look surprising especially if we keep in mind that in the past corruption was not 
perceived, if perceived at all, as bad.  
The main goal of this chapter was to draw attention to the specificities of transitional 
countries and the problems which they face in terms of corruption combat. The trust appears to 
be the first problem which should be resolved and according to the literature it could be 
achieved only through the impartial and strong social institutions which will act according to 
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the rules of procedural justice and as such deserve respect and trust. Based on the 
characteristics of post-socialist countries described in this chapter, further chapters will try to 
construct an optimal theoretical scheme which should improve the combating of corruption 
among civil servants who are in the spotlight in this thesis.  
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Chapter 2: Designing an optimal anti-corruption structure 
of the administration in transitional countries 
Because power corrupts,  
society’s demands for moral authority and character  
increase as the importance of the position increases.  
John Adams,  
 
 
2.1. Introduction  
 
Administration is a very important aspect for the running of a country and its 
functioning affects the lives of the citizens in various ways. As indicated earlier the research 
subject of this thesis is in the domain of administrative corruption, more precisely the 
corruption of public servants. Civil servants have power which the law entrusted them for 
performing routine government actions. This power, usually accompanied by discretion, non-
transparency or massive procedures opens the floor for misuse and bribe extracting with major 
negative consequences for society. In socialist countries the administration had a crucial role 
for the state performance and therefore it is here considered very important for the corruption 
assessment in transitional countries. The introduction of this thesis presented the model 
structure-conduct-performance as a framework in which the analysis of corruption in 
transitional countries is here conducted and on that ground the proposal fora new solutions in 
the combat against it. Adjusting this model for the purposes of this thesis, this chapter will start 
with the first above mentioned part of the model: structure. The main question aiming to be 
answered is: What is the optimal structure of public administration in post-socialist countries 
for improving corruption combat? In order to provide an answer two types of structures will 
be analysed: the structure of the institutions and its values and structure of human capital and 
its values. The chapter will first discuss issues related to public administration and corruption. 
It will then explain development and characteristics of various administration types in different 
state organization types: capitalism, communism and transition. Finally, the issues regarding 
public service motivation will be elaborated upon.  
 
2.2. Public Administration and corruption 
 
2.2.1. General description 
 
Before starting any discussion on types and principles of public administration, it is 
necessary to introduce some definitions important for a better understanding of the matter. The 
Public sector
163
 is the part of a country’s economy, controlled or supported financially by the 
government. The Public service is a service performed for the benefit of the public or its 
institutions.
164
  It is provided by the government to people living within its jurisdiction, either 
directly through the public sector or by financing private provisions of the service. Civil 
                                                          
163
Definition available at: http://www.collinsdictionary.com/dictionary/english/public-sector 
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service
165
 is the service responsible for the public administration of the government of a 
country. It excludes the legislative, judicial, and military branches. Members of the civil 
service “have no official political allegiance” and in general should not be affected by the 
changes in government. Public administration
166
consists of civil servants whose job is to 
implement a specified policy within the government executive framework. In the literature on 
public administration one of the definitions, provided by Morgan and Perry
167
 describes the 
civil service system as “the mediating institution authorized by constitutional rules which 
mobilizes human resources in the service of the civil affairs of the state in a given territory”. 
Public administration is in the literature on law and economics often seen as one of the 
sources of corrupt behaviour. Lambsdorff 
168
 claims that the essence of understanding the 
social consequences of corruption lies in the failure of bureaucracy to commit to honesty. The 
readiness of the public servant to receive the bribe disqualifies him for professions in which 
commitment to honesty is vital. This readiness has its spillover effects on the reputation of 
honest civil servants who get no income from corruption. Lambsdorff further says that 
“…corruption involves the malfunctioning of some or all areas of public sector…” because 
individuals or whole units care about their interest and not the public. He argues that literature 
provides much evidence that countries burdened with corruption manifest “poor government 
institutions”. The decisions which bureaucrats make in the corrupt administration are most 
likely based on the expected corrupt gain rather than the public interest. This as a result causes 
the choosing of wrong competitors, promotion of wrong projects, etc. If benevolent 
government aims to stop this practice it has to design monitoring systems, proper incentives, 
and penalty threats. However, Lambsdorff claims, these attempts “will be imperfect because of 
informational asymmetries”. Tanzi169 defines the quality of the public sector as “the 
characteristics that allow the state to pursue its objective in the most efficient way”. Since it 
presents the instrument for pursuing governmental policies, high public sector “is likely to 
promote good policies” while “low quality public sector is likely to promote poor policies”. 
Corruption should not be part of the decision making process of the bureaucrats and public 
resources entrusted to them should be used to maximise social wealth. Tanzi
170
 explains that a 
variety of bureaucracy exists around the world and many factors contribute to its quality such 
as: merit based hiring and promotions and absence of patronage and nepotism. In order to 
understand why some bureaucrats are more corrupt than others one should look at the incentive 
structure and tradition because corruption is a complex phenomenon and “is almost never 
explained by a single cause”. Complexity of the phenomenon asks for complex measures and 
therefore, claims Tanzi, fighting corruption should be initiated on many fronts and not be 
focused on a single area. Increasing the salaries of civil servants as well as penalties for 
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corruption, or creating anti-corruption agencies, are not quick fixes and the good strategy 
should recognize the existence of the demand and supply of corruption with the necessary price 
which plays an important role. In the background of these activities lies the state which, Tanzi 
explains, “creates the environment and incentives that influence those who pay bribes and 
those who accept or demand them”.  
Abed and Davoodi
171
 claim that corruption “…undermines the state’s capacity to carry out 
its designated functions in the economy…”. A weak state and its institutions accompanied by 
economic distortions creates the fertile ground for corruption. Their research finds that 
progress on structural reforms is a more significant factor for economic growth than corruption 
impacts. Furthermore, these reforms are important as well in lowering corruption and 
increasing foreign direct investments. Explaining the effects of administrative corruption Rose-
Ackerman
172
 says that a high level of corruption has many negative outcomes such as: the 
inefficient and unfair distribution of scarce benefits, undermined purpose of public programs, 
encouragement of civil servants for the creation of red tape, increased costs of doing business 
and limited entry and finally, low state legitimacy. 
 By now there isa broad consensus among academics and policy makers alike that good 
governance matters to economic development and problems in its operation, such as 
corruption, produce the opposite outcome. In order to measure the level of good governance 
Kaufman et al.
173
 developed six governance indicators of which each measures different 
aspects. The indicators are
174
: (1) Voice and Accountability which measures political, civil and 
human rights; (2) Political Stability and Absence of Violence which measures the likelihood of 
violent threats to/or changes in-government, including terrorism; (3) Government effectiveness 
which measures the competence of the bureaucracy and the quality of public service delivery; 
(4) Regulatory Quality which measures the incidence of market-unfriendly policies; (5) Rule of 
Law  which measures the quality of contract enforcement, the police, and the courts as well as 
likelihood of crime and violence; (6) Control of corruption which measures the exercise of 
public power for private gain, including both petty and grand corruption, or “state capture”. 
Kaufman et al.
175
 explain that the estimates of governance are based “on a large number of 
individual data sources on perception governance”. The data include “surveys of firms and 
individuals, assessments of commercial risk rating agencies, non-governmental organizations 
and number of multilateral aid agencies”. 
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 From the literature provided above, intuition dictates that corruption in public 
administration corresponds to its weak performance and ineffectiveness. The support for this 
assumption could be found if some of the indicators, which measure both aspects, are 
compared. The Table 2.1, provides the correlation matrix of four compared indicators. The 
comparison is done for 185 world countries of which 25 are transitional at the 95% level of 
significance. The indicators compared are: (a) the Government Effectiveness indicator for 
which the average of 11 years was calculated (from 2002 till 2012)and it is indicated in the 
table as gaiavg
176
; (b) Control of corruption index, calculated as well for 11 years, marked as 
ccavg
177
; (c) Transparency International Corruption Perception Index also calculated for the 
period from 2002 till 2012 and marked as ticpiavg
178
 and finally (d) Global Corruption 
Barometer for 2013, which provides opinions of people regarding corruption in different 
segments of society’s public sector such as judiciary, police, parliament, military, 
administration, etc. The reason for taking into account only the year 2013 lies in the fact that 
previous reports have no standardized questions repeated from year to year. This implies that 
this index is still improving and some standardization might be expected in the near future. In 
order to answer the two questions included in the calculation of the GCB index, respondents 
had to rank their opinion on a scale from 1 to 5. In the analysis the aggregate values of their 
responses were taken into account. The first question is: to what extent do you think that 
corruption is a problem in the public sector in this country. The second question asked 
respondents to rank the sectors based on their perception of corruption present in them. The 
listed sectors are: political parties, parliament/legislature, military, non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs), media, religious bodies, business/private sector, education system, 
judiciary, medical/health care, police and public officials/civil servants. The aggregate results 
for civil servants were included in the present analysis and together with the aggregate result 
on the first question they formed an average indicator which is marked as gcbavg
179
. 
 
Table 2.1: Correlation matrix of the four indexes for 185 countries  
 
 
The table shows the correlation among the indexes of which some of them are further 
explained by graphs. Graph 2.1 presents the positive linear correlation between the government 
effectiveness and overall perception of the corruption and supports the intuitive claim made 
earlier in this section. It shows that the higher the effectiveness of the government, the less the 
country is perceived as corrupt. This is also true for the control of corruption which is 
presented in Graph 2.2 in Appendix 2.1. The more the government is effective, the better it 
controls corruption. On the other hand, if administration is perceived as corrupt that means that 
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control of corruption is very low which Graph 2.3 shows. The more the administration is 
corrupt the more the country is perceived as corrupt (Graph 2.4in the Appendix 2.1). The 
higher the perception of the administration as corrupt the lower its effectiveness (Graph 2.5in 
the Appendix 2.1). Regarding the 25 transitional countries the correlation matrix among the 
indexes follows the patterns explained above. However, it appears to be less linear most 
probably due to the size of the sample. The table and the graphs which present the correlations 
are located in the Appendix 2.2 of this chapter (Table and Graphs from 2.6 to 2.11).  
 
 
Graph 2.1: Correlation between GAI and TICPI for 185 countries  
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Graph 2.3: Correlation between GCB and CC for 185 countries  
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2.2.2. Strategies for fighting corruption 
 
The variety of anti-corruption strategies is suggested in the literature. Here some of 
them are presented which are considered relevant for the topic of this thesis. They are grouped 
according to the influence they made in the literature. To the first group strategies which are 
discussed as the dominant ones for pursuing effective combating of corruption belong and 
those are: privatization, decentralization, competition of the offices/officials, and special anti-
corruption bodies will be analysed. In the second group is the approach which analyses various 
types of administrative systems and their norms in order to find which one of them curbs 
corruption in the most effective way. Since it started recently it is referred to here as “the more 
recent approach”.  
 
2.2.2.1. Dominant approaches in combating corruption  
 
The economic aspect of corruption and its effects raised various debates in the literature 
which discusses the possible implementation of different strategies in the fight against 
corruption. In the essence of these claims lay the idea that an institutional organization setting 
affects the incentives of public employees regarding the engagement in corrupt deals. Some of 
these strategies, mainly discussed in the literature, will be described here and they are: 
privatization, decentralization, deregulation, and payment reform. However, the specific effects 
of these strategies on transitional countries will be presented in another section of this chapter. 
All these institutional reforms are, as noted earlier, based on the logic of the principal-agent 
framework.  
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2.2.2.1.1. Privatization 
 
Privatization is the act or process of transferring industry operated by a government to 
private ownership.
180
 Bjorvatn and Soreide
181
 claim that the aim of privatization and 
deregulation is “to improve economic efficiency by reducing the role of the state and 
increasing the degree of private sector competition”. On the other hand Boycko et al.182argue 
that privatization is a means with two effects, it increases efficiency and decreases corruption. 
Clarke and Xu
183
see it as a means for combating corruption. They say that corruption in the 
utility sector could be reduced through privatization and increased competition. Privatization, 
on one hand, should be able to improve internal incentives, while competition, on the other 
hand, might reduce the ability to demand bribes. Some authors claim that the effects of the 
privatization are positive
184
. However, Kikeri and Nellis
185
 say that such claims may be 
misleading because they measure success very narrowly, taking into account only the 
profitability of the privatized firms. The net welfare effect might not be positive if high profits 
are based on the higher prices for consumers. There are many studies which show that 
privatization does not always have the desired outcomes: increased competition and 
efficiency
186
.   
Coming back to the relationship between privatization and, some authors try to explore 
it further. For instance, Laffont and Meley
187
 make suggestions, in which cases the 
privatization should be more thorough and less frequent. If the government has financial 
problems, generalized corruption, if corruption of high level officials is intermediary as well as 
at the level of democratic life, privatization should be more frequent. However, it should be 
less frequent if governments are very weak. Bjorvatn and Soreide 
188
 try to explain the reasons 
why corruption “may be a particularly severe problem in the sale of public assets”. One of the 
reasons is that it is usually very difficult to place a value on the assets. According to their 
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analysis, in the case of highly corrupt officials the acquisition price is higher compared to the 
situation when they are less corrupt or honest. However, the price can also fall if the official’s 
propensity for corruption increases. Furthermore, under the corrupt regime the sale of the 
public firms may result in reduced economic efficiency due to highly concentrated industry, 
more precisely monopoly. Lambsdorff 
189
 claims that the impact of privatization on corruption 
is not still very clear although it may have economic advantages. With privatization, corruption 
might be shifted from the public sector to the private, a privatized firm might still pursue 
politically motivated interests, it may also augment corruption as in the case of transitional 
countries which experienced massive corruption within the process of privatization. Some 
authors try to explore this relationship. Without going into a deeper analysis of privatization, 
which is a highly complex topic and might be a subject for another doctorate, the main point of 
this section is that in the case of corruption, even though economically beneficial, some 
strategies, such as privatization, under corruption, provide results which do not always 
correspond to the desired outcomes.  
 
2.2.2.1.2. Decentralization and deregulation  
 
Decentralization 
 
Decentralization is the distribution of the administrative functions or powers of central 
authorities among several local authorities.
190
 Bardhan and Mookherjee
191
 explain that the 
“trend toward greater decentralization” was initiated by the disappointment in centralized 
government who were perceived as rent seeking, corrupt and unaccountable. They ask if 
decentralization could be a useful institutional reform for reducing corruption. There are 
various types of decentralisation. For instance, Fisman and Gatti
192
 explore fiscal 
decentralization and claim that it has strong and significant effects of lowering corruption as 
predicted by the theory of decentralization. However, they say that further research is needed 
on the most effective type of decentralization for combating corruption combat and in which 
governmental services decentralization would have the strongest impact on corruption. Another 
type is political decentralisation. Nas et al.
193
 and Rose-Ackerman
194
, claim that decentralized 
political systems tend to have lower corruption due to the stronger accountability mechanisms. 
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Lederman et al.
195
 explain that political decentralization in the sense of enhancing local 
governments in practice has two effects: one effect increases the ability of the states to compete 
against each other for citizens, and the other allows the state to increase regulation over the 
areas already covered by the central government.  
The term decentralization in the literature has various meanings and, besides the one 
provided by the definition at the beginning of this section, it also includes the competition of 
offices within the government. Lederman et al.
196
 discuss corruption and institutional 
accountability and claim that decentralization can increase transparency which is one of the key 
aspects in combating corruption. Decentralized institutional design has the same effects on 
public servants and the level of corruption like the market structure on the price in any 
industry. More precisely, if several public agencies provide the same service with the 
possibility for citizens to choose from which one to obtain the service, competition among 
them will reduce corruption. In this case, the agencies compete and cannot control each other 
compared to the case in which agencies share the power and could extract the rent from the 
same source. In the former case, according to Shleifer and Vishny
197
, the service provided by 
different bureaucracies is substitute since they do not have control over each other.  Some other 
authors, like Bowles
198
 support this view saying that by opening up alternatives, competition is 
introduced because it lowers the capacity of the civil servant to uphold the citizen. Laffont and 
Martimort
199
 argue that in the case of a benevolent regulator who is in charge of the 
implementation of socially optimal contract, separation of power, in the sense of splitting 
regulatory authorities among different bodies, is not necessary. It always uses its powers to 
maximize social welfare. However, in the opposite case, of a non-benevolent regulator, it is 
likely that power will be used for pursuing its personal agendas. Therefore, separation is 
required which divides the information available and limits the socially harmful activities. 
Rose-Ackerman
200
 claims that the roots of corruption usually lay in the discretionary power of 
civil servants and it could be avoided if the same service is interchangeable among a few 
officials. Because no one of the bureaucrats has the monopoly, power citizens can choose who 
they want to approach and if one does not provide the required service there is always an 
alternative.  
However, different types of decentralization affect corruption differently. In the case of 
the federal state Lederman et al.
201
explain that on the one hand political decentralization with 
states being able to overlap regulations appears to increase corruption. On the other hand, 
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decentralization of the expenditures through the level of national government reduces it. 
Regarding competition among the offices, Lederman et al. claim that although beneficial if it 
introduces new layers of bureaucratic decision-making it could only deepen the problem of 
corruption. Bardhan and Mookherjee
202
 make a distinction regarding the level of a country’s 
development. They say that “…decentralization has different effects in different countries…”. 
In developing and transitional countries it faces “common problem of capture and lack of 
accountability of local governments”. The capture is related to poor functioning due to, among 
other things, asymmetry in local wealth, social status, literacy, and availability of information 
to the citizens.  If decentralization in this case aimed to be successful it should be monitored by 
the central government. Regarding accountability, Bardhan and Mookherjee claim that 
“decentralization by itself is unlikely to be a panacea for its problems”. It should be 
accompanied by “institutional safeguards” which should prevent the capture.  
In general, decentralisation is seen as beneficial, although its application should be 
analysed carefully. Lambsdorff’s203 opinion is that bringing government closer to the people 
could reduce corruption although this approach is not without shortcomings. However, the 
alternative to a centralized public sector should be observed closely. If local government is 
“captured by strong local players” it is less likely that decentralization in that case would 
provide the desired outcome. He points out that empirical research on the effects of 
decentralization on corruption show mixed results and “depend on how decentralization is 
measured” because decentralisation, “a simple economic recipe”, does not necessarily improve 
the fight against corruption. If put into corruption context, decentralization needs to be 
accompanied by other factors such as: culture, civic cooperation and trust. Therefore, one 
should also be aware that it does not work as a panacea. For instance, Fun et al.
204
 claim that if 
a country has a high number of administrative “tiers” bribery is more frequent. Lessmann and 
Markwardt
205
 stress that decentralization has the effect of lowering corruption only in the cases 
where freedom of press is high. If that is not the case in a certain country decentralization 
causes more harm than good. They claim that the only solution for this problem is to set up the 
monitoring system which should increase accountability of bureaucrats and strengthen the 
press freedom. They conclude that “decentralization is not in every case the technique to fight 
corruption” and “one size does not fit all”.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
202
Bardhan, P. and Mookherjee, D. (2006): “Decentralization, corruption and government accountability”, in  
Rose-Ackerman, S. (ed.): International Handbook on the Economics of Corruption, Edward Elgar 2006, pp. 161-
188 
203
Lambsdorff, J. G. (2006): “Causes and consequences of corruption: What do we know from a cross-section of 
countries?”  in Rose-Ackerman, S. (ed.): International Handbook on the Economics of Corruption, Edward Elgar 
2006, pp.3-52 
204
Fun, S. C., Lin, C. and Treisman, D. (2009): “Political decentralization and corruption: Evidence from around 
the world”, Journal of Public Economics, 93(2009), pp. 14-34 
205Lessmann, C. and Markwardt, G. (2010): “One Size Fits All? Decentralization, Corruption, and the Monitoring 
of Bureaucrats”, World Development, 2010, Vol. 38, No. 4, pp. 631–646 
Ana Jakovljević, LL.M 
73 
 
Deregulation 
 
Deregulation is defined as the reduction or elimination of government power in a 
particular industry, usually enacted to create more competition within the industry.
206
 This 
practically means removing various rules and regulations which give the state authority to 
intervene. OECD report
207
  stress that “administrative burden reduction policies” are in the last 
twenty years highly ranked on the political agendas of many countries. Administrative burdens 
are in that sense defined as “regulatory costs in the form of asking for permits, filling out 
forms, and reporting and notification requirements for the government”. The issue is 
sometimes also referred to as “cutting the red tape”. Bozeman and Feeney208  define red tape as 
“rules, regulations and procedures that require compliance but do not meet the organization’s 
functional objective for the rule”. Discussing its effects they claim that research show red tape 
is negatively related to “performance outcomes and employee alienation, public service 
motivation, communication and performance”.209 
Regarding the effects of over regulation on corruption Rose-Ackerman
210
, Ades and di 
Tella
211
 and Blis and di Tella
212
 argue that corruption can be reduced only by increasing 
competition. Since the interdependence of the red tape and corruption is considered very 
strong, Guriev
213
 claims that corruption and red tape “cannot be treated independently” in the 
attempts at making public administration efficient. Mishra
214
 explains that anti-corruption 
strategies in general implement the widespread idea that “greater competition through 
liberalization and deregulation would lead to lower levels of corruption” and Ogus215 stresses 
that from regulations many opportunities for corrupt transactions arose. Therefore, in order to 
decrease the opportunity space Western regulatory developments advocate for deregulation. 
Lederman et al.
216
 say that reduction in the amount or intensity of regulation should, in general, 
reduce the level of corruption.   
However, Mishra
217
 explains that despite the cross country results, experiences of many 
countries present the reality in which deregulation and liberalization did not lower the 
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corruption but rather increased it
218
. Furthermore, Ogus
219
 points out that a superficial 
conclusion on deregulation should be avoided. This applies especially to the cases of the 
jurisdictions in which private law is ineffective in dealing with many types of market failures 
and therefore the regulatory intervention is necessary. In this case, Platteau
220
 argues that the 
question is how dismantling of regulatory opportunities excess could be achieved.  
To sum up the previous section, it could be said that although aimed at achieving 
corruption combat effectively, decentralization and deregulation are not a universal cure which 
could be applied to any case. There are positive and negative sides of both approaches which 
should be analysed closely before making any decision on their implementation. Applied in the 
context of transitional countries they gave, in many cases, an outcome different from the 
desired one. Further discussion on this issue will be provided in this chapter in the section 
devoted specifically to transitional countries and the reform process of public administration 
carried out in the last two decades. 
 
2.2.2.1.3. Civil servants payment 
 
The important aspects discussed in the literature on corruption and public 
administration concerns the level and structure of the salaries of civil servants. For the former 
one it is claimed that the wage level affects the bureaucrat’s incentives to engage in corrupt 
transactions while the latter depends on various factors, such as the size of public and the 
strength of the private sector.  
Regarding the level of salary Rose-Ackerman 
221
 claims that corruption is “a survival 
strategy” in cases when public sector wage is low. It may also produce a selection bias since 
the most skilled workers are not rewarded and therefore they look for job opportunities in 
private sector or abroad. She further explains that although some of the public servants are 
committed to public service it is less likely that the optimal number of them will be employed, 
or they might not be qualified enough on various grounds. Mishra
222
 explains that low wages in 
bureaucracy are seen as one of the main reasons for corruption of public servants for two 
reasons. First, the financial status of the parties which put the civil servant in the unequal 
position to his client may induce him to abuse his power in order to improve his income. 
Second, high wages will deter corrupt behaviour because civil servants might not be ready to 
lose it once caught for corrupt behaviour. However, this is true if civil servants face a 
sufficiently high risk of being fired in case of corruption. Klitgaard
223
 and Chand and Moene
224
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advocate for this “efficiency wage” approach, which should replace the system of large fines 
for taking bribes, usually difficult to implement. Enforcement literature also supports this 
view.
225
 However, Mishra
226
 explains that this approach is not without its shortcomings. It is 
based predominantly on the ability of monitoring officials and if the probability of detection is 
small this approach will not be effective.
227
 They might even work in the opposite direction 
since the higher wages could raise the amount of the bribe.  
A couple of studies tried to provide the empirical evidence between the level of wages 
and corruption. In a cross country regression of 28 countries Van Rijckeghem and Weder
228
 
find a “significant negative relationship between corruption and wages”. Some other studies do 
not find strong support for these claims.
229
 Dabla-Norris
230
 explains that in economies with 
high levels of corruption, the weak monitoring systems are present and low salaries for public 
service employees. In the case of massive bureaucratic apparatus providing of “proper wage 
incentives” might be costly and difficult to achieve. This measure cannot be applied alone but 
only as part of the general public service reform which assumes: restructuring, increasing of 
wages, strengthening the institutional controls by “enforcing the standards for ethical 
behaviour, improving accounting and auditing practices” and implementing well defined and 
transparent rules.  
Discussing the structure of the salaries Rose-Ackerman
231
 claims that an increase in the 
wages could be effective only if “tied to productivity” together with downsizing of the public 
sector in general. This is, however, achievable only if “jobs are available in the private sector”. 
If the private sector functions well then the reform of the public sector is possible. 
Furthermore, Seidman and Seidman
232
 advocate raising the level of salaries as a reward for 
honest behaviour the promotion of which will alleviate corruption. However, the literature 
review provided above presents vivid discussion which shows that there are no universal 
strategies which automatically hit the target. They all appear to be context dependent and 
different types of countries should have different approaches towards them.  
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2.2.2.1.4. Special Anti-corruption Bodies 
 
Establishment of numerous anti-corruption agencies (ACA) in the last decades, as one 
of the important element in the fight against corruption, is according to Meagher
233
the result of 
two successful cases achieved in Singapore and Hong Kong. These two countries opted for the 
establishment of one strong agency for combating corruption instead of using a multiple-
agency approach which assumes the strengthening of the capacity of various governmental 
agencies. Meagher explains the differences between the two approaches. A multiple-agency 
approach includes the combination of traditional state institutions with units/agencies 
specialized in combating corruption. In this system, judicial and administrative agencies still 
possess traditional capacities and legitimacy while newly established bodies aim to “address 
gaps, weaknesses and newly emerged opportunities for corruption.” The single-agency 
approach moves to the anti-corruption agency investigation and prevention, the core functions 
of combat. However, this approach does not move all functions into a single agency but places 
a “number of key capabilities, responsibilities and resources under one roof”. It further means 
that anti-corruption bodies are still required to interact with courts, prosecutors and ministries. 
Meagher provides the reasons for choosing the second approach. He says that experiences of 
both countries shows that this approach strengthened the legitimacy because a strong agency, 
with a centralized information system and intelligence reduces the coordination problems and 
sends a strong signal of confidence to investors.  
The basic idea of the two agencies mentioned changed over time and the variety of 
agency types and anti-corruption bodies, commissions and committees arose in different 
countries. According to the OECD report
234
 the creation of these types of institutions became 
important when the question of corruption gained international importance. It was closely 
related to the process of political democratization, building the rule of law and good 
governance in many post-authoritarian countries, transitional and developing. Despite variety 
some patterns can be established based on their different purpose. In general there are three 
models: 1) multi-purpose agencies with law enforcement powers – identified with Hong Kong 
and Singapore agencies. It has two key pillars, repression and prevention while prosecution is a 
separate function. Among transitional countries Latvia and Lithuania has adopted this model; 
2) law enforcement type institutions is the most common model applied in Western Europe. It 
can be implemented in detection, investigation and prosecution of the anti-corruption body(s). 
Poland, Romania, Hungary and Croatia are transitional countries which adopted it; finally 3) 
preventive, policy development and co-ordination institutions which includes one or more 
prevention functions in the domain of assessing risks, monitoring in implementation of the 
strategies and action plans and conflict of interest rules, training of officials, etc. Transitional 
countries who implemented this model are Slovenia, FYROM, Albania, Montenegro, Bulgaria 
and Serbia.  
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Hence, the performance of these bodies is questionable since the various reviews 
indicate failures rather than successes. Meagher
235
 explains that when the anti-corruption 
agencies are established it is usually difficult to perceive their limitations. If they are not 
“structurally independent” they cannot be above bureaucrats and politicians. Their success 
depends on the cooperation with the government which is not well maintained in many cases. 
There are various explanations for this outcome. For instance, the OECD lists “Seven Deadly 
Sins”236  which include: political, economic, governance, legal, organisational, performance 
and public confidence factors. The lesson learned from the OECD analysis dictates that 
although establishing an ACA has as a main goal the reduction of corruption some important 
facts should be kept in mind. One of them is the answer to a very important question: which 
model in the particular country context is appropriate since legal and institutional transplants 
have a tendency to fail in different, foreign social environment. Therefore in the decision 
making process some factors should be taken into account such as the level of the corruption in 
the country; competences, integrity and capacities of existing institutions; constitutional 
framework; existing legal and criminal justice system and financial resources. Johnsøn et al.237 
explain that the initial enthusiasm about anti-corruption agencies is today replaced by 
defeatism. The UN report for 2005
238
 concludes that “there are actually very few examples of 
successful independent anti-corruption commissions/agencies”. The reason for this lies, 
according to Johnsøn et al.239, in the fact that they are “never given an easy or a well-defined 
task” because they were expected to “overcome the inadequacy of traditional law enforcement 
structures and processes and assume a leading role in implementing national anti-corruption 
strategies”. Authors explain that well-grounded debate on the agencies’ performance could be 
made only on the basis of a credible measure and evaluations of what they are able to achieve. 
Therefore, they develop a methodology which should in future help in monitoring the 
performance and the effectiveness of the anti-corruption agencies. The establishment and 
results of anti-corruption agencies in transitional countries will be presented in one of the 
coming sections.  
 
2.2.2.2. More recent approach for the improvement of corruption combat 
 
If summarized, economic strategies which target the administration structure, described 
above, show mixed and sometimes limited results. They all try to encourage the setting up of 
proper incentive systems by providing the proper institutional framework. This brings into the 
discussion some other aspects of the corruption fight which targets the value system and its 
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connection to corruption. However, their suggestion is guided from clear economic perspective 
which does not include the internal values of the administration. Some authors see in this fact 
the shortcomings of the above described strategies. They aim to shed light on another aspect 
which is considered important for designing of sound anti-corruption policies. In that context 
Rauch and Evans
240
 look at the institutional characteristics of bureaucracies which are 
associated with low levels of corruption or red tape. Their research is guided by “Weberian 
state hypothesis”, whose key characteristics are: recruitment based on merit through 
competitive examinations while further promoting and firing should be based on civil service 
procedures and not on political ones. Testing the hypothesis on 35 countries, they find that 
“meritocratic recruitment is…the most important for improving bureaucratic performance”, 
while internal promotion and career stability are in second place. This implies, according to 
authors, that “behaviour of bureaucrats is rooted in organizational norms and structures”. 
Olsen
241
 discusses the “shift from Weberian bureaucracy to a market organization or network 
organization” and argues for rediscovering Weber’s analysis. He explains that “contemporary 
democracies are involved in a struggle over institutional identities and institutional balances” 
and therefore in order to better understand the current administration setting it is necessary to 
“rediscover bureaucracy as an administrative form”, more precisely as an “analytical concept” 
which has certain ideas about its organization. Olsen claims that since administrative theory 
and practice are context dependent, it is necessary to learn about “political, social, cultural and 
economic characteristics that impinge on the administration”.  
Building upon the analysis of Rauch and Evans, Dahlström et al.242 explore the role of 
professional bureaucracy in corruption combat. They claim that “actions and choices of public 
servants” are usually disregarded in discussions on corruption because current literature 
focuses “mainly on the political side of the state” while only a few studies “consider its 
bureaucratic side”. They test three hypotheses, by taking the “bureaucratic side of the state into 
account” and bridging political and bureaucratic factors into one approach. The focus on 
political factors in explaining corruption focuses on the impact of the type of political 
regime
243
, the members of the political elite
244
 and the characteristics of the electoral system
245
. 
                                                          
240
Rauch, J. E. and Evans, P. B. (2000): “Bureaucratic structure and bureaucratic performance in less developed 
countries”, Journal of Public Economics 75, 2000, pp. 49-71 
241
Olsen, J. P. (2005): “Maybe It Is Time to Rediscover Bureaucracy”, Journal of Public Administration  Research 
and Theory 16, pp.1-24 
242Dahlström, C., Lapuente, V. and Teorell, J. (2012): “The Merit of Meritocratization: Politics, Bureaucracy, and 
the Institutional Deterrents of Corruption”, Political Research Quarterly, SAGE Publications, 2012, 65: pp.656-
668 
243
For further discussion see: Harris-White, B. and White, G. (1996): Liberalization and New Forms of corruption, 
Brighton, NJ: Institute of Development Studies; Sung, H. E. (2004): “Democracy and Political Corruption: A 
Cross-National Comparison”, Crime, Law and Social Change 41, pp.179-93; Montinola, G. R. and Jackman, R. 
W. (2002): “Sources of Corruption: A Cross-Country Study”, British Journal of Political Science 32, pp.147-170;  
244
For more insights see: Dollar, D., Fisman, R. and Gatti, R. (2001): “Are Women Really the ‘Fairer’ Sex? 
Corruption and Women in Government”, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 46, pp. 423-429; 
Wängnerud, L. (2009): “Women in Parliaments: Descriptive and Substantive Representation”, Annual Review of 
Political Science 12, pp.51-69. 
245
For further discussion see: Persson, T., Tabellini, G. and Trebbi, F. (2003): “Electoral Rules and Corruption”, 
Journal of the European Economic Association 1, pp.958-989; Kunikova, J. and Rose-Ackerman, S. (2005): 
“Electoral Rules and Constitutional Structures as Constraints on Corruption”, British Journal of Political Science 
 
Ana Jakovljević, LL.M 
79 
 
On the other hand, scarce studies regarding the administration’s design show that the Weberian 
type of organization has “positive effects in terms of good governance”. However, it has a wide 
set of structural characteristics with the main features such as: merit based recruitment and 
promotion, formalized and standardized procedures, hierarchical organization and life tenure. 
Dahlström et al. seek to find which of the characteristics mentioned has the highest influence 
on corruption control. As previously mentioned they focus on three issues presented in the 
Table 2.2. 
 
Table 2.2: Bureaucratic structures as deterrents of corruption 
Hypotheses on the effects of 
bureaucratic structure over 
corruption 
Causal mechanisms Observable indicators 
Hypothesis 1: A “closed 
bureaucracy” will curb 
corruption. 
Esprit de corps: The key is to “create 
better types” through socialization of 
certain values, strong ties among the 
members of the Corps, and isolation 
from external influences. 
1a.Competitive formal examinations 
1b. Career stability/secure tenure 
1c.Special laws for public 
employment(as opposed to standard 
labour laws) 
Hypothesis 2: A “well-paid 
bureaucracy” will curb  
corruption 
Temptation: The key is to pay 
bureaucrats enough so they do not 
engage in corrupt behaviour to 
complement their salaries 
2. Competitive salaries in the public 
sector 
Hypothesis 3: A “professional 
bureaucracy” will curb  
corruption 
Separation of interests: The interests 
of principals and bureaucratic agents 
are separated because they are 
responsive to different chains of 
accountability. 
3a. Meritocratic recruitment 
3b.Non-politicization of public service 
posts 
3c. Internal promotions 
Source: Dahlström et al., “The Merit of Meritocratization: Politics, Bureaucracy, and the Institutional Deterrents of 
Corruption, pp. 4 
 
The first hypothesis questions the classification of the bureaucracies as “open and 
closed”246 and their relation to corruption. The essential difference between the two lies in the 
institutional organization. While the latter is characterized by “career stability, life tenure and 
special labour laws which govern the public administration employment, the former are 
governed by the opposite rules. Closed bureaucracies operate according to inner rules called 
Corps which “set common norms…fostering impartial and non-corrupt behaviour”. It is 
therefore assumed that this type, due to its stronger ties among bureaucrat’s and devotion to the 
organizational goals, should prevent corruption
247
. However, the authors do not find the 
support for this claim. The second hypothesis tests the arguments from the economics literature 
that incentives of the civil servants could be affected by the level of wages as well as the 
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probability of detection and penalization for corruption
248
 and, like the first one did not get 
support from the data. The third hypothesis, “based on overlooked Weberian characteristics”, 
tests the effects of professionalism of the bureaucracy on corruption. Using the distinction 
between “organizationally oriented” and “professionally oriented” bureaucrats, made by 
Silberman
249, Dalhström et al.250 claim that merit based recruitment of professional 
bureaucracy reduces corruption because it establishes the “separation of interests” since agents 
selected this way have interests different from politicians. Its formation creates the 
environment in which two groups, professional bureaucrats and elected officials, have different 
“chains of responsiveness”, different careers and the possibility to monitor each other and as 
such improve the fight against corruption. To conclude, according to this study the essential 
issues in the fight against corruption in public administration are “employment terms” and 
level of (in)dependence of public servants on politicians.  
In a further analysis of the relationship between the administration design and 
corruption Dahlström and Lapuente251 reflect upon the claims that politicians and public 
administration should be institutionally isolated. The isolation can happen in two ways: 
through the separation of activities and the separation of careers. In the former case the 
activities of the bureaucracy are “as separated as possible” from the activities of the elected 
politicians and the two cannot intervene in the processes of the other. This means that public 
servants cannot influence the policy making nor elected representatives the policy 
implementation. However, the results of the analysis follow the line of the previous study and 
authors conclude that the separation of careers, rather than the separation of activates, curbs 
corruption. This section aimed to shed light on the approach that analyses the values within the 
particular type of administration which a particular setting induces. As previously mentioned, 
their correlation with corruption is still the field which needs exploration.  
 
2.3. Structure of the institutions: Public Administration and transition 
 
As mentioned above, according to some authors, the dominantly applied anti-corruption 
strategies overlook specific issues in the public administration. Following this claim this 
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chapter will look at two structural issues of public administration. The first refers to the 
structure of the institutions, their prescribed values and goals, while the second looks at the 
structure of human capital employed in public service, more precisely Public service 
motivation (PSM). Some of the administration values were already presented in previous 
sections. Different types of administration promote different values and their understanding is 
essential for any public administration research. As Bekke et al.
252
 claim historical dimensions 
and specific political and social contexts are incorporated into the civil service systems of a 
certain country. Therefore this section presents the public administration in three types of the 
societies: capitalist, socialist and transitional. Each of these societies is characterized by a 
specific institutional setting which reflects the image of a particular society and as such should 
be helpful in locating corruption within it.  
 
2.3.1. Public administration in Capitalism 
 
The literature discussing public administration in capitalist, developed, societies makes 
a distinction between a few models of public administration: traditional public administration; 
public management, including new public management, and responsive governance. To this list 
some authors add New Weberian State approach, which among others, is presented in this 
section. According to the UN
253
 many developing and transitional economies, with various 
histories and legacies, such as colonialism and socialism, applied these models of public 
administration which at the end have been modified in distinctive ways. The characteristics of 
the traditional public administration, public management and responsive governance are 
provided in the Table 2.3. It summarizes the differences among the models regarding: the 
positions of citizens towards the state, to whom senior officials are accountable, which 
principles guide the work of the administration and how the success is measured; finally, what 
are the key attributes considered important for the functioning of public administration. 
Following the above provided short introduction, the next sections will deal with particular 
characteristics of each of the administration types together with New Weberian State approach. 
These discussions aim to provide the full administrative picture for a better understanding of 
the points and arguments made in this thesis. It will start with the type which is considered the 
foundation of modern public administration, the Max Weber’s bureaucracy. 
 
Table 2.3: Models of public administration  
 Public 
administration 
Public 
management 
Responsive 
governance 
Citizen-state 
relationship 
Obedience Entitlement Empowerment 
Accountability 
of senior officials 
Politicians Customers  Citizens and 
stakeholders 
Guiding 
principles 
Compliance with rules 
and regulations 
Efficiency and 
results 
Accountability, 
transparency and 
participation 
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Criteria for 
success 
Output Outcome Process 
Key attribute Impartiality Professionalism  Responsiveness  
Source: UN report p.7 
 
 
2.3.1.1. Traditional public administration (Max Weber) 
 
The definition of traditional public administration relates to the second half of the 19
th
 
century in the countries with undergoing industrialization and emergence of civil service.
254
 
The goal in that time was to create an impartial civil service system which, by taking politics 
and politicians out of the field of personnel management, should be the protector of the public 
interest and therefore a symbol of continuity and stability. These ideas were expressed by Max 
Weber who is according to Menzel
255
  “widely recognized as the intellectual father of modern 
bureaucracy”. Although Warner256 agrees that the most commonly referenced treatment of 
bureaucracy is that of Max Weber, he reminds us that the analysis of administration in 
representative governments started with John Stuart Mill. He claims that Mill wrote before 
Weber and set out “succinct yet comprehensive theory of bureaucracy within the representative 
government”. In his work Consideration on Representative Government (1861) Mill draws 
some conclusions that are considered important for the discussion in this section.  Mill’s257 
central concerns in his work are liberty, individual rights, and limited government. He claims 
that good government is more than honest officials and well-run institutions; it is striving for 
the development of the intelligence and virtue of the citizens while in return improving itself. 
However, he is concerned that in representative democracies the wrong perception of 
democracy itself can endanger good governance. Namely, the democracy is not about people 
governing themselves, but that they have the security of good government. Continuing the 
discussion on good governance, Mill says that governing requires professional training, skills 
and devotion and public business should be the primary occupation of a group that is specially 
trained for governing. Bureaucracy plays a major role in the progress of the state and the 
improvement of the people; its qualities of stability, skills, knowledge and experience help to 
mediate the passion and impulse of democratic decision making.  
Analysing bureaucracy, Weber
258
 describes the conversion of patrimonial bureaucracy 
into the modern rational one by linking the expertise and rational administrative capabilities of 
bureaucracy with industrial development. He argues that bureaucracy develops more perfectly, 
the more it is “dehumanized”. It is more complete if it succeeds in “eliminating from official 
business love, hatred, and all purely personal, irrational and emotional elements which escape 
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calculations”. This is appraised as its special virtue by capitalism. He also lists the principles 
by which officialdom is functioning: (1) the principle of fixed and official jurisdictional area 
ordered by the laws or administrative regulations; (2) the principle of office hierarchy in which 
superiors supervise subordinates; (3) the principle of written documents, “the files”, which 
ordain its preservation in the original or draught form; (4) requirements of thorough and expert 
training of office management; (5) in case of full development of the office, official activity 
demands the full working capacity of the officials; finally,  (6) the management of the office 
follows general rules, which are more or less stable, more or less exhaustive and which can be 
learned. Regarding officials, Weber claims that, for the external position, office holding is a 
“vocation” and for the internal position some patterns could be noted: (1) officials enjoy social 
esteem, due to the specific position guaranteed by law; (2) an official is appointed by a superior 
authority and he derives his position “from above” in contrast to an elected official, who 
derived his position “from below”; (3) officials tenure is for life; (4) the officials receive 
pecuniary compensation of a normally fixed salary and the old age security provided by a 
pension; finally, (5) the official is set for a career within the hierarchical order of the public 
service. He moves from the lower, less important, and lower paid to the higher positions based 
on terms of “seniority’ or grades achieved in a developed system of expert examination. 
Weber’s view of the administration was and still is a subject of discussion among scholars. 
Peters
259
 discusses the principles of the traditional administration and groups them in 
six “chestnuts” which governs the thinking of public service. The first one is apolitical civil 
service which assumes that civil servants should “serve any master” regardless of their own 
personal opinion due to the expectance of their loyalty towards the governments of the day. 
The complement to this principle is the concept of competences which promote objective 
qualifications as “the first hurdle for recruitment”. Peters claims that the policy role of civil 
servants is obvious not only in the implementation process but also in the formulation stage of 
the laws in which they have an advisory role. The second principle is that management should 
be hierarchical and rule-bounded within the public service and civil servants should have 
authority “to implement and enforce regulations outside of it”. The third principle assumes that 
the position of the public servant is permanent and stable, usually described as “lifetime 
commitment”. The fourth principle establishes the civil service as institutionalized service 
which “is governed as a separate body” which should make it “distinctive and professional”. 
Strong internal regulation is the fifth characteristic of traditional bureaucracy which should 
serve as a control and accountability mechanism. Finally, the equality as a principle of the 
traditional type of administration assumes a couple of aspects. First, it should provide equal 
employment conditions for all civil servants in the same rank. Second, in dealing with clients 
civil service should provide equality in front of the law for everybody following the principle 
“sine irae et studio (without anger or bias)”. As mentioned in the previous sector, some authors 
like Lægreidand Wise260 call this model “closed” because of its main assumption that “public 
sector employment is different from work in other sectors” and as such asks for specific 
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employment rules which will regulate “recruitment, promotion and mobility”. Based on the 
description provided above and some of the other discussions
261
, Table 2.4 summarizes the 
principles and characteristics by which the “Weberian” public administration is organized. 
According to the UN report
262
 the Weberian bureaucratic model when applied to different 
countries around the world, produced variations based on the national legal traditions and 
cultural factors. However, the underlying similarities were more crucial than the differences.  
 
Table 2.4: Principles and Characteristics of Weberian Administration 
Weberian administration 
Principles  Characteristics 
 An apolitical civil service; 
 Hierarchy and rules;  
 Legality 
 Permanence and stability; 
 An institutional civil service; 
 Internal regulation; 
 Equality (internally and externally to the 
organization). 
 official duties are fixed by rules, laws, or 
administrative regulations;  
 offices are arranged hierarchical with a clearly 
ordered system of super- and subordinate 
relationships;  
 management is based on written documents;  
 management is selected and promoted via the 
merit principle; 
 the official is a full-time employee;  
  management follows general rules that are stable 
and can be learned 
Source: based on Peters, “The Future of Governing”, pp. 1-12 
 The discussion about Weberian administration here will be coloured by one line of 
criticism which points to some of its misinterpretations. Samier
263
 claims that literature which 
discusses Weber’s administration mainly disregards history, values and three forms of 
authority, important features in his writings, which lead to “many distortions, 
misrepresentations and misuses of Weber”. The main point in this article is that instead of 
analysing the organizational structure one should focus on an individual level of analysis which 
is in this case mentality. Interpreting Weber, Samier says that causal factors, mentioned above, 
produce mentality. Historical factors create inherited conditions and a “conceptual framework 
through which we perceive and interpret the world”. Human nature, discussed by Weber and 
historical context together create the values “from which our social action is derived and 
authority fashioned”. Resolving the conflicts among these factors should lead to the changes 
and improvements towards the ideal type of bureaucracy. The criticism of Weberian 
administration introduced a new approach towards the public administration. The foundation 
for this approach lies in the market and its functioning mechanisms. The next section provides 
more insights into this approach. 
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2.3.1.2. Public Management and New Public Management (NPM) 
 
Public management 
 
 In the late 19
th
 century the idea of business management entered into the discussions 
about public administration reforms. The UN
264
 report says that the United States progressive 
movement stressed the importance of separating the administration and politics and 
employment of professional managers. At the core of the public management model, called 
“managerialism” are the practices developed in the private sector, such as: unsecured tenure; 
pay, remuneration and mobility governed by market conditions; use of contracts or temporary 
workers, etc. The public management model is not fond of strict, rigid rules, uniform systems 
and formal procedures which are typical of the traditional mode but for efficiency and results. 
Therefore, managers at all levels should exercise initiatives and be driven by the business 
objectives and bottom-line organizational performance. These ideas were the main starting 
point for reviewing the efficiency of the government in the USA and Europe during the 20
th
 
century. The change of terminology describing the essence of the administration 
understanding, from “personnel administration” to “human resource management” illustrates 
the difference between two concepts of traditional and new. The new model draws practices of 
managing human resources from management science and applies them according to the 
“business needs” and “business model” of the particular organization.265 
 The main criticism which public management addresses to traditional public 
administration is “one-size-fits-all” approach. Regarding the business circumstances different 
means should be employed: contracting, competition, permanent employment, team work, etc. 
However, ironically, the main critics addressed to public management are that it tries to impose 
itself globally, promoting in that way the “one-size-fits-all” approach. Although the proponents 
of this view believe that management is a generic term and it could be used in a sense “one size 
fits all”, reality shows that business management doctrines and practice are not that easy to 
categorize as a coherent component of the traditional public administration model. This is 
because of their constant change and adaptation due to business dynamics as well as the fact 
that they are susceptible to the influence of waves of fashion which spread around the world 
usually disregarding local environment and exhibiting constant experimentation.  
 
New Public Management (NPM)    
 
New Public Management (NPM) represents a modern development in public 
management tradition and it is an example of globalized public sector reform. It generates a set 
of similar doctrines, born mainly in Anglo-Saxons countries, which were in play in the 1970s 
in many OECD countries regarding the administrative reform. Olsen
266
 describes it as a 
movement which aimed to promote the “opening up public administration to society, beyond 
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the traditional gate keeping institutions, and changing the relations between societal 
institutions”. This practically means that the focus is shifted from public service to public 
service delivery. One of the founders of the NPM, Hood
267
 describes it as a marriage of “new 
institutional economics and “managerialism” in which one partner brought to the marriage, on 
one hand, public choice, transaction costs and principle-agent theories, and on the other a set of 
administrative reform doctrines built on contestability, user choice, incentives and 
transparency. The other partner contributed with ideas of “professional management” and 
higher discretionary power in order to achieve a better output. Dunleavy and Hood
268
 advocate 
strongly for the shift from the classical model towards the market based one. Osborne and 
Gaebler
269
 say that this transformation was “inevitable” because of the need for advanced 
administration while Peters
270
 explains that NPM includes at the internal level of the 
administration participation, flexibility, and deregulation while externally it uses market 
mechanisms. Describing the meaning of NPM idea, Pfiffner 
271
 claims that this view actually 
criticises the efficiency of the organizations with similar means of organization, more precisely 
fully developed government, and targets its marginal improvement. In order to achieve this, 
NPM argues for decentralized administration, delegation of discretion, contracting for goods 
and services and use of market mechanisms of competition and customer service. According to 
him the main contrast between NPM and traditional public administration is reflected through 
the tension between accountability and efficiency. The traditional model argues for 
accountability, while the NPM advocates for allowing more creativity and flexibility through 
the system which will encourage employees (managers) to take risks and be more 
entrepreneurial and as a result better fulfil the goals of efficiency and improved customer 
service. The accountability in this sense will be achieved through measuring output rather than 
by monitoring processes.  Taking this into account it becomes clear that if a government 
system did not yet achieve the necessary level of accountability NPM methods could be very 
risky and harmful.  
 Olsen
272
 explains that NPM reforms include the shrinking of the public sector and 
limiting the governmental role in society with the main goal of serving the economy. Neo-
classical ideas are used as a foundation for “market-and-management reforms” which 
“celebrate individualism, consumer sovereignty and customer-driven services”. According to 
him, compliance with formal rules and procedures are replaced by performance and cost-
efficiency of which the main features are: privatization, deregulation, commercialization, etc. 
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Administrative agencies have “clear tasks, goals, resources and borders”, and as such are 
responsible for the outcomes. The ideas of accountability and control exist but in a different 
form. They are related to “discover and accommodate market signals”. Olsen claims that 
according to the main idea of the movement that market actors and consumers are rational 
actors, NPM sees the population as a “collection of customers and clients focused on individual 
benefits”. As such they have a commercial relationship to the state instead of political which 
denies the “special nature” of the public sector.  
Lægreid and Wise273 describe NPM as an “open” bureaucratic system, as opposed to an 
earlier described “closed” one, which challenges two main doctrines of the traditional public 
administration concept. First, it abandons the strict employment procedures leaving “managers 
to manage” and shift the responsibility for the selection to their hands. Second, it tried to blurs 
the lines between public and private employment through its key field Human Resource 
Management (HRM). According to this view HRM should: 1) normalize the status of the 
public sector employee, meaning their transformation to a business contract by excluding 
security of tenure; 2) focus on performance or output particularly expressed in “pay for 
performance” contracting practice; however this practice conflicts with the core capacities of 
the administration such as: continuity, integrity and commitment to the public service which 
might be blurred if private practices are adopted in total and 3) implement customerization with 
incorporation of customer-satisfaction indicators into measurement of performance.
274
 
Nevertheless, like all approaches, NPM is not without criticism. The main argument, on 
which NPM based its criticism of the traditional bureaucracy, is that it has no adequate answer 
to efficiency except increasing the volume of regulations which further creates inefficiency.
275
 
However, these ideas are described as predominantly Anglo-Saxon and not well suited to the 
countries in which bureaucracy is substantially based on the traditional rules which are not so 
easy to change; therefore they are not receptive to marketization as a method of improving 
public administration. Hood
276
 points out that although most OECD countries moved in an 
NPM direction it is questionable whether it is suitable for all OECD countries, not mentioning 
transitional or developing ones. Olsen
277
 claims that in the early 1990s “the enthusiasm for a 
universal de-bureaucratization cure”, and insisting on its global validity, diminished. 
Minimalistic government is no longer seen as the best choice and when approaching 
administrative reforms each government should match them with “the needs, traditions and 
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resources of each political system”. As usually happens, the critic of one approach introduces a 
new one. The next section elaborates on it.  
 
2.3.1.3. New Weberian State (NWS) 
 
The New Weberian State (NWS) is, according to Cepiku and Mititelu
278
, one of the most 
discussed “post-NPM” models recently introduced by Pollitt and Bouckaert279. The roots of the 
concept could be traced to the 1970s in the literature of political science, sociology and public 
administration.
280
 The model assembles on the one hand principles which are considered as the 
core values of Weberian administration model and on the other positive elements of NPM such 
as standards of reliability, predictability, openness, transparency, accountability, efficiency and 
effectiveness. Pollit and Bouckaert
281
 make a distinction between different groups of countries: 
the maintainers, the modernizers and the marketizers but only the last two are crucial for the 
reform. Marketizers are Anglo-American countries, the strong NPM proponents and 
modernizers, the continental European who advocate for the NWS. The NWS is based on the 
Weberian principles of bureaucracy which are married to some of the principles of NPM. Pollit 
and Bouckaert provide the explanation for each of them and they are summarized in the Table 
2.5. 
 
Table 2.5: Elements of the Neo Weberian State approach 
Neo Weberian State 
Weberian elements Neo elements 
 Reaffirmation of the state as the main facilitator 
of solutions to the new problems of 
globalization, technological change, shifting 
demographics and environmental threat;  
 Reaffirmation of the role of representative 
democracy(central, regional, and local) as the 
legitimating elements within the state apparatus; 
 Reaffirmation of the role of administrative law 
suitably modernized in preserving the basic 
principles pertaining to the citizen-state 
relationship, including equality before the law, 
legal security, and the availability of specialized 
legal scrutiny of state actions; 
 Preservation of the idea of a public service with 
a distinctive status, culture, and terms and 
conditions; 
 The shift from an internal orientation towards 
bureaucratic rules towards an external 
orientation towards meeting citizens’ needs and 
wishes. The primary route to achieving this is not 
the employment of market mechanisms (although 
they may occasionally come in handy) but the 
creation of a professional culture of quality and 
service;  
 Supplementation (not replacement) of the role of 
representative democracy by a range of devices 
for consultation with, and the direct 
representation of, citizens’ views);  
 In the management of resources within 
government, a modernization of the relevant laws 
to encourage a greater orientation on the 
achievement of results rather than merely the 
correct following of procedure. This is expressed 
partly in a shift in the balance from ex ante to ex 
post controls, but not a complete abandonment of 
the former;  
 A professionalization of public service, so that the 
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bureaucrat becomes not simply an expert in the 
law relevant to his or her sphere of activity, but 
also a professional manager, oriented to meeting 
the needs of his or her citizens/users; 
Source:  Pollitt and Bouckaert, “Public Management Reform: A Comparative Analysis”, pp. 118-119 
 
Dunn and Miller
282
 claim that NWS was developed in Europe “primarily as a challenge 
to NPM”. The concept is built on principles, promoted by OECD and applied in the EU public 
administration. Since the national public sectors in the EU are in the jurisdiction of member 
states Acquis Communautaire contains only broad principles such as: reliability and 
predictability; openness and transparency; accountability
283
; monitoring and evaluation of 
government outputs, and their control through the Regulatory Impact Assessment (RIA)
284
. 
Dunn and Miller claim that the guiding principles of NWS, drawn from the work of 
Drechsler
285
 and Pollitt and Bouckaert
286, refer to “a specifically European perspective of 
bureaucratic organization” whose foundation lies in Weber’s views and NPM. Since the EU is 
composed of a variety of countries Dunn and Miler analyse each of the NWS principles in that 
context, providing a sort of background for the necessity of its use. The interesting description 
is the one regarding Weberian principles which are presented here about which they claim the 
following: 1) Centrality of the State , which is assumed in “strong countries” is necessary in the 
“weak” ones in order to enable them to deal with domestic and international problems; 2) 
Reform and Enforcement of Administrative Law,  aims to protect the individuals and groups by 
guaranteeing them equality before the law and protection against arbitrary and unpredictable 
actions by public administration; 3) Preservation of Public Service is  necessary in post 
socialist EU accession countries to stress the importance of public service distinct status, 
culture, and conditions of employment because in the history these states had poorly paid civil 
servants who were poorly educated and under the influence of political authorities; 4) 
Representative Democracy is a necessary basis for the legitimate, controlled and stable public 
administration, the ideal type described by Weber. It is particularly important when put in the 
context of post socialist countries where, according to Bendix
287
, public administration was 
unstable, unreliable, inefficient and “unbureacratic”. This approach will, together with 
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Weberian administration, be discussed once again in this chapter in the context of the reforms 
pursued in transitional countries. Before that, the description of another public administration 
type is provided.  
 
2.3.1.4. Responsive/good governance 
 
The responsive/good governance approach focuses on “creating public value”288 and its 
significance lies in the fact that it tries to overcome the failures on NPM in a sense of narrow 
assumptions and values by defining broader and a more inclusive set of principles and practices 
called “governance”.289A UN report indicates that this term is being used since the 1990s and 
in the beginning it mainly referred to financial accountability of governments. Later it was re-
conceptualized as the “exercise of political, economic and administrative authority to manage a 
country’s affairs”.Ladi290 says that the term “good governance” has been widely used for more 
than a decade in an international concept and she describes it as a “container concept”. This 
means that it consists of a variety of principles but it is at the same time very general. The 
discussion on the definition of the term is vivid. Weiss
291
 explains that at the beginning the 
term “good governance” assumed that the force which cares for human rights and the rule of 
law strengthens democracy and promotes transparency and capacity in public administration. 
However, the term is expanded to “multiparty elections, a judiciary and a parliament”. 
Doornbos
292
 concludes that over time it became “an elastic term… rather than constituting a 
concept on its own”. Since the quantity of goals related to governance increased, which in 
practice might impose the problems for states with weak governance in its capacity building, 
Grindle
293
 introduced a new term, “good enough governance”. She explains that “not all 
government deficits need to be tackled at once” and the interventions should be carefully 
examined and prioritized. For prioritization government needs to take into account the 
individual characteristics of the country, more precisely it should be based on “historical 
evidence, sequence, and timing”.  
 Like many other principles, good governance gained global popularity through its use 
by international organizations. The World Bank
294
 defines governance as “the manner in which 
power is exercised in the management of a country's economic and social resources for 
development”. It stresses the importance of three aspects for governance: first, the type of 
political regime; second, the public management of economic and social resources and, finally, 
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third, the capacity of government to design, formulate and implement policies
295
. According to 
a UN report
296
 the main goal of governing institutions is to ensure interaction between all 
stakeholders: state, private sector and civil society by institutionalizing transparency, 
accountability, due process and efficiency. More precisely the “good governance” approach has 
in mind government, open and responsive to civil society, accountable and better regulated by 
law and external watchdogs. Important aspects of this approach are non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs) which should be the “voice” of civil society and should provide a 
partnership of community participation. Therefore, including citizens in all stakeholders’ roles 
and the creation of public values rather than simply consumer satisfaction is the goal of “good 
governance”. Ladi297 explains that good governance principles were used in the form of 
conditionality but also through “their inclusion in the modernization agendas of many 
countries”. This demands a closer look at “policy transfer framework” which is rooted in the 
part of public policy analysis which deals with the impact of “exogenous factors upon policy 
making and policy institutions”. Following this line of argument the analysis of the concept 
should start by looking at Dolowitz and Marsh
298. They introduce concepts such as “policy 
learning”, “lesson drawing”, “emulation” and “diffusion”, to explain the transfer of specific 
institutional knowledge from one time or place to another. However, they make a distinction 
between the terms by explaining that “lesson-drawing” refers only to voluntary transfer, while 
“policy transfer” may include both, coercive and voluntary. Ladi299 explains that the distinction 
between voluntary and coercive policy is not always easy to make because “most of the cases 
concern indirectly coercive transfer…put forward by international organizations or foreign 
governments”.  
 Rhodes
300
, argue that the new approach first provides variety regarding networks on 
which the state relies rather than hierarchy and second, these self-regulating models together 
with non-governmental institutions provide light government authority. Behn
301
 stresses the 
importance of various public accountability forms which are present in different public 
administration organizations. Unlike Weberian administration and NPM, which advocate for 
hierarchical and professional accountability, responsive governance proclaims the “360-
degree” accountability in which all stakeholders involved are accountable to each other. This 
could not be achieved without the presence of a variety of mechanisms such as: transparency, 
openness, professional and personal ethics, which further demand well-developed HR 
strategies.  
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However, like all the approaches towards the government organization this one is not 
without critique. Grindle
302
 argues that “the good governance agenda is unrealistically long and 
growing longer over time” with little guidance on priorities among the goals which should be 
achieved. That is the reason for her introduction of the above mentioned term “good enough 
governance”. This label could be applied to the countries which score high on the factors 
essential for the reduction of society’s problems. The problem of good governance is that the 
agenda is overwhelmed by many indicators which are in practice difficult to achieve especially 
in the countries which lack financial or human resources. De Vries
303
 explains that, although 
originally seen “as an alternative for government”, the governance approach became 
synonymous with “steering of developments” not by governmental hierarchy but by social 
actors through social networks. However, he claims, the concept is no longer used “to describe 
different trends in the steering of societal developments” but for “the role of the government 
and creation of good institutions by government” which “added a normative prefix to it”. De 
Vries points out that the descriptive characteristic “good” brought overloaded agendas to which 
governments are expected to comply. At the initial stage the criteria were not that numerous. 
For instance, UNDP listed five good governance principles: legitimacy and voice, direction, 
performance, accountability and fairness
304
. The World Bank cites six dimensions of the 
concept
305
: voice and accountability, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, political 
stability and absence of violence, rule of law and control of corruption, of which some were 
already used in this chapter. However, behind listed dimensions there are multiple indicators 
taken into account for their measurement. Kettl
306
, therefore, describes the concept of good 
governance as “slippery”.  
 
2.3.2. Public administration in socialism 
 
For transitional, post-socialist countries, socialism is the starting point on their journey 
towards capitalism. For a better understanding of the transitional process it is necessary first to 
learn about the characteristics of the institutions of socialism and their way of functioning. 
Developed as a critique of capitalism it promoted certain values which are expected to be 
created by establishing new organizational setting. According to Glassman et al.
307
 in the 
analysis of the relationship between bureaucracy and socialism Weber claimed that socialism, 
according to its ideology, would require even more bureaucratization than capitalism and 
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would be fully fused with the politico-military might of the state. This, as a result, would 
indicate an increase in the tendency toward despotic control. If private capitalism was 
eliminated, state bureaucracy would rule alone. The private and public bureaucracies, which in 
capitalism work next to and potentially against each other and hence check one another to a 
certain degree, would in socialism be merged into a single hierarchy.
308
 Furthermore, the 
abolition would mean that the top management of the nationalized or socialized firms would 
become bureaucratic. This would as a consequence have less freedom, because of the hopeless 
struggle with the state and lack of agency which should limit the employer’s power.309 Weber’s 
predictions regarding socialism appeared to be fulfilled with the history of post-socialist 
countries, described further in this section.  
Bendix
310
 claims that since Marx refused to specify the structure of the coming socialist 
society, his views should be inferred from his interpretation of historical trends. The important 
objective of socialism is the gradual abolition of the division of labour which affects 
bureaucracy in the sense that it would eliminate the necessity for coercion. Lenin elaborated the 
idea by claiming that under socialism the administrative apparatus would diminish in size, 
because a special force for suppression was no longer needed. Since most functions of 
government would be exercised by the masses, special functionaries are no longer needed. 
Hence, the reality was different. Bendix explains that in practice, bureaucracy in socialism was 
composed of the apparatus of party or the state or a specific mass organization, e.g. labour 
union, which broadened its understanding compared to the one in capitalism. Kornai 
311
 defines 
forces that bind bureaucracy together: (1) ideology with ideas, aims and values; (2) power; (3) 
prestige and privileges combined together make the system in which the level of position 
attained in the bureaucracy corresponds to the measure of rank. The result of this is the 
phenomenon called “cult of personality” which is created when the ultimate instance of 
prestige is attached to high office; (4) coercion – the functionary has faithfully to follow a 
currently correct political line and any departure from it incurs the disciplinary punishment by 
the party or prosecution by the state. The behaviour of obedience is highly evaluated and 
rewarded and is a guarantee for a successful career in bureaucracy. The main criteria for the 
selection of the candidates are political reliability, loyalty, and fidelity to the party and its 
ideas.
312
 
Although constitutions of socialist countries formally separate the power into three 
branches in practice all of them are subordinated to the Socialist/Communist party. According 
to Kornai
313
, all major appointments, promotions, and dismissals are decided upon by the 
various bodies of the party. This practically means that the party apparatus plays the crucial 
role in selecting the members of the legislature, the state administration and the judiciary. It is 
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in direct touch with the apparatus of state which further means that party functionaries are 
responsible for every important sphere of state activity. Since the party people are few 
compared to the parallel state organizations the small circle has great power in the state 
administration. The constitution did not prescribe the obligation of obedience for state officials 
to the instructions of socialist/communist party however, in practice they were members of the 
party and as such obliged to follow them. Therefore, Kornai
314
 says that the main characteristic 
of socialist administration is the duplication of functional and regional vertical chains, which 
supervise and overlap each other’s activities due to the lack of trust in the system. No superior 
has full confidence in his subordinates. The direction of the influence within the vertical chain 
goes from top to bottom meaning that the superior may issue a command to a subordinate but 
not the reverse. Boettke
315
 explains that while in representative government bureaucracies grow 
slowly over time in the continuous and gradual process, in the former Soviet Union the hiring 
of personnel was carried on through nomenclatura
316
 system and political patronage. Moreover, 
the bulk of state administration came to power at the same time and therefore the same cohort 
controlled the key positions in bureaucracy. In a book edited by Verheijen
317
 the description of 
crucial characteristics of the civil service system in socialist countries is provided. They are 
summarized in the Table 2.6. located in the Appendix 2.3. 
The socialist system had a specific approach towards corruption. Orthodox socialists 
believed that corruption was a by-product of capitalism. Their argument was based on the 
belief that corruption cannot be created in socialist countries. 
318
  However, this argument has 
been overthrown, along with the political system, beginning in 1989 when most of the socialist 
countries in the West collapsed, in part because of the prevalent corruption. Lovell
319
 claims 
that even without adequate studding or quantification, in socialism corruption was widespread 
and systemic. It was reinforced by a culture of bureaucratic secrecy. Shlapentokh
320
 describes 
the corruption in the Soviet Union claiming that the most important condition for developing 
corruption in the public sector –bureaucracy- is mutual trust of those involved which means 
that family and friends form the base for most enterprises in unofficial spheres. Corruption 
presents abuse of public office for private gain and soviet officials abused it by deceiving the 
state with statistical reports in many ways. Hiding the real potential production of the 
enterprises, diminishing the planned targets, wasting resources are just some of them. By 
having access to the great share of scarce goods they had the opportunity of exploiting them by 
exchanging it for equivalent goods or services. However, this behaviour was not properly, if 
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ever, sanctioned. Holms
321
 claims that a distinction has to be made in the first place regarding 
the punishment of corruption between officials who are members of the party and everyone 
else. This means that party members found guilty of corruption faced a party disciplinary 
process instead of regular courts. For minor infringements the party used “educational and 
influential” measures such as: “comradely criticism”, “advice” and “warnings before the 
members’ assembly”. For more serious misdemeanours, the sanctions range from reprimand 
(or censure) to severe reprimand (or severe censure), severe reprimand with the explicit treat of 
expulsion and finally, expulsion.  
When compared, capitalist and socialist systems express many structural differences. 
This also applies to corruption and some authors claim that although present in both societies 
they are not the same. According to Kim
322
, the specificity is shown in the following: (1) some 
types of corruption exist only in socialist countries; (2) corruption appears to be more 
destructive in socialist than in capitalist countries; (3) anti-corruption campaigns in socialism 
are mainly used temporarily by political leaders and are rarely sustained for a longer period; (4) 
levels of corruption between socialist and capitalist countries can be seen to be related to 
economic growth; (5) the role of individual subsystems could be an important  issue for the 
design of the efficient and effective anti-corruption policy of a certain country since the top-
down mechanism was so far unsuccessful;  and finally (6) corruption in socialist countries has 
until recently rarely been reported to the outside world. These differences should be taken into 
account when addressing corruption in administration in transitional countries. They provide 
the view of different starting points of the two systems in terms of corruption combat and 
therefore should be used as a guide for defining sound anti-corruption policies.  
From the descriptions provided above, some conclusions important for this thesis could 
be drawn. While writers on the administration organization in capitalism insist on 
professionalism, skills and competences, socialist administration in practice shines the spotlight 
on obedience to socialist/communist ideology and its interpretation by the party. These two 
approaches in reality create the incentive systems opposite to each other regarding behaviour, 
values and concepts of functioning and understanding civil service. On one side the demand for 
professionalism creates incentives for responsibility and “using one's own head” while on the 
other, unquestionable following of the socialist ideology stimulates the avoidance of it and 
hiding behind the superiors. This further influences people’s opinion, first about themselves 
and their self-esteem and, second, how they see the institutions that they are working for, more 
precisely whether they have respect and trust in them or not. 
 
2.3.3. Public administration in transition 
 
2.3.3.1. Reform process 
 
 The collapse of socialist system inevitably raised the question of the institutional reform 
in a variety of aspects. The development of administration in transitional countries is 
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sometimes seen as turbulent or interrupted.
323
 After the collapse of the socialist regimes, these 
countries dismantled many of the socialist-style bureaucracy instruments and took steps 
towards the modernization and rationalization of public administration, particularly under the 
influence of the European Union Accession. Norgaard
324
 explains that the experience of post-
socialist countries showed the need for new standards which should govern the public sector. 
When faced with a new social and economic context the old bureaucracy was “inadequate”, in 
terms of organizational structure as well as human capital. The steps taken towards the reform 
were, according to Abed and Davoodi
325
, associated with the reduction in the public 
administration size and the narrowing down of the authorization for resources distribution. 
However, although it sounded simple, the transformation process was anything but that. 
Verheijen
326
 summarizing the achievements of post-socialist countries claims that when it 
comes to public administration change, instead of reform one should rather talk about 
development since previous regimes, “with the partial exception of Yugoslavia”, did not leave 
any legacy of the civil service system in its traditional meaning. According to Nunberg
327
, CEE 
countries initiated the creation of new, modern government on the ruins of “formerly 
communist-dominated bureaucracy”. She recognizes two important issues in this process: the 
development of appropriate rules of the game and the development of the “new civil servant”. 
The first issue addresses establishing legitimate legal framework and merit-based mechanisms 
for recruitment, promotion, and assessment which should reinforce probity and politically 
neutral competence. This is necessary in order to replace past corrupt and ideological system. 
The second task is to create the “new civil servant” who is able to make decisions 
independently of higher authority and “demonstrates effectiveness in carrying out very 
different tasks than previously required”. However, in most of the cases the governments of the 
CEE countries did not undertake a holistic reform approach, but rather they created several “ad 
hoc routes” to construct a civil service framework. Nunberg claims that although the 
communist content has been removed from the procedures, in the beginning the basic elements 
of compensation, recruitment, promotion, and evaluation mechanisms have remained. One of 
the assumptions, at the beginning of reforms, was that the bureaucratic class would resist or 
subvert modernization and change. Therefore the best approach to deal with this obstacle was 
to clear away the habits, characteristics and values of those who served under the socialist 
regime. She explains that the opinion was that this could be achieved through the building of 
new skills and loyalties in “those who replaced the old guard”. However, reality demonstrated 
that the “new civil servant” was a rehabilitated version of the old one. Initial efforts for 
“fixing” this were through new recruitment and training. Nunberg says that the former were 
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quite limited due to, for instance, the informal process of hiring through personal networks, 
while the latter were not very well planned and applied. In conclusion, incentive structures of 
bureaucracy which rewards performance or recognizes the merit should be established in order 
to professionalize civil service because in most of the cases the systems of remuneration and 
promotion practices were based mainly on seniority and non-transparent managerial 
preferences. 
 Transformation of the socialist bureaucracy into a modern civil service depends on the 
attitude and behaviour change in the interaction between public servants and citizens. In 
achieving this task, post socialist countries had or still have to make some decisions regarding 
the type of the administration which fulfils the above described goals. Pevkur 
328
 claims that 
reforms from hierarchical public service to open a modern administration brought many 
questions to the table regarding common values and ethical demands. As already described in 
previous sections, different approaches toward the “best design” of public administration carry 
different characteristics and value systems. In order to present the variety of options among 
which post-socialist countries choose, Cepiku and Mititelu
329
 summarize the main 
characteristics of Weberian, New Public Management, Neo-Weberian State and Public 
Governance approaches, shown in Table 2.8. 
 
Table 2.8: Characteristics of Weberianism, NPM, Neo-Weberianism and Public Governance 
Weberian 
characteristics 
NPM 
characteristics 
Neo-Weberian 
Characteristics 
Public Governance 
Dominance of rule of 
law, focus on rules and 
policy systems 
Inward focus on 
(private sector) 
management techniques  
External orientation 
towards citizens needs 
Outwards focus and a 
systematic approach 
Central role for the 
bureaucracy in the policy 
making and 
implementation 
Input and output 
control 
Central role of 
professional managers 
Process and outcome 
control 
Unitary state Fragmented state Unitary state and 
collaboration 
Plural and pluralist 
state (networks) 
Public service ethos Competition and 
market place 
Public service ethos Neo-corporatist 
Representative 
democracy as the 
legitimating element  
Client empowerment 
through redress and market 
mechanisms 
Supplementation of 
democracy with 
consultation and 
participation 
Participative decision-
making 
Political-
administration split within 
public organizations  
Political-
administration split within 
and between 
(agencification) 
organization 
Political-
administration separation 
and emphasis on 
professionalization of the 
latter 
Collaborative 
relations between 
politicians and managers 
Source: Cepiku and  Mititelu, “Public Administration Reforms in Transitional Countries: Albania and Romania between the 
Weberian Model and the New Public management”, p.61 
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 The influences of the approaches are diverse. Randma-Liiv
330
 describe the early years 
of transition as a period which coincided with the neo-liberal concepts of public administration, 
more precisely NPM, coming from the west. These views were dominant in international 
financial organizations such as World Bank and IMF, which provided assistance and financial 
means for transitional countries. Therefore, policy transfer in the area of public administration 
development in CEE countries has two types of consequences. One is the adoption of similar 
ideas in a number of these countries and second due to the shortage of competent local policy 
makers it has been difficult for governments in transitional countries to judge foreign 
experience and compare various models. Cepiku and Mititelu
331
 claim that the agreement on 
the scope, contents and sequence of public administration reforms in transitional countries, 
cannot be found in the literature. Nonetheless, three central areas of public administration 
reform are recognized: strategic planning and coordination across public administration, stable 
financial and budgetary management and human resource management. However all these 
levels are considered separately most of the time and “very often synergies have not been 
achieved”. Jacobs332 says that reforms of public administration in post-socialist countries entail 
a broad agenda which is not clearly defined and prioritized in terms of effective 
implementation, although created with high-level intentions. Therefore, Cepiku and Mititelu
333
 
argue, the model of public service modernization in transitional countries should be based on 
the key characteristics and needs of the countries in question, instead of following current 
trends and, as such should be used for interpreting and assessing results.   
As previously mentioned, since the imperative of PA reforms became clearer during the 
1990s, which coincides with the NPM current fashion, it is understandable why this approach 
had echoed in both transitional countries and international institutions.
334
 However, according 
to Lægreid335 the NPM public administration model can only work in the countries with strong 
Weberian culture and trust relations. He therefore concludes that the introduction of NPM is 
not advisable in low trust countries, which transitional countries are, and suggests that either 
Weberian or Neo-Weberian models should be applied. Peters
336
  agrees by saying that NPM is 
not a good choice for the countries, such as transitional, which attempt to build effective 
administration and democracy because efficiency and effectiveness, which dominate this 
approach, are not crucial for the creation of probity and responsibility. Instead it might be 
necessary first to create “a proper Weberian” administration before breaking that style down. 
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Going “back to basics” is also Olsen’s337 opinion. However, the two approaches towards the 
public administration structure comply with these suggestions. One is the original, traditional 
Weberian administration and the modern one is the Neo-Weberian State. The literature 
discusses both and they are presented here.  
 
Weberian administration proponents  
 
Discussing the situation in CEE countries Drechsler
338
 points out that their fundamental 
challenge is “insufficient development of the concept of State” which practically means that the 
problem does not lie in the structure of the institutions but in people’s perception. In other 
words, Drechsler identifies the lack of well-qualified, motivated civil servants and says that the 
state must react accordingly by offering classical virtues such as: security, honour, stability, 
civility and fulfilment. Referring to the reform towards the traditional model he claims that 
NPM is bad if pushed upon transitional countries because it only makes sense in well-
functioning democratic administrative structure not applicable to transitional countries. 
Transitional and “western” countries, for which NPM was developed, do not share the same 
problems regarding the public administration reform. Continuing the discussion on 
administrative reforms in transitional countries Lee
339
 says that both Weberian and NPM 
models have influenced them, although the EU accession gives a greater prominence to the 
former ones. Goetz 
340
 agrees with him, explaining that modernization in the sense of creating a 
managerialist administration in line with NPM did not feature it significantly. Pierre and 
Rothstein 
341
 claim that Weberianism has no alternative in transitional countries and the 
application of NPM is not an adequate solution since it depends on professional managers and 
skilful politician. Weberianism is considered the perfect model of public administration in 
societies where trust in institutions and public officials is low. A similar claim is brought by 
Rodrik
342
 and Rothstein
343
 who say that the Weberian type of administration by creating 
security against arbitrariness and favouritism, respect for contracts and transparency, can create 
a fair amount of social trust. Pierre and Rothstein
344
 explain that by establishing values of 
legality, hierarchy impartiality, Weberian philosophy allows citizens to engage with the public 
bureaucracy without trusting its officials, because they have a minimum of latitude and 
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discretion. They also draw the conclusion that in fighting corruption, the “old-fashioned” 
Weberianism could be much more important than it was perceived by NPM movement.  
 
New Weberian State proponents 
 
Arguing for the Neo-Weberian State approach, Randma-Liiv
345
 claims that CEE 
countries faced the absence of basic reform policy directions which created tense atmosphere 
and scepticism. Thus, a conceptual clarification as well as informed thinking is necessary to 
target the needs of the state for successful public administration reform. The only way to 
achieve this is to first establish the rules based on the Weberian principles of administration 
before accessing the modern managerial techniques advocated by the NPM. Therefore she 
analyses public administration reform of transitional countries from the few aspects suggesting 
that the New Weberian State approach is a solution for all problems detected. 
The first one is minimal vs. strong state. During the socialist era the state was usually 
equated with the Communist Party, with the massive, overly intrusive administration and as a 
result it had a bad reputation. Following this Drechsler claims that CEE have no concept of 
state, she explains that automatic loyalty of the citizens to the state is lacking and as a result 
cooperation with the government or respect for legal and administrative decisions. Therefore 
the ideas of the minimal state and jumping into the modern management system without 
developing a base for democratic development were some of the challenges. However, for CEE 
countries, anti-state minimizing could have disastrous consequences as well as the 
predomination of NPM tools which may threaten long-term development and sustainability. 
The second one is flexibility vs. stability. Public sector in CEE countries in the transitional 
period struggles with many constant changes which decreased the commitment and the 
motivation of civil servants. Therefore, the problem of these countries is not the rigid system 
but rather frequent change of it. The key solution for this issue is finding a balance between 
flexibility and stability. Third aspect is deregulation vs. regulation.  Transitional countries 
require more regulation in order to create conditions necessary for institutional development 
and elimination of nepotism. Therefore, deregulation and decentralization can lead to 
politicization, instability and an increased level of corruption if applied before the 
establishment of the principles which will allow government to operate in an accountable and 
non-corrupt manner. The fourth aspect questions whether the marketization is good or not. In 
the environment of non-competitive markets, hidden internal costs, poor management 
experience, applied deregulation, decentralization, flexibility, competition and governance 
through non-state actors may prove very problematic under these circumstances and undermine 
the legitimacy of the state and diminish trust in public organizations. The fifth aspect discusses 
fragmentation vs. unity. The legacy of the past regime in which integration and 
implementation control of the policies laid within the Communist Party caused the lack of 
elements, such as co-ordination of mechanisms and professionalism, which could bind the 
different parts of public administration together. Therefore the decentralizing administrative 
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reform model, in the case of transitional countries, could be very risky due to the lack of the 
capacity to monitor and assess effectively the performance of the decentralized units. 
Transitional countries first need to develop a public service which is unified, less politicized, 
with identifiable administrative culture and unified standards of conduct. The sixth aspect, 
which Randma-Liiv analyses is democratic vs. technocratic values. According to her, several 
democratic goals: transparency, equal opportunities, access to public services, fair procedures 
and citizen’s participation may conflict with technocratic/rational goals such as efficiency, 
effectiveness, value-for money or rapid decision making. Transitional countries should avoid 
this situation by strengthening the legitimacy of the state, giving confidence to politicians and 
public servants and at the same time weaker business actors that dominate civil society.   
In conclusion, Jenei
346
 claims that a state whose governmental actions are based on the 
rule of law and private enterprises are involved for competing quality in the service delivery, 
and civil society organizations have a full range involvement in public policy making, from 
decision making to service provision is the desired goal of the transitional which could be 
achieved to a Neo-Weberian State type of public administration. This approach is a 
requirement in these countries because “it is the only solution for providing a synthesis 
between legalism and managerialism”. 
 
2.3.3.2. Anti-corruption strategies and special bodies  
 
The importance of fighting corruption in transitional countries was already discussed 
earlier. Following the widely advocated strategies they made the required changes. However, 
the implemented privatization, decentralization, deregulation, payment reform and 
establishment of anti-corruption agencies, did not provide the expected results. The 
explanations for this outcome are various and will be described here in order to complete the 
picture of the complexity of the reforms through which transitional countries are going.  
Privatization – Regarding privatization Roland347 pointed out that faced with transition, 
economists advocated for privatization which should induce economic growth, but they could 
not perceive that privatization in transitional countries would be one of the generators of 
corruption. According to experience, it mainly led “to massive asset stripping and plundering 
by insider managers”.Bjorvatn and Soreide348 say that concerns about privatization in 
transitional countries were raised in terms of the asset price as well as its effects on the 
economy. Kaufman and Siegelbaum
349
 claim that privatization is seen as a mechanism which 
should restore the market and deprive the state bureaucrats and politicians of control over the 
enterprise sector. Nevertheless, in transitional economies an increase in corruption coincided 
with the process of privatization. However, Kaufman and Siegelbaum claim that it does not 
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necessarily mean that privatization caused this. One of the explanations could be that 
privatization was a convenient vehicle for ongoing and unchecked corruption. The variety of 
types of privatization can either stimulate or hinder public officials and private counterparties 
to engage in corruption. Nevertheless, privatization is still a preferable method for transitional 
economies to climb out of the economic problems and fight against corruption. Without it, 
corruption would be more widespread since it prevails in non-privatized sectors. 
Decentralization and deregulation –The two types of strategies were already discussed 
and, based on that literature review, some interesting questions on their effects in transitional 
countries should be raised. To remind the reader, it should be said that Lessmann and 
Markwardt
350
 claim that “one size does not fit all” and in the application of decentralization as 
an anti-corruption strategy one should be very careful. Peters
351
 argues that “deregulation may 
not be the most appropriate response for the governments of transitional countries”. The need 
for higher predictability and accountability is dominant in these types of countries and not 
“greater demand for entrepreneurship”. Following these lines of argument a couple of 
observations could be made in line with the arguments of Randma-Liiv provided in the 
previous section. Since transitional countries are going through the institutional change which 
includes comprehensive transformation of values, mind setting and institutional design if 
public administration is for instance deregulated, it might leave an “empty space” in some 
areas which first of all cannot help in internalising new values and secondly could open the 
floor to misinterpretation of the regulations and misuse of the position. Furthermore, 
decentralisation should bring the service closer to the people and that claim assumes that 
central government already has a certain quality which should be spread towards the lower 
levels of the state organisation. But what are the effects of government decentralisation if there 
are no established and well founded values to be transferred? Again, it appears highly possible 
that misinterpretation and misuse of the regulations can occur.  
Payment –Discussion about increasing wages as a strategy to confront corruption 
provides, like in all other cases, different results. Some studies show that it improves anti-
corruption combat but some deny its significance. However, speaking in practical terms, and 
some authors mention it as an argument, for some countries this strategy is difficult to 
implement due to economic reasons. More precisely, it is less likely that countries which, first 
of all, face economic problems could afford to use it, which is usually the case of transitional 
countries. Vanyolos and Hajnal
352
 and Damiran and Pratt
353
 explain that a lack of funds 
subverted many ideas for increasing performance and lowering corruption with money 
incentives. 
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Anti-corruption Agencies - For the majority of transitional countries, accessing the EU 
was the most important step in establishing stability after the fall of socialism. Charron
354
 
argues that EU accession brought into the play a significant number of anti-corruption agencies 
which are mainly located in post-socialist CEE countries than in other regions in the world. 
However, Batory 
355
 claims that empirical analysis, which focuses on these types of countries, 
is relatively novel and rare and still leaves the open floor for research due to the fact that 
researchers were more curious about agencies in post-colonial contexts. She points out that 
ACAs offer a way out in countries with weak institutions by providing “island-like isolation”, 
hence successful stories are rather an exception than a rule. According to her there are four 
factors for this suggested outcome to which experience can point: an initial official mandate of 
the agency, de-facto operational autonomy, political support and leadership. A diversified 
picture of the agency’s organizational form in CEE countries, which include all three above 
mentioned models, is not an easy task to be explained although these countries present in a way 
a homogeneous group. Public administration, burdened with the post-socialist legacy, mixed 
with western NPM reforms and almost no tradition of power delegation to independent 
agencies before EU accession, are some of the possible explanations for this situation. Batory 
in her paper argues that the scope of delegated powers and the organizational form of the 
agency depend on the one hand on the external actor’s requirements, such as EU, or domestic 
public opinion and on the other the creator’s assurance that the agency will not backfire against 
him. In compromising all these factors the scope of delegated powers to the agencies appears in 
two ways: strongly politically controlled agencies with no autonomy and “paper tigers” but 
with the goal to punish electoral opponents. In these circumstances the key de facto 
responsibility lies in the integrity and “zealotry” of the agency’s leadership which is, in this 
case, rather a result of chance. Therefore the suggestion is that the creation of agencies in CEE 
countries should be made only if lasting consensus among politicians about their purpose and 
goals can be achieved. 
Discussing the achievements in fighting corruption in CEE, Dionisie and Checchi
356
 
argue that progress in this matter remains scarce, besides the creation of an institution charged 
with this task. They claim that requirements during the EU accession did not have a significant 
contribution towards meaningful anti-corruption combat. On the contrary, in some cases the 
external pressure for delivering quick results diverted the intention of dealing with complex 
anti-corruption efforts to those who can be fixed promptly. Experience of post-socialist EU 
member states has shown that progress in governance reforms dominates over effectiveness of 
anti-corruption measures in accession-related monitoring. Experience with anti-corruption 
agencies in CEE suggest that there is no quick solution in building an anti-corruption system in 
post-socialist countries even with political will present. Due to its complexity, instead of a 
narrow sectorial approach, corruption should be rather assessed through a broader multi-
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disciplinary one which reforms state and its vital aspects such as civil service reforms, 
institutional capacity development, etc. Dionisie and Checchi conclude that anti-corruption 
agencies cannot play alone in the anti-corruption game but as a team with the rest of the public 
institutions.  
 
2.4. Structure of human capital: Public Service Motivation – PSM 
 
2.4.1. General remarks 
 
It was explained earlier that this thesis applies the broader economic point of view 
which in the analysis includes the specific social context and mental models created as a 
result.
357
 According to it, the internal values of people employed in the administration matter. 
This claim is supported in the literature and in the context of public service, reform in 
transitional countries appears to be particularly relevant. This approach called Public Service 
Motivation (PSM) analyses the motivation of people who work for public institutions. As in 
many other cases, in the literature of PSM many disputes arise regarding the definitions, 
measurement and etc., of which the author is fully aware. In this case, with no intention to 
engage in any discussion regarding the above mentioned issues and leaving them aside, the 
original meaning of the ideas are taken into consideration.   
 
2.4.2. PSM in capitalism 
 
In describing civil servants Demmke
358
 claims that for a long time the prevailing 
opinion about civil servants was that since they work for the state they have specific 
characteristics which distinguish them from private employees.  They are characterized as 
people with high integrity standards because they are the public interest protectors. Somewhere 
on the way the image changed and a negative campaign against bureaucrats took place. In this 
respect civil servants were described as “expensive, slow, inefficient, and unresponsive”. 
Demmke explains that this situation created a paradox in which  “at one moment public 
employees are praised for helping the less fortunate, protecting society, or participating in 
grand projects designed to enhance the well- being of all members of society and on the other, 
they are accused of being more motivated by power and are lazy, corrupt and egoistic”. He 
further claims that serious studies show the reality in which public servants are not lazy and do 
care about the public good. They possess an “immaterial motivator and respond to immaterial 
incentives”. These comments provided an introduction to the discussion about Public service 
motivation and its importance for the functioning of public administration.  
The critics of bureaucrats in the USA in the 60’s depicted them as budget maximising, 
self-centred and unable to pursue public goals. However, Goodsell
359
 in the 80’s tuned this 
view to a positive approach towards bureaucracy. The PSM approach was born as an idea 
which aimed to approach the analysis of public service from a different point of view by 
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criticizing the principal-agent dominant one. Dilulio
360
 explains that instead of using the 
perspective of principal-agent model in which the agent is the rational actor who is always 
ready to maximize his wealth, one should take a different approach. In this approach the focus 
should be on bureaucrats, who work hard, respect the rules, put organizational goals before 
private ones, make sacrifices and cooperate with colleagues. Public Service Motivation 
originates from a belief that employees in the public sector possess unique motives different 
from those found among people employed in the private sector. Although ideas and ideals of 
PSM could be traced back to Aristotle and Plato
361
, the foundation for the modern approach is 
set by Perry and Wise
362
 who claim that a unique motive of a high sense of public interest is 
one of the important elements for individuals who choose public service careers compared to 
those who work in the private sector.  They define PSM as “an individual’s predisposition to 
respond to motives grounded primarily or uniquely in public institutions and organizations”.363 
By this definition they identified the type of motives associated with public service which 
includes rational, norm-based, and affective motives.
364
 
Regarding the causes of PSM, Perry
365
 defines the most comprehensive theory which 
identifies the socio-historical context, such as parental relations, religion, observational 
learning and modelling during the course of their lives, education, and professional training, 
has a primary influence. Therefore, according to the literature people could be driven not only 
by self-interest but some other motives as well. Perry offers an alternative to the rational choice 
theories which dominate research about motivation. In a further analysis Perry and 
Vandenabeele
366
 claim that although proven effective in explaining and predicting certain 
behaviour, rational choice theories cannot explain the variety of behaviours within the public 
service. They claim that institutions form the rules and norms for society members which shape 
their values and guide them in their behaviours. The rules and norms partially influence people 
because the social and cultural mechanisms which transmit the content vary across the 
countries. This information will play out according to the individual’s identity which is the 
foundation of his self-regulated behaviour. The guidance of an individual’s behaviour by 
public service motivation will depend on factors such as the public nature of an individual’s 
identity, PSM alignment with incentive systems which govern the situation, “the extent to 
which the identity is regulated autonomously rather than controlled”, goal content and goal 
intensity. Perry and Vandenabeele conclude that their theory suggests that behaviour has many 
                                                          
360
Dilulio, J. D. (1994): “Principled agents: The cultural bases of behaviour in a federal government bureaucracy”, 
Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, 4, 277–318. 
361
For more information see: Horton, S. (2008): “History and Persistence of an idea and an Ideal”, in Perry, J. L. 
and Hondeghem, A. (eds.) Motivation in Public Management: The Call of Public Service, Oxford University 
Press, pp.17-32 
362
 Perry, J. L. and Wise, R. L. (1990): “The Motivational Bases of Public Service”, Public Administration Review 
50(3), pp.367–73. 
363
Ibid, p. 368 
364
Perry, J. L. and Hondeghem, A. (eds.) (2008):Motivation in Public Management: The Call of Public Service, 
Oxford University Press, pp. 1-14 
365
Perry, J. L (2000): “Bringing Society In: Toward a Theory of Public-Service Motivation”, Journal of Public 
Administration Research and Theory, 10 (2), pp. 471 – 488  
366Perry, J. L. and Vandenabeele, W. (2008): “Behavioural Dynamics: Institutions, Identities, and Self-
Regulation”, in Perry, J. L. and Hondeghem, A. (eds.): Motivation in Public Management: The Call of Public 
Service, Oxford University Press, pp. 56-79 
Ana Jakovljević, LL.M 
106 
 
origins. Two of them, individual’s identity and values, are particularly important for the 
operation of motivational processes. However, the individual’s identity is not created in a 
vacuum because individuals are social creatures exposed to variety of institutions and social 
mechanisms. Perry
367
 also developed a measurement scale which empirically reduces the types 
of motives to four dimensions: attraction to public policy making, commitment to the public 
interest and civic duty, compassion and self-sacrifice. Vandenabeele
368
 expands Perry’s 
measurement by adding one more value as a component of institutional identity. This fifth 
component includes democratic governance with traditional bureaucratic values. Therefore, 
Perry and Wise see PSM as “institutional unique motives associated with public service”, while 
Vandenabeele presents it as “beliefs and values that transcend self and organizational interests 
on behalf of a larger political entity”369.  
 In analysing PSM, Perry and Wise
370
  offered three propositions which guided subsequent 
various empirical researches. These propositions relate to the relationships of PSM and factors 
which are considered important for its analysis and they are: (1) the relationship between PSM 
and the likelihood of an individual selecting a public organization, (2) the relationship between 
PSM and individual performance, (3) the relationship between PSM and the structure of 
organizational incentives. Perry et al.
371
 assess the validity of the propositions through analysis 
of existing empirical research. The first proposition: “The greater an individual’s public 
service motivation, the more likely the individual will seek membership in a public 
organization” relates to the prediction that individuals with high PSM would be attracted to the 
organizations which satisfied their prosocial and altruistic behaviour. It is in general supported 
by the empirical research in the field of public administration although some aspects, such as 
attraction-selection-attrition relationships with PSM are more nuanced than Perry and Wise 
predicted and demand further research.
372
 The attraction-selection-attrition model is developed 
by Schneider
373
who claims that forces within the organization are incharge of the structure of 
employees. They operate to attract, select and retain a certain group of homogeneous people. 
On the other hand people who look for a job base their decision while keeping in mind 
organization values perception on which basis they make job related decisions. This, as a 
consequence, implies that only people who fit into the system stay in the organization which 
over time makes the group more homogenous and potentially dangerous because it could 
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generate resistance to change.
374
 Another aspect which asks for more attention within this 
model is the person-environment fit concept
375
 which implies that individuals will most likely 
behave according to their essence if they are well adapted.  
The second proposition: “In public organizations, PSM is positively related to 
individual performance”376 is based on two premises: first, public jobs are motivating for 
individuals with high PSM because of their specific characteristics such as high task 
significance, and second, PSM is likely to positively affect organizational commitment and 
innovative activities. This proposition is supported by public administration research as well as 
organizational behaviour and economics. However some important questions such as to what 
degree PSM matters for the performance, how they interact over time, are its effects collective 
or individual, still remain open. The special attention is drawn to the last question because it 
points in a direction which departs from the original Perry and Wise’s377 view because instead 
of focusing on an individual level of analysis it opens up research and institutional design 
options, which is the focus of economics studies. Finally, the third proposition: “Public 
organizations that attract members with high levels of public service motivation are likely to be 
less dependent on utilitarian incentives to manage individual performance effectively”378 is 
based on Knoke and Wright-Isak’s379 claims. They develop a predisposition-opportunity model 
which discusses the degree of dependence of PSM on the utilitarian and monetary rewards 
system within the organization for stimulating the individual performances of the employees. 
Perry et al.
380
 claim that this proposition has empirical support in all literature which deals with 
this issue, the public administration literature, social and behavioural. An interesting research 
trajectory in this domain is carried out by Frey
381
 who develops a theory of motivation 
crowding effects building it on Ryan and Deci’s382 definition of extrinsic and intrinsic 
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motivation. He explains that economics considers that individuals are influenced by 
preferences and constraints. Since preferences are hard to measure, economists assume they are 
constant and therefore targeting constraints in order to determine behaviour because 
individuals act differently when the constraints are manipulated. He further argues that if 
constraint in the form of extrinsic motivation is perceived as controlling it could have a 
“crowding out” effect which reduces the individual’s intrinsic motivation for performing the 
action. This is due to the weakened self-determination and self-esteem of a performer and 
therefore he reduces the level of activity. On the other side of the coin of extrinsic incentives 
(motivation), claims Frey, is the “crowding-in” effect. The perception of the individual is that 
these incentives are supportive which, as a consequence, has an increase of the person’s self-
esteem and self-determination, and therefore motivates him intrinsically to perform action. 
This analysis is important in the context of the New Public Management approach proposed as 
the alternative to the traditional one of public administration. Referring to Frey, Moynihan
383
 
points out that NPM may erode the normative model and this should be taken into account 
when reform is discussed.  
Regarding the relationship of PSM and organizational institutions, Moynihan and 
Pandey
384
 aim to contribute to the limited empirical research regarding this issue. They extend 
Perry’s385 model in order to test the effect of organizational institutions on PSM implementing 
numerous organizational variables such as organizational culture, red tape, hierarchy, reform 
orientation and length of organizational membership. The argument is that work-related rules 
and norms shape not only “the administrative behaviour of civil servants but also the basic 
attitudes that these actors hold about the value of public service”. The aim of the analysis was 
to test the work-environment aspect of the theory. More precisely, Moynihan and Pandey 
claim, and find support for the claims in their research, that socio-historical context influences 
PSM before the individual enters the organization but once he enters it the organization 
environment affects him as well.  Although additional research is needed this analysis shows 
the importance of organizational institutions for PSM. Authors say that PMS helps in the 
recruitment of individuals and strengthens their ties with the public sector “providing a basis 
for loyalty, motivation and commitment that is more effective than monetary incentives”. 
According to Moynihan and  Pandey
386
, once having joined an organization, the contribution of 
individuals with a high level of PSM is varied: engaging in whistle-blowing is higher among 
them
387
 as well as organizational commitment
388
; they work harder
389
 and enjoy higher job 
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satisfaction and therefore are less likely to leave their jobs
390
.However, the fostering of PSM is 
also an important aspect which public organizations need to take into account when designing 
management systems and other organizational institutions. The research shows that reducing 
the red tape, reforms with clear goals and empowered employees might have positive effects 
on PSM
391
. Romzek and Hendricks
392
 claim that employees are less frustrated and more 
committed if they feel as meaningful and contributing to organizational goals. In conclusion, 
Moynihan and Pandey
393
 argue for the two things. The first is the importance of creating the 
atmosphere in which public employees will feel that they are contributing to the organization’s 
valuable services and removing unnecessary control of their efforts. And second, the 
importance of the employees to the institution and their contribution to society should be 
clearly communicated to public servants.   
The discussion of PSM literature in this section provided the framework which will create 
the basis for the possible implementation of the concept in another field which is discussed in 
this thesis. The PSM discussion is dominantly provided within the framework of capitalist 
societies and its implication into socialist and transitional countries will be provided in the next 
section. Before entering further discussion two main points, from the presented literature, 
should be kept in mind. First, PSM as intrinsic motivation, depends on the socio-historical 
context of a particular state and its institutions, and second it is also influenced by the 
organization of the public institution in which an individual works.  
 
2.4.3. PSM in socialism and transition  
 
The Public Service Motivation discussion appears an important issue for the analysis of 
public administration. In the spotlight of this thesis is administrative corruption in transitional 
countries. Therefore two aspects in this context are important to be presented: administration 
and corruption. Regarding the history of the institutions in countries in transition and the final 
goal of reducing corruption in them, PSM literature might serve as one of the links in the anti-
corruption combat chain. However, according to the knowledge of the author of this thesis, 
PSM is until now dominantly used in the analysis of capitalist societies while socialist or 
transitional countries appear briefly in a couple of analyses which will be provided further. In 
order to introduce it here it is necessary, first, to recall some characteristics of social systems in 
socialism and transition, as well as public administration organization in both types of 
countries. After connecting these descriptions with PSM the possible relationship with 
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corruption should be analysed. Regarding the administration, the lack of the detailed PSM 
research in this area deprives researcher from asserting any claim regarding the matter. 
However, the intuition which will be presented in this section could lead to further and deeper 
analysis in the future. To remind the reader, in the Chapter 1, the description of the mentality of 
Soviet people was provided and homo sovieticus was introduced. According to the literature 
he, from the intended Uomo Universale, ended up as an anti-hero and negative by product of 
the socialist system (See the section 1.3.3.2. of the Chapter 1). Furthermore, the description of 
the public administration setting in socialist and transitional countries is provided in this 
chapter (see sections: 2.3.2. and 2.3.3.). The claims that institutions matter and that socio-
historical context contributes to their better understanding and interpretation and were repeated 
many times throughout this research. Therefore, the starting point in the analysis would be the 
PSM of homo sovieticus in public administration of socialism and the end point PSM in 
transition.  
Based on the literature the description of the former appears as follows: the person, who 
disrespects the state due to its oppression and as a result possesses developed various anti-
social and anti-public behaviours, enters the public administration in which loyalty to the party 
and its ideology is the main guiding rule. He has no alternative of choosing the private sector 
since the main, and most of time the only, employer is the state. It seems that neither the social 
environment nor public institutions encouraged the striving towards public interests and 
benefits. Although not studied in details some characteristics are mentioned briefly in the 
literature as an intuitive example. For instance Frey
394
 describes the situation in which people 
are forced to work under the threat of punishment and claims that intrinsic motivation is, in 
these cases, crowded out. This is due to the fact that people are left with fewer choices which 
produce low work morale and initiative. Furthermore this will affect citizens’ civic virtue 
which will become low and as a result they will develop a cynical attitude towards the state and 
society. Frey claims that the experiences of Soviet-type command economies are the best 
example. Citing authors who studied the socialist system he writes that people in the Soviet 
economic system were lazy and immoral, apathetic cynics prone to pessimism. Consequently, 
the destruction of intrinsic motivation was inevitable and was expressed in the form of “low 
work morale, civic virtue, social capital and trust”.395However, it would be wrong to assume 
that noble sentiments, such as altruism and commitment to common good were absent and that 
all people became homo sovieticus. The point is that although prosocial behaviour was present 
among people, it was not supported by formal state institutions which dictated desirable 
behaviour. With the collapse of socialism, new formal rules were introduced, mainly 
transplanted from capitalist societies. However, regarding this transition the claim of Kornai
396
, 
should be kept in mind. According to him, in the process of transition the dual value system 
will be in place for a while and it will be the source of many kinds of conflicts. Although 
confronted by the values of the new system and disillusioned with the socialist regime, “great 
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masses of people” will continue to adhere to the old values. This is mainly confirmed by the 
description of the administration in transitional countries (see section 2.3.3. of this chapter). 
The administration reform, according to the literature, is described as unsatisfying in achieving 
the standards of Western, capitalist, societies. Since, some of the reasons for the 
underachievement were presented earlier, here only the possible influence of PSM issues will 
be addressed. Shamir
397
 claims that PSM might be “highly influential in situations where 
behavioural rules compete, are weak, or where one’s self concept is tested”. Therefore, in 
transitional countries the formal rules which govern public administration have changed, but 
their strength depends on correct understanding and interpretation. If the majority of people is 
facing a new system and new logic of functioning how is it likely that they will change their 
value system overnight. This analysis leads to the conclusion that people will interpret the new 
institutions in the old manner which in a way explains the poor results of the administration 
reform. To support these claims some data on transitional countries could be found as part of 
the wider analysis of international patterns in PSM. Vandenabeele and Van de Walle
398
 used 
data from the 2004 International Social Survey Program (ISSP)
399
 which was particularly 
interesting due to its focus on “citizenship” with questions related to the relationship between 
citizens and the state, characteristics of a good citizen, trust, public service, etc. Authors 
analysed the data for 38 countries to measure public service motivation of which eight were 
transitional: Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovenia, Poland, Bulgaria, the Russian Federation, 
Latvia and Slovak Republic. Of the ten lowest-scoring countries, nine are European of which 
six are in Central and Eastern Europe (see Appendix 2.4). 
Dur and Zoutenbier
400
 claim that learning about PSM is important because it 
contributes to a “better understanding of organizational performance in the public sector”. 
Performance is important due to its linkage to the motivation of the work force and public 
sector organizations usually make little use of extrinsic work incentives. Since pay for 
performance and steep wage-tenure profiles are not at the basis of the incentive system, 
intrinsic motivations appears even more important compared to the private sector. Furthermore, 
Dur and Zoutenbier explain that intrinsic motivation is important from the prospective of 
policy makers for effective human resource policy designing. For instance, organizations, 
instead of using self-selection of workers, may employ selection tools, such as personal tests, 
in order to select desirable candidates. So if we take into account these claims and put them 
into the context of corruption in the administration, the straightforward intuition will tell that 
PSM in transitional countries is strongly negatively correlated to corruption. However, the 
literature on this topic is rather scarce. Cowley and Smith
401
 discussing the “mission 
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alignment” run the analysis in a cross-country regression framework which included 51 
country and more than 30,000 workers. They show that the more corrupt the administration is 
the more it attracts people with lower public service motivation. In a cross-country level 
“corruption has a negative effect on the (average) proportion of motivated workers” compared 
to the private sector. In an individual level the authors show that “intrinsically motivated 
workers are less likely to work in the public sector when levels of corruption are higher”. 
Reflecting upon the literature which discusses higher wages as anti-corruption strategies
402
, 
Cowley and Smith
403
 state that if implemented it will attract extrinsically instead of 
intrinsically motivated people. This is true because “corruption reduces the mission alignment 
between intrinsically motivated workers and the public sector”. The research has two important 
implications. The first provides the evidence for the importance of the mission definition in 
attracting intrinsically motivated workers and it can help governments in its effective 
development. Second, “they highlight a potential mechanism through which corrupt institutions 
may lead to worse public service outcomes”. In general, Dur and Zoutenbier404 claim that 
recent economic research on PSM finds that “some workers…intrinsically care about serving 
the public interest” and this usually comes from altruism. 405 They summarize the literature by 
saying its common finding is that in order to promote “self-selection of altruistic workers” 
organizations in the public sector set relatively low wages.  
 
2.5. Conclusion  
 
This chapter aimed to provide a response to the sub-research question presented in its 
introduction: What is the optimal structure of public administration in transitional countries 
for improving corruption combat? To answer it, the analysis covered various relevant aspects. 
The structure of this chapter is presented in Figure 2.1. 
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Figure 2.1: Summary of the ideas expressed in the chapter 
Corruption in PA 
 
 
 
 
                  Dominant strategies                                              Rising strategies  
           (organizational structure)                                                  (PA values) 
 
 
 
 
                          1.Privatization                                        Institutional design                     Personal design 
                   2. Decentralization & deregulation           a. Weberian PA                                  PSM 
                   3. Civil servants payment                         b. NPM 
                   4.Special anti-corruption bodies               c. NWS 
                                                          d. Good governance 
 
 
Corruption in public administration produced a significant amount of the literature 
which targets different aspects aiming to suggest a solution which will contribute to the 
improvement of corruption combat. The law and economics literature mainly suggest strategies 
such as: privatization, deregulation, decentralization, increased wages, etc. which are pulled out 
whenever somebody mentions research on corruption. However, the results of these 
approaches are not straightforward and always need to be understood as context dependent. 
They are not a panacea for corruption in all countries around the globe. Another strategy, 
which belongs to the list of dominant approaches, and which is usually introduced by the 
international pressure, assumes the establishment of an anti-corruption body. Successes in 
Singapore and Hong Kong made the international law makers think that this approach might 
help in overcoming the shortages of current corruption combat approaches. However, the 
achievements of this move appear to be disappointing.   
 The search for better approaches which could address corruption more effectively 
introduced to the literature some aspects which target institutional and personal values of the 
civil service and its employees. Regarding institutional values, the discussion targets various 
types of public administration, such as Weberian, New Public Management and Neo Weberian 
State (NWS). The studies on this matter are rare and so far they show that merit based 
recruitment, which is one of the core characteristics of Weberian and NWS approach, curbs 
corruption. Another aspect, also considered relevant for the research topic in this thesis, relates 
to Public Service Motivation. This approach focuses on intrinsic motives for people who work 
in public administration. Its relation to corruption is, however, still in its infancy.  
Last but not least, regarding the main topic of this thesis, transitional countries, couple 
of conclusions should be made. When the socialist system collapsed it produced demand for 
the new systems and rules. The logical step was their import from capitalist countries since 
capitalism was the intended final destination. Mainly due to economic reasons, transitional 
countries adopted almost all rules and regulations required by the international community. 
They also followed dominant trends advocated regarding anti-corruption strategies which 
include privatization, deregulation, decentralisation and establishment of anti-corruption 
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bodies. The results of the implementations of these rules are discussed at length in this chapter 
and they come as no surprise if one recalls the characteristics of starting points of transitional 
countries based on socialism. In the past administration, was heavily dominated by the 
Socialist/communist Party in all its aspects and as such as a main actor had homo sovieticus. 
When time came for change these countries took various paths which were offered by the 
international community. The trend of introducing New Public Management, advocated along 
with the Big Bang strategy, did not provide the expected results. Therefore, the literature which 
discusses the public administration reform process in transitional countries strongly argues for 
the implementation of the either the Weberian, or Neo Weberian State approach. They claim 
that these countries first need to internalise the basic values of the civil service operation before 
they apply institutions suggested by developed countries. Based on the characteristics of each 
administration type, intuition indicates that the Neo Weberian State reform approach would be 
the first best option, since besides the traditional values it includes the active interaction with 
clients as an external control. The second best solution for an effective corruption combat 
would be the implementation of the Weberian, traditional administration. NPM, as already 
discussed, will not have any effect in this case.  
The claims made earlier in this thesis that the historical and cultural context are 
important factors for understanding a particular institutional setting and they include analysis 
of not only formal but also informal institutions as well. This chapter looked mainly at the 
formal structure of public administration and its human capital. However, following the claim 
of institutionalist informal institutions are those who sometimes even count more for the 
successfulness of an enforcement of certain policy. The next chapter looks into the informal 
institutions in order to observe their role in corruption combat in post-socialist countries.  
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Graph2.5: Correlation between GCB and GAI for 185 countries  
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Table: Correlation matrix of four indexes for 25 transitional countries 
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Graph 2.6: Correlation between GAI and TICPI for 25 transitional countries  
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Graph 2.7: Correlation between GAI and CC for 25 transitional countries 
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Graph 2.8: Correlation between TICPI and CC for 25 transitional countries  
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Graph 2.9: Correlation between GCB and CC for 25 transitional countries 
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Graph2.10: Correlation between GCB and TICPI for 25 transitional countries  
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Graph 2.11: Correlation between GCB and GAI for 25 transitional countries  
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Appendix 2.3 
Table 2.6: Characteristics of the civil service in socialist countries 
Country Description of the civil service systems 
Russia - Servants were selected according to the criteria of origin and ideological fidelity with questionable 
professional competences and performances 
- The bureaucratic system was rigid, inward-looking administrative apparatus, which performed strictly 
controlled functions with limited capacity for decision making 
- The whole civil service structure was responsible to the Communist Party 
- Membership of the Party was a minimum requirement for promotion  
- Party “functionaries” were present in every large office with the main task of controlling the activities of 
employees and compliance of the management to the Party’s directives  
Bulgaria - Followed Soviet civil service model 
- System of “parallel bureaucracy”: the administrative structures existed together with the Communist 
Party bureaucracy  
- General labour laws applied to civil servants 
- The main basis for recruitment and promotion was “nomenklatura” system 
- Party membership was condition for most of the middle and higher ranks in the state administration 
- Discharging happened only in case of gross misconduct  
- The principle of the loyalty to the political leadership was the crucial operation principle 
Hungary  - Followed Soviet civil service model 
- Political loyalty and reliability were the main criteria for filing the civil service positions 
- Civil servants were mainly Party members 
- General labour laws applied to civil servants 
Poland - Followed Soviet civil service model 
- Public administration was fully subordinated to the Communist Party 
- Civil servants loyal and faithful to the political communist programme, unresponsive to the needs of the 
public  
- Communist party had its own administration and all public policy decisions were taken there, sometimes 
even executed   
Slovak Republic - Followed Soviet civil service model 
- Civil service system was the servant of the Communist Party 
- Civil servants were fully dependent on political masters  
- The system of “nomenklatura” and “party cells” guaranteed that each civil servant and institution will 
follow the directives of the Communist Party 
- Civil servants had to be loyal to the political regime 
Estonia - Followed Soviet civil service model  
- Civil servants did not serve the citizens but ran the state according to the plans and instructions of the 
Communist Party 
- For the success and career of a clerk his personal loyalty to superior was even more important than the 
loyalty to the regime 
- There was no civil servant status and no social guarantees  
- Superiors opinion was more important than legal provisions 
- Selective implementation of legislation which depended on “whose interests were involved” and what 
are the instructions “from above” 
- In order to be discharged civil official had to be engaged in serious dead; the low performance was not 
one of the reasons for it. 
Latvia - Followed Soviet civil service model 
- Orders were coming “from above” 
- Principle of “double subordination”: governmental organizations received orders from a central 
administrative institutions (vertical subordination) and a local party institution (horizontal subordination) 
- Special civil service “nomenclatura”  casts were created 
- civil servant were expected to unconditionally obey to a higher rank and to the Communist Party but at 
the same time they showed and arrogant attitude towards lower-level employees and customers 
- Adequate and reliable information was not available to all civil servants or to the general public 
Lithuania - Followed Soviet civil service model 
- ‘nomenklatura” system was applied 
- Fusion between politics and administration by employing party-approved officials who pursued goals of 
the Communist Party 
- Civil servants had to obey to the Party instructions and that was the key factor for the service 
Yugoslavia - In 1948 it developed own type of socialism 
- Since then civil service was fairly centralised but executive branch was made more dependent on 
parliament 
- Civil servants were a special group of employed workers until 1970 
- However, even after that a civil service career was regarded as privileged, especially for those who 
worked in the federal administration  
- It was difficult to distinguish between the state and party apparatus until 1950s when worker’s self-
management concept was introduced; however, the two structures merged on the top 
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Appendix 2.4 
 
Table: Average countries scores for PSM  
No. Country Coefficient    No. Country Coefficient 
1.  Portugal 5.63 20. Netherlands 4.94 
2.  Philippines  5.56 21. South Korea 4.93 
3.  South Africa 5.51 22. Denmark 4.90 
4.  Mexico 5.50 23. France 4.84 
5.  Brazil 5.49 24. Norway 4.83 
6.  Venezuela 5.44 25. Slovenia 4.83 
7.  Uruguay 5.42 26. Sweden 4.77 
8.  Spain 5.40 27. Japan 4.74 
9.  Chile 5.33 28. Germany 4.72 
10.  Canada 5.31 29. New Zealand  4.56 
11.  USA 5.29 30. Slovakia 4.59 
12.  Ireland 5.28 31. UK 4.58 
13.  Australia 5.25 32. Russia 4.57 
14.  Austria 5.16 33. Flanders 4.40 
15.  Israel 5.10 34. Latvia 4.13 
16.  Cyprus 5.09 35. Finland 4.22 
17.  Poland 5.033 36. Bulgaria  4.17 
18.  Taiwan 5.00 37. Hungary  4.13 
19.  Switzerland  4.98 38. Czech Republic 3.97 
Source: Vandenabeele and Van de Walle: “International Differences in Public Service Motivation: Comparing Regions Across 
the World”, pp.238 
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Chapter 3: Designing of optimal anti-corruption policies in 
transitional countries: incentives in a complex environment  
The radical novelty of modern science lies precisely in the rejection 
of the belief that the forces which move the stars and atoms 
are contingent upon the preferences of the human heart.  
Richard Adams 
 
 
3.1 Introduction   
 
The previous chapters described the corruption problem and consequences that it 
induces, the public choice theory framework for the analysis of corruption, as well as initiatives 
and measures taken by the international institutions and their member countries to improve 
corruption combat. However, despite the efforts made, recent researches revealed non 
impressive results in achieving this goal. In particular in transitional countries, the weak rule 
enforcement is recognized as one of the main problems for this underperformance. This implies 
that the “one size fit all” anti-corruption framework does not provide desired outcomes. The 
main claim of this research is that the dominant framework for corruption combat and its 
institutions are not suited well to transitional countries and as such should be redesigned taking 
into account their specificities. Consequently, this and the next chapter aim to target the second 
issue in the structure-conduct-performance paradigm, human conduct in order to provide 
possible solutions for optimal anti-corruption strategies design for post-socialist (transitional) 
countries. Human conduct is here analysed through the incentive mechanisms, expressed 
preferences and behaviour in the case of imposed constraints. This chapter will particularly 
target preferences and their coordination. Therefore, the main sub-research question in this 
chapter is: How the preferences of civil servants should be targeted/coordinated in order to 
achieve the optimal level of corruption combat in public administration of post-socialist 
countries. In order to answer the question this chapter takes a broad economic approach which 
is still based on individual preferences and constraints but in a much more complex 
environment than the one used in the traditional neoclassical models. Earlier in this thesis the 
description of a specific mental model of (post)socialist people was provided. To stress its 
importance, the work of Denzau and North
406
 is recalled. They claim that mental models are 
present among the individuals with a common cultural background and shared experiences. 
According to this view, these individuals “share reasonably convergent mental models, 
ideologies and institutions”. If individuals are coming from different backgrounds they will 
have different theories to interpret a certain environment. Denzau and North explain that “the 
mental models that the mind creates and the institutions that individuals create are both 
essential to the way human beings structure their environment in their interactions with it”. 
Therefore the Shared Mental Models – SMM provide to the individuals from the same 
environment a sense of its intellectual understanding together with a common set of concepts 
and language which make their communication easier. They further explain that the evolution 
of mental models is achievable through better communication links by which individuals who 
                                                          
406
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share them learn from the world. The link between mental models on one side and ideologies 
and institutions on the other depends “on the product and processes of representational 
redescription”. Finally, the understanding of a society’s performance could be achieved by the 
understanding of the way in which ideas evolve and are communicated. 
After the fall of socialism and its ideas, post-socialist countries were in need of a new 
system which can “fix” the problems of the old one and repair society after the collapse. 
However, this change cannot occur over night. For a while, according to Kornai
407
, the dual 
system, especially regarding the system of moral values, will be the source of many kinds of 
conflict. Although disillusioned with the socialist system, great masses of people continue to 
adhere to its values. This causes confusion because they are drawn toward moral values that 
contrast with those instilled over a long period
408
. Boettke
409
 explains that when facing the 
reforming government, citizens do not know with whom are they playing because the only 
knowledge that they have about it is the “old way” of doing things and signals that this way 
should be abandoned might not receive support and trust. Therefore the participation of the 
citizens is crucial to any reform. For instance, Czarczynska
410
 says that public administration 
should advocate for effectiveness and productivity in public service and therefore lack of 
quality in the domain of public sector produces costs for the whole society. Change of the 
scheme which will encourage administrative staff to improve will improve the administrative 
service as a result. Therefore, this chapter discusses the regulation of human behaviour, culture 
and transparency and accountability as important aspects of corruption combat.  
 
3.2 Regulating behaviour and enforcement pyramid   
 
3.2.1 Ways of regulating human behaviour 
 
As mentioned earlier the dominant framework for corruption combat targets three main 
areas: repression, prevention, and transparency. A repression component includes demand for 
increased criminalization. Following these patterns in supressing harmful corrupt behaviour 
many countries reach for deterrence-based approach. This approach coerces compliance by 
sanctioning the violator through a “confrontational enforcement style”.411Its foundation is set 
                                                          
407
Kornai, J. (1992): The Socialist System: The Political Economy of Socialism, Princeton University Press, 
pp.579-580 
408Buyandelgeriyn, M. (2008): “Post-Post-Transition Theories: Walking on Multiple Paths”, The Annual Review of 
Anthropology, Vol. 37, pp. 235-250; Anthropologists, who analysed the behaviour of people in transitional 
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410Czarczynska, A. (2011): “Towards better public governance. The importance of proinnovative public 
administration”, Cambridge Business and Economic Conference 
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by Becker
412
 who applied traditional economic tools in the analysis of the behaviour of 
criminals explaining that rationality plays an important role in deciding whether to obey the 
law or not. This view pictures criminals under the veil of Rational Choice Theory and explains 
that before making any decision criminals, like all other rational persons, calculate the costs 
and benefits of any action in order to maximize their objectives-utility. As a result, the 
deterrence mechanism, when aiming to decrease crime rates, should take into account severity 
of punishment and probability of being caught for the act committed. Becker’s analytical 
framework became a basis for law and economics scholars who have relied on the Deterrence 
theory in explaining the social goal of enforcement policies.
413
 Hough et al.
414
 define the key 
assumptions of penal and criminal policy expressed in the simple ‘crime control’ models: (1) 
people are rational-they apply economic calculations in deciding whether to break the law; 
(2)the main weapon of criminal justice is deterrent threat; (3) offenders  and crime rates  are 
responsive to the risk of punishment, which vary on dimensions of certainty, severity and 
celerity; (4) sensible responses to crime are expressed in increasing the severity of sentencing, 
and extending the reach of enforcement strategies and (5) offender rights are seen as a 
constraint on effective crime control. This view implies approaches to crime control that are 
designed to secure instrumental compliance – where people’s reasons for law-breaking are 
based on self-interested calculation. This approach is elaborated on in more detail in the next 
chapter. 
On the other hand, more refined models of crime control recognise formal criminal 
justice as one of the many systems of social control, most of which have a significant 
normative dimension. A deterrence based approach puts too much attention on questions 
regarding why people break the law instead of trying to answer the opposite one why people 
comply with the law. The questions about compliance recognise the difference between formal 
and informal systems of social control, more precisely the normative dimensions in people’s 
orientation towards the law. As Hough at al.
415
 explained, normative compliance with the law 
“occurs when people feel a moral or ethical obligation or commitment to do so”. Therefore, the 
shortcomings of the deterrence based approach lead to the development of the cooperative 
enforcement approach. This approach argues that regulatees are concerned to do what is right, 
and to be faithful to their sense of responsibility. The explanation for this behaviour lies in the 
fact that most regulates have a law abiding nature which motivates them to obey the law even 
when the treats of punishment are absent. Oded
416
  says that in order to support this approach 
the theory refers to the well-established Procedural Justice Theory. This theory represents one 
of the ways of thinking about how public could be stimulated to commit to the rule of law. 
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Focusing on people’s compliance with institutional authority, Hough at al.417 claim that in the 
essence of this approach are specific relationships between: (1) the treatment which people 
receive from the police and justice officials; (2) the resultant trust which people have in 
institutions of justice; (3) the legitimacy which people confer, as a consequence of this trust, on 
institutions of justice; (4) the authority which institutions exercise when regarded as legitimate; 
and, (5) people’s consequent readiness to “obey the police, comply with the law and cooperate 
with justice”.  
 Tyler and Mentovich
418
 explain that procedural justice studies people’s subjective 
evaluations of the justice of procedures. For instance: are they are fair or unfair, ethical or 
unethical, or if they are otherwise in accordance with people’s standards of fair processes for 
social interaction and decision-making. According to them the two key dimensions of 
procedural fairness judgments are: fairness of decision making (voice, neutrality) and fairness 
of interpersonal treatment (trust, respect). Procedural justice is particularly important in studies 
of decision acceptance and rule following, which are core areas of legal regulation. According 
to Tyler and Mentovich, the central claim of this approach is that “people are responsive to 
evaluations of the fairness of procedures, even if authorities do not provide the outcomes 
people hoped for”. Reflecting upon deterrence based approach they further argue that from 
motivational perspective it is not self-sustaining because it requires “the maintenance of 
institutions” and authorities which are able to keep the probability of detection of the 
wrongdoers at a “sufficiently high level” in order to motivate the public to comply with the 
laws through external means.  However, Tyler and Mentovich explain that if citizens fail to 
obey legal constraints in sufficient level, legal authorities will react to achieve the desired level 
of compliance which will result in continued surveillance and attempts to improve enforcement 
which is sometimes feasible. Nevertheless, these strategies might show limitations in the cases 
such as hidden behaviours which are difficult to detect, like corruption, or when resources for 
the achieving sufficiently high deterrence are lacking even though we know how to monitor. 
 Therefore, the authors stress that self-regulation offers an alternative to the 
deterrence model. In this model “people are seen as motivated to follow rules because their 
own values suggest to them that doing so is the appropriate action to take”. Behaviour which is 
motivated by an individual’s values and attitudes is superior to coerced behaviour but the 
problem lies in motivating people to everyday compliance to the rules or self-regulation. Tyler 
and Mentovich further explain that if people identify with the authorities and perceive them as 
legitimate, they will “voluntarily abide by laws”. Recent studies show that the manner of 
exercising the authority shapes the people’s feelings of their self-esteem and self-worth.  
 This approach, explains Oded
419
, served as an ideological ground for the development 
of several enforcement regimes which embrace the idea of regulatory cooperation. One of these 
approaches is the Responsive Regulation approach which will be described in the next section. 
In between two opposed approaches – deterrence based and procedural justice – there are 
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authors who argue that a combination of two would be the best solution. Oded claims that an 
“inclusive enforcement approach can maximise the welfare”.420 As Braithwaite and Ayres421 
argued “the trick of successful regulation is to establish a synergy between punishment and 
persuasion”. The core of this approach is based on the Prisoner’s Dilemma game422 and applied 
Tit-for-Tat strategy on that ground. In essence the Prisoner’s Dilemma game involves two 
players, and each of them has a choice either to cooperate or to defect. Decisions are made 
simultaneously and the parties cannot coordinate their choices. If both players choose 
cooperation, both gain the maximal payoff; if only one chooses to cooperate, the other one, 
who opts for defection, gains more; finally, if both choose defection, both gain very little, but 
still more than the co-operator who was defected by his counter party. 
423
 Table 3.1 describes 
the standard prisoner’s dilemma payoffs. 
 
              Table 3.1: Prisoner’s Dilemma Game payoffs 
 Player A 
Cooperate Defect 
 
Player B 
Cooperate (150,150) (40,250) 
Defect (250, 40) (100, 100) 
        Source: Oded, “Corporate compliance: new approaches to regulatory enforcement” 
 
In the one-shot game the dominant strategy of the players is defect/defect. However, 
when the game is played repeatedly, the outcome of the game is different which is shown by 
Axelrod
424
. He explains that if the game is played a known finite number of times, the players 
still lack the incentive to cooperate, especially on the last move because of no future to 
influence. However, with an indefinite number of interactions cooperation can emerge. 
According to Axelrod, the best strategy to play this game in this case is through “Tit-for-Tat” 
(TFT) strategy which is based on reciprocity. Sustainable cooperation could be reached if one 
player starts by cooperating and continues to cooperate, unless provoked by the counterpart’s 
decision to defect. If provoked, the player retaliates in the next round of the game by doing the 
same as his counterpart, defecting. Axelrod describes TFT as “nice, retaliatory, forgiving and 
clear”, explaining that its niceness prevents parties from getting into unnecessary trouble; its 
retaliation discourages the other side from persisting whenever defection is tried; its 
forgiveness helps restore mutual cooperation; finally, its clarity makes it intelligible to the 
other player, thereby eliciting long-term cooperation.
425
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The logic of the Prisoner’s Dilemma game and TFT strategy is further used in the 
literature in regulatory context. Scholz
426
 argues that the voluntary compliance outcome 
provides both sides (e.g. governmental agency and firm) with “the mutual rewards of flexible 
compliance combined with flexible enforcement”. He further argues that if enforcement and 
compliance costs could be minimized through the party’s cooperation net social benefits would 
be higher and the enforcement strategy which has TFT characteristics is the most likely 
candidate for establishing “socially beneficial cooperation”.427Policy implications from this 
view are the following: enforcement authorities should set a minimal level of compliance and 
those who meet this criterion become a subject of cooperative response by the authority while 
those who do not meet the required level “face a rigorous, deterrence based enforcement 
response”.428 The TFT strategy has been applied to various structures of enforcement regimes 
and they are all known as State-Dependent Enforcement. The model of state-dependent 
enforcement has been made by Landsberger and Meilijson
429
. They introduced an incentive 
system which, in case generated externalities by repetitive actions, proves instrumental and 
argue that penalty system should be state dependent. This further implies that states are those in 
charge of the classification of individuals in terms of their recent activity regarding the rule 
compliance. In conclusion, mixed regimes – deterrence based and cooperative enforcement – 
follow an inclusive approach which addresses all types of regulatees while adjusting 
enforcement responses to the particular circumstances at hand. However, these regimes show 
significant pitfalls, namely information asymmetry (e.g. taking into account only detected 
violations) and arbitrariness, (e.g. granting an enforcement authority wide discretion). This 
requires further improvement of mixed regimes in order to overcome these pitfalls.
430
 
 
3.2.2 Responsive Regulation approach: Enforcement pyramid and Pyramid of 
regulatory strategies 
 
Responsive regulation approach was developed by Braithwaite and Ayres 
431
 and it 
promotes the use of persuasion and advisory measures by the authorities before use of more 
invasive measures. Regulators will be more able to speak softly when they carry big sticks 
together with a hierarchy of lesser sanctions. The bigger and the more varied the sticks, the 
greater success regulators will achieve by speaking softly. More precisely the more sanctions 
can be kept in the background, the more regulation can be transacted through moral persuasion, 
and the more effective the regulation will be. They claim that instead of choosing punishment 
as first choice, compliance sounds like way better solution because it is “affordable, workable 
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and productive in stimulating the good will of those who have to comply”. The central issue of 
this approach are two pyramids, enforcement pyramid and pyramid of regulatory strategies 
which depicts the idea of regulatory agencies seen as “benign big guns” which “speak softly 
while carrying very big sticks” and having enormous powers. The pyramid of enforcement idea 
suggests that the greater the heights of punitivness to which an agency punishment can 
escalate, the greater its capacity to push regulation down to the cooperative base of the 
pyramid. Or as Braithwaite and Ayres say “graduated response up to draconian final solutions 
can make passive deterrence formidable and can give active deterrence room to 
manoeuvre”.432Regarding their enforcement pyramid, Pyramid 3.1, compliance is most likely 
when an agency displays an explicit enforcement pyramid which targets a single regulate firm. 
Most regulatory action occurs at the base of the pyramid where attempts are initially made to 
obtain compliance by persuasion. The next phase of enforcement escalation is a warning letter. 
However, if this fails to secure compliance, imposition of civil monetary penalties steps in. The 
next step is a criminal prosecution. Before the final step, a plant might be shut down or 
temporary suspension of a license to operate can take place. If, however, this fails to produce 
the expected outcome, permanent revocation of license is applied. 
433
 
 
Pyramid 3.1: Enforcement pyramid 
  
 
Source: Braithwaite and Ayres, “Responsive Regulation: Transcending the Deregulation Debate” 
 
 The pyramid of regulatory strategies, Pyramid 3.2, is designed for the entire industry. 
Governments are most likely to achieve their goals by communicating to an industry that the 
referred strategy is industry self-regulation. When self-regulation functions well, it is the least 
burdensome approach from the point of view of both taxpayers and the regulated industry. The 
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pyramid starts from self-regulation, and then moves to enforced self-regulation. If this fails to 
provide the desired outcome it includes command regulation with discretionary punishment 
and finally command regulation with nondiscretionary punishment. Braithwaite and Ayres 
claim that “regulatory cultures can be transformed by clever signalling by regulatory agencies, 
public interest groups, and political leaders that an escalation of the interventionism of 
regulatory strategy may be in the offing”. Since the higher costs and “more unfathomable 
probabilities are involved in such treats”, the chances of bluffing are higher. Therefore the 
industry association might be very often involved in “disciplining and bluffing firms that free 
ride on the regulatory future of the industry”434 Analysing this approach Kim435 claims that 
Braithwaite places high importance on “the moral educative effects of punishment” and on the 
“role of punishment in constituting an image of invincibility within a regulatory culture”. 
 
Pyramid 3.2: Pyramid of regulatory strategies 
 
 
Source: Braithwaite and Ayres, “Responsive Regulation: Transcending the Deregulation Debate” 
  
3.2.3 Anti-corruption pyramid  
 
Discussion in the previous chapters provided the insights into the corruption problem 
and the results achieved so far in post-socialist countries regarding combat against it. In order 
to decrease corruption, countries in general reach for the dominant international anti-corruption 
framework. Although, these mechanisms for fighting corruption are employed by the majority 
of countries around the world, the results of their implementation do not show the equal 
success in reducing corruption. The transitional countries, which are the subject of this 
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research, besides their formal readiness to adopt the suggested framework, show very modest 
result in the domain of corruption combat. One of the explanations for this underachievement 
could be found in the idiosyncrasies of these countries, regarding specific historical, economic 
and cultural factors. Braithwaite and Ayres
436
  claim that socialist countries had strong coercive 
power but “in commanding voluntary consent from its citizens they were weaker than the 
democracies”. This was the result of lacking a respect for law because it was perceived as “the 
extension of the power of party functionaries”. For instance, corrupt and inefficient firms were 
kept alive since no market mechanisms such as competitors, criticism from the opposite parties 
or free press were in the place to put them out of business. This legacy has been already 
discussed earlier with the implication that it might be one of the main reasons for 
underachievement of transitional countries regarding corruption combat. Before offering a 
possible solution a few important facts should be kept in mind. This thesis analyses corruption 
of public administration and it is described as abuse of public office for private gain.  In that 
sense, the nature of the corrupt act is, in most of the cases, in the essence contract, agreement 
between two parties for interchange of benefits. As Macrae
437
 says, “it is an agreement, private 
exchange, between two parties – the “demander” and “supplier” – which has an influence on 
the allocation of resources, either immediately or in the future and involves the use or abuse of 
public or collective responsibility for private ends”. The main characteristics of this agreement 
is its secrecy and therefore problematic for discovering. Therefore, Lambsdorff and Nell
438
 
suggest that corruption combat improvement should employ the reform measures which should 
promote betrayal among corrupt parties in order to break the secrecy. Furthermore, corruption 
could be seen as victimless crime, since a direct victim is missing, although whole society is 
indirectly affected by it. Hence, the necessity of raising the awareness of people to this fact is 
crucial. It is also important to recall important features of the public choice theory for the 
analysis of corruption: the agency structure, which arises when two individuals enter a non-
market relationship in which one individual relies on another to carry out certain actions on his 
behalf. The actions of the agent affect principal’s payoff particularly in the case of conflict of 
interest or in the situations not regulated by the contract. Regarding this relationship, the agent 
is usually better informed than the principal. Having in mind the asymmetry of information 
problem, the principal tries to put in an incentive scheme in order to induce the optimal action 
by the agent. This scheme can also include another agent- supervisor, who should monitor the 
performance of the firs agent. 
Taking into account corruption characteristics mentioned above and using the 
theoretical models of responsive regulation, particularly pyramid of regulatory strategies and 
principal-supervisor-agent model, it is possible to create an anti-corruption pyramid, Pyramid 
3.3, as a potential solution for corruption combat improvement in post-socialist countries. 
Pyramid combines compliance and deterrence approach targeting with each specific areas of 
individual and social behaviour. It also uses the dominant international anti-corruption 
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structure prevention – transparency – deterrence as a basis, but the elements are differently 
organized. Prevention part regarding culture and education is located in the bottom of the 
pyramid, followed with transparency and accountability and finally punishment on two levels: 
administrative and criminal.  Its main idea is to target administration – civil service (agents), 
who are supervised by government, responsible to citizens (principals) for developing trustful 
relations among people, in order to foster economic development and growth of transitional 
countries. Supervisors are here considered as benevolent, due to the commitment of post-
socialist governments to reform the country, e.g. by joining the EU. This pyramid aims, as 
well, to break the secrecy of the agreement, and therefore the asymmetry of information 
between officials and bureaucracy in discovering it, by targeting the improvement of the 
quality of administration and trust in it as well as the recovery of respect for state institutions. 
If administration is not asking and accepting bribe, then the other side in a corrupt agreement 
will not have the possibility of giving it.  
As described in previous section on responsive regulations, the design of the anti-
corruption pyramid uses persuasion and advisory measures by the authorities before use of 
more intrusive ones. Therefore, in order to improve the behaviour and quality of administration 
(civil service), government should start to act first on the level of culture and transparency, 
before employing deterrence mechanisms. The layers of the anti-corruption pyramid 
correspond to the layers of the pyramid of regulatory strategies (Pyramid 3.2). In latter, first 
level includes self-enforcement which in anti-corruption pyramid equals to culture and intrinsic 
values of people, in this case civil servants. Culture governs our life and explains our intrinsic 
values and motives of our acts. This thesis claims that some cultural characteristics are 
important in order to approach corruption combat effectively and efficiently and it will be 
analysed in more detail in this chapter.  
The second layer addresses enforced self-regulation, which in anti-corruption sense 
calls for transparency and accountability of civil servants as a corrective tool for desired self-
regulation. If intrinsic motivation fails, than external motivation and institutional setting should 
serve as a “corrector” of unwilling behaviour. The third layer, command regulation with 
discretionary punishment, corresponds to administrative sanctions conducted by superiors if 
corrupt behaviour passes through the first two layers. In previous chapter it was explained that 
corruption has many classification and for this layer important distinction is one in which 
bureaucrats are bribed to speed up the process in providing the service for the clients who are 
entitled to it and bribes paid to them for the services which are not available to the clients, 
more precisely illegal ones. The third layer should be applied in the case when “oiling the 
wheel” is in place, since parties already have certain rights. Finally, command regulation with 
nondiscretionary punishment, corresponds to heavy weapon of criminal sanctions for corrupt 
behaviour. This layer includes the most severe sanctions which are usually most costly for the 
society and therefore, according to the regulatory strategy approach, should be used as a final 
solution. Corrupt acts that fall into this category are all those which are illegal, more precisely 
in which public officials provide services which parties are not entitled to. 
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Pyramid 3.3: Anti-corruption pyramid 
 
 
 
The design of the pyramid targets two components of human behaviour in one policy. It 
coordinates the preferences and puts constraints on the socially undesirable behaviour. Putting 
constraints on in order to create a socially desirable outcome is in the literature of law and 
economics undisputable but coordinating preferences is the subject of debate. In the next 
paragraphs of this section, the theoretical background for these claims will be provided while 
constraints will be elaborated on in the next chapter.  
 
3.2.3.1 Targeting/coordinating preferences 
 
In one of the previous sections of this chapter it was explained that the analysis of 
individual preferences and constraints are put here in the broader economic model which 
includes much more complex environment than the one used in the traditional neoclassical 
models. When discussing people’s choices, traditional economists have different opinions 
about the possible influence of the law on them. On one side, there is the claim that personal 
preferences are outside the scope of the law, while on the other, there are arguments that law 
creates focal points which stimulates people to create equilibrium accordingly. Michael and 
Becker
439
 claim that “for economists to rest a large part of their theory of choice on differences 
in tastes is disturbing since they admittedly have no useful theory of the formation of tastes, 
nor can they rely on a well-developed theory of tastes from any other discipline in the social 
science, since none exists”. Put differently, the theory used by an empirical researcher is unable 
to assist him to choose the “appropriate taste proxies on a prior ground” or in the formulation 
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of predictions regarding their effects on people’s behaviour. In line with this approach is the 
view of Stigler and Becker
440
, who explain that the biggest advantage “of relying only on 
changes in the argument entering household production function” is that any change in 
behaviour is “explained by changes in prices and incomes”, variables which organize and give 
the power to economic analysis.  
 However, if the incentives are put in the social context different from the one in 
capitalism, the social environment might appear highly influential on them. For instance the 
change of the social system in transition from a socialist to a capitalist society, caused to a 
certain extent the loss of an orientation among the people about what is right and wrong. In that 
case the norms of the new system should promote and express new values which in the future 
would govern human behaviour.  Cooter 
441
 talks about expressive law explaining that law can 
create a “focal point by expressing values” and this focal point can shift the system from an old 
to a new equilibrium. With this characteristic “law can change the individual values of rational 
people” by internalizing a social norm which is a moral commitment that “attaches a 
psychological penalty to a forbidden act”. Cooter further explains that “a rational person 
internalizes a norm when commitment conveys an advantage relative to the original 
preferences and the changed preferences”. This change is called “Pareto self-improvement”. If 
law creates the opportunities for Pareto self-improvements, it induces rational people to 
coordinate their preferences. Therefore, there are two use of expressive law: creating focal 
points and changing individual values. Cooter
442
, stresses that law and economics scholars 
typically put the “rational bad man” into the decision-maker shoes in their models and “for the 
bad man, law is a constraint and not a guide”. However, real life includes bad and good people, 
together with those undecided, in between. Therefore, the laws should not be made only for 
bad people, because “the response of good people also determines the law’s effect”. Sceptical 
claims that “internalized values do not matter”, are, according to Cooter, reduced to the “false 
claims that costs alone determine the equilibrium”. For sceptics, law has no impact on the 
values which citizens internalise. Taking this argument into account it could be said that people 
change the preference in order to increase their opportunities and they “internalize morality to 
improve their opportunities for cooperating with others”. Therefore, Cooter concludes, state 
has to “align law with social norms” and should enlist “pre-existing morality in the service of 
that state” in order to solve agency problems “that plague government”. In line with the 
previous view is Bar-Gill and Fershtman’s 443 opinion. They claim that, although the law and 
economics approach consider legal rules as incentive mechanisms, “legal system does more 
than provide incentives”. It affects the dynamic formation of preferences and norms which 
change people. Bar-Gill and Fershtman point out that although “preference formation will 
likely remain a controversial subject”, one cannot ignore their interdependence with prevailing 
legal rules.  
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From the arguments described above it is clear that this view stands at the opposite end 
to the typical economic analysis because it stresses the “expressive function of law”. As 
already explained this approach identifies the law as a mean for expressing social values and 
encourages social norms to move to certain direction. According to Sunstein
444
, “many laws 
have an expressive function” because “they are designed to change existing norms and to 
influence behaviour in that fashion”. More precisely, their design promotes a way in which 
certain goods should be evaluated. They claim that the impact which law has on human 
behaviour is important aspect which lawmakers should understand because of its connection to 
social norms. This understanding should help in illuminating “effective regulatory policy”.  
Having argued that law has the ability to influence people’s behaviour, some 
suggestions on how to achieve that the best way could be found in the literature. Regarding the 
relationship of social vs. legal norms Kahan
445
 discuss the “sticky norms” problem which 
occurs when “the prevalence of social norm makes decision makers reluctant to carry out a law 
intended to change that norm”. The “norms stick” if lawmakers attempt to change them with 
“hard shoves”, however if they apply “gentle nudges” the norms yield. If the policy maker tries 
to “break the grip of the contested norm” and condemns certain behaviour too severely, most 
likely it will end up like “dead letter and could even backfire”. On the other hand if citizens are 
“gently nudged” towards the desired behaviour and therefore for breaking the law are 
condemned “more mildly”, this will lead to an “eradication of the contested norms and 
associated types of behaviour”. This mechanism is especially effective in the situation when 
society is divided regarding the support for the introduced norm, some support, some oppose 
and the rest is ambivalent towards it. As an example, Kahan describes shaming penalties which 
are “enjoying a renaissance in American law” in the form of “stigmatizing publicity and more 
ritualized degradation ceremonies”. These sanctions are applied to nonviolent and white-collar 
crimes. Corruption could be classified in these categories. The crucial advantage of this 
approach is that, on one hand “shame costs led than imprisonment” and on the other “is more 
expressive of condemnation than are fines and community service”.  
Targeting preferences is also important in the case of transparency. Stiglitz
446
 argues 
that in general “incentives for secrecy are great” as well as “the opportunities for evading of 
any disclosure regulations”. Since legalistic approaches have limitations, the dominant strategy 
should be creation of “culture of openness” with the presumption and public should be 
informed about all collective decisions and should participate in them. It essential for society, 
argues Stiglitz, to create a “mind-set of openness” which means that people believe that the 
public is the owner of information in possession of public officials and any use of them for 
private purposes “is theft of public property”. Although legal framework committed to 
openness has an essential role it is not sufficient because other institutions, such as “free, 
competitive and critical media”, play a significant role.  
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This section presented different approaches and opinions in the literature of law and 
economics and provided arguments for targeting culture and transparency as first layers of the 
anti-corruption pyramid. The claim of this research is that the state’s first approach should be 
on the basis of persuasion and education in order to improve corruption combat. The 
propensity for corruption will be depicted in the next section through the various cultural 
aspects: universalism and particularism, collectivism and individualism, power distance and 
certainty avoidance.  
 
3.3 Propensity to corruption – Culture 
 
 The word culture is rooted in the Latin word cultura which literally means cultivation. 
Culture nowadays has different meanings. In social anthropology, according to Hofstede
447
, 
culture refers to all patterns of thinking, feeling and acting of a certain group of people. This is 
“way of collective programming of the mind which distinguishes the members of one group or 
category of people from another”. Patterns of thinking, learning and acting for each person 
have been acquired in early childhood and these he calls mental programs or “software of the 
mind”. The programming starts first within the family, continues in neighbourhood, at school, 
in youth groups, at work place and the living community. Culture is learned and not inherited 
and therefore Hofstede claims that is should be distinguished from two other important 
categories: human nature and personality (see Figure 3.1) 
 
Figure 3.1: Three levels of uniqueness in human mental programming   
 
Source: Hofstede, “Cultures and organizations: Software of the mind”, p.6 
 
According to Hofstede, human nature encompasses universal characteristics of all 
human beings and it is inherited with one’s genes. It includes human ability to feel anger, fear, 
love, sadness, the need to associate with others and etc. However, expressing these feelings is 
shaped by culture. Finally, personality represents set of unique characteristics which a person 
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does not share with any other human being. It consists of two traits, partly inherited through an 
individual set of genes and partly learned through culture and unique personal experience. 
Focusing on the culture Hofstede
448
 further explains that since almost everyone belongs at the 
same time to various different groups and categories of people, it is possible to identify six 
basic levels of culture: (1) national level according to one’s country; (2) 
regional/ethic/religious/linguistic level; (3) gender level; (4) generation level; (5) social class 
level; finally (6) organizational/corporate level. Analysing national cultures using survey which 
was distributed through the multi-national corporation IBM, Hofstede defined four 
fundamental cultural dimensions relevant for resolving common problems recognized by 
surveyed employees: power distance (from small to large), collectivism vs. individualism, 
uncertainty avoidance and femininity vs. masculinity.
449
 For each of the dimensions he 
calculated indexes which provide the information regarding cultural aspects for a certain 
number of countries. 
Although Hofstede’s model is widely used in the literature it is not without critique. 
Some authors, such as McSweeney
450
, Smith
451
, Triandis
452
, Earley
453
 and Kirkman et al.
454
, 
direct the debate to the various aspects of the model which among the others include: data 
collection methods and sites, number of cultural dimensions, and particularly, the concept of 
national culture as a homogeneous construct. However, Greckhamer
455
 claims that studies 
which replicated Hofstede’s model support “the relative stability of its cultural values over 
time”456. Williamson457claims are in line with this view because he says that total rejection of 
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Hofstede’s model without developing a satisfactory one would mean throwing away of 
valuable insights because “quantification of national culture opens up what is otherwise a black 
box of cultural factors”. The attributes of national culture provided by Hofstede could be used 
to describe social phenomenon or could provide “a comparative yardstick for other cultural 
attributes”. His model also provides a valuable framework for cross-cultural research. 
Discussing the concrete application of Hofstede’s cultural model Taras et al.458 claim that “as 
assessment of national cultural values would be an effective tool for selecting employees with 
the set of values that best fit the existing organizational structure or job design”. However, 
culture is not the only factor which affects the workplace. Therefore, it should be used “only in 
conjunction with other selection tools”, more precisely those which test skills and knowledge 
related to a specific job for which one applies. However, Taras et al. suggest that if resources 
are limited, “culture may be a better choice than other commonly considered selection 
indicators” because cultural values could provide significant contribution for the personnel 
selection system and they should be consistent with research on person-job and person-
organization fit. This research finds that the better the fit the better are the outcomes in the 
workplace such as “productivity, job satisfaction and organization commitment”.  
Regarding the relationship between culture and corruption Lambsdorff 
459
 claims that 
the link between the two is strong with the main assumption that “causality runs from culture to 
corruption and not the other was around” and cultural aspects could be addressed only in a 
long-term reform strategy. It is also important to keep in mind that culture presents “only a 
fraction of the variance of levels of corruption”, which means that it leaves the floor for other 
contributions in countries with law favourable cultural preconditions. Husted
460
 argues that 
policy makers should take into account cultural feature if they aim to design “a policy 
instruments that will encourage integrity”. Encouraging integrity is particularly important in 
post socialist countries. Sandholtz and Taagepera
461
 in their study analyse the influence of 
socialism on corruption level in the countries by linking it to culture and to the structure of 
opportunities available to officials. They claim that socialist states created “structural 
incentives” for corruption and it became “a pervasive and enduring facto of life in these 
societies”. More precisely, corruption became “an aspect of culture”, embedded in social norms 
and practices. Therefore, the process of transition could not remove these legacies over time 
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because “cultural orientations change slowly” and most of the time lag behind even the most 
comprehensive society’s institutional change. In addition, removing of regulatory forces, 
especially in the process of privatization, provided variety of opportunities for corruption 
especially due to the fact that previous regime and its officials were in charged for these 
processes. Sandholtz and Taagepera analysis shows that due to the explained reasons, 
transitional countries have higher levels of corruption compared to similar countries. It also 
suggests that corruption “is not just the product of immediate material incentives” but result of 
cultural characteristics “acquired through socialisation in a society’s historical heritage”. In this 
case, they argue, socialism created a culture of corruption which made it part of everyday life 
and it is not realistic to expect that these practices could be changed overnight together with the 
collapse of the old system. For post-socialist countries it is highly important to reduce 
corruption since it affects market economy development by undermining trust in public 
institutions. However, the authors point out that “where cultural orientations are concerned, 
there are no quick fixes”. Following that statement their prediction is that post-socialist 
countries “will probably be wrestling with…high levels of corruption for decades” and 
therefore the creation of a proper incentive scheme is essential. Finally, maybe even more 
important is to create citizens who will be “socialized into norms and expectations that reject 
and stigmatize corruption”.  
Following this conclusion and goals of this thesis the next section analyses cultural 
aspects which are considered connected to the previously described homo sovieticus mentality. 
Since this mentality, according to the author’s knowledge, was not accessed in the literature for 
any kind of measurement, here for its description some other cultural aspects will be used 
which correspond to its essence. The next section includes the cultural aspect of universalism 
and particularism as well as two dimensions of Hofstede cultural classification: individualism 
and collectivism and power distance. Each of the cultural aspect will be elaborated through its 
value system, organizational structure in the application and its relationship to corruption.  
 
3.3.1 Particularism and universalism  
 
3.3.1.1 Value system 
 
Trompenaars
462
 claims that each culture is differentiated from the others by the specific 
solutions which it applies in resolving particular problems. These problems may arise within 
three categories: one represents our relationship with other people; another comes “from the 
passage of time”; and finally, the one related to the environment. Under the first category, 
which focuses on the relationships among people, lies the division on particularistic and 
universalistic culture. Trompenaars defines particularismas an ethical system in which the 
highest norm is to help your friends and relatives. On the other hand, universalism is a system 
with the highest norm of truthfulness and fairness toward all people, regardless of their 
personal relationship to people. Different countries have different culture in this sense. 
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According to the results of the study conducted by Trompenaars, Russia, South Korea and 
China have a largely particularistic culture, while United States, Switzerland, England, 
Scandinavia and Germany have universalistic. Having in mind these cultural differences he 
defines advices for managing and being managed if one operates in of the two environments. 
The characteristics are shown in Table 3.2. 
 
Table 3.2: Difference between Universalism & Particularism 
Universalists Particularists 
1. Strive for consistency and uniform procedures 1. Build informal networks and create private 
understandings 
2. Institute formal ways of changing the way business 
is conducted 
2. Try to alter informally accustomed patterns of activity 
3. Modify the system so that the system will modify 
you 
3. Modify relations with you, so that you will modify 
the system 
4. Signal changes publicly 4. Pull levers privately 
5. Seek fairness by treating all like cases in the same 
way 
5. Seek fairness by treating all cases on their special 
merits 
Source: Trompenaars, “Riding the Waves of Culture: Understanding Cultural Diversity in Business”, p. 46 
 
From the state’s point of view, as Mungiu-Pippidi et al.463 define universalism as 
system in which every citizen is treated equally by the state and all public resources are 
distributed impartially. This system is, at least formally, established in the majority of countries 
around the world. However, the authors claim that “particularism exist by default” due to the 
scarcity of resources available and in distributing them people tend to share them with people 
who are close to them leaving all the others out. Modern states base their organisation on 
universalism, promoting it as the highest value. However, Mungiu-Pippidi et al. claim that very 
few of them succeeded in achieving this goal.  
 
3.3.1.2 Administration/organizational structure  
 
Applying the Trompenaars theory of universalism and particularism and theory of legal 
origins, De Geest
464
 concludes that cultural differences may explain the differences in legal 
systems of various countries. For instance, on one side are the countries of civil law tradition 
such as France and Germany, and on the other countries with common law tradition, United 
Kingdom and the USA. He claims that in countries with particularistic culture and specific 
historical context, “individual citizens or local judges cannot be trusted” since they would 
rather help people close to them than taking care of the interests of the society. De Geest 
further connects this view with the organisation of the legal systems explaining that bottom-up 
approach in common law countries, which he sees as universalistic,  functions well because 
“those at the bottom can be trusted” since they will rather “do what is fair” than favouring their 
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friends. On the other hand, France as a particularistic country applies a top-down law system. 
Since French people trust “whatever is higher in the hierarchy” the approach leads to the 
concentration of powers which has an important consequence: a very formalistic system with 
extensive administrative law and separate administrative courts. De Geest, sees this situation as 
a sign that the top of an organization does not trust the bottom. On the other hand this system is 
confronted by the informal system of common law countries which shows full trust. This 
analysis provides valuable indicators in the form of branched administration and complex 
decision making process which might be useful in assessing the public administration culture 
of particular country. In this context they could reveal the information necessary for the 
structure improvement and for a better understanding of people’s conducts.  
Putting universalism and particularism in the context of post-socialist societies, 
Mungiu-Pippidi
465
 states that the institutional structure of socialism created “politocracies” 
because the political power rooted in the party membership was influential on social status and 
allocation of social rewards. This practice is in conflict with the leading universalistic ides for 
running modern societies according to which each individual should be treated equally and 
fairly regardless of the person or organization that he belongs to. In process of transition, 
sometimes called Europeanization, these countries were pushed to modernization with the 
expectation to create modern state administration. However, the achievement of full 
impartiality, impersonality and fairness has proven a non-simple task to achieve.  
  
3.3.1.3 Relation with corruption  
 
The division on universalism and particularism has an important effect regarding 
corruption fighting. According to Mungiu-Pippidi et al.
466
, existing definitions of corruption 
mainly assume all states operate “under the norm of ethical universalism” according to which 
the dominant public behaviour is equal and fair treatment of all citizens while favouritism and 
corruption happens occasionally. This approach is accepted by different international 
institutions which fight corruption in global arena. Previous chapters of this research presented 
the results in corruption combat based on international conventions and tools which show little 
progress regarding transitional countries. In searching for the roots of this failure one should 
look in the findings of social psychology. Tajfel
467
 claims that considerable evidence exist that 
human nature is “sectarian” and as a result social identity is created by inter-group comparison 
and selfish behaviour. He explains that it is naturally for people favour their family, clan, race 
or ethnic group. For treating the others fairly society need a certain level of evolution and 
resources. Mungiu-Pippidi et al.
468
 say that the latter type of society is rather exception that the 
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rule and they represent product of long historical evolution. Therefore, their critic targets the 
principal-agent model, the dominant approach for corruption analysis, because it suggests that 
“fight against corruption in fact is a collective action problem”. More precisely, corruption is 
the result of an agent’s behaviour and it is an exception from a general rule. This view further 
argues that societies reach “a sub-optimal equilibrium of poor governance” which means that 
domestic agency is not sufficient and therefore not able to push for change. They further 
explain that this approach had a significant impact on international policy makers because the 
majority of international anti-corruption tools are based on the norm-infringing context of 
developed countries which actually should be norm-building for developing context.  
However, concept of governance, although normative, according to Mungiu-Pippidi et 
al. has its advantages because it shows the way the state treats its citizens. Stoker
469
 argues that 
government should be observed in a broader context consisting not only of state but the society 
as well and their interdependence. In analysing societies, North, Wallis and Weingast
470
 claim 
that, societies through history has been organized in three social orders. The first social order is 
hunter-gatherer society which is considered primitive. The second, limited access orders, 
which dominated in past ten thousand years, solve the problem of containing violence by 
political manipulation of an economic system in order to generate rents by limiting entry. 
Finally, the third open access social order, developed in the last 500 years, aims to sustain 
social order through political and economic competition and not rent seeking. They argue that 
about twenty countries have developed this order and they are all both economically and 
politically developed. On the other hand, Weber
471
 contrast patrimonialism, which is based on 
arbitrary personalistic relations between rulers and ruled, with the impersonal and functional 
relationships of the modern, ideal type of state which is based on abstract, impersonal and 
written rules. He also develops a concept of status societies which are dominated by certain 
groups and governed by convention rather than law. In these societies particularism is the rule 
of the game and individuals get treatment based on their status. Weber’ patrimonialism is in 
modern times discussed as neo-patrimonialism. Erdmann and Engel
472
 describe it as regime 
which formally complies with the characteristics of modern state organization while in reality 
informal institutions in the form of patrimonialism dominate. O’Donell473 claims that many 
new democracies, which in the past had a ruler who treated the state as their own patrimony, 
replaced these rulers with political parties but the non-universal allocation approach has not 
changed.   
                                                                                                                                                                                        
Choices in Fighting Corruption: Lessons Learned”, Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation NORAD 
Evaluation studies 4/2011  
469
 Stoker, G. (1998): “Governance as Theory: five propositions”, International Socialist Science Journal. 50:17-
28 
470
North, D.C., Wallis, J. J. and Weingast, B. R. (2009): Violence and social orders: A Conceptual Framework for 
Interpreting Recorded Human History, New York, Cambridge University Press 
471
Weber, M. (1978): Economy and Society. An Outline of Interpretive Sociology, Roth, G. and Wittich, C. (eds.), 
New York: Bedminster Press 
472Erdmann, G. and Engel, U. (2007): “Neopatrimonialism Reconsidered: Critical Review and Elaboration of an 
Elusive Concept”, Commonwealth & Comparative Politics, 45:1, 95-119 
473O’Donnell, G. (1997): “Illusions about Consolidation”, Journal of Democracy, vol.7, no2, pp.34-51 
Ana Jakovljević, LL.M 
142 
 
Summarizing all views Mungiu-Pippidi et al.
474
 created a typology of governance 
regimes, shown in the Table 3.3. The main division is on open access order and limited access 
order. The former one is individualistic, with political equality, high personal autonomy and 
civic participation. States of this type are independent from private interest and the allocation 
and policy formulation is based on ethical universalism and transparency. In this type of state 
the contradiction between formal and informal institutions is very small and corruption, when it 
occurs, is a deviation from the norm of ethical universalism and impartiality. On the other hand 
are the countries which belong to the category of limited access order. Although the majority of 
countries belong to this group, they, however, are not the same. Therefore three additional sub-
categories are introduced: 1) patrimonial type, described by Weber, where power is monopoly; 
2) competitive particularism in which classified states are grouped that managed to introduce 
some forms of pluralism with the institution of regular elections, which represents one step 
forward from patrimonial regimes. However, allocation is still particular and unfair, rent-
seeking almost dominant rule, rule of law is poor and the state is perceived as an “instrument of 
spoliation of the many and enrichment of the few”, which greatly subverts its legitimacy and 
capacity. People in these types of countries have no expectations of being  treated fairly by the 
state but according to the status; therefore their main goal is to become a part of the privileged 
group rather than to challenge the rules of the game; finally 3) the border line category is not a 
type in itself but a transitional regime which have fulfilled some basic and necessary conditions 
of progress to open access order and the two normative orders coexist confrontationally 
without one managing to become dominant. According to the authors’ analysis, most 
patrimonial regimes that have democratized remain in the realm of competitive particularism, 
with a couple of South-East Asian and more East European evolving to borderline situations.   
 
Table 3.3: Governance regimes and their main features 
Governance 
regimes 
Limited access order Open access 
order (Neo) 
Patrimonialism 
Competitive 
particularism 
Borderline 
Power 
distribution 
Hierarchical with 
monopoly of central 
power 
Stratified with 
power disputed 
competitively 
Competitive 
with less 
stratification  
Citizenship, 
Equality 
State 
autonomy 
State captured by 
ruler 
State captured in 
turn by winners of 
elections 
Archipelago 
of autonomy and 
captured “islands” 
State autonomous 
from private interest 
(legal lobby, etc.) 
Public 
allocation 
(services, goods) 
Particular and 
predictable 
Particular but 
unpredictable 
Particular and 
universal 
Ethical 
Universalism 
Separation 
private-public 
No No Poor  Sharp 
Relation 
formal/informal 
institutions 
Informal 
institutions substitutive 
of formal ones 
Informal 
institutions 
substitutive of formal 
ones 
Competitive 
and substitutive  
Complementary 
Mentality Collectivistic Collectivistic Mixed Individualistic 
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Government 
accountability 
No Only when no 
longer in power 
Occasional Permanent 
Rule of law No; sometimes 
“thin” 
No Elites only General; ”thick” 
Source: Mungiu-Pippidi, et al.: “Contextual Choices in Fighting Corruption: Lessons Learned”, p. 12 
3.3.2 Individualism and collectivism       
 
3.3.2.1 Value system 
 
Another cultural aspect which could be considered important in corruption combat is 
individualistic and collectivistic dimension of culture. Trompeanaars
475
 defines individualism 
as a “prime orientation to the self “and collectivism as a “prime orientation to common goals 
and objectives”. According to him individualism is seen as characteristic of a modern society, 
while collectivism belongs to traditional societies and to the failure of the socialist experiment. 
Hofstede
476
explains individualism as the “emotional independence from groups, organizations 
or other collectivity” while in collectivism people are part of extended families or kinship 
which protects them in exchange for loyalty. Triandis
477
 lists several attributes of individualism 
and collectivism. According to him characteristics of individualism have “greater emphasis on 
internal process, more emphasis on consistency and more self-enhancement” and people with 
this description “tend to shape the social environment to fit their personalities”. Collectivism is, 
on the other hand, “characterised by more focus on context, less concern for consistency and 
less self-enhancement” and the personality of the people classified as collectivistic is flexible 
with no clear traits. Hofstede
478
 lists some key differences between two societies and they are 
presented in the Table 3.4. 
 
Table 3.4: Key differences between collectivistic and individualistic societies 
Collectivistic Individualistic  
People are born into extended families or other ingroups 
which continue to protect them in exchanging for loyalty 
Everyone grows up to look after him and his nuclear family 
only 
Identity is based in the social network to which one 
belongs 
Identity is based in the individual 
Children learn to think in terms of “we” Children learn to think in terms of “ I” 
Harmony should always be maintained and direct 
confrontation avoided 
Speaking one’s mind is a characteristic of an honest person 
High context communication  Low-context communication 
Trespassing leads to shame and loss of face for self and 
group 
Trespassing leads to guilt and loss of self-respect 
Purpose of education is learning how to do Purpose of education  is learning how to learn 
Diplomas provide entry to higher status groups Diplomas increase economic worth and /or self-respect 
Relationship employer-employee is perceived in moral 
terms, like a family link 
Relationship employer-employee is a contract supposed to 
be based on mutual advantage 
Hiring and promotion decisions take employees’ ingroup 
into account 
Hiring and promotion decisions are supposed to be based on 
skills and rules only 
                                                          
475
Trompenaars, F. (1993): Riding the Waves of Culture: Understanding Cultural Diversity in Business , 
Economist Books London, 1993,  pp. 47- 62 
476
Hofstede, G. (1980): Culture’s consequences: International differences in work-relates values, Beverly Hills, 
CA: Sage p. 221 
477
Triandis, H. C. (2001): “Individualism-Collectivism and Personality”, Journal of Personality 69:6, pp. 907-924 
478
Hofstede, G. (1991): Cultures and organizations, Software of the Mind, McGraw-Hill International (UK) 
Limited, p.67 
Ana Jakovljević, LL.M 
144 
 
Management is management of groups Management is management of individuals 
Relationship prevails over task Task prevails over relationship  
Source: Hofstede,“Cultures and organizations: Software of the mind”, p.67 
 
Singelis, et al.
479
 make distinction between vertical and horizontal individualism and 
collectivism and this division provides information on the way in which individuals and 
societies perceive and accept inequality between people. In horizontal collectivism (HC) 
individual perceive himself as “an aspect of an in-group” with all members equal in their 
status. In vertical collectivism (VC) individual is part of a group but members in the group do 
not have equal status within it which is accepted by all. Horizontal individualism (HI) is 
characterised by “autonomous individual” which is more or less equal in status to others while 
in vertical individualism (VI) individuals see each other as different and inequality is expected. 
This further means, as Triandis and Gelfand
480
 explain, in HI, people want to be unique and 
distinct from groups but they are not especially interested in becoming distinguished or having 
high status. In VI, people often want to become distinguished and acquire status and they 
achieve it thorough competition with others. In HC people see themselves as being similar to 
others but they do not submit easily to authority, while in VC people emphasize the integrity of 
the in-group and are willing to sacrifice their personal goals for the sake of the group. 
Following this division Rokeach
481
 in his book The Nature of Human Values, identifies four 
types of political systems that reflected the relative importance of two values: equality and 
freedom. In communism equality was high and freedom low; in fascism both, equality and 
freedom, are low; in liberal democracy freedom is high and equity low; finally, in social 
democracy, both, equality and freedom are high. Thus, claiming that this typology can be 
linked to the above described one, Singelis et al.
482
 make the following comparisons. 
Regarding HC its extreme version is found in a pattern of theoretical communism while 
moderate one is present in an Israeli kibbutz. Extreme VC is the case of Nazi Germany, while 
the moderate version is present in traditional villages.  HI is the pattern of Australia or Sweden 
and VI is present in the West, e.g. United States and France. However, they point out that 
“cultures are not pure” and individuals exhibit each of these patterns at different times or in 
different situations. These differences regarding value system have important influence 
regarding organization structure and human behaviour.     
Hofstede
483
 points out that division on collectivism vs. individualism express some 
differences which could be noticed in the family, school and workplace, important places for 
cultural programing. For instance, in collectivistic family the highest value is harmony while in 
the individualistic, telling the truth about how one feels it is the characteristic which denotes a 
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sincere and honest person. Education is in collectivistic cultures teacher-centred, with little 
two-way communication and “students do not speak up even when question is put to the class”. 
Learning is seen as one time process, exclusively designed for young people with the purpose 
of learning “how to do things” in order to fit in the society. Final results, diploma, is perceived 
as an honour and ticket for higher status groups.  On the contrary, in individualistic societies 
students are at the centre of the educational system and they expect to be treated impartially 
and as individuals. The purpose of learning is to know “how to learn” since the whole process 
is perceived as lifelong learning. The diploma is in these societies seen as personal 
achievement and success.  
 
3.3.2.2 Administration/organizational structure 
 
Trompenaars
484
 argues that individualistic culture organisations are instruments because 
“they have been assembled and contrived in order to serve individual needs”. An individual 
enters into the relationship with the organisation because it is in his interest to do so and his ties 
with it are abstract, legal ones, regulated by contract. However, collectivistic culture 
organisations are not the instruments of its founders but rather “a social context which all 
members share and which gives them meaning and purpose”. Organisation usually is a part of a 
larger community which develops and cares about its members. Furthermore, according to 
Trompenaars, collectivist culture prefers plural representation, while individualist a single 
representative voting on his private conscience. Therefore collectivist decision-making 
typically takes much longer and there are sustained efforts to win over everyone to achieve 
consensus. On the other hand in individualistic culture voting down the dissenters is not 
acceptable. There will usually be detailed consultations in order to agree collective goals and 
consensus will be achieved. Since those consulted will usually have to implement what they 
agreed upon, the phase of implementation typically proceeds smoothly and easily. Following 
the differences, Trompenaars gives advice on how to manage and to be managed in 
individualistic and collectivistic culture which are presented in the Table 3.5. 
 
Table 3.5: Difference between Individualism & Collectivism  
Individualists Collectivists  
Try to adjust individual needs to organisational needs Seek to integrate personality with authority within the 
group 
Introduce methods of individual incentives like pay-for 
performance, individual assessment, etc. 
Give attention to esprit de corps, morale and cohesiveness  
Expect job turnover and mobility to be high Have low job turnover and mobility 
Seek out high performers, heroes and champions for 
special praise 
Extol the whole group and avoid showing favouritism 
Give people the freedom to take individual initiatives  Hold up superordinate goals for all to meet 
Source: Trompenaars,“Riding the Waves of Culture: Understanding Cultural Diversity in Business”, p.62 
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Hofstede
485
 claims that management techniques and training packages employed in 
running organizations have been developed in individualistic countries and basis for their 
definition are assumptions which “may not hold in collectivistic cultures”. For instance, in 
collectivistic cultures, opposite from individualistic, employer never hires just an individual but 
a person who belongs to a certain group (e.g. relatives). As a result performance and skills are 
not relevant in terms of keeping the job. Management is not management of individuals but 
groups and the level of emotional integration in a work group is relevant to good management. 
This view is supported by House et al..
486
, who claim that human resource management (HRM) 
has different practices, regarding selection, performance appraisal, job design and termination 
processes, in organizations with different cultural setting. HRM practices in individualistic 
cultures are based on the assumption that systems promote rational exchange between the 
organisation and its members. In collectivistic cultures this assumption does not apply. An 
important constituent of this system is accountability, which in collectivistic societies rests 
with groups while in individualistic rests with specific individuals for both organizational 
successes and failures. 
 
3.3.2.3 Relation with corruption 
 
Mazar and Aggarwal
487
 argue that one of the prominent dimensions of a national 
culture is its degree of collectivism or the extent to which individuals in it see themselves as 
interdependent and part of a larger group or society. To support argument they start with claims 
of Hui
488
 that people in collectivistic cultures tend to hold more “favourable attitudes” towards 
sharing responsibilities. Furthermore, Hsee and Weber
489
claim that risky actions are less risky 
because individuals see their group or society as providing a “cushion” that would protect them 
from harm while Triandis
490
states that individuals in this type of countries make situational 
rather than dispositional attributions and have a weaker sense that they themselves determine 
who they are. This made Mazar and Aggarwal conclude that these characteristics make it easier 
for individuals to selectively deactivate regulatory self-sanctions from harmful conduct through 
“diffusion or displacement of responsibility”. This further increases the likelihood of engaging 
in detrimental conducts without violating their own moral standards. As a result they 
hypothesized two things: one that individuals in collectivistic culture would show a higher 
propensity to bribe abroad than those in individualistic cultures and the other that this effect 
would be mediated by collectivists’ lower perceived responsibility for their actions. They run 
two studies in order to prove the hypotheses. In the first one they used three independent 
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measures: Transparency International’s 2008 BPI scores (see: Riano and Hodess491); the In-
Group Collectivism Practices scores from Global Leadership and Organizational Behaviour 
Effectiveness (GLOBE) study (see: House et al.
492) and countries’ per capita GDP adjusted by 
purchasing power parity. This study yielded initial evidence of a strong relationship between 
collectivism and bribery, the results were purely correlational. In order to find out whether a 
causal relationship actually exist between these two and if so, what kind of relationship, 
Mazzar and Aggarwal conducted the second study, a laboratory experiment. Their results 
provide evidence that the degree of collectivism versus individualism present in a national 
culture plays a significant role and is proof of the causal relationship between collectivism and 
bribery. They also suggest that collectivism promotes bribery by mitigating individual’s 
perceived responsibility for their action.  
Following previously described analysis the idea of comparing the values of the 
Hofstede’s individualism index493 with Transparency International Corruption Perception 
Index (CPI) appeared interesting for the purpose of this research. The individualism index 
(IDV) is based on the survey questions which belong to a set of “fourteen work goals”. 
Dimensions relevant to these goals are for the individualistic pole: personal time, freedom and 
challenge and for the collectivistic: training, physical conditions and use of skills. The 
comparison revealed very interesting results. Graph 3.1 shows the significant correlation 
between collectivism and individualism on one side and corruption on the other. This 
correlation exists for 80 countries listed in the Appendix 3.1 and 3.2 of this chapter. Here the 
results are shown for some of the transitional countries. The reason for non-including all 
transitional countries is the lack of values for cultural index.
494
 However, for the existing pool 
of transitional countries the relation is not shown significant anymore, although the trend of 
correlation follows the bigger pool analysis. The explanation for this difference could be found 
in the size of the examined sample of transitional countries. The fact which should be kept in 
mind is that the correlation presented here requires further research and testing, although some 
studies already exist although in not large numbers. Both indicators taken here into account are 
not without critics, and they are already mentioned in this research. However, what should be 
kept in mind is that both of them have a difficult task to perform, since corruption and culture 
appear difficult to catch.  
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               Graph 3.1: Correlation for transitional countries 
 
 
Nevertheless, regarding the current results it seems that cultural aspects of 
individualism and collectivism play important role for some of the transitional countries but 
not for all and therefore this element could be considered as optional for the anti-corruption 
policy design. What also appeared interesting in this analysis are the countries with a very high 
level of collectivism but considered “very clean” which are shown in the Chart 3.1, together 
with the countries with high level of individualism but corrupt. This implies that some of the 
anti-corruption mechanisms from countries that show good results in fighting corruption 
should be observed closely in the discussion on the design of optimal anti-corruption 
framework. This actually happened in the case of Hong Kong and Singapore. For instance, 
McCusker
495
 explains that independent anti-corruption body in Hong Kong, with investigation, 
prevention and public support showed to be successful in fighting corruption. Similar steps 
were taken in strengthening of law enforcement agencies in Singapore. The civil servants’ pay 
increased substantially relative to the private sector and public officials were routinely rotated 
to make it harder for corrupt officials to develop strong ties to certain clients. Rewards were 
given to those who refused bribes and turned in a client. However, not all of the steps 
replicated from these two experiences were successful. The questionable impact of the 
established agencies worldwide was already discussed. Here attention should be paid to the 
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cultural aspects which affect corruption. The case of a Singapore agency with rotation and 
reward systems might be taken into account in shaping the institutional culture.  
  
Chart 3.1: List of outlying countries 
 
 
3.3.3 Power distance 
 
3.3.3.1 Value system 
 
Power distance is broadly defined as the extent to which a community accepts power 
differences, authority and privileges. According to House et al.
496
 acceptance of a certain level 
of power in a society is rooted in four fundamental phenomena: religion or philosophy, 
democratic tradition, strong middle class and proportion of immigrants in a society’s 
population.  For instance societies with dominant Roman Catholic religion tend to be high in 
power distance while Protestant societies prefer lower level of power distance. Furthermore, 
they claim that in societies with long democratic tradition power distance is low as well as in 
societies with a largely established middle class. This is also true for countries with a large 
proportion of immigrants. However, not all of these factors are equally important. According to 
authors “regardless of the religion, any society that has neither a democratic tradition nor an 
established middle class will have a relatively high level of power distance”.497 
According to House et al.
498
, one of the major research projects on power distance was 
conducted by Hofstede
499
 who computed the power distance index, which is discussed in more 
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detail later. This index “has been established to a fairly high degree by independent replication 
in several studies”500. Power distance is one of the cultural dimensions that Hofstede considers 
important for a society. He analyses this dimension through all important social institutions in 
one society such as family, school, workplace, state and ideas. GLOBE study 
501
 suggests that 
power distance as cultural dimension is equally relevant for all types of societies (e.g. Eastern 
and Western) only the expectations of power are different and these expectations are 
historically derived. However, House et al. claim that “the enhanced use of technology is likely 
to reduce the arbitrary use of authority and expedite the spread of democratic values…”.In 
study of Smith, Dugan and Trompenaars
502
  the conclusion is that the power distance is one of 
the important indicators whether a society is collectivistic or individualistic. When compared to 
Hofstede’s individualism and power distance measures they show strong relationship. Thus, 
high power distance is associated with collectivistic societies. 
 
3.3.3.2 Administration/organizational structure 
 
Difference in power distance is also reflected on social institutions such as family, 
school and workplace. Hofstede
503
 claims that in the family with high power distance children 
are expected to respect elders, independent behaviour is not encouraged but dependence on 
seniors. On the other hand in the small power distance family children are treated as equal to 
seniors, encouraged to take control of their own lives and personal independence is highly 
appreciated. These values are carried forward to education system and work place. Hofstede 
explains that in large power distance societies, teachers are treated with respect; the educational 
process is highly personalized, especially at the university level, meaning that knowledge 
transferred is not seen as impersonal “truth” but rather personal wisdom of the teacher. This 
further causes the dependence of the one’s learning quality on the excellence of a teacher. In 
small power distance environment, according to Hofstede, the teachers should treat the students 
as equals; students argue with teachers and express disagreement and criticisms which as a 
result put the emphasis on the excellence of students for the quality of learning. Regarding the 
workplace Hofstede claims that in large power distance situation superiors and subordinates are 
unequal and subordinates are expected to be told what to do. In the eyes of subordinates the 
superior is a “good father” and even faced with the “bad father” they will comply with the 
orders even if they ideologically reject them. Since workers are relatively uneducated manual 
work is less appreciated than office work. Hofstede further explains that in small power 
distance environment subordinates and superiors are considered existentially equal and 
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hierarchy among them is only established for convenience. This is expressed through salary 
difference, privileges in using facilities and skills. The ideal boss is a “resourceful democrat”.    
 
3.3.3.3 Relation with corruption 
 
In an analysis conducted in 1980 Hofstede computed the power distance index from 
IBM survey data. Power distance index (PDI) is a composite measure computed using the 
responses to three questions: 1) How frequently, in your experience, are employees afraid to 
express disagreement with their managers? 2) How would you describe the actual decision-
making style of your boss? and 3) What decision-making style would you prefer your boss to 
have?  Countries with lower scores on the index have “limited dependence of subordinates on 
superiors and a preference for consultation”. In contrast, countries with high index show 
significant dependence of the subordinates on bosses. 
504
 Hofstede points out that if one looks 
at the questions closely one could notice that first two indicate “the way the respondents 
perceive their daily work environment” while the third question indicates “what the 
respondents express as their preferences: how they would like their work environment to 
be”.505 
House et al.
506
  claim that Hofstede conducted another analysis which results suggested 
that power distance is present in all countries but in societies with higher educated people the 
ability of reducing power distance is higher. In his study in 2001 Hofstede
507
 correlated the 
power distance index with several items from Inglehart’s World Values Survey508. The results 
have shown that “Hoftede’s power distance index does not reflect power distance values, but 
instead power distance practices….looking more precisely to the questions used to compose 
the PDI it could be notice that two of three items – “employees afraid” and “perceived 
managerial behaviour” – reflect perception, which are likely guided more by situational factors 
than by personal dispositions or cultural values”. However, the third question - “decision 
making style” – indicates that respondents express their preference: how they would like their 
work environment to be.
509
 
Here as well the idea of comparing PDI with Transparency International CPI yielded 
some interesting results. Using the same pool of 80 countries the two indexes showed 
significant correlation in the sense that less power distance countries has less corruption and 
the opposite (Appendix 3.3). Unlike the situation of individualism index when analyses of the 
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pool of transitional countries did not show correlation, here two indexes show the significant 
correlation. The results are presented below in Graph 3.2. However, like in the previous case, 
this result presents more the pointing arrow towards further research which might take place in 
the future than the strong causal statement.  
 
Graph 3.2: Correlation between individualism & collectivism and corruption for TC 
 
 
Husted
510
 connects the dependence of subordinates to their superiors to paternalism, in 
which “superiors provide favours to subordinates in return for their loyalty”. He claims that in 
this system decisions are not merit-based but rather on “a balance of favours and loyalty” 
which opens the floor for corruption, more precisely favouritism and nepotism. Husted further 
points to the study of Cohen, Pant and Sharp
511
 which shows that suspicious business practice 
would be seen differently by people living in the two types of societies. While people with 
high-power distance culture would see it ethical, people with low-power distance values will 
disapprove it. Following these lines of arguments Lambsdorff
512
 claim that countries, in which 
hierarchy is accepted, should be treated differently regarding corruption combat. He suggests 
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that this type of countries should employ “a top-down approach” which might give better 
results compared to “grassroots movement”.  
 
3.3.4 The main points of the discussion   
 
This section analysed the first layer of the anti-corruption pyramid: propensity to 
corruption described by different types of culture. The homo sovieticus mentality described in 
this thesis is here considered as cultural aspect. However, according to researcher’s knowledge, 
this phenomenon has not been the subject of any measurement and broad discussion regarding 
corruption. Therefore, the cultural aspects analysed in the literature which in a way correlate to 
his description are elaborated upon. For instance, particularism, collectivism and high power 
distance could be related, to homo sovieticus’s amoral familism or learned helplessness. 
Amoral familism means favouritism of family and friends over the “others” while learned 
helplessness, gives the power and responsibility for almost everything to “those above”.  
Therefore, the first cultural aspect considered relevant in the case of creating optimal 
anti-corruption framework for transitional countries is aspect of universalistic and 
particularistic culture. Regarding differences between the two types and discussion in the 
literature provided above, Mungiu-Pippidi et al.
513
 offer the detailed diagnostic tool for 
particularism and the level of its tightness. This quantitative toll is presented in the table which 
can be found in the Appendix 3.4 of this chapter. Basically, it provides diagnosis questions and 
sources of information/indicators for analysis of six elements: power distribution, state 
autonomy, public allocation (services, goods), separation private–public, relation 
formal/informal institutions and accountability. This tool can assist in detecting the real 
situation on the field and designing of an anti-corruption strategy accordingly. Mungiu-
Pippidi
514
 further explains that in general, socialism made achievement in “building 
bureaucracies and delivering some goods” but universalistic ideas are not possible to survive if 
the uneven distribution of power such was the one in socialist countries. This further means 
that societies that still did not finish the modernization process and overcoming the past in 
which “the state has always been in the private property of certain privileged groups”, should 
approach corruption differently. Corruption is commonly defined as “the use of a public 
position to seek personal gain” but this definition assumes the existence of the well operating 
public sector in a fair, non-discriminatory manner, which in many countries is not the case. 
The two other cultural aspects were taken from the Hofstede’s model: individualism 
and collectivism and power distance. The rest of Hofstede’s cultural dimensions were not taken 
into account because when tested they did not show correlation with Transparency 
International Corruption Perception Index in cross country analysis. Therefore, the second 
cultural aspect of individualism and collectivism brought some interesting conclusions to the 
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table. Hofstede
515
 says that Mao Tse Tung blamed on individualism and liberalism as 
responsible for selfishness and aversion to discipline, which make them evil and bad for the 
society. However, comparison of IDV and CPI indexes, conducted in other and also in this 
research, showed the correlation in which collectivistic societies are more corrupt than 
individualistic ones. These results in the terms of corruption combat prove Mao Tse Tung 
wrong. Having in mind said, steps towards building individualistic culture should be made in 
order to improve corruption combat.  
The third cultural aspect which appeared to be related to corruption is power distance. 
Hofstede
516
 explains that Marx never questioned that exercise of power could be transferred 
from people to a system, “he never asked himself if the new system would create a new class 
of powerless people”. Hofstede explains that this was due to Marx’s “mental software” which 
he received in Germany, a small power distance country. The main problem is therefore that 
his ideas were implemented into the countries with large power distance and “without 
assumption that power should yield the law”. The analysis of PDI and CPI shows strong 
correlation in which large power distance countries are more corrupt than low power distance 
ones. Lambsdorff’s conclusion that these countries in corruption combat should apply top-
down measures instead of grass-rooted might not have the predicted outcome having in mind 
specific institutional setting of authoritarian socialism. The policies and decisions of the party 
were mainly implemented by a top-down mechanism which by that time caused a lack of trust 
and respect for the state institutions. Therefore, high power-distance should be approached in 
this case from the grass roots by educating people about the values and norms that should 
transmit them from the ugly and difficult past to a better society because without their 
participation any attempt in doing so is condemned to failure. 
To conclude, universalistic, individualist and low power distance cultures tend to have 
less corruption, while particularistic, collectivist and high power distance are prone to the 
opposite. The purpose of this section was to support the claims that beliefs and culture in the 
combat against corruption, matter, and that government, taking this into account, can influence 
the citizens in order to achieve the socially desired outcome of reducing corruption. The next 
section deals with the issues important for the second layer of the anti-corruption pyramid: 
transparency and accountability.  
 
3.4 Transparency and accountability  
 
Transparency is one of the main requirements of democratic societies. On the contrary, 
in authoritarian regimes the access to information for citizens is restricted. Lorentzen et al.
517
 
explain that the main reason for this approach lies in the attempt to “conceal catastrophic 
failures”. However they make “secrecy the default” rule even when the information asked may 
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be harmless or even beneficial to revile. Socialist countries were authoritarian countries and the 
statement made above applies to their way of state operating. After a couple of decades of 
application the default rule of nontransparency seems to have a significant impact regarding 
corruption combat. This section will first discuss transparency and accountability in general 
and then the specific legacy of post-socialist countries.  
 
3.4.1 Transparency and accountability  
 
3.4.1.1 General discussion 
 
Transparency  
 
Transparency in a social context more generally implies openness, integrity, 
communication, and accountability. Piotrowski and Van Ryzin
518
 explain that it operates in a 
way which is easy for others to see what actions are performed. According to them, “access to 
information is a central component of governmental transparency and governmental 
transparency is one tool to achieve accountability”. They define government transparency as 
“the ability to find out what is going on inside a public sector organization”. This could be 
achieved by various means such as open meetings, access to records, the proactive posting of 
information on web sites, whistle-blower protections, and even illegally leaked information. 
Transparency serves several purposes. Liem
519
claims that, among others, it provides the public 
with the information and control, it is congruent to legal certainty and if present raises the 
credibility of public administration. Principle of legality includes legal certainty and equal 
protection in front of the law, which accompanied by transparency provides an individual with 
anticipating power for administrative action.  By lowering uncertainty by disclosing the risk, 
transparency helps in adjusting expectations and provides the basis for decision making. Liem 
further explains that the administration’s legitimacy is indirect, which it derives from the 
parliament and principle of legality. Therefore, transparency could be seen as additional source 
for its legitimacy which should compensate for the lack of democratic election.
 Armstrong
520
 describes the chain which transparent public service creates. She claims 
that if public service is fair and reliable its decision-making process is predictable which as a 
consequence has high public trust which further creates good incentives for business and 
contributes to well-functioning markets and economic growth. Public trust, which is a 
“keystone of good governance”, is founded on integrity, transparency and accountability. In 
contrast, if governance is weak, corruption and maladministration are result of systemic failure.   
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 Stiglitz
521
 claims that “democratic societies have a strong presumption in favour of 
transparency and openness in government” although governments and their leaders have no 
incentives to do so. In general “information is a public good” and as such closely related to 
government and its provision. If kept secretly information provides to government exclusive 
control over specific knowledge and as such increases its power. This description was, 
according to Stigliz, a “hallmark of the totalitarian states that marred the 20th century”. The 
secrecy is corrosive for various reasons. It undermines democratic processes because it is in 
antagonism with democratic values and discourages participation in it. It not only induces lack 
of trust between the citizens and government but also exacerbates it. It further creates “fertile 
ground for special interests”, which affects the effectiveness of the press in checking the 
government’s abuses. Stigliz describes secrecyas “the bedrock of persistent corruption” which 
undermines the trust in governments and describes it within the market framework. When 
information is not available or lacking, it is artificially made scarce which in the next step 
opens the opportunity for rent-seeking behaviour. This further induces a vicious circle in which 
public officials are incentivised to create secrets and extract rents. Therefore openness of 
processes represents a warrantee that public decisions are not a result of particular interests, 
and a summary of discussion provides arguments for the public that all aspects are taking into 
account before the decision was made. This is important, claims Stigliz, because “pubic has 
paid for the gathering of government information; it is the public that owns the information”. 
Transparency is also cure in the cases of low direct accountability of government. More 
precisely, the less is the direct accountability the importance of the openness and transparency 
is higher.
522
Furthermore, Lambsdorff
523
 claims that transparency is also important for the 
information asymmetry problem resolution in the principal-agent model. He claims that in the 
relationship between the two parties the limited transparency is usually present because the 
information about agent’s performance and quality are usually unavailable. Since this further 
increases agent’s discretion, the principal’s ability to control the agent depends on 
transparency. 
The above presented arguments show that transparency is seen as one of the highest 
goals which should be achieved for the successful fight against corruption. However, Etzioni
524
 
points out to the different direction by claiming that the academic work of economists “provide 
a major modification to the theory of transparency with the introduction of transaction costs, 
including the costs of collecting and processing information”. This further means that 
processing of all disclosed information might be costly. He explains that requests for using 
modern tools to achieve higher transparency, such as intermediaries, experts and technology 
for processing the information, is not a guarantee that the substantial information will be 
revealed. Analysing the existing empirical literature on transparency, Etzioni says that a fair 
amount of the literature supports the “strong transparency thesis”, but “it does so in a much 
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more qualified way than as seen in transparency’s ideological usages”.525 Therefore he stresses 
that “strong transparency cannot work”. Another critique of transparency comes from the 
perspective of the collective action theory. Ostrom
526
 claims that increased transparency might 
risk the further increase of corruption since people will become more aware of it and as such 
would think that all other citizens are corrupt which could make them to take part in it. 
However, regarding the last critic, transparency is here understood not only in terms of 
reporting corrupt act but as a manner in which public administration should operate. More 
precisely the information on files should be available to other civil servants and to the clients as 
well. 
The discussion provided above had the main result of supporting the claim that 
transparency is one of the crucial elements of the anti-corruption pyramid designed for post-
socialist countries in order to successfully combat corruption. However its usage should be 
well structured in order to achieve the highest level of usefulness to a society. Closely related 
to transparency is accountability as a result of mal-performance of an individual.   
 
Accountability 
 
Accountability in general means, according to Cardona
527
, that “one person or authority 
has to explain and justify its actions to another”. Bovens528 describes two concepts of 
accountability: accountability as a virtue and accountability as a mechanism. The first concept 
is seen as characteristic which officials and government institutions should possess. Bovens 
explain that in this meaning accountability is used “as a normative concept, as a set of 
standards for the behaviour of actors, or as a desirable state of affairs”. This further implies that 
accountability in this case means “being accountable”, and represents a virtue of a particular 
actor, an organisation or official. Understood in this sense it is close to “responsiveness” and “a 
sense of responsibility” which further implies a “willingness to act in a transparent, fair and 
accountable way”. He takes as an example of a successful attempt to “operationalise 
accountability as virtue”, the Global Accountability Framework which defines standards of 
behaviour for its actors. Bovens says that the second, narrower sense refers to a relationship 
between an actor and a forum, in which the actor has an obligation to explain and to justify his 
conduct. The forum is entitled to ask the questions and pass judgements and the actor might 
face the consequences. From this definition, according to Bovens, variety “accountability 
relations” arise: (1) based on the type of the forum: the first question is to whom is the actor 
accountable and here distinction is made between political, legal, administrative and social 
accountability; (2) based on the actor required to appear before the forum: the second question 
is who should be accountable and the answers point to corporate or organizational, hierarchical 
and collective accountability; (3) finally based on the nature of the relationship between actor 
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and the form: the third question is why the actor feels compelled to render account, and the 
answer lies in the nature of the obligation which could be vertical, horizontal or diagonal. As 
an example for this type of accountability the author gives the Utrecht School of Governance 
which in conducting research analyses three sets of questions related to the evaluation of 
accountability mechanism. Regarding corruption Bovens claim that accountability to legal and 
administrative forums, for instance courts, ombudsman, etc., could be effective mechanisms for 
preventing and detecting corruption, as well as social forms of accountability which create 
check and balances.
529
 
The purposes of the accountability are, according to Aucoin and Heintzman
530
, 
threefold: first, it should prevent “the abuse and misuse of public authority”; second, it should 
assure citizens that public resources and “adherence to the law and public service values” is 
secured; and third, it should support continuous “improvement in governance and public 
management”. One of the central features regarding accountability is managing outcomes 
which is seen as “central feature of New Public Management. However, Aucoin and 
Heintzman disagree and argue that this system is able to function only if supported by other 
kinds of constraints such as…” comprehensive systems of administrative law, backed by 
judicial or administrative review, strong legislative oversight, or the disciplines of the market 
or professional codes”. They further explain that putting accountability and performance in 
competing position is not constructive approach because the improvement of accountability 
does not necessarily bring the performance improvement. However, performance cannot be 
improved without improved accountability.  
Transparency plays an important role for accountability. For example, Liem
531
 “output 
orientation” sets the requirements for clear and measurable objectives which could be 
controlled and for their fulfilment people could be held accountable. In this sense lack of 
transparency creates a problem of connecting results with persons which in the efforts to fight 
corruption could be essential. Apart from improving performance, according to Liem, public 
accountability also functions “to enhance the integrity of public governance” and as a 
safeguard against corruption. In the context of corruption combat in developing and transitional 
countries, transparency and accountability are seen in the synergy. The understanding of 
transparency and accountability is socialist countries was according to the institutional setting 
of authoritarian regime. Since the post-socialist countries have these perceptions as a starting 
point on their journey towards democracy, their essential features will be discussed in the next 
section.  
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3.4.1.2 Transparency and accountability in socialism  
 
The father of the theory of bureaucracy, Weber
532
 claims the bureaucracy always 
attempts to hide its knowledge and exclude the public from its activities. The concept of the 
“office secret” is bureaucracy invention which it defends it strongly although “outside specific 
areas, such as military administration, cannot be justified with purely functional arguments”. 
This immanency of each bureaucracy had specific context in socialist societies. According to 
Liam
533
, “there was no independent public administration in communism”. This proves 
Kornai
534
 whose claimed that the socialist state based its functioning and power on a “highly 
centralised and strictly hierarchical organisation” with the ruling party at the top of decision 
making chain. “Bureaucratic coordination”, was the dominant coordination mechanism. 
Managing of public sector in practice meant that plan which was decided centrally had to be 
implemented. Kornai states that implementation of plans down to the local level was “a 
basically downward flow of information… which lower level officials receives from a higher 
as a command, not a recommendation”.535 As previously explained in Chapter 1 when 
characteristics of the socialist system were discussed, constitutions of socialist countries had 
formally separation of powers, but in practice this division was not respected and that had 
consequences to the rule of law. To summarize the previous claims, in the socialist system, the 
members of the legislature were not elected by the people but nominated by the bureaucracy 
and therefore had no control over it; moreover it was the part of bureaucracy itself. This had a 
significant impact on the legality of the administrative decisions because orders and regulations 
did not always have a legislative basis, and administrative action was not always based on 
formally enacted laws. However, if it was deemed necessary a party could always induce the 
creation of a legislative basis. Even an infringement of a law could be given legal foundation. 
Furthermore, since the courts were not independent, they neither protected the individual nor 
exerted control on the bureaucracy. Legal protection was not guaranteed and individuals could 
not rely on rights granted by law. There was no legal certainty; administrative action was 
inconsistent, and decisions were incalculable and arbitrary. Similarly, since laws were 
interpreted differently depending on the case in hand, equal protection was not respected, 
either. As Kornai
536
 explains the bureaucratic apparatus was “not subordinate to any stable 
legal system but on the contrary the formal system of law is subordinate to the current 
endeavours of the bureaucracy”. The description above leads to the conclusion that under these 
circumstances, even if it was implemented, transparency could neither enhance legal certainty 
nor equal legal protection. If the rules could be arbitrarily changed or interpreted, designing of 
clear and understandable laws and regulation do not appear effective. The non-application of 
the rule of law makes transparency irrelevant in the context of public administration operating. 
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As described above, transparent administration is more accountable towards the citizens and 
provides them with control. Transparency can be considered a counterweight to administrative 
power and may reduce the risk of arbitrary action by the administration. If administrative 
performance becomes more transparent, it also can be evaluated better. 
However, regarding accountability Kornai
537
 explains that in socialist system, party had 
concentrated control which was exercised through “supervision, repression and intimidation”. 
These methods dominated through the whole system because “an exit option was virtually 
absent” because “resigning from party membership or applying for emigration was dangerous”. 
Beside party control no other mechanisms were in place. Kornai says that parliamentary 
control did not exist and any opposition to the party was “systematically eliminated”. 
Regarding civil society control, he claims that at that time it was “unthinkable” and contrary to 
the interest of the authorities and therefore all civic activity was channelled through formally 
autonomous organizations, again controlled by the state. In this context, administration 
subordinated to the direct control of the party was not able to disclose any information without 
the approval. Information was “strictly censored” and used to influence people not to inform 
them. The only available information was those in line with the official ideology.
538
 
The description of the socialist system provided above is closely related to the 
understanding and attitudes towards transparency and accountability in post-socialist countries. 
As Stiglitz
539
 said, “it is important to create the culture of openness and responsibility which 
requires the change of mind setting and it is commonly agrees that this action requires certain 
period of time”. The claim of this thesis is that the designing of a responsive anti-corruption 
framework, taking into account specificity of the countries in transition, could possibly speed 
up the process and effectively help these countries in the fight against corruption.                         
 
3.4.2 The main points of the discussion  
 
This section on transparency and accountability described the importance of these 
elements and necessity for inclusion in the anti-corruption pyramid. Transparency is essential 
for well-functioning of democratic society in many ways. It allows citizens to observe the 
processes which are going on inside the public institutions and provide them with control and 
trust that decisions are made according to the rule of law principle and equality of all. 
Transparency assures that public interests are pursued instead of private, particular once and as 
such minimises the raising of opportunities in that sense. However, it should be also kept in 
mind that providing transparency is not costless and sound policy should find the optimal level 
of costs and benefits for the information disclosure. This is particularly important in the case of 
transitional countries whose resources are usually limited.  
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  Some interesting observations regarding transparency are made by Otenyo and 
Lind
540
. According to them, depending on the level of development, the meaning of 
transparency varies. Whereas “in the more advanced countries, the current usage of the concept 
is closely related to expanding democracy in decision-making”, transparency reforms in 
developing countries are “likely to be associated with combating corruption”. Since they 
consider transparency as being “associated with broad reforms in public administration”, the 
“faces of transparency roughly mirror definable phases of global and national administrative 
reforms”. The Figure3.2 below represents their view of changing faces and phases of 
transparency reforms in government depending on the development stage. 
 
Figure 3.2: Change of faces and phases of transparency reform in government 
 
(1) Transparency as representative government 
(emphasis on government legitimacy; to ensure fairness and equity) 
 
(2) Transparency as a means of judging the distribution of policy benefits 
(emphasis on service delivery; e.g., contract management) 
 
(3) Transparency as a response to maladministration 
(emphasis on eradicating corruption) 
 
(4) Transparency as a tool for enhancing accountability 
(emphasis on information and decision making disclosures) 
 
(5) Transparency as open government 
(emphasis on information technology, electronic democracy and governance) 
 
Source: Otenio and Lind,Faces and Phases of Transparency Reform in Local Government p. 292 
 
 Authors claim that the region of Central and Eastern Europe, in this figure, is seen at 
the same level as most parts of the developing world 
541
 but Liem
542
 questions these views 
claiming that it is probably influenced by (debatable) inclusion of former Soviet republics in 
this category. Leaving debate aside, transparency and accountability in this research are used as 
means for corruption combat and improvement the achievement of transitional countries 
regarding this matter. 
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3.5 Conclusion 
 
The research question of this chapter, which in the paradigm structure-conduct-
performance discusses the second aspect, asked how the preferences of civil servants should 
be targeted/coordinated in order to achieve the optimal level of corruption combat in public 
administration of post-socialist countries. The answer to it lies in the anti-corruption pyramid, 
designed in this thesis according to one of the original pyramids described in the responsive 
regulation literature. This literature states that before using “heavy legal guns”, the 
enforcement agency should apply gentle means and provide people with the opportunity to 
voluntarily comply with the laws and regulations. This view is founded on the procedural 
justice theory which explains that people are ready to comply with any public decision if they 
perceive it as justified. This approach is considered more suitable for transitional countries 
since the dominant strategies adopted, influenced by international anti-corruption regulation, 
according to the literature did not provide expected outcome. The claim of this thesis is that 
due to idiosyncrasies of post-socialist countries which are rooted in their past, the “one size fit 
all” international anti-corruption strategies for their purpose should be modified. As previously 
explained the dominant approach is described as repression-prevention-transparency model. 
Here the claim is that these elements do not have the same rank and importance. In pyramid 
their ranking goes from prevention to transparency and finally repression. This model is 
adjusted to the specific characteristics which post-socialist countries have to overcome.  
The specific problems of transitional countries lie in the mentality of people, embodied 
in homo sovieticus model, and lack of trust in public institutions which authoritarian regime 
produced over decades. The two characteristics might be seen as two sides of the coin and the 
strategy to approach them should resolve the issues of changing mentality and increasing the 
trust. Regarding the most suitable approach in rising trust, Mulder et al.
543
 claim that although a 
sanctioning system might increase trust and make people cooperate, it does that by imposing it 
externally while it fails to do the same internally. This is true because system of sanctions 
sends the information that “fellow group members are self-interested and trust in others being 
internally motivated to cooperate is undermined”. Since high level trust represents one of the 
important aspects for the corruption combat it might be essential to be internally motivated, 
especially in the case of transitional countries.  
Kaptein
544
 provides the overview of various empirical research projects which show 
that people’s behaviour could be expressed in various ways based on different regulatory 
policy. In his book Why good people sometimes do bad things he claims that what one expects 
is what one gets. This practically means that if you expect more (effort) from people you will 
get more (effort) from them and this situation he calls “Pygmalion effect”. On the other hand if 
you expect less (effort) from people you will get less which is described as “Golem effect”. 
Second claim is that organization should not put too much emphasis on preventing people from 
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being corrupt but rather to ensure that they flourish and bear fruit. He further states that people 
adopt the norms and values of those they feel connected with. This applied to the organization 
means that the more employee feel a bond with their organization, the more they will commit 
to the goals of their employer. Finally Kaptein advocates for creation within organization, the 
culture in which dilemmas can be discussed, different opinions can be expressed freely, and 
which promotes transparency by working in teams, setting matters down on paper, clearly 
assigning responsibilities and carrying out checks.  
These insights provide an image of the way people operate which might be particularly 
important for the context of building new institutional system. Before the establishment of any 
institutions the individuals are the units relevant for its creation. Once the institution is 
established, the spot light shifts form the individuals to the institution. However, in the creation 
of new institutional settings the remains of the old system are for a certain period of time more 
or less present in the foundation of the new system. The approach of this chapter targets the 
constituents of the institutions – individuals, more precisely civil servants in the public 
administration of post-socialist countries. Therefore, the pyramid has following layers listed 
from the bottom-up: propensity to corruption-culture, transparency and accountability, 
deterrence mechanism for administrative sanctions and finally deterrence mechanism for 
criminal sanctions. 
This chapter focuses on the first two layers. As previously explained, the homo 
sovieticus mentality is in the pyramid reflected by the comparable, already developed cultural 
measures and therefore the first layer of the pyramid includes: universalistic and particularistic, 
individualistic and collectivistic and power distance acceptance culture aspects. For each of the 
type, differences regarding value system, organizational structure of administration and attitude 
towards corruption, are discussed. According to the results homo sovieticus should be replaced 
by the civil servant whose cultural values are universalistic, individualistic and with low power 
distance. Transparency and accountability, in the second pyramid layer, are seen as corrective 
tools for those who fail to follow the rules of the first one. However, the benefits of their 
employment should be balanced with their costs in order to achieve optimal level. The more 
practical implications of these two layers are discussed in Chapter 6. In sum, the optimal 
solution for targeting preferences of civil servants is to provide the mechanism which will 
employ those who possess the above described cultural characteristic and to implement the 
mechanisms which will ensure transparency of their work and make them accountable for any 
misconduct.  
To conclude, in general all behaviours which do not lead to desired outcomes should be 
targeted by the state in the proper manner. According to Sunstein
545
, government can use 
various means to achieve the defined goal. It may restrict itself to education, which represents 
statements of fact designed to provide “accurate beliefs”. It also may attempt to engage 
persuasion, “a self-conscious effort to alter attitudes and choices rather than simply to offer 
information”. This could be achieved with rhetoric and vivid images to change norms, 
meanings or roles attempting to persuade people to make certain choice. He further claims that 
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government might also use economic instruments to tax or subsidize choices. It may also 
impose time, place and manner restrictions to channel the choice. The most intrusive kind of 
government action is of course straightforward coercion which means prohibition.  Depending 
on the state context and subject of discussion the sound policy should employ those means 
which take into account all necessary facts related to the problem in order to make efforts made 
by state effective. The suggestion of an anti-corruption pyramid as a model for policy design in 
transitional counters regarding corruption combat is one example. This Chapter discussed its 
first two layers which promote education and persuasion while the next one will describe the 
last two layers and constraints. 
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Appendix 3.1 
For all countries: association between Collectivism &and Corruption 
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Appendix 3.2 
 
For transitional countries in particular, the association remains: 
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Appendix 3.3 
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Appendix 3.4 
Table: Diagnosing particularism; A qualitative tool 
 Diagnosis questions Sources of 
information/indicators 
Power distribution Is influence distributed unevenly, resulting in constant 
preferential treatment of certain groups over others by the 
state? Is it only one group (network/estate) which enjoys 
privileges? Is this consistent over time or does it changes 
according to elections? Is there one particular group that 
constantly loses due to power inequality? Is autonomy 
sufficient for a “loser” group to exercise its voice? Are 
there genuine drivers of change present in the broader 
society (media, civil society, politics)? 
Real influential jobs held by the 
same individuals or networks regardless 
of the outcome of elections 
Persistence of widespread popular 
perceptions of government corruption 
despite changes in government 
High political migration from 
opposition parties to the party in 
government search of political rents 
State autonomy Is the state autonomous from private interest or 
captured by the latter? How politicized is the administration 
and the public sector in general? Is there a permanent 
bureaucracy which does not change with elections and how 
much influence does it have over policy formulation and 
implementation? Is this bureaucracy well trained and paid 
to fulfil its functions? Are policy formulation and public 
spending transparent so that media and citizens can observe 
it? 
Degree of politicization (to what 
level personnel reshuffling occurs at 
government change); to what extent 
rules and politicians are also successful 
private entrepreneurs  
Perception of important 
government favouritism for certain 
companies despite decreasing or petty 
corruption 
Public allocation 
(services, goods) 
Is the main goal of the state to cater to everyone, or to 
special interests or groups? What is the norm in public 
allocation? Does the party/clan in government distribute 
mostly to itself (associated local governments or regions, 
favourite companies)? How much of the total spending 
budget are rents? Does this change from one year (or 
government) to the next? 
 
Budgetary sector surveys 
 
% allocation per political party 
regions/ %vote share in regional party 
elections 
 
World Economic Forum 
government favouritism indicator 
Separation private -
public 
To what extent is the norm that a public position or 
advantage is passed down in a family or used for family 
profit? Is it customary that rulers/ officials use public funds 
(or administrative resources) to cover private expenses? Is 
there any public scrutiny and disclosure of such expenses? 
Is there any moral outrage at such disclosures or is the 
practice accepted? 
 
No of public positions occupied by 
kinship favouritism 
 
Cases of use of administrative 
resources for private goals 
Relation 
formal/informal 
institutions 
Is the dominant norm closer to the formal or the 
informal institution? Is the formal institution subverted/ 
competed by the informal one? Is there an effort to enforce 
formal (legal) norms? How long has the gap existed 
between formal and informal institutions? 
Survey of practices to establish 
which norm is dominant and if informal 
norms are just parallel/ complementary 
or in fact competitive/subversive of 
formal ones 
Accountability Has anyone belonging to the chief status group (clan, 
party or family) ever been deposed from an official position 
or sentenced by a court? Are reports of wrongdoing by such 
people ever followed up with public investigations? Do 
people as a rule officially complain of unfair treatment? Are 
there any whistle-blowers? Do regular reports on 
government/ government agencies exist at end 
year/mandate? Do they include information on objectives 
which were not reached and measures taken to rectify 
them? 
Widespread perception in surveys 
that politicians are above the law, 
perception of political parties as top 
‘status groups’ and political affiliation as 
indispensable for economic success 
Source: Mungiu-Pippidi, et al., “Contextual Choices in Fighting Corruption: Lessons Learned”, p. 16 
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Chapter 4: Designing optimal anti-corruption policies in 
transitional countries: putting constrains 
Democracy is less a system of government  
than it is a system to keep government limited, unintrusive;  
a system of constraints on power  
to keep politics and government secondary to the important things in life, 
the true sources of value found only in. 
Ronald Regan 
 
 
4.1. Introduction   
 
The last two layers of the anti-corruption pyramid present the gradation of “guns” 
which regulatory strategy should employ after the failure of voluntary compliance described in 
the first two layers. The sub-research question of this chapter is How constrains should be 
imposed in order to achieve the optimal level of corruption combat in public administration 
of post-socialist countries? Chapter 1 discussed corruption in general, mentioning some basic 
characteristic of the corrupt act, for instance its secrecy. Here the discussion goes into more 
details because penalties impose constraints on human behaviour and as such their application 
should be well-founded. Therefore, the first part of this chapter will be devoted to detailed 
analysis of the essence of corrupt act and actors, types of corruption relevant for anti-corruption 
pyramid and to the theoretical discussion of punishment. The second part of the chapter 
discusses the third layer of the pyramid, more precisely administrative sanctions, its purpose 
and possible use in corruption cases. Finally, the last section presents the purpose of criminal 
punishment, sanctions and its application in corruption combat.  
 
4.2. Corrupt act 
 
4.2.1. Characteristics of the actor(s) 
 
In previous chapter it was said that the definition of corruption used in this thesis is the 
one which describes it as abuse of public power for private gain. Abuse of power, as described 
in the Chapter 1, includes: bribery, nepotism, cronyism, clientelism, embezzlement, fraud and 
conflict of interest. While the first two layers of the anti-corruption pyramid set the foundation 
for fight against the broad range of abuse of public office, due to its mainly educative and 
preventive function, the second two layers impose penalties for engaging in corrupt acts. These 
penalties represent restrictions on human rights and liberty and as such should be observed 
carefully and closely. Nepotism, cronyism and clientelism provide in the recruitment and 
promotion process favouritism based on specific characteristic of persons and, as such, are in 
the hands of the managers in public administration and not of ordinary civil servants. These 
abuses of public office could be resolved by implementing the merit based criteria embedded in 
the NWS approach for PA institutional setting. Fraud, embezzlement and conflict of interest 
belong to the abuse of office but in the essence have different characteristics from the 
corruption in a narrow sense, more precisely bribery. Therefore, regarding constraints imposed 
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to human behaviour to fight corruption here will be discussed only those imposed for bribery 
of civil servants. 
As explained earlier in the essence of a corrupt act, in this case bribery, is the 
agreement between two parties, public official – civil servant on one side and on the other 
client. Following the target of this research a closer look to the profile of civil servants is 
necessary. Describing servants in socialist era Kramer
546
claims that public officials need to 
have “opportunity and incentive to engage in corruption” because “the absence of either makes 
corruption impossible” and soviets society created conditions in which both of them 
“frequently exist”. The fusion of the Party and the state increased government activity and 
made it “the primary agent for employment, production and regulation”, which resulted in 
broad scope of opportunities for corruption. Perez-Lopez
547
 explains that specific interaction 
between “the governmental and economic institutions, ideologies and traditional political 
culture” made civil servants “particularly prone to corruption”.  Beside the extensive public 
sector and central planning, the Party was another source of corruption since the top officials 
were “immune to exposes and reprisal from below” and therefore able to engage in 
maximisation of personal wealth. This behaviour created a “new class” which Djilas 548 
describes as the one with “special privileges and economic preferences because of the 
administrative monopoly they hold”. Kramer549 claims that in soviet societies the detection and 
severe punishment of corrupt acts was very low and the benefits for public officials of these 
misdeeds far outweighed the costs. Furthermore, officials might not be willing to pursue cases 
of corruption due to the possibility of being considered responsible by higher officials for not 
preventing it in the first place. On the other hand, if party reveals the cases of corruption, “it 
may be criticized for its cadre selection policy” and therefore it prefers covering up and not 
“washing its dirty linen in public”. From this point, civil servants in post socialist countries had 
to start their journey towards the reformed and modern civil service. However, the modern civil 
service has no single meaning, which was already discussed in the Chapter 2 of this thesis.  
Demmke
550
 looks at the profile of civil servants in the EU member countries and claims 
that diversity of public employees and the jobs they perform over the years became very 
distinct. However, the core of civil service in general consist educated and skilled workers. 
When they engage in corrupt activities they appear to receive the characteristics of white-collar 
criminals which in general distinguish them from the “street, blue” ones. This comparison is 
important to make because they create the arguments for the development of the specific 
approach to corruption regarding its consequences and punishing of wrongdoers in order to 
improve combat in transitional countries. Among the first one who addressed educated and 
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respected criminals was Ross
551
. He focuses on business people who, hiding behind the mask 
of respectability, engage in the activities harmful for the society. He names them as 
“criminaloids”. For Ross, they represent more dangerous enemies of the society compared to 
ordinary criminals. They “sport the livery of virtue and operate on a titanic scale.” Building on 
Ross work, more than 70 years ago Sutherland
552
  further developed the concept of white collar 
crime using the term “white-collar criminaloid”. He disagrees with basic principles of criminal 
law and focus of the criminology on social and economic determinants as important aspects of 
criminal activity. He draws attention to the fact that crime could be committed by any 
individual regardless of their social status. Therefore, he sees white collar crime as “crime 
committed by a person of respectability and high social status in the course of his occupation”. 
Focusing on the type of white-collar criminals and complexity of criminal activity performed 
by them, he argues for the abolishment of presumption of innocence and mens rea (criminal 
intent) in these types of cases. Talking about the consequences of white-collar crime on society 
Sutherland
553claims they are “diffused over a long period of time and perhaps over millions of 
people, with no person suffering much at a particular time”. 
An important aspect regarding white-collar crime was by Clinard and Quinney
554
. 
Using Sutherland’s idea they argue that white-collar crime could be divided into two types: 
corporate and occupational crime. Corporate crime is then defined as illegal behaviour 
committed by employees in order to provide the benefit for their corporation. On the other 
hand occupational crime is a “violation of legal codes in the course of activity in a legitimate 
occupation.” According to Payne555 work of Clinard and Quinney was very influential for 
criminologists regarding the white-collar crime. He further argues that modern concepts of 
white collar crime show that criminologists and sociologist provide various definitions of white 
collar crime and they see it as: 1) moral or ethical violations, 2) crime or social harm, 3) 
violations of criminal law, 4) violations of civil law, 5) violations of regulatory laws, 6) 
workplace deviance, 7) definitions socially constructed by businesses, 8) research definitions, 
9) official government definitions, 10) violations of trust, 11) occupational crimes, 12) 
violations occurring in occupational systems. Table 4.1 shows eight different concepts and 
definitions that criminologists have used to describe these behaviours. However, each of the 
concepts provided in the Table has its imperfections.  
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Table 4.1: Evolution of the White-collar Crime concept 
Concept Definition Reference 
Criminaloid The immunity enjoyed by the perpetrator of new sins has brought 
into being a class for which we may coin the term criminaloid. By this 
we designate such as prosper by flagitious practices which have not yet 
come under the effective ban of public opinion. Often, indeed, they are 
guilty in the eyes of the law; but since they are not culpable in the eyes 
of the public and in their own eyes, their spiritual attitude is not that of 
the criminal. The lawmaker may make their misdeeds crimes, but, so 
long as morality stands stock-still in the old tracks, they escape both 
punishment and ignominy 
E.A. Ross 
(Sin and Society, 
907, p. 48) 
White collar 
crime 
Crime committed by a person of respectability and high social 
status in the course of his occupation 
Sutherland (1949) 
Corporate crime Offenses committed by corporate officials for their corporation and 
the offenses of the corporation itself. 
Clinard and 
Yeager 
(1980, p. 189) 
Occupational 
crime 
Offenses committed by individuals in the course of their 
occupations and the offenses of employees against their employers. 
Clinard and 
Yeager 
(1980, p. 189 
Organizational 
deviance 
Actions contrary to norms maintained by others outside the 
organization . . . [but] supported by the internal operating norms of the 
organization 
Ermann and 
Lundman 
(1978, p. 7) 
Elite deviance Acts committed by persons from the highest strata of society . . . 
some acts are crimes . . . may be criminal or noncriminal in nature. 
Simon 
 (2006, p. 12) 
Organizational 
crime 
Illegal acts of omission or commission of an individual or a group 
of individuals in a formal organization in accordance with the operative 
goals of the organization, which have serious physical or economic 
impact on employees, consumers, or the general public. 
Schrager and 
Short, 
(1978, p. 408) 
Occupational 
crime 
Any act punishable bylaw which is committed through opportunity 
created in the course of an occupation that is legitimate. 
Green (1990) 
Source: Payne,“White Collar-Crime: A Text/Reader” p.38 
 
Analysing the profile of the white collar criminals Wheeler et al.
556
 found that white-
collar offenders, comparing to conventional offender, have, among others, the following 
characteristics: college education, job and started their careers as criminals later in life. 
Therefore, Payne
557
claims that the recognition of difference between white collar 
crime/criminals and blue crime/offenders has a strong theoretical and policy implication 
reasons. Since none of the criminological theories can explain both types of crimes it is 
necessary to approach them differently. He further explains that regarding the policy 
implications, it is crucial to recognize that these two types of crimes require different criminal 
justice strategies. This is true because, regarding the efforts to prevent crime, the response of 
two groups of criminals is expected to be different. Payne explains that prevention of white 
collar crime is a far more complex issue compared to street crime.  
To conclude, in the bribery agreement two parties are involved of which one is public 
official, in this case civil servant. The intuitional setting and according behaviour of civil 
servants in socialist countries was for decades highly corrupt. Since the legacies of the past do 
not disappear overnight, the claim of this research is that it still might be one of the important 
factors for the relatively high level of corruption in post-socialist countries. In order to 
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approach this problem in putting constraints on behaviour of civil servants and designing of 
adequate incentive system three issues has to be kept in mind. First, tolerance to corruption, 
inherited from the past, might be still widely present behaviour in post socialist administration. 
Second, in general civil servants are educated and skilled employees and they operate 
differently from “street criminals” and as such should be treated differently in terms of 
prevention and punishment. Finally, the consequences of civil servants engagement in corrupt 
activities are very difficult to detect due to the lack of a concrete victim. As such they might be 
diffused over time and over a high number of people. Before designing the punishment 
mechanisms, the necessary distinction among corrupt acts of bribery should be made.  
 
4.2.2. Three types of corrupt acts: “legal, illegal and quasi-legal” corruption 
 
Not all acts of bribery have the same causes and as such they do not impose the same 
costs on the society. Bardhan
558
describes as a simplest model of corruption one in which 
excessive regulation is in place and the bureaucrats are given some discretional powers to 
implement them. This provides an opportunity for civil servants to engage in corruption. 
Guriev
559
 claims that optimal level of red tape is not considered as negative for society but the 
problem create “self-interested bureaucrats who tend to over produce red tape relative to the 
social optimum”. Therefore it is sometimes necessary for clients to “grace the weal” and 
bypass mindless regulations. Bardhan
560
 claims that the bypassing might take two forms. One 
form includes bureaucrats who take bribes to do what they are supposed to do and the amount 
paid for this bribe presents an additional fee for the other party, paid beside the legally 
prescribed ones. The other form applies to situations in which civil servants are bribed to 
perform the act which they are not allowed to. Similar qualification is described by Bauhr
561
. 
She distinguishes between two types of corruption based on the motives for paying a bribe. She 
presents corruption in “need” and “greed” corruption. The former one occurs when, even 
though citizens are legally entitled to certain service, they have to pay bribe. This type of 
corruption is often built on extortion. Greed and corruption take place when the bribe is paid 
for the service to which individual is not entitled to. This act presents “collusion for mutual 
benefits” and as such is more hidden with costs shared “between large number of actors and 
taxpayers” The description provided implies that the two types of corrupt acts have differing 
implications.  
The first type of bribe payment, here named as “legal corruption”, in general should 
“speed up the process”, the case of so-called speed money, and occurs when a civil servant’s 
client pays to avoid unnecessary delays in decision-making process regarding his right. In this 
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case client aims to reduce the “office value”562 of his file. The other side of the coin in this case 
is that civil servants might have an incentive to delay the process, instead of speeding it up. 
This comes from the fact that more delays provide the civil servants more possibilities to 
extract the money. It also opens the floor for other bureaucrats to ask bribes or they will delay 
the case further and so on. Since the corrupt agreement is secret and illegal the bribe payer in 
this case is not able to go to the court and ask for the execution of the obligation taken by the 
bribe taker’s side. For the purpose of this research it is important to point out that this 
classification in the further analysis includes only the cases in which no harm is imposed to the 
third parties by this agreement. The second type of corruption, here called “illegal corruption”, 
include situations in which bureaucrats are doing the things which they are not allowed to 
violating by these acts rules and regulations which govern their work and entitlements. This 
type of secret agreement creates even stronger connections between the parties because both of 
them are in collusion and therefore none has an incentive to report the case. Here, one 
additional type of bribe might be added. Somewhere in between two types of corrupt deals 
could be positioned the cases which include the misuse of discretional powers of civil servants 
as a result of the illegal collaboration with the party and they could be named as “quasi-legal”. 
From this distinction some conclusions could be made regarding the effects which to 
types have on the society. Bauhr
563
 claims that costs of different types of corruption might 
differ in their effects on the party who pays the bribe. For a person involved in need, here 
called “legal”  corruption, the personal costs of corruption could be high compared to his 
income although it might be minimal in comparison to the sums paid in greed-initiated 
corruption. On the other hand, for person involved in greed corruption, here named as “illegal”, 
the amount paid “may have a minimal effect of everyday life of a person”, even if the amount 
is “high in absolute terms”. Bauhr concludes that greed corruption is “typically less obtrusive 
than need corruption”, and as such has limited influence on institutional trust compared to need 
corruption. Collective action literature associates need corruption to systemic corruption and 
low institutional trust while greed corruption does not affects the perception and trust and in 
general lowers collective action. Based on these claims it could be assumed that costs for 
society as a whole are in general lower when induced by legal corruption compared to illegal. 
Although Bauhr
564
 claims that legal corruption is mainly based on the extortion, it is not 
necessarily the main trigger for corrupt action. Therefore, in the essence of this act lies an 
agreement which might be very unstable in the sense of breaking the silence among the parties. 
As stated above costs imposed to the society by these acts should be in general lower compared 
to those of the illegal corrupt agreement because they affect only the person who pays the bribe 
by imposing on him additional illegal fees. This party, as direct victim, is entitled to decide if 
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he would fail the claim. However, on the other hand illegal corruption, as understood here, is in 
its essence an illegal agreement which brings greater distortions when it comes to legal rights 
distribution among the parties. More precisely, it can bring benefits to the party which have no 
legal rights to obtain the service in question. For instance, if someone obtains by illegal means 
the permission to run the school or university the benefits will go only to him, by receiving 
payments from students, and to a civil servant in charged for the issuing of the permit, who will 
receive his payment from the bribe. The question is who the victim is in this case and what are 
the costs of this deal. The answer to the former question is that in the first place the victim is a 
student who is deceived by the state that certain school operates in accordance to the prescribed 
rule. As such, he in good faith pays fees to the school hoping to receive knowledge which will 
provide a place for him in the labour market and according income. Until he realised that the 
licence is illegal, he might spend months or even years which at the end might mean nothing 
for his future because the diploma which he gets at the end has no value and as such cannot 
provide him with a job and incomes which he hoped for. However, the costs induced to not end 
here because schools have hundreds or thousands of students which in this case have the same 
story. Finally, the costs for the society which employs unskilled and uneducated workers as a 
result of the initial corrupt agreement are very difficult to measure. The intuition says that the 
domino effect which could be created in this case appears particularly harmful. Finally, as said 
above somewhere in between the legal and illegal the costs of quasi-legal corrupt deals might 
be located. For instance, civil servants usually possess discretional power to decide on issuing a 
firearms licence. The rules which regulate the process differ from country to country but in this 
case the focus is on the discretionary power of civil servant which he uses after he received the 
bribe. These cases are very difficult to generalise since they might present a border line cases 
but roughly speaking, the costs of this agreement can go from no costs imposed on the society, 
to very difficult to measure. If person who paid the bribe harms no one, than the costs of 
paying bribe are only on him. However, if he injures at least one person the society might be 
affected on various ways depending on the facts of a particular case. 
Beside economic there are also legal reasons why this differentiation should be made 
regarding the punishing of bribing of civil servants. Civil servants may produce an 
administrative act as part of their regular course of activity. If that act is produced while 
committing a violation of either administrative or criminal law, it will be subject to legal 
consequences.  Cardona
565
 explains that if an administrative act represents a crime, it becomes 
null or void. If the act is null anyone can ask his removal from a legal environment and in that 
case legal authorities, administrative or judicial, declare it non valid ex tunc, which means ab 
initio. On the other hand, when an act is void it means that it produces the effects, and only 
parties involved in it can ask for its nullification due to certain reasons. If this happens the act 
is declared non valid ex nunc, which means that it does not produces effects from the moment 
of a declaration. This further means that all actions taken until that moment are legally valid. If 
the act is a result of administrative fault it does not mean that it is void per se. It can be 
annulled only if proved that causal link exist between the fault and administrative decision. 
                                                          
565Cardona, F. (2003): “Liabilities and Discipline of Civil Servants”, Support for Improvement in Governance and 
Management SIGMA, January, 2003 
Ana Jakovljević, LL.M 
179 
 
Applied to the bribery case this means that if all bribery acts are treated as criminal, without 
making above described distinction those to which parties had legal right face possibility to be 
declared null or void which might have consequences to legal certainty. On the other hand if 
the act provides to a party something which he is not entitled to, then such an act should be 
declared null or void. International regulations, more precisely only the GRECO Civil Law 
Convention on Corruption, regulate these issues but only in the domain of contracts which 
resulted from corrupt acts. The convention asks from the member states to provide the internal 
law according to which any contract or clause of a contract providing for corruption should be 
null or void.  Since these provisions refer to the civil law acts and not the administrative or 
criminal, they are not in the scope of this thesis.  
To sum up, legal corruption imposes lower costs to the society because they are bared only 
by the bribe payer. Illegal corruption could induce costs which are not even assessible to 
measurement. Finally quasi-legal corruption can go to both directions regarding the costs 
measurement. This analysis aimed to draw the attention to corruption, in a way different from 
the dominant approach and to provide the foundation for the future proposition regarding legal 
regulation. What is important to stress is that in some countries, like Germany, criminal codes 
make distinction between the above described types of corrupt acts. Graf von Kielmansegg
566
 
explains that German criminal law makes distinction in punishing corruption regarding the 
legality of the act which results from it. More precisely, if the act presents violation of the 
public official’s duties it could be punished as active or passive bribery. If the act, on the other 
hand, does not violate the official’s duties and it is not based on “improper considerations”, it is 
still punishable as “granting” or “accepting an advantage” with less severe criminal sanctions. 
Furthermore, German law does not require that a decision by a civil servant is always based on 
an illegal act. He might have a discretion to make a decision, however if it is made as a result 
of payment his behaviour is considered wrongful while the decision itself is valid. Graf von 
Kielmansegg claims that by criminalising both types of corrupt acts, regardless of their 
legality, the clear attitude towards protecting the “institutional integrity of public 
administration” is expressed. Although transitional countries do not make the above distinction 
of bribery, almost all of them criminalise accepting and giving bribe, and intermediation in 
concluding corrupt agreements. The table in the Appendix 4.1 provides the overview. However, 
treating all types of bribery as criminal acts brings another issue for discussion. Even though 
the message is clear that society will not tolerate any behaviour harmful for the institutions the 
question is how well the message is understood and implemented. Also, criminal process in the 
essence consists highly formal rules because it imposes restrictions on human rights and as 
such should be strictly followed. The next section discusses the obstacles in the corruption 
combat which are caused by the characteristics of both, corrupt acts and criminal procedures.  
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4.2.3. Punishment and corruption 
 
4.2.3.1. Treatment of corruption 
 
It was mentioned earlier that in the countries around the world bribery is mainly 
regulated as criminal act, which complies with the international anti-corruption rules and 
regulations. Before looking into the bribe criminalization it is important to see what actually 
criminal act is in its essence. Bowles et al.
567
 claim that although “universal legal definition of 
criminal act” does not exist, it could be said that it represents the violation of criminal code 
which could be performed by acting or omission. In general two characteristics are considered 
crucial. First, it does public harm and second, the act has incorporated harmful intent (mens 
rea) which is graded for the purpose of assessing the gilt and punishment. Criminalisation of a 
certain act usually means that society sees it as highly harmful and as such should be deterred 
by imposing various sanctions. However, since the acts are considered very harmful the 
sanctions prescribed impose various levels of limitations on human liberties and rights. Van 
den Berg and Visscher
568
 explain that criminal law produces negative impact for the 
wrongdoer, such as loss of reputation or stigmatization, change in the personal and professional 
relations, and waste of time in prison, and as such requires the establishment of the procedures 
with many safeguards which should prevent wrongful convictions. As a consequence formal 
investigation and judicial procedures are conducted and as a result a decision is made on the 
basis of the evidence collected. These procedures aim, before imposing any of criminal 
sanctions,  to identify the wrongdoer, the act that he committed, resulted victim and damages, 
causal link between the all and finally the wrongdoer’s intent.  
The above provided description of a criminal procedure shows that processing of 
criminal cases is not always an easy task to perform. It appears even more difficult in cases of 
corruption due to specific characteristics of a corrupt act, its secrecy and mainly non-existing 
victim.  Kwok Man-wai
569
explains that in the investigation of corruption usual elements 
present in ordinary types of crimes are missing. For instance there is often no scene of the 
crime, no fingerprint and no eye-witness which could help the investigation.  By its nature 
bribery is a very secretive crime and usually involves just two parties, which in most cases 
have no incentive to reveal the existence of the agreement. This is particularly true if a 
distinction between different types of bribery in the sense provided in previous section is not 
made. More precisely, if sanctioning of bribery follows current trends it means that both parties 
in corrupt agreement face similar penalties which strengthens the existing code of silence 
among them. The profile of one side in the agreement is explained above and in practical terms 
it means that these offenders may be equally professional as the investigators and know how to 
cover their trails. They also could be “very powerful and ruthless in enforcing a code of silence 
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amongst related persons through intimidation and violence to abort any investigation”.570 
Furthermore, as previously said, some types of bribery, like “illegal”, have no identified victim 
and the measuring of damages is difficult to provide. Finally, mens rea is also important 
element to prove. Beken et al.
571
present the results of national reports collected for the purpose 
of assessing the organisation of corruption combat in a specific country. They say that several 
countries indicated as the main obstacle in corruption combat is “the difficulty in proving the 
offence”. Another obstacle represents the burden of proof in the context of human rights 
guarantees and presumption of innocence. Finally, application of all investigation techniques 
available in a certain country is not possible to apply in cases of corruption.  
In order to assist countries to improve the chances of proving corruption OECD
572
 
provides rules and guidelines for procedure improvement based on various practices employed 
around the world. Some of these instructions are: 1) the information about suspected should be 
gathered as much as possible; the more you know the person the more is possible to observe 
some unusual behaviour; 2) a motive for corrupt behaviour should be found; 3) connection 
between parties engaged in corrupt act is important to be discovered; 4) gathering the physical 
evidences as much as possible is one of the crucial things: pictures, tape recordings of 
conversations, documents related to transactions, etc.  
In conclusion, since bribery is dominantly treated as a criminal act, the standard of 
proof is therefore considerably higher. Ashworth
573
 claims that requirement to prove the case 
“beyond reasonable doubt” comes from the fact that criminal law impose a sentence which 
infringe defendant rights and therefore their better protection should be ensured. Lower 
standard of proof, used in administrative and civil procedures, provides less protection in that 
sense and as a result higher probability of conviction. This advantage of administrative law will 
be used as one of the arguments for advocating of administrative anti-corruption sanctioning 
but before going into details the Law and economics approach towards punishment will be 
discussed.  
 
4.2.3.2. Law and economics approach to punishment 
 
Punishing wrongdoers has a history as long as humanity itself. Down through the 
centuries ways of punishing became numerous and as such subject of studding and observation. 
Criminal sanctions due to its characteristics are for a long time discussed in the literature. 
Justification and reasons for punishment by criminal law are discussed later in this chapter 
within the section devoted to punishing corruption by criminal law. Beside criminal, societies 
also employ administrative and civil punishments for sanctioning unwanted behaviour. The 
Law and Economic approach analyses all three approaches. This section presents the 
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discussion on criminal and administrative ways of punishment since their implementation is 
here advocated as effective mean for corruption combat.  
The economic analysis of criminal law started with Becker
574
. He claims that criminals 
are rational self- maximisers who before engaging in a criminal activity, which should 
maximise their utility, make certain calculations and predictions regarding the costs and 
benefits of the act. In order to make criminal law enforcement optimal in deterring criminal 
behaviour some factors should be taken into account. These factors are: harm caused by 
crimes, costs of apprehension and conviction, probability of detection and severity of 
punishment. Therefore, a wrongdoer’s calculation is based on the above mentioned factors. 
The benefits that are expected from the crime are calculated by multiplication of the probability 
of success with benefits of the crime, which can include various things such as: money, values 
of material good etc. In approaching the expected sanctions, he further assesses the level of 
deterrence which, according to the literature should be optimal. If that is not the case, the 
particular system achieves either under-deterrence, which means that society carries the burden 
of crime costs, or over-deterrence, which has the opposite effects from the former because it 
imposes excessive costs on an individual who takes precautionary measures. Both of these 
options are inefficient.
575
 The magnitude of the sanction presents its severity and in general it 
should be based on the gain or the harm which resulted from the violation.
576
 Finally, expected 
sanction is calculated when the probability of detection and conviction is multiplied by the 
monetary value of the sanction and any non-pecuniary loss suffered.
577
 Therefore, the main 
goal of criminal justice system should be to minimize the total social costs of crime. They 
present the negative externalities imposed on the society minus the gains of wrongdoer, the 
supply of crime dependent on probability of detection and severity of the sanction and the costs 
of punishment. Minimization can be achieved through combination of the probability of 
detection, magnitude and type of the sanction. For instance, the increased probability of 
detection, according to Becker is more effective that punishment increasing. On the other hand, 
criminal fines are not costly to enforce and have great deterrent effect.  However, besides other 
reasons imprisonment might be a solution for judgement proof problem
578
, but as a sanction it 
should be used exceptionally due to its costs and principle of marginal deterrence
579
. As 
previously mentioned, rationality of the actors is assumed in this model, although Becker
580
 
himself recognised that people are not always rational in decision-making. However, on the 
aggregate level these behavioural divergences play no role.  
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Stigler
581
 claims that optimal enforcement mechanism represents a degree of 
compliance which society considers affordable. More precisely the resources spent on the law 
enforcement are balanced with the gains they induce. However, enforcing the rule is almost 
impossible to fulfil because of its costs. Law and economics points also to the problem of 
negative externalities which are created by most harmful activities and achieving their optimal 
control is therefore required. Externalities are defined by Cooter and Ulen
582
 as external costs 
imposed on an exchange in the market. They are in economics classified as market failure. As 
such they should be internalized by the wrongdoer in order to be prevented from pursuing his 
activity. Leger
583
 says that the internalisation of the externalities could be achieved by 
imposing liability rules
584
, administrative sanctions 
585
or some market based instrument such as 
taxation
586
.Van den Berg and Visscher
587
 explain that external costs are costs created by the 
third party and not the parties involved in certain activity. If these costs are not imposed on the 
actor who caused them, it is highly likely that he would continue engaging in the harmful 
activity without taking necessary care. He will reduce the activity only if his private loses, 
which are the results of activity, “decrease by more than foregone benefits”. Furthermore, he 
will take more care only if the “decrease in personal losses outweighs the increase in care 
costs”. These calculations of the actor leave out the costs imposed on third-parties even though 
they should be included in the calculation. Therefore, the legal instruments should correct this 
situation and make the actor to internalize the externality and help him to “choose a better 
activity level”. In general, the acts cause higher losses to the victim than gains to the actor. 
Therefore, in order to influence actor’s decision “the externalities should be fully internalized” 
because only by this the actor in making decision will have a clear picture of relevant costs and 
benefits. This further means that “sanctions should vary with the size of the externalities 
caused”.  
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Cooter
588
  tries to find the best solution looking from both, jurisprudential and 
economic approaches, to the problem of external costs. External costs are costs which someone 
imposes on others by engaging in certain activity and they can be reduced by the injurer at his 
expense, like for instance by taking precautions. Jurisprudential opinion is that economy can be 
regulated efficiently only by giving orders to which he disagrees by saying that instruments 
similar to prices can achieve that as well. On the other hand economists should be aware of the 
fact that sanction is not the price for doing what is forbidden. In attempt to reconcile two 
approaches Cooter explains that sanction is punishment for doing what is forbidden while price 
is payment for permitted activity. From the economic perspective prices should be used if 
obtaining accurate information about external costs is cheaper than those about socially optimal 
behaviour. If the reverse is true, then the activity should be controlled by sanctioning. In 
defining socially optimal behaviour officials can use community standard which represents a 
consensus among individuals, either private or specialized communities. Without community 
standard, officials have to assess the level of optimal behaviour by themselves which requires 
information about costs and benefits that may be difficult to obtain. On the other hand 
assigning the correct price to an activity only requires officials to compute the external cost, as 
opposed to balancing the costs and benefits. Based on the best assessment of social costs and 
benefits regarding the private persons and officials, Cooter creates a table (Table 4.2) which 
provides the best strategy answers to concrete situation.  
 
Table 4.2: Distribution of information and the optimal policy (assuming market failure and external costs)  
 
Best 
observer of 
social 
benefits 
 Best observer of social costs 
Officials Private Persons 
Officials Legislative standard and sanction Official subsidy 
Private persons Official price Community standard and 
sanction 
Source: Cooter, “Prices and sanctions”, p. 1537 
 
Regarding the optimal enforcement, the literature says that enforcement costs should 
not be higher than the benefits of deterrence
589
. This practically means that some rule 
violations should be tolerated because otherwise it would be too expensive to deter all 
violations. Beside this, as discussed above, some additional costs should be taken into account. 
In order to provide internalization of externalities by wrongdoer an enforcement agent should 
acquire information on the wrongdoer’s behaviour and accompanying consequences. 
Furthermore, obtaining and processing the information is also costly and also should be 
included in the decision about internalization instrument and the desired rate of compliance. 
Applied in the case of bribery two parties who engage in a corrupt agreement impose the costs 
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to the society which vary depending on the act. Furthermore, since the victim is lacking in 
many cases their measurement appears difficult to perform. Criminalisation of bribery sends, 
from economic point of view message that society aims to deter any kind of this behaviour. 
Since the results of this policy are, in the literature which discusses its effects in post-socialist 
countries, described as unsatisfying the questions posed it what could be done for their 
improvement. Suggestion in this chapter is that beside deterrence, the approach of internalising 
external costs by the wrongdoer should be taken into account. Therefore Cooter’s table (Table 
4.2) claims that if the best observers of social benefits are private persons and best observers of 
social costs are officials due to the dispersed consequences of the corruption over time and 
population than official pricing should take place. In case of bribery this seems applicable. 
Private parties usually perceive only the benefits of the agreement without taking into account 
full costs of the agreement imposed to the society. Cooter
590
 claims that pricing system allows 
individuals to choose how to behave as long as they have to pay. On the other hand penalty 
induces a jump of an individual’s costs when he crosses the line between permitted and 
forbidden zone protected by sanctions. Since price provides the internalisation of the costs and 
depends on harm caused, individual can decide whether to engage in certain activity or not. 
Sanctions are, on the other hand, related to the wrongdoer’s state of mind since they have 
purpose of deterrence punishment and compensation.  
Coming back to the bribery cases it has to be repeated that not all acts of this type are 
the same because they do not produce the same costs for the society, as already discussed 
above. Therefore, their different treatment seems to be justified. The treatment, beside 
deterrence, should include the internalization of costs which can be achieved through pricing 
system which will be imposed on civil servants, the target of this research. However, price in 
this context should be interpreted very flexible, not only as monetary value. Before suggestion 
on concrete implementation some interesting aspects regarding the administrative and criminal 
law should be point out. In internalising externalities administrative and criminal laws have 
different approaches. Van den Berg and Visscher
591
 claim that administrative law can prohibit 
certain behaviour or to impose a fine for its violation which is not limited to the losses induced. 
Beside the harmful behaviour the fine could be attached to the norm breaking one. On the other 
hand, criminal fines are financial sanctions which aim to deter wrongdoer from breaking the 
law and their magnitude is not limited to the size of the losses. However, they might induce 
some additional effects on the wrongdoer since involvement in criminal procedure leaves 
consequences on reputation or establishment of criminal record after the conviction. Criminal 
fines are in general considered as more serious than administrative because they have negative 
associations attached to them. However, these associations call for the use of criminal 
sanctions as “ultimum remedium”, which means that only if administrative sanctions to not 
provide expected outcome the criminal ones should be applied. As a non-monetary fine it 
produces a solution to the judgement proof problem. Imprisonment with its highly intrusive 
character is seen as solution for the problem of low probability of conviction because negative 
sentiments that people attach to it should prevent them for engaging in criminal activities. 
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However, the use of this sanction should be exceptional because if many behaviours that are 
not desired by the society are treated as crimes then “the less self-enforcement” will occur.592 
Furthermore, an important economic reason for its limited use lays in the fact that it has very 
high opportunity costs for the society due to the inefficient allocation of labour force.  
Based on all arguments provided above the claim of this thesis is that in case of legal 
bribery, which imposes low external costs to the society, “pricing mechanisms” should be 
employed in order to make parties of the harmful agreement internalise the costs they induced. 
To this category could be also included quasi-legal bribery which does not induce high costs. 
This “pricing mechanism” should be imposed in the form of administrative disciplinary 
sanction, whose main targets are civil servants engaged in corrupt agreement. Regarding the 
illegal acts of bribery and some of quasi illegal which induce high costs for the society, 
sanctioning mechanism should be applied designed according to the suggestions of Law and 
economics literature for reaching the optimal level of policy enforcement. Coming sections 
describe suggested system in more details. Its aim is to make civil servants comply with the 
anti-corruption policy as well as to deter them from committing bribery acts.  
 
4.3. Putting constraints – administrative sanctions   
 
4.3.1. Justification and purpose of punishment  
 
Previous sections discussed administrative law and its sanctions from the perspective of 
Law and economics approach, more precisely its optimality. Here some aspects of 
administrative disciplinary regulation are discussed. Cardona
593
 explains that the main rationale 
for the “ius puniendi” of sanctions applied in the administration is reinforcement of internal 
discipline and accountability for wrongdoing and poor performance. This has to ensure that 
employed agents will comply with their duties. The sanctions that administration employs 
could be classified in two groups. One type is imposed on the persons outside the 
administration who break the law and enforcement agency reacts accordingly. The other type 
of administrative sanctions, called disciplinary, is implemented within the organisation for 
those who, again, break the rules. Both types of sanctions aim to assure public that state 
apparatus has in place systems necessary to respond in appropriate manner to inappropriate 
conducts of public or public servants.
594
 The focus of this research is on the second type of 
administrative punishment, disciplinary sanctions. The purpose of disciplinary sanctions is to 
motivate employees to comply with the rules of conduct which are prescribed by the 
organization. Their enforcement includes identifying the causes of misconduct and taking 
appropriate corrective measures. The mechanism of disciplinary sanctions serves to punish 
concrete wrongdoer as well as to deter any other possible.  
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In the literature when compared to criminal law, administrative in general shows certain 
advantages. Bowles et al.
595
 claim that application of criminal law costs society more than its 
alternatives, such as administrative law. This comes from the fact that criminal sanctions have 
higher costs due to the standard of proof as well as possible mistakes and therefore criminal 
law should be “more transparent and clearer”. The other side of the coin is that this solution 
“offers less flexibility and increases complexity”. On the other hand, administrative law is less 
complete compared to criminal, which gives to the regulatory agencies higher influential role 
and flexibility. Bowels et al. identify couple of characteristics which distinguish two laws and 
they are: the use of non-monetary sanctions, stigma, the necessity of specialisation in rule 
enforcement, flexibility and complexity of the law. Based on these criteria they claim that 
criminal law will be used in the situation when losses are diffuse and relatively large. The later 
also includes insolvency as a potential obstacle. The view is supported by Van den Berg and 
Visscher
596
. They explain that the administrative system of regulating human behaviour 
induces a certain amount of costs related to: formulation of detailed ex ante norms, possible 
inconsistencies due to the existence of different authorities, and the fact that ex-ante regulations 
are closely related to monitoring of the actors in terms of rule abiding and rule violating 
behaviours. In theory, costs of monitoring could be reduced by increasing the magnitude of 
fine but the judgement problem imposes limits to this option.  They further explain that 
criminal law has higher amount of costs than administrative. The specificity of criminal law 
and negative impact that it has on a wrongdoer, such as loss or reputation and stigmatization, 
change in personal and professional relations and so on, asks for careful design which includes 
many safeguards in order to avoid wrongful conviction.  In the case of criminal law its punitive 
character lowers social welfare “because there is no offsetting gain”. The problem could be 
reduced by imposing fines rather than imprisonment since they present transfer of money and 
the latter “creates additional harm”. Required safeguards in practice mean that enforcement 
agents have to collect sufficient information necessary for conviction which increases costs. In 
addition, imprisonment is itself costly because it induces variety of costs for its establishing 
and maintaining.  
 
4.3.2. Administrative sanctions and corruption 
 
4.3.2.1. Administrative disciplinary sanctions: general description 
 
Discussing the disciplinary sanctions, Cardona
597
claims that the more activities of civil 
servants are able to impinge on citizens fundamental rights the more they should be controlled 
by standards and regulations and with harsher sanctions. If actions or omissions of civil 
servants present the violation of their duties established by the law, they can face three types of 
liabilities: disciplinary, penal and civil. Regulation of discipline in essence responds to fault 
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which could be “wilful wrongdoing” or “culpable negligence”. These rules are not applied in 
cases of incompetence or incapacity unless they are result of the factors under wrongdoer’s 
control
598
. However, disciplinary and penal liabilities, which are the subject of this chapter, 
have different types of procedure. Although they can overlap in some cases not all 
administrative misdeeds are crimes. Cardona
599
 explains that act can be classified as both, 
administrative fault and crime, only in the situation when it affects public interest. Some crimes 
could be only committed by civil servants, such as abuse of power, while others provide 
harsher penalties if committed by civil servants, such as fraud, embezzlement and so on. The 
explanation for this treatment is that acts of civil servants are very sensitive regarding public 
trust in the administration and therefore, public interest should be protected. In the case when 
certain act might be susceptible to punishment by both, disciplinary and criminal laws, the 
criminal process prevails over the administrative which is mainly suspended until the former is 
finished. The facts proven during the criminal process can be included as evidence in the 
administrative disciplinary procedure as well as criminal conviction, which influence the 
disciplinary sanction. For instance, if a civil servant is sentenced to prison, the disciplinary 
sanction is almost always a dismissal from the service. On the other hand, if civil servant is 
acquitted it is still possible to be punished with disciplinary sanction
600
. However, it is still 
necessary to stress that administrative procedures and sanctions have subsequent, 
complementary role when compared to the criminal ones.
601
It is also important to stress that 
principle “non bis in idem”, which means that nobody may be punished twice for the same 
offence committed under the same legal order, does not apply in the case of phishing civil 
servants for the same misdeed with two procedures, criminal and disciplinary.
602
 
The imposition of administrative sanctions is performed according to the procedure 
established in the regulation. The main goal of the procedure established for disciplinary 
sanctioning is to ensure fairness and respect of essential human rights. This is achieved by 
establishing principles which should be respected during the process. In general these 
principles are: 1) adversarial principle, which allows civil servants to present to the authorities 
“their side of the story” and evidences for it; 2) access to documents, provides civil servant 
with the access to all relevant documents which are the basis for the charges or those which 
could help him; 3) granting of hearing of the civil servant; and finally 4) appeal to a court in 
case of the imposition of disciplinary sanction
603
. Ghindar
604
 explains that a civil servant “can 
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be held responsible for a wide range of misconduct” which can vary from “minor” offences, 
such as disrespect of working hours or unjustified absence from work, to “grave” once, such as 
abuse of authority, unjustified refusal to follow orders and so on. The rules on disciplinary 
punishment mainly prescribe variety of sanctions which could be imposed on civil servants 
which according to principle of proportionality, correspond to the gravity of the offence 
committed, actual harm caused and intention of the wrongdoer. The usual range of sanctions is: 
1) oral warning; 2) written reprimand; 3) various suspensions, of career advancement and 
promotion for a certain period or without right to salary; 4) demotion to lower ranks; 5) 
financial penalty; 6) termination of employment or definitive separation from the public 
service
605
. Usually, except the dismissal sanction, all others are removed from a civil servant’s 
personal file after a certain period of time which varies from country to country (e.g. it goes 
from six months to ten years).
606
Disciplinary sanctions are usually imposed by the direct 
superior or head of the institution. However, many systems prescribe the establishment of 
disciplinary commissions which should carry the investigation of the offence and hold hearings 
of the parties. While pursuing the task they are guided by the principle described above. Based 
on their recommendation person in charged makes decision and imposes a sanction on civil 
servant
607
.  
As previously explained, disciplinary law consist the rules of conduct which govern 
members of a group whose main goal is to keep its internal order.
608
 The above described 
disciplinary process and its sanctions induce certain costs which should be taken into account 
in this research. As explained above, a disciplinary sanction is mainly imposed by a direct 
superior although a commission might be established to perform this task. The process itself is 
guided by principles which should assure the respect of law and human right of a civil servant 
charged for a misdeed. Regarding the mental state of the wrongdoer it should be proved that 
his act was wilful wrongdoing or culpable negligence. The standard of proof is not “beyond 
reasonable doubt” like in criminal cases but, preponderance of evidence or clear and 
convincing evidence. While the former represents the lowest level of standard and means that a 
certain claim is more likely true than not true, the latter presents the middle level of proof 
standard and means that for a certain evidence is substantially more likely than not that it is 
true. Finally, as previously mentioned usual disciplinary sanctions are: oral warning, written 
reprimand, various suspensions, of career advancement and promotion for a certain period or 
without the right to salary, demotion to lower ranks, financial penalty and termination of 
employment or definitive separation from the public service. The overview of the disciplinary 
and criminal procedures is provided in the Table 4.3. When compared the left and right 
columns show the difference in terms of costs for conducting both of the procedures appears 
fairly high since disciplinary process requires no special separate system for its conduction, 
                                                          
605Cardona, F. (2003): “Liabilities and Discipline of Civil Servants”, Support for Improvement in Governance and 
Management SIGMA, January, 2003 
606
Ibid 
607
Ghindar, A. (2009): Why Go Democratic? Civil Service Reform in Central and Eastern Europe,  ProQuest 
LLC, pp. 86-88 
608
Sugman, K. G. (2003): “Slovenia, principles of criminal procedure and their application in disciplinary 
proceedings“, Revue internationale de droit pénal, 2003/3 Vol. 74, p. 1063-1076 
Ana Jakovljević, LL.M 
190 
 
less demanding principles of the process, lower levels of state of mind and standard of proof 
and finally, less costly sanctions.  
 
Table 4.3: Disciplinary and criminal procedure comparison 
 Disciplinary procedure Criminal Procedure 
In charged for 
the 
implementation 
Direct superior or special disciplinary 
commission 
Criminal Justice system: prosecutors and 
courts 
Principles - Adversarial principle 
- Access to documents 
- Grantee of hearing 
- Right to appeal 
- Presumption of innocence 
- Due process 
- Independent Judiciary 
- Openness and accessibility of the court 
- Equality before law 
State of mind wilful wrongdoing / culpable negligence Mens rea (negligence – recklessness- intent) 
Standard of proof Preponderance of evidence/clear and 
convincing evidence 
Beyond reasonable doubt 
Sanctions oral warning, written reprimand, various 
suspensions, of career advancement and 
promotion for a certain period or without right 
to salary, demotion to lower ranks, financial 
penalty and termination of employment or 
definitive separation from the public service 
Fines, capital punishment, imprisonment, 
preventive detention, suspended sentence 
and probation, pecuniary sanctions, 
community service, electronic monitoring, 
castration, rehabilitation programs, 
disenfranchisement, restorative justice or 
mediation 
 
 
4.3.2.2. Application in the case of corruption 
 
4.3.2.2.1. General discussion 
 
The international community recognised the harmfulness of corruption, especially 
bribery, and made as one of the main requirement its criminalisation which was mainly 
accepted by the countries around the world. The table in the Appendix 4.1 shows that 
transitional countries followed this pattern. However, as mentioned couple of times in this 
thesis, the literature points to the many shortcomings of the international approach. Bell
609
 
states that anti-corruption international rules do not represent a significant contribution for 
corruption combat because the core of the problems lays in culture and not in the laws. Culture 
is an important aspect in definition of corrupt acts and laws have only subsidiary role. Criminal 
law in this setting aims to target exchange conception by imposing liability and as such 
enforces a minimum of basic standards, while administrative law tends to act preventively 
enforcing the higher standards contained in the codes of ethics. As a result, criminal law 
enforces “basic minimum standards”. Graf von Kielmansegg610 claims that corruption of civil 
servants in Germany is treated as a criminal offence. However, corrupt civil servants are 
subject of disciplinary sanctions in case of breaching their duties. In the case of overlapping the 
legal principles of “seniority of criminal law”, described in the previous section apply here as 
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well.  The above discussion provides the image in which countries besides criminal law use 
administrative law as additional in fight against corruption, mainly applied as preventive mean.  
However, in some countries the approach of regulating corruption by both types of law 
shows some shortcomings. According to OECD
611
report in countries of CEE and Central Asia, 
mainly post-socialist, corruption is treated as criminal as well as administrative offence. This 
means that same acts are covered by two procedures of which administrative should be applied 
in a case when the specific act is not classified as criminal. This situation reflects the trends 
present in many post-soviet countries which aim to “decriminalise and to humanise 
legislation”. However, the report points out that this overlapping is fertile ground for abuse 
since authorities tend to use administrative sanctions because clear differentiation between 
administrative and criminal description of an act is difficult to draw. This overlapping causes 
"weakening of repression mechanisms”. Therefore, the suggestion is that they should follow 
the international trends and treat corruption as criminal act. Furthermore internal ethical bodies 
are usually in charge of the application of disciplinary sanctions based on internal 
investigations. If an investigation indicates that certain act is rather criminal than 
administrative offence it should be transferred to the criminal law enforcement authorities. 
However, there is not much information on the effects of their work in corruption combat. 
Therefore the report identifies as a danger reluctance of the agencies to expose corruption even 
when they identify it. Furthermore, the unclear and overlapping threshold for the distinction of 
criminal and administrative offences may lead investigators to prefer administrative processes 
and sanctions over criminal
612
.  
To sum up, criminal sanctions are dominantly imposed for acts of bribery although 
administrative law in many cases presents its complementary. However, in cases of post-
socialist countries it is used for voiding criminal liability of wrongdoers. The claims of the 
importance of a culture in particular country appear valid in this context. However, since all the 
regimes applied provide unsatisfying results the alternative solution should be provided. The 
discussion in this chapter pointed out the difference between the administrative and criminal 
law. While former aims to secure compliance with the legal rules the latter aims to punish and 
deter. Svatikova
613
 claims that in certain cases criminalization might be socially desirable from 
economic point of few. There are four normative criteria which should help in making such a 
decision: 1) imprisonment – only when monetary sanctions are insufficient to internalize the 
social cost of harms and when offender should be removed from a society; 2) stigma – if that is 
the one of the purposes; 3) preference for deterrence vs. compliance strategy; 4) enforcement 
costs. 
However, having in mind the high cost of the criminal law, legal systems which are 
based dominantly on criminal law enforcement and lack of or limited possibilities to enforce 
via administrative law may be less effective. This claim is supported by the assumption that 
given the high costs of the criminal procedure, public prosecutors have to allocate their scarce 
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resources to the most important cases which, as a consequence has a large number of cases 
which might not be prosecuted, while there is a range of cases, which deserves sanctioning. On 
the other hand administrative proceedings are less strict and more informal in terms of time, 
money and personnel and therefore administrative fines might be relatively cheaper to impose 
than criminal sanctions. Svatikova says that administrative law has a shortcoming regarding 
stigma because administrative sanctions do not possess a “shaming element”.  
Stigma itself is, according to some authors, a cost-effective means of criminal law. One 
line of discussion compares stigma with fines. For instance Rasmusen
614
 claims that although 
Becker suggested that fines represent the transfer and not social costs and as such should be 
used whenever possible, there are many problems associate to implementation of this 
suggestion. One of them is judgement proof problem. Another issue is that high fines might be 
used to increase the government’s revenue. He suggests stigma as a solution for the concerns 
presented because it represents a fine which affects future labour rents of a wrong doer. As 
such it is imposed by private sector and therefore it is non-costly for the government and does 
not present revenue-raising like fines. However, its main disadvantage is that in the case of 
recidivism the effects are diminished. This means that stigma in the first conviction has greater 
effects than all other subsequent. It is only applicable in cases when people have a reputation to 
lose. Applied to the case of optimal deterrence, the sanctions imposed for the first offence 
should be lower than for the subsequent once. Rasmusen further explains that stigma and fines 
have the advantage of deterring criminals “without creating reals costs” since both transfer 
wealth from the criminals to the society. Further limitations are discussed by Funk
615
who 
claims that stigma plays an important role in cases where the offence committed is connected 
to high illegal earning opportunities at the work place to which convicted individual applies. 
Therefore, the employer should be informed about the criminal past of a candidate. 
Nevertheless, in case of the offences which are not related to a certain type of a work, “benefits 
of stigma are less clear”.  
Another line of discussion on stigma compares its effects to those of imprisonment. 
Kahan
616
follows this view and claims that people should be educated about the alternatives on 
the “virtue of prison’s rivals” such as stigma. Alternatives are usually seen as less severe 
because they fail to express condemnation which poses imprisonment and to not make people 
suffer for breaking the law. However, beside deterrence and retributivism Kahan claims that 
punishment has “the expressive dimension”. Broadly speaking it is very difficult to measure 
the level of subjective displeasure which certain punishment induces when imposed on an 
individual. For instance, arguing for application of fines in cases of white-collar criminals, he 
says that these offenders are mostly well situated and their crime does not include violence. 
However, people are prone to think that in this way they are just “buying their way out”. 
Therefore in order to identify alternative sanctions to imprisonment which would satisfy 
expressive sensibilities of people, Kahan classifies shaming penalties in four groups: 1) 
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stigmatizing publicity, which communicates the offender’s status to a wider audience; 2) literal 
stigmatization, represents the stamping of and offender with a mark or symbol that invites 
ridicule; 3) self-debasement, includes penalties which involve ceremonies or rituals that 
publicly disgrace the offender; 4) contrition,  which in one version requires the offender to 
publicize their own convictions by describing his own crime in first-person terms and 
apologizing for them and another version is apology ritual. Shaming penalties are cheaper than 
imprisonment and they express appropriate moral condemnation and according to Kahan they 
should be widely used also in combination with other sanctions. Shavell
617
 express the same 
view by explaining that sanctions differ not only by the costs they impose but also by disutility 
they create. Therefore the effectiveness of a sanction is defined as disutility it generates per 
monetary unit of social cost. Base on this definition some sanctions can be seen as more 
effective compared to imprisonment for certain people. For example, individuals with 
reputation “might be significantly deterred by the humiliation of having their names and 
violations published”. Since humiliation appears cheaper for society, because among other 
things “it does not remove individuals from the labour force”, its effectiveness might be very 
high. 
It is also important to keep in mind that stigma is culturally dependent and their effects 
vary from country to country. For instance, Treisman
618
 claims that corrupt public officials 
besides using the job may face stigma whose effects vary from society to society since its roots 
are grounded in the culture. He points to the claims of Myrdal
619
 and Ekpo
620
 that in traditional 
societies, where distinction between public and private, as well as a tribute of giving and 
bribery are not clearly made, stigma might be low or non-existent. Kramer
621
 in this sense 
provide the image of Soviet societies in which public officials do not attach stigma to corrupt 
acts and as such contradict and reject officially promoted values. Perez-Lopez
622
 explains that 
in socialist societies system makes no differentiation between public and private purposes, and 
therefore “individuals in these societies tended to use state property as their own, with very 
little stigma attached to it”. 
 The main target of this research is corruption of civil servants in post-socialist countries 
since their administrations are in general graded as highly corrupt. Their profile complies with 
the profile of white-collar criminals, in sense that they are educated and skilled workers which 
makes them different from “blue”, “street” criminals.  This implies that different sanctions 
might be applied for more effective corruption combat. Bribery of civil servants is dominantly 
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prescribed as a criminal act although administrative penalties play certain role in punishing, 
hence in many cases not positive. Earlier in this chapter it was argued that criminal procedures 
and sanctions induce high costs for the society and in certain cases administrative procedure 
and sanctions are seen as their alternatives. The remark made that the latter do not impose 
sufficient stigma on the wrongdoers, could be corrected with the introduction of expressive 
dimension in sanctions imposed. Following these arguments, it is suggested here, according to 
the anti-corruption pyramid, application of administrative procedures and sanctions for fight 
against corruption in specific cases which are discussed in the next section.  
 
4.3.2.2.2. Concrete implication 
 
Criminalisation of bribery has its limitations which have been already discussed earlier. 
Besides being expensive, it also makes no distinction among different bribery acts and as such 
the system lacks, in a way, marginal deterrence. Heavy weapon of criminal sanctions, with 
dominant use of imprisonment in transitional countries (see Appendix 4.1), do not provide 
sufficient deterrence and induces numerous costs which these countries with limited material 
resources cannot afford. As said above criminalisation is socially desirable from economic 
point of view if four normative criteria are fulfilled. The criteria are: imprisonment should be 
used  only when monetary sanctions are insufficient to internalize the social cost of harms and 
when offender should be removed from a society; when state express preference for deterrence 
over compliance strategy; when stigmatisation is one of the purposes of punishment and finally 
if enforcement costs are not too high for a society. On the other hand, Shavell
623
 stresses that 
general enforcement strategy has no strong effects if very high sanctions for criminal acts are 
accompanied by low probabilities of detection. For general enforcement maximal sanctions 
should be employed only for the most harmful acts and lower for the less harmful ones. 
The literature has already pointed out that not all types of bribery are the same and 
suggested that they require different treatment by criminal law. For instance, Basu
624
 focuses 
on harassment bribe, here called legal, and argues that the giving of bribe in this case should be 
considered as legal activity, which practically means that a bribe-giver will have full immunity 
while the bribe-taker will be charged. This scenario will make the former to cooperate in 
catching the latter and as a result the other bribe-takers will be deterred from taking it. 
Furthermore, the problems related to detection of bribery will be lowered because bribe-givers, 
aware of the immunity, will try to make evidence which should prove that bribery took place. 
Basu claims that this approach will “cause a sharp decline in the incidence of bribery”, since it 
will not take place in the first place. The downside of this approach is that since faced with 
weaker position in the corrupt agreement, a civil servant might become the subject of black 
mail and false accusations. The solution for this case might be to increase the punishment for 
these particular acts for which a bribe-giver will be charged. However, he is aware that this 
might be only one step in all the others necessary to tackle corruption as complex problem. 
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Dufwenberg and Spagnolo
625
 analysing Basu’s proposal conclude that it could have poor 
effects in countries with weak institutions. For instance, they say that the bribe-giver might not 
be motivated to report the act because of the fear of being harassed by the police after the 
reporting. Therefore this proposal asks for “complementary policies” which target 
improvement of civil service performance and accountability of law enforcement institutions.  
Anti-corruption pyramid, introduced in Chapter 3, in its third layer introduces 
administrative sanctions for punishment of bribery among civil servants. This layer is aimed to 
be applied if the first two layers do not provide a sufficient level of compliance since they 
should provide an environment in which pursuing public goals and care of the society’s interest 
is established among servants as the highest norm. That should be achieved by careful selection 
of employees and monitoring of their work through transparency and accountability. These 
mechanisms aim to create environment in which prevailing opinion will go in line with the 
highest norm. This is important step for post-socialist countries in which prevailing opinion 
was that stealing from a state is not a wrong behaviour. As previously mentioned, during the 
socialist time punishing of corruption was mainly missing since the party members could 
always find their way out. It is therefore crucial to send the message to civil servants that 
bribery is behaviour which is not acceptable anymore because it harms society and prevents its 
economic development. They have to become aware that their conducts are harmful if power is 
abused and as a consequence they destroy trust of people in public administration. In order to 
build this awareness suggestion is that less harmful acts of bribery should be punished with the 
disciplinary sanctions, whose aim is to reinforce the internal discipline. Since this proposal 
departs substantially from dominant approach in order for any confusion and misinterpretation 
to be avoid, it is necessary that three questions who-what-how important for proposals 
implementation are answered as precisely as possible.   
Who– The comparison of civil servants and white-collar criminals are made couple of 
times thought this chapter. The main purpose of this linkage was to describe the profile and 
distinguish them from ordinary, “street” or “blue” criminals”. Comparison with white collar 
criminals was related only to the profile description but not in terms of sanctioning since white 
collar criminals receive harsh sentences. Actually, Wheeler et al.
626
 claim that the higher is the 
status of the white-collar offender the more sever the sentence is. What is important here is to 
stress that they share common characteristics. They are educated, have a job, have a reputation 
which is usually important to them since it is closely related to their job and they are less likely 
to repeat the crime once being caught. Since they have more to lose than ordinary criminals, 
other sanctions, than predominantly used imprisonment, could be applied. Some which cost 
society less and could be more effective than heavy one employed by criminal justice system.  
What – The differences between legal, illegal and quasi-legal acts of bribery are widely 
discussed. The proposition here is that legal bribery and some acts of quasi-legal bribery which 
do not impose high costs for the society, should be targeted by administrative disciplinary 
sanctions. As mentioned earlier, some Criminal codes make the above mentioned distinction, 
but the difference is only visible with regard to the harshness of criminal sanction.  
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How–Administrative law is used if policy makers aim to secure compliance and make a 
wrongdoer to internalise the costs of his acts. The use of administrative law is usually faster 
and also imposes lower costs for the society since its enforcement is cheaper than this of a 
criminal law. As previously shown, in the Table 4.3, for the implementation of administrative 
disciplinary sanctions in charged is either direct superior or special disciplinary commission 
formed within the organisation. The principles of the procedure corresponds the low level of 
intrusion to human rights of a wrongdoer. Furthermore, the state of mind in the moment of 
breaking the law should correspond to wilful wrongdoing or culpable negligence and this 
should be proved with standard of proof which corresponds to preponderance of evidence or 
clear and convicting evidence. In addition, the lower level of proof further means that the 
probability of punishment is higher which has more importance than severity, as discussed 
earlier.  
However, it was previously mentioned that disciplinary and criminal procedure may be 
pursued for the same act. Unlike in the counters, where in this case administrative law is 
subordinated to criminal, in some CEE countries the provisions of both law seems to compete. 
The criminal and administrative law which regulate corruption appear to show no demarcation 
line due to very broad definitions in both codes. This allows abuse of administrative law in 
order to allow the wrongdoer to avoid punishment for corruption. It seems that in these cases 
the old practice from the soviet times only found the new way of living, even though these 
countries formally follow the international anti-corruption requirements. 
What is suggested here is that administrative disciplinary law when applied to cases of 
bribery should be clearly defined in order for any misuse to be avoided. It is argued here that it 
should be used as a mechanism only in the case of legal bribery and quasi legal in which costs 
to the society are measurable and not very high. As explained earlier in the case of legal 
bribery, since the party is already entitled to a certain right, and bribe pays as an additional fee 
only to speed up the process, the costs are dominantly bared by the bribe-giver. In order to 
prevent civil servants from taking bribe in this case, the bribe giver’s act should not be 
punished, while civil servant should bare all the consequences. In order to break with the homo 
sovieticus tradition, civil servants have to learn to respect work discipline and they might be 
thought that lesson effectively and efficiently through the administrative law in cases when the 
harm to society is very low or non-existing. In order to make them comply with the 
disciplinary rules, another pyramid of responsive regulation approach could be constructed 
which employs some of the existing disciplinary sanctions. The disciplinary anti-corruption 
pyramid, Pyramid 4.1 depicts this proposal.  
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Pyramid 4.1: Disciplinary anti-corruption pyramid 
 
 
 
Disciplinary sanctioning systems have scale which goes from less to more severe 
sanctions, which should have marginal deterrence, like in the case of criminal sanction. Some 
of these sanctions could be applied in the case of bribery. First punishment in this scale could 
be a written warning for the reported attempt of bribe taking by the civil servant. It is important 
to be written in order to be noted since according to the administrative procedure any document 
produced within the administration or received from the outside should be registered. For the 
second attempt or the first detected case of taking bribe, applied sanction should be suspension 
and stigmatizing by using some of the types of shaming penalties provided earlier. Suspension 
might be implemented in a way of career advancement and promotion for a certain period of 
time or without right to salary.  Stigmatization could also be achieved through various means. 
For instance, the decision and reasons for suspension could be communicated publicly, by 
announcing on the information boards within the administration (stigmatizing publicity). The 
wrong-doer could be stamped with the mark or symbol which says that he is bribe taker and 
which should cause ridicule (literal stigmatization). Furthermore, stigmatization might include 
the ceremonies or rituals which disgrace the bribe taker which might be performed for instance 
by reading the decision of disciplinary sanction to the co-workers of the offender (self-
debasement). Finally, the bribe taker should publicize his own wrongdoing by describing it in a 
letter to his colleagues written in first-person in which he would apologize for his acts 
(contrition).  Stigmatization in this context will add the strength to administrative sanctions 
which, according to Svatikova
627
 have a lack of it, and make them an acceptable replacement 
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for criminal sanctions. She stresses that stigma has a desirable, strong effect in cases of: small, 
petty crimes, first time offenders and white collar criminals who will suffer social and 
economic consequences if being convicted. Both of the penalties, according to the 
administrative rules, should be registered and be part of the civil servant’s personal file and as 
such used as a basis for the evaluation of his work which should be performed in order of 
fulfilling the merit-based criterion for promotion (see Chapter 2). The stigmatization in this 
context should send the message that corruption is, unlike in previous regime, not anymore 
tolerated. As mentioned earlier, during the socialist time the widespread opinion was that 
cheating the state is “cool”. It was a result of the lacking system of sanctions and no stigma 
attached to it. Therefore, if applied in this case stigma should revive the good reputation as one 
of the high quality virtue of civil servants by making them aware of their misdeeds. Finally, 
depending on the gravity of the corrupt act, firing civil servant should be used as the most 
severe sanction. In this case his punishment is the harshest since he loses the job and future 
income as well as reputation. In the last two cases disciplinary sanctions should be 
accompanied by forfeiture of the bribe taken.  
The whole process should be in general initiated by the bribe-giver who in this case 
faces no sanctions or any kind of prosecution. This should make the corrupt agreement among 
the parties very week and impose the fear on civil servant that he might be reported and 
sanctioned. This further should decrease their readiness to take the bribe and as such the 
amount of legal bribe in general. After the reporting, the disciplinary process should be 
conducted by a direct superior, or ad hoc disciplinary commission or in some cases special 
units within the organisation in charged for corruption combat, since some institutions have 
these type of bodies with employees specialised for corruption. If during the investigation 
process person or body in charged discover that the act committed does not fulfil the criteria 
for being characterized as legal bribe, it should forward the case to the criminal justice system 
which, according to the suggestions in this thesis, is responsible for illegal bribes. It is also 
important to stress here the problem of false accusations or black mailing of civil servants. The 
gradual system of penalties might mitigate the negative effects of a dishonest client of a civil 
servant. If however, in theory the result of his action is firing of civil servant he can use the 
remedies provided in civil or criminal law to protect himself.  
  
4.4. Putting constraints – criminal sanctions 
 
4.4.1. Justification and purpose of punishment 
 
Criminal sanctions are mainly considered by people as the important keepers of social 
order which should punish the wrongdoers who harmed society’s values. Justification for 
society’s right to punish those who break the law was since ancient times subject of discussion 
between lawyers, philosophers, sociologists, etc. From these discussions different theories have 
been developed which justified this practice. The two most important approaches will be 
presented in this chapter: retributivist and utilitarian. Besides the justification, the effects of 
punishment will be also analysed such as: deterrence, incapacitation and rehabilitation. Before 
discussing application of criminal law in cases of bribery, the important aspects of criminal law 
discussed in the literature are provided.  
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Retribution and desert 
 
Retributive view justifies punishment on the ground that “person who does wrong 
should suffer in proportion to his guilt”628, and therefore sanction’s severity should depend on 
the depravity of the act. The history of this view in law and philosophy is long and goes back to 
the lex talionis – “eye for an eye”. The main proponent of this approach is Immanuel Kant629. 
He claimed that reason for punishment should be found in the fact that individual committed a 
crime and not in its threatening effects to potential offenders. He explains that when a person 
commits a crime he gains unfair advantage over other individuals in society and therefore the 
punishment should help in restoring the previous equilibrium. Moore
630
 describes retributivism 
as very straightforward theory of punishment. Society is justified in punishing because 
offenders deserve it since he is morally culpable. Moral culpability is not only a justification 
for but punishment but it also creates the duty for society to react. In essence the retributive 
theory of punishment focuses on offender’s act and his moral culpability and as such 
recognizes the value of person and the person’s place in society.” 631 
Modern approach to retribution is desert. Von Hirsch
632
 does not find retribution as 
helpful term which expresses the essence of the idea that criminal should be punished because 
he deserves it. Instead he prefers the term desert due to its less emotional load and better 
expressiveness in focusing on past event. Hirsh points out evidence that society benefits from 
the existence of the punishment but that itself cannot be a good reason for “depriving the 
offender of his liberty and reputation”. 633 The rationale behind this view lies in the primacy of 
the individual fundamental rights, idea which is the best way expressed in work of philosopher 
John Rawls in his book Theory of Justice.  
Utilitarian - The utilitarian theory of punishment justifies imposing punishment upon 
the offender because it will bring greater good by affecting potential criminals in preventing 
them from engaging in criminal activity. Rychlak
634
 says that pure utilitarian thought does not 
take moral culpability into account. In the 18
th
 century Beccaria
635
 wrote that the sovereign’s 
right to punish crimes lies in his duty to protect public interest entrusted to him from the 
individual’s usurpation. Since past crime cannot be undone the purpose of punishment should 
prevent potential criminals of committing crimes and that could be achieved through the 
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sanctions which have to be balanced with the particular crime. Following Beccaria, Bentham
636
 
considered the punishment as an instrument available to state for preventing crime through 
imposition of fear. This could be achieved if authorities impose a threat of costs which exceed 
potential benefits of crime. 
637
 By doing this the state invests in prevention which could be 
divided in two branches: particular prevention – applies to wrongdoer itself and general 
prevention – applicable to whole society.638 Since the punishment involves infliction of pain 
the only justification for using it if there are beneficial consequences to outweigh it which 
could be found in deterrence. However, this hold with the assumption that citizens are rational 
human beings which could be deterred by the well-constructed sentencing system which 
creates disincentives to crime.
639
 
As previously discussed, Becker
640
 translated deterrence theory to economic model by 
showing that criminals are rational utility maximisers who before committing the crime 
calculates the costs and benefits of it. Therefore, a person commits a crime if the expected 
utility to him exceeds the utility he could get by using his time and resources in performing 
other activities. In calculating the expected benefit of the offence, criminals take into account 
not only the likelihood of punishment but also of the probability of being detected. Therefore, 
in deterring crime the key lies in optimal amount of enforcement of the law, which depends on 
costs of catching and convicting offenders, the nature of punishment and responses of 
offenders to change in enforcement more precisely probability of conviction. Becker, therefore, 
claims that “some persons become criminals not because their basic motivation differs from 
that of other persons, but because their benefits and costs differ.”  Following Becker, 
Posner
641
 claims that the economic function of punishment is to make criminals internalize the 
social costs of their activities. From an economic point of few, the rational of punishment is not 
to undo bad consequences of crime, but to affect people’s incentives for future engagement in 
criminal activity by placing a price on crime. He states that economic rationale for punishment 
thus resembles, but not replicates the deterrent theory of criminal punishment. They are not the 
same because “the economist’s objective is not to deter crime as such but simply to assure that 
any prospective criminal internalize the full social costs of his activity” which also has effects 
on people’s incentives to commit crimes. The latter is not in the scope of interest of 
retributivist/desert theory. This view is shared by Von Hirsch and Ashwort
642
 who claim that 
economic theorists are not purely deterrence theorists.  Their only concern is to “promote 
economically efficient penalties, and this optimizing approach leads them to take account of 
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the costs of law enforcement as well as the probable benefits and disbenefits from the 
offender’s point of view”. Beside the discussion about justification of punishment, theory also 
analyses the effects which punishment has on potential law breakers. Von Hirsch and 
Ashwort
643
 clam that deterrence, rehabilitation and incapacitation are forward-looking aims 
which “may be termed preventive”. They all share the idea that punishment is warranted by 
reference to its crime-preventive consequences. These aims are advanced within utilitarian 
framework, the justification for punishment and the measure of punishment calculated by its 
utility compared with the attendant disutilities.  
Deterrence –Von Hirsch and Ashwort644 argue that on a broader level, deterrence aim 
belongs to the overall aim of the reduction or prevention of crime which are part of a set of 
social and political principles for government, more precisely the aim of criminal justice 
system as a whole. Blumstein, et al.
645
 explain that underlying hypothesis of general deterrence 
claims that human behaviour can be influenced by incentives, thus sanctions are negative 
inducements and their imposition on a detected offender serves to discourage at least some 
others from engaging in similar pursuits. This assumes that people have free will and that they 
behave rationally. That practically means that criminals weight the consequences of their acts, 
more precisely, probability of being caught and convicted (certainty of punishment) and 
severity of punishment. If the offender thinks that capture and conviction can be avoided, then 
the deterrent effect will be missing regardless of the severity of any punishment. Thus, 
Rychlak
646
 claims, observers of popular sciences are more prone to argue that certainty, not 
severity of punishment is the key to effective deterrence.  
Deterrence is divided to individual and general. Shavell
647
 explains that the former on 
presents the tendency of a punished wrongdoer to be deterred from committing a crime in the 
future as a result of sanction imposed on him. General deterrence is the tendency of people 
who did not commit the crime yet to prevent doing it in the future because of the prospect of 
sanctions prescribed. Individual deterrence is important if a person does not know the 
probability of being sanctioned. Therefore, if sanctioned for a misdeed a wrongdoer “will 
rationally increase his estimate of the likelihood of punishment” because of peoples 
immanency to adjust the beliefs about probability upwards. Magnitude of sanction provides 
slightly different picture regarding the individual deterrence because it depends on the 
estimation of the wrongdoer before being punished. If he underestimated it when actually 
punished with higher sanction he would be more deterred in the future. However, if he 
overestimated the magnitude but actually was punished with the lower sanction he would be 
less deterred in the future. This analysis leads to conclusion that individual deterrence matters 
in the situations when “there is substantial uncertainty about the likelihood of sanctions” or 
when parties “systematically underestimate the magnitude of sanctions”. In all other situations, 
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individual deterrence does not appear relevant. Apart from making a choice of committing or 
not a certain crime, Shavell
648
 explains that an offender can also make a choice among them. In 
this case the magnitude of sanction can have deterrent effect in sense that he can choose to 
commit less harmful act with lower sanction over the opposite one. This deterrence is called 
marginal deterrence. The offender’s moderation of the level of harm could be beneficial for the 
society and therefore, “sanctions should rise with the magnitude of harm”. More precisely, all 
harmful acts, beside the most harmful ones, should be punished by less than maximum 
sanctions.  
Incapacitation - Incapacitation, according to Blumstein et al.
649
, involves removing of 
the criminal from society and as such reduces the crime by physically preventing him from 
future committing of crime. It is, as Von Hirsch and Ashwort 
650
 say, the idea of “simple 
restraint. By rendering the convicted offender incapable for a certain period of time, society 
imposes and obstacle and prevents him offending again. Usual obstacles are the prison walls 
but there are other incapacitative techniques such as: exile or house arrest. Incapacitation has, 
usually, been sought for the offenders who deemed more likely to reoffend. However, 
Rychlak
651
 argues that this is not easy to determine. Moreover, even when the common factors 
among likely repeat offenders are detectable, consideration may prevent judges from imposing 
longer sentences. He claims that white-collar criminals are less likely to be repeat offender but 
whenever they get relatively minor sentences people are upset. 
Rehabilitation - Rehabilitation is based on the idea of “curing” an offender of his 
criminal tendencies. It assumes the changing an offender’s personality, outlook, habits, or 
opportunities so as to make him less inclined to commit crimes. Von Hirsch and Ashwort
652
 
claim that rehabilitation often is said, involves “helping”, but it does not necessarily means that 
benefit of the offender is presupposed. In other words, those who are benefiting are other 
persons who become less likely to be victimized by the offender, ourselves and society as 
whole. Traditionally, rehabilitation included offer of counselling, psychological assistance, 
training, or support – but a variety of other techniques might be used. Some of the techniques, 
such as aversive therapies, may be unpleasant.  The success in rehabilitation is measured by 
recidivism rates: whether the offender has been induced to desist. So the idea that society takes 
the offender provides education and makes him a better person with one important fact which 
Rychlak 
653
 points out. It assumes that an offender is capable of being rehabilitated. 
Describing the justification of punishment and its consequences, this section aimed to 
provide the ground for further discussion of application of criminal sanctions in corruption 
combat. Important aspects of it are types of criminal sanctions as well and closer look on them 
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will be provided below. An already criticized approach based on increased criminalisation, 
which in case of transitional countries includes dominant use of imprisonment, will try to be 
improved with new solutions and application of other sanctions and will take into account all 
that is stated above. 
 
4.4.2. Criminal sanctions and corruption 
 
4.4.2.1. Criminal sanctions: general description 
 
The characteristics of criminal act are already described earlier. Two important 
characteristics refer to harm and the state of the mind of a wrongdoer. Bowles et al.
654
explain 
that the harm is usually substantial and it should be caused by the offender who in the moment 
of committing a crime has mens rea. Criminal law is in economics treated as one of the 
mechanisms which can control harmful behaviour. It is applied if it brings society closer to the 
optimal level of harmful activities which is assessed through comparison of costs and benefits 
of the tools applied. Bowels et al. claim that efficiency of using criminal law sanctions is 
determined on the basis of victim’s role and the nature or magnitude of harm caused. As shown 
at the beginning of this chapter, the literature on optimal law enforcement in its extensive 
discussions recommends that sanctions should depend on the characteristics of acts and parties.  
While criminal act represents the behaviour which is in criminal code prescribed as 
criminal act, criminal sanction represents the punishment for committing a criminal offence.
655
 
Criminal sanctions imposed by the society on offenders are usually divided in two types: 
nonmonetary and monetary. Nonmonetary sanctions are death penalty, imprisonment, 
probation, community service, etc., while monetary sanctions are fines and forfeiture. In the 
law and economics theory, Becker
656
 claims that fines have several advantages over other 
sanctions. They, among the others, conserve resources, compensate society as well as punish 
offenders, etc. However, offenders who are not able to pay fines have to be punished in other 
ways. Shavell
657
 follows these claims and says that monetary sanctions are superior to 
nonmonetary because the latter are socially costly to be employed. Therefore, monetary 
sanctions should be always the first choice while nonmonetary should be employed only if the 
former are not able to deter adequately. However, Shavell stresses that monetary fines are 
cheaper for the society but not costless as sometimes is claimed. Their imposition requires 
legal proceeding, locating the assets of a wrongdoer and “forcing him to disgorge” them. 
Therefore, all these costs should be added to the sanction which is already imposed as optimal. 
In order to assist in deciding which sanction, monetary or nonmonetary should be applied, 
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Shavell
658
 provides a framework, which consists “five factors”. These factors include: (1) the 
value of the wrongdoer's assets; (2) the probability that the wrongdoer will escape being 
sanctioned; (3) the level of benefits to the wrongdoer from engaging in the harmful act; (4) the 
probability that an act will cause harm; and (5) the magnitude of the harm. Applying these 
criteria he claims that monetary sanctions might be inadequate if the purpose of policy maker is 
deterrence. Therefore, nonmonetary sanctions should be imposed. If a wrongdoer has a low 
level of wealth it is less likely that he would be deterred with a monetary fine. This also applies 
to those who can escape the punishment. For the offender who gains substantial benefits from a 
crime required monetary sanction should be accordingly high However, it alone might not be 
sufficient for deterrence. Finally, expected harm should be observed through two criteria, the 
likelihood of harm is high and its magnitude tends to be high as well. If based on them the 
harm caused by wrongdoer is high, then the act should be deterred.
659
 
Regarding corruption, application of criminal law has its rationale. Corruption is secret 
agreement which could induce high costs for the society and in that case it asks for 
criminalisation. Earlier in this chapter the four economic criteria for criminalisation were 
mentioned
660
: 1) harm is a large and/or immaterial and/or diffuse and/or remote; 2) stigma is 
desired; 3) the probability of detection is low; 4) the criminal enforcement costs are sufficiently 
low. It is earlier explained that illegal corruption and in some cases of quasi-legal corruption 
can produce substantial harm to the society. Usually, in these cases the bond among the parties 
is very strong and therefore the probability of detection is very low. Furthermore, since the 
costs are difficult to measure due to the non-existence of a precise victim, it appears that in this 
case criminal enforcement costs might be lower than those produced by corruption. Finally, 
stigmatization is highly desirable in this situation and criminal law poses this characteristic. 
The next section discusses the implementation of criminal sanctions in cases of bribery in post 
socialist countries, current state of art and suggestions for improvement.   
 
4.4.2.2. Application in the case of corruption 
 
International anti-corruption conventions prescribe criminalization as one of the main 
instruments for fighting corruption. This “push for criminalization” comes from developed, 
wealthy, countries with strong judicial system and it was already been discussed in Chapter 1 
of this thesis. When applied to transitional countries, this policy does not give expected results, 
most probably due to limited resources and week judicial system. The table in the Appendix 4.1 
shows the list of formally imposed criminal sanctions for bribery in post-socialist countries. In 
most of the cases imprisonment is prescribed as dominant sanctions, while the others mainly 
have supplementary role. This situation has its rationale. Since corruption and poverty go hand 
in hand, in countries which aim to improve the economic performance corruption imposes 
significant problems. Its criminalisation sends the message that this type of behaviour is not 
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tolerated in the society. However, definition of formal rules is just one step. The other, more 
important, is their enforcement, which is usually low due to the reasons embedded in the 
mentality of post-socialist people, widely discussed in this thesis.  
Criminalisation of certain acts has necessarily economic consequences since public 
enforcement by criminal justice system is required. Economics focuses on a couple of elements 
of criminal acts which are considered basic for the application of this type of law enforcement 
system. Bowles et al.
661
 list these elements. The first is mens rea, which is “an essential 
element of crime” which goes from negligence to intent. In general economic analysis assumes 
that actors are aware of the scale of damages they cause and certainty of its occurrence. 
However, intent is mainly required in the moment of offender’s act which imposes difficulties 
for its accurate and cheap observation by enforcement agencies. The second element is 
detection of victim which in some cases might be difficult to detect, like in the above 
mentioned cases of bribery. Therefore the state is required to intervene “in order to achieve 
efficient control of negative externalities”. The third element is enforcement technology which 
is based on the deterrence theory. This element is string argument in cases of victimless crimes. 
Finally, criminal law has punitive nature of enforcement and compared to compensation in civil 
law, it provides full compensation. From the above provided analysis it could be concluded that 
criminalisation of illegal and some cases of quasi-legal corruption is justified due to the 
difficulties of harm and victim assessment. Furthermore criminalization should also deter 
people from committing a corrupt act and finally, it might provide if not full compensation then 
the highest possible.   
 The law and economics approach teaches us that criminal sanctions, especially 
imprisonment, due to its high costs to the society, should be used as last resort for deterring 
people of committing undesirable acts. Therefore, the employment of other nonmonetary and 
monetary sanctions with lower costs which if applied might produce similar deterring effects 
like the most expensive one, imprisonment. Another argument for wide use of the alternative 
sanctions is that civil servants, as argued earlier, are educated and skilled and as such could be 
sanctioned in the way to compensate more effectively society for the harm they caused. 
Imprisoning might not achieve this goal and in addition would induce additional costs. It is also 
important to stress that with imprisonment in many countries the disciplinary sanction of firing 
is triggered ex lege. By using alternative sanctions, civil servant is able to keep the job and 
repay to society the damage that he caused. The counter argument could be that be keeping the 
job he could be tempted to engage in similar activities and cause additional harm. However, 
this problem might be resolved by using disciplinary sanctions as a complementary mean since 
double punishment in different procedures is allowed according to the law. It was previously 
said that facts established in criminal procedure are taken as proved in case that the parallel 
disciplinary one is going one. In concrete case, based on the criminal judgement, the 
disciplinary sanction of moving civil servant to another job might be applied. This will change 
the environment and will also allow him to repay the debt to society. The practical application 
of the above described criminal sanctioning system is presented in Pyramid 4.2. 
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Pyramid 4.2: Criminal anti-corruption pyramid 
 
 
 
On the first level, monetary sanctions, fines should be used as the first option in 
punishing corrupt parties and especially civil servants. As already explained, fines are 
considered less costly to enforce and they represent a state’s revenue which compensates for 
the harm caused. One of the main arguments against fines, judgment proof argument here 
might be mitigated since civil servants have secure income and as mentioned above if allowed 
to keep the job, society can be secured that they would pay their debt. Furthermore, the day 
fines could be also applied in this case. Polinsky and Shavell
662
 suggest that if individuals differ 
in wealth, than the fines imposed on them should differ as well. Hillsman
663
 explains that day 
fines link the wrongdoer’s income and the gravity of the harm he caused. The calculation of the 
fine has two steps. First, a certain number of fine units (days) is set and that is usually done 
according to specific guidelines designed for this type of sanction. Second, the amount of the 
unit is defined based on the offender’s economic circumstances which include income, assets 
and financial obligations. This sanction aims to impose an equal burden on the offenders who 
committed the crime regardless of their wealth. In the next layer of pyramid probation is 
located. It allows the postponing of the sanction imposed on the offender under condition that 
he will not commit any additional crime. This sanction, although includes occasionally various 
conditions such as: supervision and special treatment programs, is still more affordable to 
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society compared to prison
664
. In the third layer is community service which presents the 
unpaid work for the benefit of society. The sanction is imposed with the consent of the 
offender since in many countries forced labour is forbidden. This sanction is in law and 
economics literature treated as combination of imprisonment and fines. Since the offender is 
performing unpaid labour for public good this sanction transfers the wealth to the society and 
as such is more efficient than imprisonment.
665
 The next sanction which is listed in the criminal 
sanction pyramid is electronic monitoring. This sanction is enforced by attaching the 
surveillance device to the offender’s ankle. The ankle band sends the signal once he leaves a 
determined area, usually his accommodation place. This sanction has not benefits of monetary 
fines, which transfer wealth to the society, however it is still, according to the law and 
economics theory, considered as less expensive than imprisonment, since the costs for 
maintenance are lower.
666
Finally, as the last option, the pyramid provides imprisonment, as 
sanction for corruption. As previously argued prison is considered as costly way for crime 
combat and it does not transfer wealth back to the society and therefore scholars suggest that 
other measures should be exhausted prior to its imposition. 
Two more sanctions might be provided as additional punishment to the main ones 
described in the pyramid. The first one is forfeiture. This pecuniary measure gives right to the 
authorities to confiscate, without compensation a benefit which offender obtained 
illegally.
667
Law and economics literature as one of the benefits of adding this sanction to the 
already imposed one improves the marginal deterrence because of the variation in the 
punishment based on the gravity of the crime.  The table in the Appendix 4.1 shows that 
forfeiture in transitional countries is not in some cases directly prescribed for bribery. 
However, general norms of many criminal codes include forfeiture as sanction which applies to 
all criminal acts in which an offender gained unlawful benefit. The second sanction, called in 
some codes deprivation of rights, is provided in some of the criminal codes in transitional 
countries for acts of bribery (see Appendix 4.1). This sanction deprivation of the right to 
occupy a position or pursue a particular activity means that a convicted civil servant is 
forbidden to be assigned to a position in civil service or to pursue professional or other activity, 
in general for a certain period of time. However, it is might be interesting to mention here a 
criminal sanction of disenfranchisement. It represents the restriction of a citizen’s voting right 
and it is usually applied to prisoners. Ewald and Rottinghaus
668
, say that it is not clear whether 
this sanction aims to achieve deterrence or retributive effects. It affects one of the crucial rights 
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in a democratic society, right of the citizen to be involved in a political life and therefore policy 
shaping in his country. Empirical studies run in this matter focus on the impact it has on 
election’s outcome rather than its deterrent effects.669 In the cases of corruption of civil 
servants, a sanction “administrative disenfranchisement” could be established. Since sanction 
of deprivation has in general time limits, this one could be used in the sense of losing right to 
perform civil duty in the future, more precisely it should create the ban on being employed by 
the state in the future. This sanction, due to limitations which are imposed on human labour 
rights, should be in theory considered as a sufficient deterrent for people who usually see as 
high benefit life tenure which civil service provides. In addition, majority of civil servants in 
post socialist countries work in public administration for decades and losing this job will cause 
for them substantial costs. The range of sanctions presented in the pyramid should be applied 
on civil servants on a case-by-case basis, having in mind particularly facts of the case, and the 
way which will deter corrupt behaviour the best and which will be the most beneficial for 
society.  
Another important issue discussed earlier is the difficulty of detecting and investigating 
criminal acts.  In case of illegal corruption the agreement among parties is even stronger since 
they collude knowing that both are doing something wrong. Bell
670
 explains that in processing 
corruption one of the major issues is protection provided to those who report corruption 
“whistle-blowers”. Even though some individuals are obliged to report corrupt acts, whistle-
blowers are mainly volunteers and as such need special protection. Cooter and Garoupa
671
 
discuss the creation of distrust among criminals in order to prevent cooperative crime, focusing 
of bribery of state officials. This should be achieved by offering amnesty or bounty to “the first 
criminal who secures his partner’s conviction”. Shavell672 suggests that self-reporting by the 
wrongdoer could be induced if state provides lower sanctions for those individuals who 
disclose their misdeeds. This approach is important for a couple of reasons. First, it reduces 
enforcement costs because enforcement agency does not need to spend resources identifying 
and proving the wrongdoers. Second, it is advantageous if potential offenders are risk averse. 
Third, it can mitigate the harm or reduce its level. Finally, Lambsdorff and Nell
673
 suggest 
approach of unequal, asymmetric, sanctions in punishing corruption. They divide corrupt deal 
into four actions: 1) accepting bribe by public official, 2) his illicit reciprocation by giving 
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favourable treatment, 3) bribe giving, 4) accepting the favourable treatment. In order to foster 
whistle-blowing and to break the mutual silence in corrupt agreement, they suggest asymmetric 
design of sanctions that should be applied, shown in Table 4.4. They also claim that if used, 
immunity must be granted only to the bribe-giver in case when civil servant has already 
provided favourable treatment. 
 
Table 4.4: Asymmetric sanction design 
Type of corrupt action Severity of sanctions 
Accepting bribe Low 
Illicit reciprocating by benefit High 
Giving bribe High  
Accepting illicit benefit Low  
Source: Lambsdorff and Nell, “Let Them Take Gifts, and Cheat Those Who Seek Influence” 
 
Basu’s674 shares this view by explaining that the parties are not equal in corrupt 
agreement. A public servant should be a “gate keeper”, who in case of bribery violates the 
rights which he should protect. Therefore he has “the primary moral responsibility” and the 
gravity of his act is higher. Keeping in mind the specific situation of transitional countries and 
the mentality which should be changed this thesis also supports this view.  
 
4.5 Conclusion 
 
The purpose of this chapter was to discuss how constrains should be imposed in order to 
achieve the optimal level of corruption combat in public administration of post-socialist 
countries. Bribing of civil servants is in many countries sanctioned by criminal law in 
accordance to international anti-corruption requirements. In addition some of them treat bribery 
with and administrative disciplinary law as well. However, legal principles provide supremacy 
of criminal law whenever the act has dual treatment, and therefore administrative law has 
subsequent role. Nevertheless, some CEE post-socialist countries following the patterns of the 
old regime use both laws in a way which mitigates punishment of corruption and liability of 
civil servants. Important issue from the point of this research is that transitional countries do 
not make a distinction between legal, illegal and quasi-legal corruption, suggested in this 
chapter. The differentiation is made according to the costs and level of harm which each of 
them induce.   
 This division is important from the prospective of detecting and prosecuting corrupt 
acts, since these two might appear a difficult task to perform. It was previously argued that 
civil servants of post-socialist countries might still keep the mentality of homo sovieticus who 
did not see anything wrong in stealing from the state. In that sense he needs to internalise new 
values of how administration should operate (discussed in Chapter 2) and to perceive 
corruption as wrongful act. The important aspect of any administration is discipline which is in 
place to assure respect of the goals and values of the institution. In order to discipline corrupt 
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civil servants and their acts of taking bribes this thesis suggests that legal bribing and some 
cases of quasi-legal bribing should be punish with the range of administrative disciplinary 
sanctions, provided in the Pyramid 4.1. This approach is suggested with respect to a couple of 
facts. First, in general legal bribing induces only costs for a bribe giver and not to the society as 
a whole. Second, administrative procedure is less demanding and requires lower standard of 
proof which makes bribery’s detection and punishing more successful and less costly as well. 
Finally, by punishing only a civil servant, the secret agreement becomes les stabile and as such 
has a deterrent effect.  
 Illegal corruption and some acts of quasi-legal corruption in general induce higher costs 
for the society since the victims are difficult to access and consequently the harm as well. 
According to the Law and economics literature this situation asks for application of criminal 
law for deterring undesired behaviour. However, optimal use of criminal sanctions depends on 
many aspects. According to the literature imprisonment should be used as last instance since it 
provides mainly costs and no returns for the society. Nevertheless, according to the 
international anti-corruption regulation, transitional countries mainly prescribe the use of 
imprisonment as sanction for corruption punishment. Other sanctions are reserved for limited 
cases. Therefore, the suggestion in this research is that in punishing bribery of civil servants a 
range of sanction, provided in the Pyramid 4.2, should be employed before imprisonment. In 
addition, for achieving higher level of detection and prosecution of these cases the asymmetric 
punishment regime should be employed. However, since the civils’ servant misdeed carries 
higher level of moral condemnation, the immunity when granted should be provided only for a 
bribe giver.  
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Appendix 4.1 
 
Table: Punishing of bribery of civil servants 
Country Bribery is a 
criminal act 
Types of bribery 
regulated 
Imprisonment Other sanctions 
Albania Yes Accepting and giving bribe 
bribing  
Yes No 
Belarus Yes  Accepting and giving bribe 
and intermediation in bribing  
Yes  No  
Bosnia & 
Herzegovina 
Yes  Accepting and giving bribe,  
mediation in bribing 
Yes - Forfeiture 
Bulgaria Yes Accepting and giving bribe,  
mediation in bribing,  
Yes  - Fine with prison 
- Deprivation of rights 
- Forfeiture  
Croatia Yes Accepting and giving  bribe, 
mediation in bribing 
Yes  - Forfeiture   
Estonia Yes Accepting and giving  bribe, 
mediation in bribing , 
 
Yes - Forfeiture  
- Fine/prison for 
intermediation 
Georgia Yes Accepting and giving  bribe,  
accepting illegal presents 
Yes  - Deprivation of rights 
for accepting illegal 
presents 
Hungary Yes Accepting and giving bribe,  
failing to report bribery,  
Yes  No  
Kazakhstan Yes Accepting and giving bribe,  
mediation in bribing,  
Yes  -Fine 
- Restriction of freedom 
- Deprivation of rights  
- Forfeiture 
- Correctional labour 
- Detention under arrest  
Kirgizstan Yes Accepting and giving  bribe, 
mediation in bribing  
Yes  - Fine  
- Forfeiture 
- Deprivation of rights 
Latvia Yes Accepting and giving bribes, 
misappropriation of bribes, 
mediation in bribery 
 
Yes  - Community service 
- Fine 
- Deprivation of rights 
- Forfeiture  
Lithuania Yes Accepting and giving bribe, 
mediation in bribery  
Yes  - Deprivation of right 
- Fine 
- Restriction of liberty 
Macedonia Yes  Accepting and giving bribe Yes  No  
Moldova Yes  Accepting and giving bribe Yes  - Fine 
- Deprivation of rights  
Montenegro Yes  Accepting and giving bribe Yes  No  
Romania Yes Accepting and giving bribe Yes  - Deprivation of rights 
Russia Yes Accepting and giving bribe, 
mediation in bribing 
Yes  - Fine 
- Deprivation of rights 
- Compulsory labour 
-  
Serbia Yes  Accepting and giving bribe, 
Intermediation in bribery 
Yes  - Forfeiture 
 
Slovakia Yes Accepting and giving bribe, Yes  No  
Slovenia Yes  Accepting and giving bribe, 
intermediation in bribery 
Yes  - Fine 
  Source: Legislation online, accessible on:  http://www.legislationline.org/documents/section/criminal-codes 
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Chapter 5: The case study of the Republic of Serbia 
“Reform is not pleasant, but grievous; 
no person can reform themselves  
without suffering and hard work, 
how much less a nation” 
Thomas Carlyle 
 
 
5.1. Introduction 
 
The Republic of Serbia is a country with a fifteen century long turbulent history. In one 
part of that history Serbia was part of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) 
which was created after the Second World War. The fifty years of socialist institutional setting 
had significant impact on the people and its behaviour which became visible when transition 
and implementation of new values started. This chapter will provide the explanation of the 
reasons for pursuing the case study and all other information necessary for the completing the 
image of corruption in Serbian public administration. It consists of two parts. In the first part 
some basic history facts, current situation, and anti-corruption framework of the Republic of 
Serbia are described. Second part presents the results of the case study conducted. The main 
goal of running the qualitative study in this case was to provide insights in to some of the 
issues addressed in previous chapters. Methods used are grounded theory, case study and 
survey 
 
5.2. Motivation for the case study 
 
In the discussion about socialism it was mentioned that, comparing to Soviet Block, 
Yugoslavia had different approach towards the interpretation of socialism which caused the 
difference in the state organization. These differences will be elaborated on later in this chapter 
but here it is important to stress that in the essence they made the authoritarian socialist regime 
less visible to people inside and outside the country. Sevic and Rabrenovic
675
 claim that on one 
hand, “Tito’s moderate socialism made Yugoslavia complaisant” but on the other, it had effects 
on the ex-Yu republics by making them reluctant “to introduce the necessary changes quickly”. 
Table 5.1 provides the list of six ex-Yugoslavian countries and current important facts relevant 
for this research.  
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Table 5.1: General data of the ex-Yu countries 
Country  EU status Population
676
 No. of 
employed 
Employed  
in Public 
Sector
677
 
Employed 
in  
Civil 
Service 
TICPI 
2013 
(1-10) 
GCB 
2013 
(1-5) 
Bosnia & 
Herzegovina 
Potential 
candidate 
(2000) 
3,833,916 442,111678 222,000 
(50%) 
20,000 
(9%) 
4.2 3.9  
Croatia Member 
(2013) 
4,281,000 1,388,045679 388,222 
(28%) 
63,000 
(16%) 
 
4.8 3.9  
FYR 
Macedonia 
Candidate 
(2005) 
2,071,000 685,479680 170,000 
(25%) 
44,500 
(26%) 
4.3 3.6  
Montenegro Candidate 
(2010) 
621,000 197,300681 61,500 
(31%) 
10,511 
(17%) 
4.4 No 
data 
Serbia Candidate 
(2012) 
7, 181, 505 1,698,000682 781,000 
(46%) 
30,000 
(3.8%) 
4.2 4.3  
Slovenia Member 
(2004) 
2,059,000 796,601683 266,000 
(33%) 
45,220 
(17%) 
5.7 3.5 
 
What could be seen from the table is that countries, during the transition, had different 
paths towards the EU accession. The first column provides the information on the EU 
membership status which in a certain way provides the image how the transitional changes are 
graded externally. Second column provides the number of country’s population while the next 
one gives the number of people employed in general. The third column presents the number of 
people employed in public sector and in the brackets its percentage regarding the total number 
of employed people (provided in the previous column). The fourth column provides the 
number of those employed in civil service together with their percentage calculated from the 
number of people employed in public sector. TICPI gives the rank of the country regarding 
corruption but since it refers to the general perception of corruption additional indicator, Global 
Corruption Barometer
684
, is presented as well. As explained in the introduction of the thesis, 
the GSB indicator measures corruption in main public institutions in a country. Here the 
aggregate values of the respondent’ opinion about corruption in the civil service are presented. 
The two rankings go to different direction. In TICPI scale 1 stands for highly corrupt country 
while 10 is the grade of the “cleanest” country. In the GCB scale 1 refers to “not corrupt at all”, 
while 5 stands for “extremely corrupt”. What could be seen from the table and the Graph 5.1, if 
all parameters from the Table 5.1are taken into account, is that even though their progress in 
transitional process is graded differently, the problem of corruption in the civil service is still 
perceived as serious. For instance Slovenia is, according to many parameters, the most 
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advanced ex-Yu countries. It became the EU member in 2004, and its TICPI is the highest 
among the six countries. However, the GCB for 2013 shows that on the scale from 1 to 5 its 
administration is graded corrupt with the 3.5 score.  
 
Graph 5.1: TICPI and GCB of ex-YU countries 
 
 
 
What could be also noticed from the table is that the size of the public sector, shown in 
percentages, is relatively high. In the EU countries the average size of the public sector is 
between 10-20%
685
.In the literature the size of the public sector is measured in various ways. 
The commonly used measures include relating income public sector or its expenditure to GDP 
or connecting them to the number of employees. How the size of the government affects 
corruption is still not finally concluded. Goel and Nelson
686
 claim that size of the government, 
analysed through its spending, has strong positive influence on corruption. However, 
Montinola and Jackman
687
reach the opposite conclusion and claim that, contrary to the rent-
seeking literature opinion, large public sector is not “necessary… and… sufficient cause of 
corruption per se”. Nevertheless, they explain that their conclusion might not stand if instead of 
using government expenditure, the number of public employees would be taken into account. 
Glaeser and Saks
688
claim that government size measured by the number of state legislatures 
per capita, the number of local governments per capita and the share of GDP related to 
government’s size have no effects on corruption. Without deepening debate one interesting 
point, made by Montinola and Jackman, should be kept in mind. Intuition could lead us to 
conclude that the greater the number of people employed by public sector the higher the 
number of corrupt opportunities might arise. If this claim is put in the context of post socialist 
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countries, whose administration structure and mentality were widely described earlier, the 
reasons for concern appear conclusive. This research is focusing on the specific socialist 
regime of SFRY, and as such takes the Republic of Serbia, the largest ex-YU republic, as unit 
for case study analysis. It is considered that since the six republics share the history and 
institutional setting it is most likely that conclusions from the one representative case study 
could be applied to the rest of five countries 
 
5.3. The Republic of Serbia 
 
5.3.1. Facts 
 
5.3.1.1. History  
 
The Republic of Serbia is located in the South-Eastern Europe on Balkan Peninsula. It 
has the population of around seven million inhabitants. History of Serbia starts at the end of 
sixth century when Serbian tribes settled the Balkans, which in that time was the border of 
Byzantine Empire. Due to the geographical position of its settlement, which is often called “the 
bridge”, between East and West and North and South, the 15 century long history was, on one 
hand, full of different influences and cultural varieties and, on the other, wars and conflicts that 
those influences created, which both inevitably left marks on the people who lived and still live 
on this territory. During its history Serbia was kingdom, empire, vassal feudal country, 
capitalist country, socialist country and at the end transitional country. Transition in Serbia 
started during the 1980’s after almost 50 years of communism, which was introduced after the 
Second World War by creation of Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) with Josip 
Broz Tito as its president. At that time it was a promise of better future, and for a while, at least 
for the people in Yugoslavia, the promise was fulfilled. However, the happy future was limited 
and, like majority of socialist regimes, the socialism in Yugoslavia did not pass the duration 
test of history. The idea of socialism and its different implementation in practice was already 
described in Chapter 1 and therefore this chapter will only touch upon the specificities of 
Yugoslavian socialism. 
 From its implementation in 1945 till 1948, Tito followed the Soviet model of socialism, 
complying with the path of other Eastern European countries. However, unhappy with the role 
of Stalin’s obedience he decided to take another direction in implementing socialist idea. In 
1948, Communist Party of Yugoslavia refused to take further dictates form the Soviet Union, 
and as such was expelled from Communist Information Bureau (Cominform). This decision 
reflected on Yugoslavian internal and external politics. Baradat
689
 analyses that are the 
essential differences in Soviet and Yugoslavian socialism caused by Tito’s attitude that “there 
are many different paths of socialism”. He, claims that Tito reversed the Soviet interpretation 
in many principles and created “the most pragmatic and least dogmatic” variant of communist 
ideologies which reflected, as mentioned above, international and domestic policy. Reversing 
the principle of permanent revolution, in international arena he pioneered the policy of 
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neutrality, non-alignment with either East or West, and cooperation and trade with both. The 
level of cooperation with the West might be depicted through an interesting situation, quite 
unusual for that time. Tito was in very friendly relation with John F. Kennedy and after his 
assassination in Yugoslavia the day of mourning was declared. Furthermore he was one of the 
founders of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM)
690
 which brought many benefits to 
Yugoslavian economy.   
Regarding domestic policy Baradat
691
 claims that Tito’s conviction that “there was no 
true interpretation of socialism”, led him to introduce some innovations in this area. Afraid that 
regime has a tendency to over-centralization he focused on decentralization in three aspects. 
The first one was structural decentralization, explained by Tito who described Yugoslavia as 
“one country with two alphabets, speaking three languages, professing four religions, made up 
of five nationalities in six republics”. It was implemented through federal state organization 
composed of six republics. The second one was political, which transferred the involvement of 
the Communist Party to people’s life from central to the local level Party’s machinery. 
However this decentralization was abandoned after some unexpected outcomes. Finally, the 
third decentralization, the most significant one was decentralization of the economic system 
called market socialism. This included on one hand, recapitalization, returning private 
ownership to agricultural enterprises and small business and on the other, introducing in 
industrial sector worker’s self-management (WSM). The changes made in the industrial sector 
were considered the most advanced because it gave to the workers direct control of the 
factories. In this program all workers, not only the most qualified ones, stand for election to the 
factory’s workers’ council and as such became part of the management which allowed them to 
participate in making plans and carrying out production goals. However, these goals, certainly, 
had to agree with the needs of society defined at higher levels. Some authors, like Kuljic
692
, 
describe worker’s self-management as modern for the time when it was established and which 
combines the best from socialism and capitalism. He claims that on one side it had pluralism of 
ownership, and on the other, it had the dictatorship of the party from the top and democracy 
from the bottom of the organization. There are three aspects in which workers’ councils had 
different voting power. In one, which concerned division of the earnings among the workers, 
the councils had full voting power. In the second aspect, which includes question referred to 
the expert regarding production process, the experts had final word. Finally, human resource 
management was in the power of the Communist party and workers’ councils did not have 
voting power in decision making. However, this was not absolute rule since the worker could 
not be fired without the permission of the council. Kuljic states that this system was not 
without structural problems which could be classified in three groups. The first group of 
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problems is related to the characteristics of the workforce. During the fifties, when worker’s 
self-management started, farmers dominated in the population and it was a big challenge to 
create industrial workers out of them. The problem was not only an underdeveloped industrial 
culture but political as well. The turbulent history of Balkans, with many wars and 
dictatorships, did not allow a development of stronger political culture which affected WSM as 
well. The basic conditions for its well-functioning are, according to him, culture, education, 
schools and expert’s knowledge. Second problem relates to the antagonism between direct 
democracy and human resource management from the top which creates internal tensions since 
the workers were aiming to create its own democratic space. Finally, the tensions between rich 
and poor areas of the country and rich and poor republics, which arose in 60’, additionally 
disturbed the functioning of WSM.  
However, social experiment called worker’s self-management, created on the ground of 
the Paris Commune inheritance, ideas of Serbian socialist democracy at the end of 19
th
 century, 
relicts of anarchy and ideas of Trockizm used for criticism of Stalinism, moved formally, 
together with other socialist institutions, to the history with collapse of the socialist regime. 
Yugoslavia disintegrated at the beginning of 90’s and during this time economic crisis 
escalated in all countries created on its territory. The socialist regime in Serbia, tried to 
overcome the crisis, which was particularly large due to the civil war on the territory of ex-
Yugoslavia and UN economic sanctions imposed on Serbia. In 1994 in order to stabilize the 
hyperinflation that reached enormous rate in 1993, it was 2% per hour, government introduced 
the economic reform program, made by Governor of National Bank of Serbia, Dragoslav 
Avramovic. However, this program did not have long impact. On the 5
th
 October 2000, after 
the big demonstrations of citizens caused by the irregularities during the elections for the 
president of Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
693, in so called “5th October Revolution”, socialist 
regime was dethroned. The power was taken by Democratic Opposition of Serbia (DOS), 
composed of a coalition of 19 parties. This overthrow has been seen by the people in Serbia as 
promising in reforming the country and its economy, and it could be described the best way by 
the Hirschman’s “tunnel theory”.694 He claims that in the initial stage of the change people are 
ready to accept greater inequalities in the society even if that means that means that their own 
social and economic status will degrade because of the expectancy that success of others, 
created by social differentiation, indicates improvement of their own future opportunities. He 
compares this situation with the traffic jam in a tunnel. People in the inner line will accept for 
some time their position if they see that people in the outer line are moving because this is seen 
as indicator that all of them soon will be able to move out of the tunnel. However, if they stay 
caught for a long time they will react against the unfair treatment of the cars in inner lane and 
will ask from the police privileges given to the cars in the outer lane. 
Serbian government used this initial time, as Norgaard calls “opportunity space”, to 
implement “shock therapy” introducing reforms in financial sector, forcing liberalization and 
privatization of state owned companies. The last measure is by some authors considered as the 
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crucial one which assumes transformation of social to private ownership and it is considered as 
the main presumption and mean of the transitional process.
695
 Together with other 
macroeconomic components it is aimed at providing the structure for the development of open 
market institutions. However, the results of privatization is Serbia were not as they were 
expected to be. In research, which included empirical analysis of effects of privatization 
conducted after 2002, Nikolić696 claims that privatized companies make a modest contribution 
in creation of value added in the economy of Serbia. General conclusion is that from the year 
2000 onwards, the privatization concept did not bring to Serbia expected results. When looking 
closely at specific companies the conclusion is that effects vary and they depend on the size of 
the company. More precisely larger companies showed faster progress and higher profitability 
while small and middle-size enterprises, even after five years, did not enter the positive 
business zone. In addition 45,000 work places per year disappeared.  
These results have negative effects on the people’s attitude towards reform and quite 
often the current situation is compared with the times in ex-Yugoslavia of which they think 
with nostalgia. This attitude might surprise the reader unfamiliar with the circumstances but as 
explained above the Yugoslavian socialism had in some aspects different path from the Soviet 
one. Although they ended the same way, their life had different characteristic which affected 
people’s everyday life. However Rueschemeyer697 claims that although Yugoslavia in the 
initial stage experienced rapid modernisation in sense of the expansion of the female work 
force, mobility within and out of work force and mobility of whole households, the 
performance was not that different from the other socialist countries. Maddison historical GDP 
data
698
 per capita for couple of socialist countries are presented in the Graphs 5.2 andGraph 
5.3. Graph 5.2shows the trends in GDP per capita for the socialist countries: Bulgaria, 
Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Yugoslavia and USSR for the years 1950, 1960, 
1970, 1980 and 1990, and, even though the results are shown in “1990 international dollars” 
the reader can get the impression of the situation back in the past. Graph 5.3 compares these 
values to the values of France, the UK and the USA in order to show the difference among the 
two types of countries. Detailed numbers are provided in the table in the Appendix 5.1of this 
chapter.  
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Graph5.2:GDP per capita for socialist countries 
 
Source: Maddison Project database  
 
 
Graph 5.3: GDP per capita for socialist countries and France, UK and USA 
Source: Maddison project database  
 
 Although the data present the economic situation which is not significantly different, 
the people in Serbia show a tendency to think that they live much better compared to other 
socialist countries. It appears that central planning and soft budget constraints as well as state’s 
obligation to provide free education and healthcare, jobs and housing for all citizens diluted the 
real picture of the economic performance of the country. Another interesting aspect which 
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might contribute to explain the phenomenon is found in the article written by Jansen
699
. He 
analyses traveling document in ex YU, so called the “red passport”, which allowed citizens to 
travel all around the world without visa, and visa regime imposed on the states formed after the 
break up. He says that many of the citizens of Serbia and Bosnia and Hercegovina, who were 
ones Yugoslavian republics, say that ”…normal lives in Yugoslavia were commonly recalled 
in terms of living standards, order, and social welfare, but explicitly related to the dignity of 
having a place in the world”. This impression is gained through traveling anecdotes in which 
foreigners expressed admiration for Yugoslavia, as anti-fascistic country with social well-
being, and its leader Tito, who had a status of “great statesmen”. Although people will admit 
that Tito was authoritarian ruler they will focus on how he created a place in the world for 
Yugoslavia and its citizens. All put together this might be an explanation why people in Serbia, 
when reform did not fulfil their expectations, turn back to the image of the past as better 
society leaving the impression that they do not count the bad aspects, which in practical terms 
may create obstacles to change.  
 
5.3.1.2. Current situation 
 
In the beginning of its transitional journey Serbia committed itself to become a member of 
the European Union. The European framework is imposed as the guiding principle in this 
process. On 1 October, 2005 negotiations for Stabilisation and Association agreement were 
launched. Two years later on 22 December, Serbia applied for the EU membership. On 1 
March 2012 European Council confirmed Serbia as a candidate country and finally, on 21 
January first intergovernmental conference Serbia-EU was held.
700
 Parallel with the EU 
accession, Serbia started the accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO)
701
. The 
application was submitted on 23 December 2004. This double track accession imposes lots of 
changes and adjustments on Serbia legal and economic system. The method chosen for the 
adjustment is, like in the majority of transitional countries, through legal transplants. The 
Watson’s 702theory of legal transplants has been already discussed earlier in this thesis as well 
as its implications studied by Berkowitz et al.
703
.Legal history of Serbia in most cases was 
combination of original and transplanted law. From Dušan’s Code in Middle Ages, through 
19
th
 century, socialism and nowadays legal acts were in a larger or smaller part based on 
imported law.
704
 It is, however, interesting to observe what impact this type of laws have since 
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the institutions defined by law should determine the incentive structure of a society and help it 
in promotion of efficiency, which is the key of sustained economic growth. Buch et al.
705
 claim 
that basic institutional reforms in transitional countries include the establishment of a legal 
system, property rights, contract law and company law. This also applies to anti-corruption 
measures which are predominantly based on the imported rules and regulations. This chapter 
will, therefore, first present the anti-corruption framework implemented in Serbia and, second, 
the data analysis of various qualitative research on their effectiveness in corruption combat.  
Current economic parameters of Serbia show that it has population of 7.2 million 
inhabitants
706
 of which, although, around 3 million makes labour force, around 1.7 is 
employed. According to official statistics the unemployment rate, in October 2013, was 20.1%. 
Nominal GDP per capita in 2013 was $5,421. Average monthly salary in 2013 (fourth quarter) 
was 52,438 dinars (around 504 Euros) and average monthly expenditure per household was 
55,881 dinars (around 540 Euros). Inflation rate was 2.2%. According to some analysts
707
, in 
2011 grey economy provided significant level of cash, around $100 million per month, and 
although it had positive effect to the living standard of the population it, also has a negative 
impact to couple of aspect such as number of potential credits approved to the citizens due to 
the lack of evidence on economic power of the household. In 2012 10% of the population lived 
below the poverty line. More precisely 800,000 people are not able to even buy food while 2 
million are in the situation to cover basic needs and to pay taxes. Public sector, public 
administration together with state companies and other institutions, employ 781,000 workers
708
 
of which 30,000 people work in the former (before year 2000 it employed around 8,000). 
Numbers show that around 45% of employed people in Serbia are paid from the state budget, 
which consequently draws attention to the public administration as an important constituent in 
the country and as such to the reform process.  
 
5.3.1.3. Public administration 
 
Administration during the socialist times in Serbia was like in all ex-YU republics. 
Sevic and Rabrenovic
709
explain that from 1945 till 1953 in SFRY government and civil service 
were “very centralized and highly hierarchical”. The state-owned enterprises and the 
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institutions which performed entrusted public services had the status of administrative organs. 
Overall they describe the “executive authority” as a “very powerful conglomerate”. After the 
split with Stalin and the introduction of a worker’s self-management the change in Constitution 
occurred in 1953. The civil servants were threatened by these changes as special group, 
different from regular workers, with special legal regime. However, this special status 
disappeared ten years later with the enactment of the new constitution. Besides this change, the 
Constitution of 1963, introduces decentralization by transferring the original power wasted in 
the federal state, to the republic’s level. Finally, the Constitution of 1974 conferederalized the 
country. It also confirmed that civil servants are equal to all other workers without any special 
treatment. However, Sevic and Rabrenovic claim that “civil service tradition was very strong 
and the public perception of public servants remained unchanged”. This further means that a 
“civil service career continued to be regarded as good career choice” and therefore “civil 
servants…were regarded as a privileged group”. 
After the breakup of the Socialist Federal Yugoslavia in 1992, the third 
Yugoslavia
710
,composed of Serbia and Montenegro was created. In 2003 it changed the name 
to Serbia and Montenegro, until finally the two countries split in 2006. This period will be left 
out of the scope and only the crucial changes regarding Serbia’s administration transformation 
will be discussed. Facing the necessity of the bureaucracy reform, first moves towards it were 
made already in 1992. However, the real foundation for depoliticization and 
professionalization of civil service was established in 2004 when Strategy for the reform of 
civil service was enacted
711
. Shortly after the adoption of the strategy the Law on State 
Administration was enacted (2004) which was the basis for the adoption of the Law on Civil 
Servants
712
in 2006. This law re-established the special regime for civil servants and its main 
goal was to professionalize the public sector by promoting legality, transparency and merit-
based principles of functioning. The latter one was aimed to be achieved by allowing a political 
influence only on the top level by appointing the highest ranked position in the ministry, the 
minister and state secretaries (minister deputies). According to the Law, the ranks below these 
positions should be held by carrier public servants, either by hiring or promoting. 
Lončar713claims that all these changes were crucial for the development of professional civil 
service because the promotion of merit-based criteria for recruitment and promotion of civil 
servants establishes new values and separates them from ordinary workers. In addition to the 
laws, two bodies specialised for civil servants were established: Human Resource Management 
Service
714
 and High Civil Service Council
715
. The former one exercises important professional 
tasks and it is considered crucial in the process of development and management of human 
resources, while the latter has established as its main goal creation of policies and strategies of 
                                                          
710
Yugoslavia was first established after the World War I and it was called the Kingdom of Yugoslavia.  
711
The document available at: http://reforma.bezbednost.org/wp-content/uploads/downloads/2012/09/2004-
Strategija-reforme-dr%C5%BEavne-uprave-u-Republici-Srbiji.pdf 
712
Available at: http://www.paragraf.rs/propisi/zakon_o_drzavnim_sluzbenicima.html 
713Lončar, Z. (2013): “Depolitizacija I profesionalizacija uprave u Republici Srbiji” (Depoliticization and 
professionalization of governance in the Republic of Serbia), Zbornik radova Pravnog fakulteta u Novom Sadu, 
4/2013, pp. 185-202 
714
More about the Service see on the website: http://suk.gov.rs/en/about_us/ 
715
More about the Council see on the website: http://suk.gov.rs/en/senior_incumbent_council/index.dot 
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human capital development. From 2008 another set of laws and regulation was enacted to 
support the ongoing reform. In 2009, the Public Administration Reform Council has been 
established but it was practically inactive. Finally, in January 2014, the Public Administration 
Reform Strategy was adopted which promoted as its main goals: decentralization, 
professionalization and politicization, rationalization and modernization of public service. 
Beside this, few important documents
716
 for public administration are enacted, such as: 
National program for EU integration (2008), Strategy for professional development of civil 
servants in the Republic of Serbia for the period2011-2013, and National program for adoption 
of EU acquis communautaire for period 2013-2016.  
In addition to these steps, the reform process included some other aspects with mixed 
results. Regarding the reform of law and regulation the step forward was made with the 
enactment of the Strategy of regulatory reform for the period 2008-2011. The main goals of the 
Strategy are rationalization and simplification of administrative procedures in order to increase 
foreign investments. Following this the Comprehensive reform of legal acts, called 
“Regulatory Guillotine”, was presented to the Government and 203 out of 304 
recommendations were implemented. However, besides the recommendations which were not 
implemented, Serbian Parliament and Government adopted few thousand laws, regulations and 
other legal acts which impose additional burden to the economy. This process was named as 
“regulatory cunami”.717The next reform step was made in 2010 when the governmental Office 
for Regulatory Reform and Regulatory Impact Assessment
718
 was established with the main 
task of implementing regulatory reform. Nevertheless, its work faces challenges such as: 
expired regulatory strategy without new one enacted, previous recommendations implemented 
partially and lack of institutional capacities for the realization of the initiatives for regulatory 
reforms and proper usage of Regulatory Impact Assessment (RIA) methods.  
The overall results of the reforms of public administration in Serbia, according to the 
critics, do not leave positive image despite all efforts. Discussing the changes regarding the 
core of the professional administration, the merit based criteria, Lončar719, claims that after the 
year 2004 formally established presumptions for the successful reform of public administration 
are subverted in the practice because politicians are not ready to give up their intervention in 
the selection of high civil service official and therefore the proper enforcement of legal rules is 
missing. The research made in 2013 within the framework of COCOPS – Coordinating for the 
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Nacionalni program za integraciju u EU (National program for EU integration) available at: 
http://www.seio.gov.rs/documents/national-documents.226.html ; Nacionalni program za usvajanje pravnih 
tekovin Evropske unije (National program for adoption of EU acquis communautaire), available at: 
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Republici Srbiji (Strategy for professional development of civil servants in the Republic of Serbia) available at: 
http://suk.gov.rs/dotAsset/7326.pdf 
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USAID: “Business Enabling Project“,  report, available at: 
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Office for regulatory reform and Regulatory Impact Assessment, web site: http://www.ria.gov.rs/eng 
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Cohesion in the Public Sector of the Future
720
, conducted among the senior managers in the 
civil service about the public administration reform in Serbia reaches similar conclusions. 
Their findings reveal that high level officials have concentrated significant amounts of power 
in their hands which is particularly disturbing since in the practice they are susceptible to the 
political influence. This further mans that they are highly fluctuating whenever government 
change occurs. In the essence of this practice lies the fact that politicians do not respect 
professional knowledge of senior civil service managers and if they have no political influence 
their activity is reduced to obeying the rules which further creates the “culture of civil service 
based on rules and risk avoidance”721which might be dangerous in the situation when pursuing 
reforms is necessary. The overall conclusion of the senior managers is that reforms of Serbian 
public administration are partial and unsuccessful. 
Furthermore, Dzinic
722
 finds that one of the main reasons for underperformance of the 
reform process is “bad implementations” of the laws adopted. Looking at the possible reasons 
for this situation, she claims that “the weak motivation for work in public administration” 
could be the most important one. Besides this some other obstacles should also be taken into 
account, such as:1) Partocracy, expressed through the influence of the political parties on 
public administration by appointing senior civil servants; 2) disregarding of legal provisions by 
civil servants which creates distrust in public authorities among citizens; 3) the lack of the HR 
capacity and coordination between various sectors in the law-drafting process and leaving out 
the key stakeholder from it; 4) hierarchical decision making style inherited from the socialist 
period; 5) weak monetary and administrative capacities for appropriate decentralization and 
finally 6) the lack of the capacity to benefit from foreign support. SIGMA
723
 report for 2012, 
points mainly to the similar direction like previous commentators. According to it, the 
professionalization of the civil service is jeopardized because politicians have “excessive 
concentration of decision making powers” which do not delegate to the administration. This 
gives as a result: a) difficulties in policies and laws implementation, since political pressure 
“inhibits the development of managerial skills”, b) lack of accountability, transparency and 
predictability of administrative procedures and finally c) weak legality and equality before the 
law in decision-making process. Again, the merit-based system for recruitment and promotion 
is not implemented because it is replaced in practice by political affiliation and patronage. This 
is result of the wide discretion left in hand of senior officials. The performance-appraisal 
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More about the project at: http://www.cocops.eu/ . The research available at: http://www.cocops.eu/wp-
content/uploads/2014/01/Serbian-Country-Report.pdf; More about Fund at: http://www.bfpe.org/en/ 
721Eriksen, S. (2005): “ Unfinished Transition – Public Administration Reform in Serbia 2001-2004”, in 13th 
NISPAcee Annual Conference, Democratic Governance for the XXI Century: Challenges and Responses in CEE 
countries, Moscow  
722Dzinic, J. (2011): “Public Administration Reform in Serbia”, Croatian and Comparative Public Administration, 
11 (4), pp. 1075-1105 
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SIGMA (Support for Improvement in Governance and Management) is a joint initiative of the European Union 
and the OECD. Its key objective is to strengthen the foundations for improved public governance, and hence 
support socio-economic development through building the capacities of the public sector, enhancing horizontal 
governance and improving the design and implementation of public administration reforms, including proper 
prioritisation, sequencing and budgeting. The participating countries are: Albania, Algeria, Armenia, Azerbaijan, 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Egypt, FYR of Macedonia, Georgia, Jordan, Lebanon, Moldova, Montenegro, 
Morocco, Serbia, Tunisia, Turkey and Ukraine. 
The 2012 report on Serbia is available at: http://www.sigmaweb.org/publications/Serbia_Assess_2012.pdf 
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scheme is formally implemented and according to it around 80% of civil servants are graded as 
excellent or very good, while 20% are good or satisfactory with 0% of those with 
“unsatisfactory” grade. Another problem defined by SIGMA report is that “constant 
proliferation of public bodies”, mainly agencies, which took place after the year 2000, 
additionally made the public administration complicated and created “parallel state 
administration without clear accountability”. This fragmentation further weakens the 
accountability, transparency and efficiency of public administration.  
 Finally, the European Commission, in its report on Serbia’s progress, issued for the 
year 2013 evaluates the implemented reforms. General observation that EC makes about public 
administration is that “reform remains hampered by the lack of clear steer and coordination 
structures”724. More precisely, the system is fragmented with low coordination capacity, 
without clear lines of accountability and low level policy development. It is necessary to 
improve the institutional and administrative capacity for policy planning and coordination. 
Promotion and recruitment are still problematic because they not follow merit-based principle 
and much recruitment is still conducted on non-transparent way. Professional development 
should be also improved through training. Although government showed the willingness to 
rationalise the organization of PA and to advance subordinate bodies and agencies, the clear 
and comprehensive organization policy still has to be determined. However, beside the bad 
image of the public administration, the research conducted under the auspice of the Serbian 
Ministry of Youth and Sport
725
, shows that 40% of young people will rather choose lower paid 
but a more secure job, which is, according to view of 57% examines, seen as such in public 
sector. The explanation for this result might be found in the fact that 40% of the same sample 
of people thinks that private entrepreneurs are not adequately paid and rewarded for their 
efforts when compared to civil servants. Moving to the second important aspect of this thesis, 
the next section presents anti-corruption framework which is in place in the Republic of Serbia. 
  
5.3.2. Anti-corruption framework 
 
The anti-corruption framework in Serbia is created of formally established bodies with 
direct or indirect jurisdiction to confront corruption and set of laws and regulations enacted 
with the same goal. Regarding bodies this section will present: Anti-corruption council, Anti-
corruption agency and Commissioner for information of public importance and personal data 
protection. Section devoted to anti-corruption acts provides, beside the ratified international 
documents, description of Strategy for Fight against Corruption, Integrity plan and Ethical code 
for civil servants.  
 
5.3.2.1. Anti-corruption council  
 
The Anti-corruption council
726
 was established by the Decision of the Government of 
the Republic of Serbia in October 2001. The Council is an expert, advisory body of the 
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European Commission progress report on Serbia for 2013,  
available at: http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2013/package/sr_rapport_2013.pdf 
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The research available at: https://docs.google.com/file/d/0B3GsycnrBBm-Ymdkc3R0U3hhVzA/edit 
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Government. It is founded with a mission to observe all aspects of anti-corruption activities, to 
propose measures to be taken in order to fight corruption effectively, to monitor their 
implementation, and to make proposals for introducing regulations, programmes and other acts 
and measures in this area. The Council receives petitions from the citizens on a daily basis but 
it reacts in particular cases only if they indicate the existence of a larger problem, especially if 
they point to the corruption in the economy or politics. After the processing, it forwards 
petition to the competent state institutions with the request that both, the Council and the 
petitioners, would be informed about the steps taken. Since 2003 until 2012 the Council has 
received 2,751 petitions with complaints on the work of judiciary, local governments, 
privatization process, processes for issuing the construction permits and corruption in the 
healthcare system, police and private companies. The number of complaints per year is given 
in the Graph 5.4while the detailed numbers are available in the Table, located in the Appendix 
5.2. 
 
Graph 5.4: Number of cases filed per year 
 
Source: The Anti-corruption Council web-site 
 
The largest number of petitions refers to the privatization process implemented 
according to the Law on privatization from 2001 and to the trade of stocks of companies 
privatizes according to the laws in 1990s. In most of the cases petitioners are labour unions and 
associations of minority shareholders, and very rarely participants of the auctions and tenders. 
Petitions filed in 2003 and 2004 mostly address issues such as: not adequate (minimized) price 
of the capital made during the assessment process in the privatization and initial low stock 
price of the privatized company. From 2005 dominant are the petitions for termination of the 
purchase contract due to the buyer’s breach of duties to which he agreed to fulfil in terms of: 
social and investment programs, non-adequate control in the process of privatization by the 
Commission for securities and minority shareholder oppression.  
As mentioned above the Anti-corruption Council is Government’s advisory body. In 
accordance to its jurisdiction, it forwards received petitions to the competent state institutions, 
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which contain information used for the examples of large systemic corruption. Although 
Council enjoys respect among citizens, especially its deceased president Verica Barać, almost 
none of the reports and criminal charges filed by the Council were prosecuted. The same 
destiny share the numerous criminal charges filed by citizens. The reason for this is, according 
to the Council, the protection which the people in question enjoy from the state.  
 
5.3.2.2. Anti-corruption agency  
 
In 2009 the Anti-corruption Agency
727
 was established as institution with strong 
preventive role, which has not been assigned to any of the anti-corruption bodies founded 
earlier, and its main goal is to improve the corruption combat with cooperation of other public 
institutions, civil sector, media and general public. Legal framework in which Agency operates 
consist domestic laws and regulations as well as international anti-corruption documents such 
as UN, GRECO and OECD conventions. Regarding jurisdiction the agency is in charge of: (1) 
the monitoring of the implementation of the Strategy for fight against corruption and its Action 
plan, (2) monitoring of the adoption and implementation of the Integrity plans in public and 
private sector, (3) providing opinions and recommendations in enacting the anti-corruption 
laws and regulations, (4) training of key stakeholders crucial for corruption combat such as: 
scientific and educational institutions, media, NGOs, (5) development of methodologies and 
tools for measuring different types of corruption as well as implementation of the international 
ones, (6) keeping the records of officials and their incomes and properties, (7) protection of 
whistle-blowers, (8) receiving citizen’s complaints, (9) international cooperation with GRECO, 
UNODC and OECD and coordination of domestic laws with international rules and 
regulations, (10) carrying on the process and resolving the issues regarding conflict of interest, 
(11) monitoring the financial status and activities of the political parties, etc. 
From the data available on the web site of the Agency, what is not clearly readable are the 
success rates of the opinions, recommendations, and decisions regarding the issues from its 
jurisdiction in the implementation process but some interesting numbers regarding research 
made by the Agency are available. For instance, the research on civil servant’s perception of 
the Agencies activities provides information relevant for the purpose of this thesis
728
. The 
questions in this research addressed the issues such as the general impression about the 
Agencies work, the ways of acquiring the information about the Agency and the obligations 
which the law imposes on public institutions. The results show that half of the respondents 
consider themselves informed about the Agency ant its work and the other half has the opposite 
opinion. These results should be interpreted in light of the claim that people usually tend to 
overestimate their knowledge in self-assessment, which practically means that the higher is the 
percentage of the latter group. However, when asked about the necessity of establishing the 
Agency 82% said that this type of institution is necessary for Serbian society, 7% said that the 
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Data available at: http://www.acas.rs/sr_lat/o-agenciji/nadleznosti/sektora.html 
728
Research is available at: http://www.acas.rs/images/stories/Percepcija_uloge_Agencije_-
_Organi_javne_vlasti.pdf. The research about the perception of the Agency’s work includes other stakeholders 
such as: citizens, media and NGOs. Research made with these groups is available at: 
http://www.acas.rs/sr_cir/podizanje-antikorupcijske-svesti/698.html. Since in the focus of this thesis are civil 
servants only the examination on their views is presented here.  
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other anti-corruption bodies are sufficient for corruption combat while 11% had no opinion 
about this question. When asked about the effects of the Agency’s work on citizens and 
officials the respondents gave interesting answers. They think that it had greater effects on the 
work of the officials (39%) than citizens (30%) but they also think that nothing significantly 
changed in the behaviour of both categories which is in partial collision with the finding that 
the funding and work of the Agency brought positive effects in corruption combat. This is 
interpreted through the possible difference in two attitudes, one that on some general level 
some positive effects exist (eg. corruption is recognized as important issue) and the other, that 
on the concrete level of each person significant improvements still should be made.   
5.3.2.3. Commissioner for information of public importance and personal data  
protection 
 
The necessity of improving transparency and strengthening of civil sector resulted in 
the establishment of the Commissioner for information of public importance and personal data 
protection
729
in 2004. It is an autonomous public authority, who exercises his powers 
independently and whose competences are set by the Law on Personal Data Protection. For 
the purpose of exercising the duties within his sphere of competence, the Commissioner 
basically has two types of powers: those relating to his capacity of a second-instance authority 
responsible for protecting the right to data protection in appeal proceedings and those related to 
his capacity as a supervisory authority responsible for enforcing the law. According to the Law 
on Free Access to Information of Public Importance in his jurisdiction is, among the others,: 
(1) monitoring of public institutions and their compliance with the Law, (2) education of the 
public service employees on their duties regarding citizen’s right to access the information and 
(3) appellate procedure against the authorities decisions with which the rights protected by the 
Law are infringed. The data available on the Commissioners web site
730
 show the number of 
complaints filed to the Commissioner regarding the access to public information and their 
acceptance. From 2009 to 2013 the number of complaints increased but the percentage of 
justified claims varies. For example, in 2009, in 44% of the cases the Commissioner found the 
infringement of the rights and issued an order to the authority to comply with the Law, while in 
2013 this number is 23%. The Graph 5.5 presents these variations and concrete numbers for 
the each year could be found in the Table in the Appendix 5.3of this chapter.  
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Graph 5.5: Trends in filed and justified claims 
 
Source: The Commissioner’s web-site 
  
European Commission in its report on Serbia’s progress731 observes that the 
Commissioner is active both within the government and with the media and civil society. The 
Commission notices that number of citizen’s request increased but without further explanation. 
The results from the above provide graph show two things. One is that the number of cases 
increased but the number of justified claims varies. This could be interpreted that the 
Commissioner gains greater importance over time as an institution important for the society 
and, as a result, people are more encouraged in terms of protection of their rights which makes 
good overall impression of his work. On the other hand, if compared, the two numbers might 
be interpreted as expressed mistrust which by citizens towards the administration because they 
ask the protection of their rights from the outside unbiased authority believing that civil 
servants did not respect their rights.  
 
5.3.2.4. Anti-corruption Acts 
 
Serbian anti-corruption legal framework consist numerous laws, regulations and by-
laws which govern the institutions in their functioning regarding the fight against corruption. 
However, this section will only reflect of the most important once such as UN and GRECO 
Conventions, Strategy for fight against corruption, Integrity plan and Code of Ethics for civil 
servants. Serbia has not ratified the OECD convention on bribery.  
UN Convention Against Corruption – Serbia has ratified the Convention in October 
2005
732
. The Law on Anti-corruption Agency does not explicitly derive the legal ground for its 
foundation from the Convention but it might be present in the annotation part of the Law draft, 
which explains the reasons and motivation behind the law proposition and it is a mandatory 
                                                          
731
European Commission progress report on Serbia for 2013,  
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part of each drafted law submitted to the parliament. However, Article 6 of the Convention 
provides grounds for such a conclusion especially if combined with Article 5 of the Law, 
which entitles the Agency to cooperation with international institutions and obliges it to follow 
the international rules and regulations. The web-site of the Agency also refers to the 
cooperation with the UN as one of its important goals. However, the area which the convention 
regulates includes some other institutions important for fight against corruption, such as 
Ministry of Justice, and therefore it is treated as “cover regulation”.   
GRECO conventions – Serbia had ratified the two anti-corruption conventions of the 
Council of Europe. Criminal Law Convention on Corruption became part of Serbian legal 
system in 2002, while additional protocol and Civil Law Convention on Corruption were 
ratified in 2007
733. Like in the previous case, these conventions are “cover regulations” and all 
institutions which deal concretely with the corruption consider them important documents for 
their practice and harmonisation of domestic laws.  
Strategy for Fight against Corruption – New Strategy for fight against corruption734was 
adopted in July 2013 for the five year period and it is defined on the basis of international best 
practice framed under the auspice of the UN, GRECO and OECD and domestic experiences 
gained through cooperation with all institutions in charge of corruption combat. Due to the 
time and resource constraints the Strategy targets couple of areas which are considered crucial 
in decreasing the corruption level in the society and these are: political activities, public 
finances, privatization and public-private partnership, judicial system, police, space planning 
and building, healthcare system, education and sport and media. Prevention is considered  
equally important aspect in corruption combat and therefore the special attention should be 
devoted, among the others, to: risk assessment in the processes of drafting laws and 
regulations, recruitment and promotion in public institutions, which should be merit-based, 
transparency, increasing of the opportunities for continuous education about corruption, the 
improvement of the conditions for larger participation of civil society as well as private sector 
and providing better protection of whistle-blowers. The strategy has it accompanying Action 
plan the monitoring of their implementation is in the hands of the Anti-corruption agency. 
However, coordination on the Government level in the implementation process is entrusted to 
the Ministry of justice.  
Integrity plan – The integrity plan735 is developed by the Anti-corruption Agency and 
presents a preventive anti-corruption measure, document which consist of self-assessment of 
the risks to which institution is exposed in relation to corruption, its incidences, development 
and unethical and unacceptable behaviour. The main objective of the plan is to reinforce the 
“integrity of an institution, including individual honesty, professionalism, ethical behaviour, 
institutional entirety, as well as acting in accordance with moral values”, which, as a result, 
should mitigate the risk of misuse of power. Realization of this task is within the Anti-
corruption agency jurisdiction and it is obliged to provide any assistance to the institutions 
regarding its fulfilment.  
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Ethical Code – Ethical Code of Conduct for Civil Servants in Serbia was enacted in 
2008
736
. The Code promotes the fundamental values which should be incorporated in the 
behaviour of civil servants such as: legality and impartiality in job performing, political 
neutrality, protection of public interest, prevention of conflict of interest, respecting clients and 
their privacy, rejection of presents and proper use of information related to job performance. 
Monitoring of the Code’s implementation is entrusted to the High Civil Service Council737, 
which operates in the auspice of the Government Human Resource Management Service. 
This section provided the list of main anti-corruption acts which are in place in the 
Republic of Serbia. It is clear that laws and regulations are present, updated and synchronized 
with the best international practice, at least on paper. However, the reality appears to be 
different, since life is always more creative than law makers, and therefore the next section 
presents various research results pursued in order to acquire the picture of the field situation 
regarding the presence of corruption, its causes, consequences and attitudes of people towards 
it.  
 
5.3.3. Hitherto research results on corruption  
 
In 2013 Transparency International Corruption Perception Index (TICPI), with score of 
42, ranked Serbia on the 72 position out of 177 countries and territories observed.  This section 
presents previous research carried out on corruption in Serbia from both, international and 
domestic sources. International sources include: UNDP, TI, UNODC, Dutch Embassy in 
Serbia, and EC reports, while domestic describes the analysis of the Anti-corruption Agency 
performance. 
 
5.3.3.1. International organizations 
 
The United Nations Development Program (UNDP) is supporting the Government of 
Serbia and civil society in promoting good governance, accountability and transparency and 
corruption combat through monitoring of corruption perception by households. In the research 
regarding corruption, done in 2010
738
 on 600 examinees, the main goal of exploring was the 
citizen’s perception of the level of corruption in Serbia together with their experience with 
corruption. People in Serbia ranked corruption as the fifth important problem, while the first 
four positions are held by unemployment, poverty, low salaries and lack of opportunities for 
young people. They believe that all spheres of life are to a certain extent affected by corruption, 
but 81% think that political life is the flourishing area of corruption. Regarding everyday life, 
83% of people think that corruption is a common practice in Serbia and 56% agree that some 
level of corruption is expected. Although corruption combat should be initiated and led by the 
Government it is interesting that citizens seem to underestimate their own role, contribution 
and responsibility. Regarding corruption in public administration, the dominant opinion is that 
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strong penalties are the most appropriate measure to reduce corruption in it. Table5.2, presents 
the sectors which citizens consider most affected with corruption. Citizens think that the 
leading role in corruption combat should be entrusted to the Government (50%) and the police 
(46%). Although they perceive severe penalties as a crucial method for decreasing corruption, 
rising public awareness, strengthening of civil society and transparency in administrative 
decision making are considered an important one as well. 
 
Table 5.2: Extent to which, by citizens’ perception, particular sectors are affected by corruption 
Sector % Sector % 
Political parties 76.7 Police 62.3 
Health service  73.6 Media 51.6 
Judges 69.3 City/Administration 54.7 
Prosecutors 66.0 Education 51.0 
Lawyers 67.0 Business/private sector 48.3 
Customs  65.7 International help and donators 50.3 
Government 63.3 Tax board 49.0 
Parliament/legislation 63.3 Average other institutions 35.2 
Source: TNS-Medium Gallup/UNDP, 2011. The three rounds have been averaged 
 
In 2011 Transparency International issued National Integrity System (NIS) Assessment 
for Serbia
739
. This evaluation provides an objective introspective of the legal basis and 
regulations of the country assessed. It does not measure corruption or an effort invested in fight 
against it, but rather presents the potential and capacities of the key state and social institutions 
and their contribution to corruption combat. Assessment describes Serbia’s NIS as moderate 
with imbalance between the independent institutions and government/legislative and political 
parties. The System consists of fifteen pillars which include analysis of the work of following 
institutions: Ombudsman, Commissioner for Information of Public Importance and Personal 
Data Protection, Supreme Audit Institution, Anti-corruption Agencies, Judiciary, Political 
Parties, Civil Society, Executive, Law Enforcement Agencies, Business, Local Self-
government, Electoral Management Body, Legislature, Public Sector and Media. Among the 
other things the report stress that the legislature in practice operates almost exclusively on the 
initiative of the government; reports of the independent bodies are formally analysed but 
monitoring the implementation of their recommendations is lacking; the decision-making 
process of the Government is not transparent and it also fails to monitor the public companies 
under its jurisdiction. Finally, the public sector is under heavy political influence, especially 
recruitment and promotion of the employees, besides the existence of the rules and regulations 
which should prevent it. One of the main recommendations in the Assessment include 
depoliticization of the managers in public sector, increasing transparency in decision making, 
protecting whistle-blowers and strengthening the independence of judiciary and media.  
 In 2011, another research project was carried out by United Nations Office on Drugs 
and Crime
740
. This research focused on the actual experience of administrative corruption and 
the nature of bribery and its procedure and not on the people’s perception of it. More precisely, 
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the subject of investigation was petty corruption that affects the daily lives of ordinary people 
in their dealings with public administration, since it plays a large role because nine out of ten 
people interact with it in some point during the course of the year. Therefore, respondents rank 
corruption as the third most important problem of the country, after the unemployment and 
poverty/low living standard. On a yearly basis, in contacts with public officials 13.7% of 
Serbian citizens experience direct or indirect exposure to bribery while 9.3% actually pays it. 
Half of the bribes paid (56%) are initiated by citizens due to their belief that PA cannot 
function without payment which facilitate bureaucratic procedure. More than 40% are paid in 
response to the request, direct or indirect, by public official. One third of those who pay a bribe 
do so to speed up a procedure, while almost one in five does that in order to finalize the 
procedure or to receive better treatment. Although the situation explained seems like a 
troubling one it is also important to say that there is some resistance to bribery and people do 
not always accept paying bribes. More precisely, for every three who agree to so there is one 
who refuses. However, less than 1% of those who pay report their experience to the authorities 
and there are various reasons for this practice such as: bribery is not seen as serious crime but 
rather a common practice or gratitude for service rendered, it can be of direct benefit to the 
bribe-payer and, finally, they think that not much can be done about it because no one would 
care. The report states that not only citizens are affected by bribery but public officials as well, 
since the public administration is the largest employer and job security and accompanying 
benefits are highly desired. Around 16% of Serbian citizens applied for a job in public sector 
and of those who were successful 6% admitted to paying some money, giving a gift or doing a 
favour to help secure the position. Among those who failed only 8% think that the selection 
was mad on the merit basis while others have perception that cronyism, nepotism and bribery 
played a crucial role in the recruitment process. On the other hand, besides the results on 
bribery experiences, perceptions about corruption in Serbia are not positive as well. More than 
50% of the population believe that corruption is often or very often present in numerous public 
institutions such as political parties, public hospitals, the police and judiciary, customs office 
and local government. Although perceptions are nothing more than opinions and should not be 
confused with real experience, they are important as an expression of a citizen’s awareness of 
the main challenges which Serbia faces.   
The results of the latest research project “Intensifying anti-corruption policy in Serbia by 
furthering law enforcement transparency and evidence based policy making”741 were published 
in the beginning of year 2012. It was supported by the Dutch Embassy and it aimed to “shed 
light on the criminal side of corruption and related offences”. This field is characterized by the 
authors as “camera obscura”, with prevailing lack of transparency of the processes which are 
going on inside and it gives rise to a “black box” research approach to the institutions of law 
enforcement. The research did not aim to look into the black box but rather to investigate its 
inputs and outputs and their characteristics.  More precisely, the question was: what kind of 
corruption related cases enters the judicial institutions, prosecution or courts, and how, what 
and when they leave the institution.  One of the interesting points, made by the authors, is that 
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scientific research in Serbia virtually stopped after 2007 due to the lack of interest. Therefore in 
order to collect the necessary data, they had to look at multiply resources and to “knock on 
many doors” facing different responses from the institutions in charged. The results show that 
black boxes are acting without statistical order when dealing with the cases. The authors could 
not find coherence and correlation between the variables of the inputs and outputs which made 
them to conclude that “the judicial institutions concerning corruption (in its broad meaning) 
behave statistically at random” which describes it as more random box than a system. It is also 
pointed out that for a fact based anti-corruption strategy it is necessary to single out “real” 
corruption from the variety of offences covered by the “abuse against official duty’ articles”. 
Finally, the existence of major defects in the communication between competent organs 
decreases the effectiveness of corruption combat.  
 Finally, in 2013 the Progress report of Serbia
742
 issued by the European Commission 
evaluated various aspects important for Serbia’s accession to the EU. There are several issues 
which should be improved for effective fight against corruption. The implementation of the 
legal framework and improvement of the efficiency appears as the first on the list. 
Furthermore, a proactive approach to corruption investigation has to be maintained and should 
result in final convictions, especially in high profile cases, because the ratio of convictions 
remains relatively low. In this regard, the judiciary has to build up a solid track record of 
prosecution and convictions. The law enforcement institutions need to become more proactive, 
they should improve internal capacity and inter-institutional cooperation. Finally, continued 
political support for institutions is needed, together with more effective inter-agency 
coordination in order to significantly improve performance in combating corruption. 
 
5.3.3.2. Domestic institutions 
 
 In 2012 an interesting research in the domain of public administration was made by the 
Anti-corruption agency
743
 and included 368 institutions.  In the first part the examinees, public 
servants, were asked some general questions regarding corruption while in the second part they 
had to reply on couple of questions related to the work of the Agency. Since the second part of 
the research was presented in this chapter in the section devoted to the Agency, here the results 
on the questions related to corruption will be discussed. When asked who contributes more to 
the emergence of corrupt deal, 26 % of respondents said that it is civil servants who are 
abusing power, 5% said that citizens initiate the deal because they are ready to do anything for 
their own gain, 66% claimed that both are equally contributing and finally, 3% did not have 
opinion about the issue. Regarding the crucial cause of corruption in Serbia, 39% of public 
servants think that corruption is a matter of a personal integrity, 56% claims that the whole 
system setting causes corruption and 5% has no opinion about the topic. Furthermore, when 
asked to rank the causes of corruption in the system the results show the equal score for 
political influence in the functioning of the administration and existence of the “red tape”, 
while as “other causes” are listed lack of transparency and broad discretional power. When 
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asked about public interest, majority of the examinees (62%) think that “public interest” is 
something which is in the interest of the whole community and each individual in that 
community. However, 11% percent of the public servants said that public interest is the state 
interest, regardless of the interest of the citizens and society as a whole, which is a matter of 
concern because they justify the principle of “state reason”. Furthermore, another 10% of the 
examinees think that the public interest is defined in each concrete case by the part of the state 
apparatus in charge of governing certain areas. This view is seen as problematic especially 
because of the fact that is comes from the public servants who do not see the state as an 
instrument for the protection of public interest but rather as the main actor for its definition.  
 In terms of being informed on the ways and situations which might lead to the 
corruption incidents and in which way it is possible to prevent it, 38% of the respondents said 
that they think that they are well informed, 57% think that they need to have more information 
and 5% claim that they have no knowledge about the issue. Regarding the selection of the more 
appropriate method, 77% percent said that prevention is a better method while 23% votes for 
repression. According to the research, the concept of good governance has many supporters in 
public service in Serbia. Namely, the 71% percent of the public employees think that each 
institution has to develop its own preventive anti-corruption mechanisms, 27% votes in favour 
of specialized anti-corruption institutions and 2% has no opinion on this matter. This research 
revealed some important aspects that should be considered carefully for future anti-corruption 
action. Public servants think that in the anti-corruption fight, institutions do not cooperate even 
though they all supposed to work on the same goal. It is especially important to keep in mind 
the fact that 69% of the respondents think that Serbia lacks the will for real and efficient fight 
against corruption. This is troubling because the expressed attitude shows that civil servants do 
not see themselves as part of that “will” which should fight against corruption. They think that 
each institution, and them as well, should engage in corruption combat but at the same time 
they claim that there is no will for this task to be completed.  This attitude is more clear only if 
put into the context of “political will”, which means that willingness to fight corruption 
seriously should come “from the above”, more precisely from the political parties which are 
seen as centres of power. This implies that in the future substantial efforts should be made in 
other to change the mentality of people in the direction which puts the willingness and 
readiness of each individual in each public institution in the heart of corruption combat. The 
following section presents the method and results of the case study conducted for the purposes 
of this thesis. 
 
5.4. Case study  
 
5.4.1. Research area and methods applied 
 
The research is commonly divided to qualitative, which aims to understand and interprets 
social interactions and quantitative, whose goal is to test the hypothesis, look at causes and 
effects and make predictions. Denzin and Lincoln
744
 explain that qualitative research locates 
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the researcher in the world and allows him, by using different tools such as field notes, 
interviews, etc., to make the “world visible”. More precisely he study things in their natural 
settings and tries to interpret the studied phenomena in “terms of the meanings people bring to 
them”. Creswell745 in his definition puts the emphasis on the process of research which flows 
from “philosophical assumptions to worldviews through theoretical lens” and on the 
“procedures involved in studying social or human problems”. These procedures include 
different frameworks such as: grounded theory, case study research, narrative research, etc. He 
explains that various reasons can cause the use of qualitative research such as: necessity to 
explore the issue, if empowerment of the individuals to share their stories is desired, if an 
understanding of the context or settings in which participants in a study addresses a problem or 
issue, if the need to develop theories exist because the existing ones are inadequate or they do 
not capture the complexity of the phenomena, and for other similar reasons. 
The qualitative study in this research includes two approaches: grounded theory and 
case study. Regarding the case study method Creswell
746
 explains it as one of the qualitative 
approaches in which the researcher investigates the case(s) through data collection from 
multiple sources of information and reports the results. According to Yin
747
, this method is 
preferred if three conditions are met: 1) “how” or “why” questions are being posed by the 
researcher, 2) researcher has little control over the events, and 3) his focus is on a 
contemporary phenomenon within a real-life context. Table 5.3 shows the comparison between 
the various research methods. 
 
Table 5.3: Research method comparison 
METHOD Form of research 
question 
Requires Control of 
Behavioural Events? 
Focuses on Contemporary 
Events? 
Experiment how, why? Yes yes 
Survey who, what, where, how 
many, how much? 
No yes 
Archival 
Analysis 
who, what, where, how 
many, how much? 
no yes/no 
History how, why? no no 
Case Study how, why? no yes 
Source: Yin – Case Study Research, Design and Methods , p.8 
 
The purpose of this study was to acquire an insight into how public administration 
functions and why the anti-corruption framework is not effective in the Republic of Serbia 
(RS). This was done by testing the assumptions based on work experience of the author in RS 
public administration and the theoretical framework established in chapters 1 to 4 of this thesis. 
Common public opinion in Serbia is that administration is not effective in performing its duties 
and the increased number of civil servants after the year 2000, from 8,000 to 30,000 employed, 
was made only for purposes of taking care of party members. This as a consequence resulted in 
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the establishment of numerous ministries, departments, governmental agencies, openings of 
new positions, etc. In everyday conversation the opinion is present that state job is the “best 
deal” that one can get. The explanation for this could be found in the fact that this was, and in a 
way still is, an alternative solution because state owned companies collapsed and their 
privatisations turned out to be unsuccessful in large number of cases. This together with 
weakly developed private sector increases the value of the secure state job. An additional 
problem imposes the labour force, which is in many cases hardly adaptable to new 
circumstances. Socialist system promoted idea of stability by giving everyone right to free 
education, health care, housing and employment which decreased the ability of people to 
“swim in uncertainty” and deprived them of developing skills necessary for survival in the 
open market environment. Faced with new challenges during the system change, not many 
found the way out and therefore, the logical solution for the existential problem was, and still 
is, a state paid job.   
Therefore, the questions which this study seeks to answer include: reform of public 
administration, mentality of people employed, (un)transparent work, effectiveness of anti-
corruption framework and punishment mechanisms. All the issues targeted are considered 
related and might be depicted in the way in which citizens observe the state and its role. As 
mentioned above, during socialism the government was seen as an institution with super 
powers which was capable of solving each and every problem that arose. Totally opposite from 
the Kennedy’s quote748, most of the citizens asked, and still ask, what can my country do for 
me. This attitude, according to author’s view might reflect many important issues, especially 
during the reform process which has to change the perspective of administration as wealth 
creator to service which should facilitate people’s lives.  
Looking for the research in this area, the author found that the literature, in general, 
addresses questions mentioned above, and it is used for building the theoretical framework of 
the thesis. However, each of the aspects is treated as a separate item with no studies which 
analyse connection among them. Although this study uses case study research method, it 
should be stressed that it does not stand alone. As stated above, this research is partially based 
on the work experience of the author, and the definition of its theoretical framework is created 
on the basis of these experiences. From this point the explanation of a grounded theory 
research method, beside the case study approach, is considered to be the appropriate one. This 
research method is applicable when existing theories do not address the issues in which the 
researcher is interested or they address it but its incomplete. Creswell
749
 points out that “a key 
idea is that theory-development does not come “off the Shelf”, but rather is generated or 
“grounded” in data from participants who have experienced the process”.  
 Grounded theory was developed by Glaser and Strauss
750
 as qualitative method used to 
generate, in a systematic way, a theory that should explain, at a broad level, process, action or 
an interaction about substantive topic. They advocate discovering the concept and hypothesis 
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based on filed data from participants, rather that verifying and testing theories. This method, 
called systematic design, assumes detailed and rigorous procedures which include steps of 
open, axial and selective coding. In the first step, based on the data collected, the researcher 
forms initial categories about the phenomenon investigated. In the next step, axial coding, he 
puts one of the categories which is considered central and relates other to it. These categories 
are: (a) causal conditions, which influence the main one, (b) strategies, action taken in response 
to the main phenomenon, (c) contextual and intervening conditions, factors that influence 
strategies and finally (d) consequences, outcomes of the strategies used. The last phase, 
selective coding, includes writing a theory from the interconnection of the categories defined in 
the previous step.  
The second approach to the grounded theory method, emerging design, was developed 
by Glaser
751
, who although worked at the beginning with Strauss, criticises further 
development of the theory by Strauss and Corbin
752
 claiming that they overemphasize rules and 
procedures at the expense of theory generation. For him the connection between categories and 
emerging theory is more important than categories description because the theory exists in the 
more abstract level and it should fit well into reality.  It should, also, explain behaviour of the 
participants and if works then it has its validity but even with these characteristics it should be 
flexible and open to modifications. The third concept of grounded theory, called constructive 
design, was elaborated by Charmaz
753
, who is more interested in the attitudes, believes and 
values of the examinees than gathering the information and their description. She focuses on 
the understanding of the individual’s views and feelings in experiencing the process and 
therefore she does not use the diagrams or figures for summarizing the processes but rather 
narrative discussion. Choosing among the approaches is the researcher’s decision and depends. 
Finally, Clarke
754
 extends the idea further claiming that social situations should be involved in 
creation of the unit of analysis in grounded theorizing and she puts it into the context of 
“postmodern turn” which is characterized by complexity and heterogeneity.  
As explained, the grounded theory method deals with the experiences and opinions of 
the subjects tested and derives the broader theory from it. During the three-year work 
experience in one of the ministries in the Republic of Serbia, the researcher had a chance to 
look closely at the processes and discuss with employees on the variety of issues and topic 
which are addressed in the previous chapters of this research. From these insights part of the 
theoretical framework is developed. However, the original method of the grounded theory in 
this case could not be applied according to the book due to the sensitivity of the topic and not 
many people are willing to be interviewed. Therefore, the only possible solution for conduction 
of research was to provide opinions in the anonymous way through questionnaire, which in 
present circumstances appears to be the most appropriate approach for acquiring the necessary 
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information, but to which different rules apply and they will be discussed more in details in the 
next section.  
 
5.4.2. Case study method 
 
5.4.2.1. General discussion 
 
A previously explained, the aim of this case study was to get some insights in the opinion 
and attitudes of public servants in the Republic of Serbia regarding the issues discussed in the 
theoretical part of this thesis. Due to the delicacy of the topics targeted the questionnaire was 
seen as the only appropriate to achieve this goal. The estimation was that people in the sample 
would be more willing to participate in this type of examination and the hope that they would 
answer the questions more honestly if the anonymity was guaranteed. The questionnaire used 
Likert scale for measuring the attitudes. Measuring character, attitude and personal preferences 
brings challenge in the procedure which, for the purpose of data measuring, transfers these 
qualities into a quantitative measure. As a response to this challenge, Likert
755
 developed a 
procedure for measuring the attitudinal scales. The scale that he created is composed of Likert 
items (questions) to which should be responded by the words (a) strongly approve, (b) approve, 
(c) undecided/neutral, (d) disapprove and (e) strongly disapprove. In the attempt to replace the 
sigma method of scoring for the simpler one Likert assigned the values from 1 to 5 to each of 
the five different positions on the five point statements described above. To the negative end of 
the sigma scale the ONE end was assigned and to the positive the FIVE end. After this coding 
of the answers the score for each individual was calculated by finding the average of the 
numerical values of the positions that he checked. More precisely, since the number of Likert 
items was the same for all examinees, the sum of the numerical scores rather than the mean 
was used.
756
Validity of the scale was explained by Likert who claims that scale deals only with 
verbal reaction and behaviour and it is to be hoped that these expressions and other more overt 
forms of behaviour may be determined because in many situations it “would seem reasonable 
to conclude that our daily behaviour in these areas is largely verbal, the verbal responses would 
be valid indices of other habits”757. However, Likert emphasises that situation in which the 
attitude test that was given is equally important as the reaction on it. If the situation elicits 
honest cooperation one can feel that the examinee will express his own opinion rather than the 
one he thinks is expected of him. In that case reliabilities of the scales tend to be higher.  
 The Likert scale is an instrument widely used in the researches that use questionnaires. 
The scale is used with different response options for Likert items which can go from 3 to 10. 
During the time different application and data interpretation emerged and that as a result 
brought various discussions pointing in two different directions. Without going into deeper 
argumentation only the essence of it will be presented here. According to Carifio and Rocco
758
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the main confusion comes because researchers analyse Likert scale item by item and then 
present this “unorganized laundry list”, which is practice that should be stopped because Likert 
scale is a composite result which consists certain number of items that make a whole. As van 
Alphen et al.
759
 state, items in Likert scale are equal and highly correlated among each other, 
more precisely they are assumed to be “the replications of each other …. or parallel 
instruments”. Carifio and Rocco760 claim that these two approaches cause all other confusions 
and differences in data interpretation and application of different statistical tools.  
Regardless of the argument expressed in the cited article above, researchers continue using 
both approaches for attitude measurement. Boone and Boone
761
 explain that Likert-type items 
are single questions which use Likert response alternatives with no intention of combining the 
responses of items into a composite scale. On the other hand, “a Likert scale is composed of a 
series of four or more Likert-type items” which are in the analysis combined in a single 
composite score. This difference reflects in the data analysis procedure because the former are 
considered as ordinal type of data and the latter as interval. Therefore the different analysis 
methods apply which are presented in the Table 5.4. 
 
Table 5.4: Differences of the Likert type and Likert scale data 
 Likert type data Likert scale data 
Central Tendency Median or mode Mean 
Variability Frequencies Standard deviation 
Associations Kendall tau B or C Pearson’s r 
Other statistics Chi-square ANOVA, t-test, regression 
Source: Boone and Boone – Analysing Likert data 
  
De Winter and Dodou 
762
 reflect on the discussion on how the Likert-item type data should 
be analysed, by means of parametric or nonparametric procedures. They compare the t and 
Mann-Wilcoxon (MWW) test and conclude that both tests generally have similar power and 
there should be no worry that the differences will be found. Clason and Dormody
763
 discuss the 
proper way for analysis of single items from Likert scales and they claim it should 
acknowledge the discrete nature of the response. More precisely, if the researcher wants to 
know if the population is different on several measures or if the two or more populations are 
different and the data collected are Likert-type items “methods focusing on location parameters 
may oversimplify the analysis”. The statistical procedures should be chosen to answer in the 
best way the research question.  
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Likert scale could be also used in the form of “forced choice” with even number of 
categories, usually four, in order to eliminate the “neutral” option764. This would be done in 
order to force examinees to express their opinion but, on the other hand, this might reduce the 
accuracy of the responses. The literature is debating how inclusion of neutral responses affects 
its distribution, reliability and validity. Regarding the reliability and validity, Tsang
765
 claims 
that the literature review shows that “there is still no conclusion whether the midpoints on 
Likert scale are desirable or not” and for that reason the epistemological issues should be taken 
into account. This practically means that, if we have in mind that forcing respondents to choose 
agree or disagree may bring misleading conclusions, the neutral option is necessary on the 
scale but one must be careful in using “optional labels” or he has to “define midpoints as clear 
as possible”. On the other hand, research shows that the neutral option affects the distribution 
of responses which sometimes lead to different conclusions. For instance, respondents who 
slightly lean towards one of the ends, agree or disagree may be attracted by neutral option and 
their sentiments would be masked. Presser and Schuman
766
 findings on couple of politically 
sensitive questions show that between 10-20% of examinees choose the neutral option when 
provided. However, despite the shifts which appeared when the neutral option was included or 
excluded, the researcher found that distribution of the responses did not change significantly 
which, at the end, will bring the researcher to the same conclusion. Presser and Schuman finish 
they article by citing Stanley Payne’s767 advice which he gave in the book The Art of Asking 
Questions: “If the direction in which people are leaning on the issue is the type of information 
wanted, it is better not to suggest the middle ground. . . . If it is desired to sort out those with 
more definite convictions on the issue, then it is better to suggest the middle-ground”. 
However, Bishop
768
, in the research on the similarly politically sensitive topics, draws different 
conclusion which say that type of question does matter and the researcher should take into 
consideration the context and consequences when deciding on neutral options.  
 In analysing why respondents choose a neutral option DeMars and Erwin 
769
 say that 
unwillingness to “exert the cognitive effort to form an opinion” might be an explanation”. This 
claim goes in line with Krosnick
770
 assertions that answering the question requires a lot of 
cognitive work and there are various motives which encourage people to put an effort in 
fulfilling this task. The situation in which all examinees behave like in the described situation 
is, however, unrealistic and, on the other hand, some other motives can influence the opposite 
behaviour. Respondents may have no intrinsic motivation to properly involve themselves in the 
answering process and as a result they might select the first reasonable response to the question 
rather than thinking of the accurate one, or to choose the safe option by choosing the option “I 
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don’t know”/ “I have no opinion”, or he could randomly select one response from those 
offered. He further discusses neutral option choice by saying, that despite lack of information 
on the issue, people can choose it because of other reasons such as: ambivalent feelings about 
the topic in the question, they do not understand the question, some think that they need 
thorough knowledge before giving an opinion, and finally, people avoid honest answers when 
they are not flattering. According to Krosnick certain types of people usually choose neutral 
option as an answer, which for instance are: people with limited cognitive skills, people who 
have no personal interest on the topic or those who feel no ability to give an informed opinion.  
The literature also connects the way of answering to cultural characteristics of the 
respondents. Chen et al.
771
 in examining cross-cultural differences in response style regarding 
the use of rating among students from Japan, Taiwan, USA and Canada find that Asian 
students were more likely to select midpoints compared to American colleagues. The different 
practice lay in the different types of culture that they belong to: Asians to collectivistic and 
American to individualistic. The former chose the answers based on individual preferences and 
the latter based on group norms. Johnson et al.
772
 investigated at the country level the effects of 
four cultural dimensions defined by Hofstede on two commonly recognized response biases: 
extreme response style and acquiescent responding. The data were collected from 19 countries 
on five continents. They found that power distance and masculinity are positively correlated 
with extreme response style. On the other hand individualism, uncertainty avoidance, power 
distance and masculinity are negatively associated with acquiescent response behaviour, which 
has as a main goal maintaining harmony and conveying agreeableness. 
When it comes to data analysis some authors suggest that neutral responses should be 
treated as a missing value. For instance, according to Grichting’s773 research, “I don’t know” 
answers are rather expression of ignorance than indifference and as such should not be used as 
midpoints in the scales which measure attitudes, opinions and beliefs. He states that researchers 
should accept this type of answers as valid and relevant and should not be treated as an easy 
escape from answering the questions honestly. On the other hand, Liao
774
 stresses that “I don’t 
know” answers should be taken into account and not treated as missing values because they 
represent another attitude toward the question in between two options by people with certain 
demographic characteristics. He claims that all attitudinal questions may generate this type of 
answer in social science research and therefore should be treated as issue dependent whenever 
they are present (“as few as about 5%”). Madden and Klopfer775 concluded that the stronger the 
intensity of the attitude towards an issue in question  the greater is the exactness of the 
response required by the respondent, which can induce the higher frequency of a neutral 
options. More precisely, if a certain issue is considered more important by the respondent he 
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will choose the neutral option only if he is really unsure. On the other hand if the issue in 
question has no significant importance the midpoint option will be chosen as “the easiest 
response”. 
The application of the Likert scale raises lots of issues discussed in the theory. The 
literature review provided touches upon numerous aspects and leads to the conclusion that 
depending on the topic and the social context which has been investigated, the researcher has to 
decide which approach to the analysis of the data he will choose and which type of scale, 
forced or the regular one, with or without midpoints, and how they will be analysed. The next 
section explains the application of the Likert scale in this concrete research. 
 
5.4.2.2. Application in the RS case 
 
The study in this thesis focuses on the corruption in central government administration 
and it included four Serbian ministries and one institute, which operates under the jurisdiction 
of one of the ministries. In order to provide the higher number of possible examinees, the two 
approaches were chosen to access ministries. One was direct contacts through private 
connections and the other, indirect one, was through e-mails sent to the cabinets of the 
ministers. In the final result the first option was the only successful one and, as mentioned 
above, the questionnaires were distributed to four ministries and one state institute: Ministry of 
energy, Development and Environmental Protection (29 questionnaires returned), Ministry of 
Economy (34), Ministry of Education and Science (32), Ministry of Youth and Sport (29) and 
Institute for nature conservation of Serbia (26). The subjects were chosen randomly and out of 
200 questionnaires given to the ministries 150 were returned filled in. The questionnaire was 
closed type and it had 37Likert Items, grouped in a way to create seven Likert scales developed 
for the purpose of this research. Since these scales are based on the claims made in the 
theoretical part of the thesis and the personal experience of the author’s work in the public 
administration of the Republic of Serbia, it was not possible to identify similar scales in the 
literature. The scales look for the answers in the domain of: PA functioning, mentality of civil 
servants, transparency, punishing of corrupt civil servants and functioning of ant-corruption 
framework. The second set of questions referred only to the basic characteristics of the 
respondents: gender, education, and work experience. The questionnaire is attached to this 
chapter in the Appendix 5.4. 
The questionnaires were distributed in paper form because of the specific mentality of 
the people employed in the ministries who generally express a tendency to think that whatever 
task is performed using the computer and internet it could be traced back to them and therefore 
anonymity is not possible to achieve. However, the paper option caused in some cases similar 
reactions by which the respondents expressed concerns about the anonymity because the 
questions were qualified as “delicate and potentially dangerous”. Some even refused to fill in 
the questionnaire. Reflecting on the situation described, in the introduction of the questionnaire 
it was explained that it was conducted for the scientific purposes and the anonymity of the 
subjects was guaranteed. Even that was not convincing for some of the examinees and the 
comment on the explanation was “they all write it is for scientific purposes” meaning that those 
who run the examinations in the past wrote the same but apparently the results were used for 
some other purposes. The level of distrust might be described the best way with another two 
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situations which occurred during the examination. In two of the five institutions examined the 
researcher was present in the room with the respondents that were leaving the room once they 
finished the filling in of the questionnaire and the new people were coming in instead. The 
whole process lasted around one hour and the half. The subjects were usually quiet and had no 
questions. In one of the ministry, somewhere in the middle of the process, one examinee asked 
the researcher what is the reason for conducting this survey and after the researcher’s reply that 
it was for her Ph.D. thesis, she said “why did not you tell us, we could have been honest while 
replying”. This, as a possible scenario, was predicted in the preparation stage of the research 
and the questions, due to its delicacy, were, to a large extent framed in the way to acquire the 
opinion of civil servants about their colleagues and their behaviour as well as the functioning 
of the administration as a whole. Due to the characteristics of the mentality of people form 
socialist countries (homo sovieticus, described in Chapter 1) it was estimated that if the 
questions were asked directly the answers would be framed in the way that leaves positive 
image of the respondent with the smallest chance of being honest and from these results it 
would not be possible to draw any conclusions. It is true that all described steps taken might 
not be enough to convince people to reply absolutely honestly but the hope was that by using 
this type of examining in measuring attitudes at least some level of honesty might be achieved.  
 
5.4.3. Results and its interpretation  
 
The questionnaire had two parts and at the beginning of each of them the method of 
recording the answers was explained. In the first, Likert-item part, they should have made the 
comments by choosing one of the answers on the five-point scale: strongly disagree, disagree, 
neutral, agree, and strongly agree. Numbers provided next to every question did not assign 
any value to the answer but rather they were replacement for the attitude, which was explained 
to the respondents. This is done only for the practical reasons of printing the questioner. In the 
second part, examinees had to choose one of the options offered to describe their status.  
Coding of the answers of Likert-items was done in accordance to the procedure described 
earlier in the chapter. To each of the different positions of the five-point statement in each item 
values from 1 to 5 were assigned. The negative end received ONE and the positive FIVE. 
Graph 5.6 
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Graph 5.6: Distribution of the answers in total 
 
 
The Graph shows that the final score contains a significant percentage of neutral option, 
24%. Discussion, regarding inclusion and exclusion of neutral option is provided in the 
previous section. In this analysis the third option is included in the questionnaire and in the 
analysis. The reason for this decision is the claim made in this thesis that people in the post-
socialist countries poses specific mind setting characterized by general lack of trust to people 
and institutions which has numerous consequences to the behaviour of people, described in 
Chapter 1. To recall some of the aspects, the existence of verbal delict and its possible severe 
consequences on people, resulted in the development of “double talk” style and distrust of the 
governmental institutions. The situation in Yugoslavia is partially presented in the book written 
by famous Serbian lawyer Rajko Danilovic
776
, who documented various trials which took place 
during the socialist times. In his book he focuses on the “opinion delict”, described earlier, 
which, however, should be distinguished from a “verbal delict”, because verbal delict among 
the other things includes insult and damnation. Danilović explains that in the Criminal law it 
was written that all critics of scientific, artistic and literary acts, performance of political and 
other social duties made without intention to humiliate would be exempted from punishing. 
However, in reality the “opinion delict” covered all the issues exempted from verbal delict and 
its purpose was to discipline everyone, from ordinary people, political opponents, and 
journalists to writers, scientist and artists. The book gives the description of trials and court 
decisions for many distinguished people of that time who were killed, imprisoned or sent to 
work camps. In 2011 Law on rehabilitation was enacted and numerous processes for 
rehabilitation of the above mentioned people were initiated by their descendants. On the other 
hand Serbia still did not open the secret files of people, mostly political opponents, made by the 
regime and which contained detailed activities collected during the surveillance. If all these 
facts are taken into account then the high percentage of neutral answers presented in the Graph 
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5.6, are less surprising and maybe easier to explain since the questions in the survey were 
characterizes by the respondents as “delicate and potentially dangerous”.  
The data were processed in the SPSS programme. This program for the reliability of the 
scale, more precisely its internal consistency, uses Chronbach coefficient alpha whose 
minimum recommended level is .7 in the range from 0 to 1.
777
 Chronbach alpha value provides 
the indication of the average correlation among all the items which make up the scale and it is 
dependent on the number of items in the scale. For testing the assumptions related to each of 
the scale t-test was run. Initially the data were coded according to the researcher’s prediction of 
the situation and as such analysed statistically. As discussed earlier, t-test is one of the many 
which could be applied in the case of Likert-scale data. The t-test is applied when two 
situations are compared. Here it compared the situation depicted by the data with the ideal, 
theoretically constructed one which expresses the view opposite from those of the researcher’s. 
Based on the experience gained during the examination, which implied suspicion and lack of 
trust on the side of civil servants, the null hypothesis for each of the scales was that they will 
choose the middle option in answering “dangerous questions”. This practically means that if 
the mean for a certain scale was higher than 3 they tend to agree more or less strongly with the 
assumption. On the other hand, if the mean was lower than 3 civil servants tend to more or less 
disagree. The confidence interval for t-test was 95%. The results gained for the 7 scales and 
their important numbers are provided in the Tables 5.5 and 5.5.Table 5.6presents the results 
regarding the public administration and its operation while Table 5.5 discusses issues regarding 
corruption. The results of the T-tests run are provided in the Appendix 5.5 of this chapter. What 
could be seen is that the mean for each of the scales go slightly above or below the 3. This 
means that in replying to the questions civil servants in general avoided expressing the opinion, 
mainly choosing the middle option.  
 
Table 5.5: Summary of the five scales related to PA operating  
Hypothesis No. of 
quest. 
Quest. Cronbach’s 
Alpha 
Mean T-Test 
PA is not 
reformed 
14 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 
7, 20, 21, 22, 
24, 25, 26, 27 
.824 3.38 0.0000 
PSM is not the 
main reason for 
accepting the job 
in PA 
7 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 
7, 
.710 3.3 0.0000 
PA is functioning 
on old way 
7 20, 21, 22, 24, 
25, 26, 27 
.820 3.36 0.0000 
Homo Sovieticus 
is still alive 
8 8, 9, 10, 11, 
19, 23, 28, 29 
. 865 2.92 0.8698 
PA does not work 
transparently 
7 12, 13, 14, 15, 
16, 17, 18  
.769 2.75 1.0000 
 
 The first scale is made of two composite scales and aims to look closer to the reform of 
public administration. These questions refer to the ways of the recruitment for the job 
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(questions: 1, 2, 3), reasons for accepting the job (quest.: 4, 5, 6, 7) and rules of running PA 
(quest.:  20, 21, 22, 24, 25, 26, 27).Chapter 2 discusses in details the structure of public 
administration and effective rules for its operating. An important part in the transformation of 
transitional countries is abandoning of the socialist rules of PA functioning by implementing 
the Weberian or Neo-Weberian rules. The assumption in the case of Serbia was that besides the 
efforts described earlier in this chapter, the administration is still not reformed, which is also 
stated in the literature and in the reports of various international organizations. T-test shows 
that civil servants slightly tend to support this assumption. In further analysis this group of 
questions was divided into two subgroups which are analysed separately. One group analyses 
the motivation for choosing the public serve job and included questions from 1 to 7, and it is 
presented in the second row in the Table. The assumption was that public service (intrinsic) 
motivation is not the main reason for accepting the job in public administration and it was 
again slightly supported. The second subscale includes questions from 20 to 27 without 23, and 
the assumption was that PA still functions in the old, socialist, way to which civil servants, 
again, slightly tend to agree. 
 Another issue which is considered important in this research is specific mentality of 
people in post-socialist countries, called in the literature homo sovieticus, discussed in the 
Chapter 1. Questions targeted the issues which are considered crucial, and which represent 
point of divergence between socialist and Weberian type of administration. These issues are: 
respecting the legality principle, following the merit based criteria for recruitment and 
promotion, presence of the culture of quasi-activity, care about public interest, taking 
responsibility for the acts, and independency in making professional decision. The questions 
that cover them are under the numbers 8, 9, 10, 11, 19, 23, 28, and 29. The assumption in this 
case was that people are still operating in the old socialist manner, or framed to sound 
catchier, homo sovieticus is still alive. However, from the responses collected it could be said 
that civil servants in this case tend to slightly disagree.  
 Transparency of PA is considered as one of the important aspects in fight against 
corruption. The detailed discussion on this issue is presented in Chapter 3. In the present study 
the questions 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, and 18 referred to the transparency of the ministries and 
civil servants’ attitude about it. They were asked to reflect upon the information flow between 
the colleagues in the same department and in different departments, their familiarity with the 
Law on Classified Information and compliance with it, the availability of the information to the 
clients and the role of the Commissioner for Information of Public Importance in the work of 
PA. The scale actually measure two dimensions of transparency, one internal and one external, 
related to the outside “watchdog” in the form of Commissioner for information of the public 
importance.  The assumption was that the public administration work is not transparent and 
again, it faced very weak disagreement.  
Regarding corruption, the two scales aimed to provide the insights of civil servants 
regarding two things: punishing of corrupt servants and effectiveness of the anti-corruption 
framework. The first scale seeks for the opinion on the effectiveness of the anti-corruption 
framework which is in place in Serbia and included the questions regarding ethical codex, 
strategy for corruption combat, integrity plan, special units for corruption combat within the 
institution and finally internal motivation of civil servants for reporting corruption. The 
assumption was that the anti-corruption framework is not effective to which they tend to agrees 
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lightly. The second scale asked questions about the existence of clear internal mechanisms for 
control of the work of civil servants, the punishment of corrupt civil servants, and application 
of disciplinary administrative measures. The assumption made in this case was that corrupt 
civil servants are not internally punished for their misdeeds and again the answers provided 
slight agreement with the assumption.  
 
Table 5.6: Summary of the two scales related to corruption 
Hypothesis No. of quest. Quest. Cronbach’s 
Alpha 
Mean T-Test 
AC framework 
is not effective 
5 32, 33, 34, 35, 
36 
.703 3.38 0.0000 
Corrupt CS are 
not punished 
3 30, 31, 37 .727 3.29 0.0000 
 
 The ratio of women and men civil servants is 2:1 and the same is for elder and young 
civil servants. A couple of respondents, more precisely 7 of them, did not fill in the second part 
of the questionnaire. The estimation regarding the age was that opinion of young civil servants 
will defer significantly from those of the elder ones because they should not be influenced by 
the old way of thinking and regime. However, the average scores of their responses are 
compared show no difference (Appendix 5.6). There are two possible explanations for this 
result. One is that the situation reflected by civil servants is realistic and the age difference 
does not influence the view on the issues reflected in the survey. Another possible explanation 
goes in line with the assumption made earlier that PA is not reformed. In that case since the 
administration operated in the old way and for instance, the process of recruitment is not 
transparent and not merit-based the possibility is that candidates are chosen on this basis to fit 
in the old system and not to change the existing one and therefore their opinion cannot differ 
significantly from those of their elder colleagues. Graphs 5.7 and 5.8 present the percentages 
of the answers distribution. Regarding the gender the data show no difference because the 
distribution of answers is almost the same. The Graphs are located in the Appendix 5.7. 
 
Graph 5.7: Distribution of answers by young civil servants 
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Graph 5.8: Distribution of answers by elder civil servants 
 
 
 
5.5. Conclusion 
 
The case study of this chapter was the Republic of Serbia, one of the ex-Yugoslavian 
countries. Yugoslavia had different approach towards the socialism and, Serbia, as its largest 
republic is considered representative enough for the study since it shares history but also 
common problems with the rest of the five republics with which they once created the single 
country. Yugoslavia had different institutional settings and one which is particularly relevant 
for this thesis is the setting of public administration. Unlike the other CEE socialist countries, it 
treated for certain period of time civil servants as special category of people who, according to 
public opinion, enjoyed respect and whose job was perceived as prestigious. In the later stage 
the different treatment disappeared but the opinion stayed even until present times since the 
researches show that 40% of young people in Serbia would accept the job in public service due 
to its security.  
The operation of the administration, besides various attempts of decentralization and 
reforms, in essence followed very similar patterns like the other socialist countries. Strong 
hierarchy, centralization and party control, were one of the main characteristics which were 
fertile ground for the development and operation of homo sovieticus. From this starting point, 
when the socialist system collapsed six countries formed after the breakup of Yugoslavia 
started their transition. From the year 2000 Serbia introduced “shock therapy” as an economic 
reform strategy, which in many aspects did not provide desired outcomes. The reform of public 
administration started four years later with the adoption of various laws and regulations 
modelled according to the EU requirements, since Serbia as many post-socialist countries on its 
political agenda has the EU membership as one of the priority goals. From this prospective, the 
legal framework is in place. However, its enforcement is described by the literature and various 
researches as problematic because the old socialist practice still prevails in the public 
administration operating. Merit-based criteria for recruitment and promotion are not followed, 
transparency and accountability are lacking, and the administrative system is expanded largely 
by various agencies and other public bodies which reduces coordination capacities and as such 
efficiency.  
In the described situation corruption is perceived as one of the dominant problems for 
the state functioning. Serbia, like in the previous case, adopted all necessary laws and 
established various bodies with the main task of fighting corruption. However, the results are 
Ana Jakovljević, LL.M 
250 
 
the same like in the case of public administration reform. GCB index of the corruption in 
public service in Serbia scores 4.2 out of 5 which indicate that it is perceived as highly corrupt. 
The opinion of civil servants is that institutions do not cooperate enough in the corruption fight 
and almost 70% of them think that Serbia lacks the will for a serious corruption fight but do not 
see themselves as part of the “will”. This could be explained by the fact that they still see the 
outside factors as controlling in the institutions and do not perceive themselves as contributors, 
which is connected to the previous claims that public administration operates in the old way.  
The qualitative research conducted in this thesis, which as a basis had the working 
experience of the researcher in Serbian public administration and theoretical framework 
constructed in previous chapters, provided in a way expected results. Civil servants in this case 
mainly have chosen the neutral option for expressing their opinion. This was not surprising 
since during the examination process the questions were mainly characterised as potentially 
dangerous and these comments reflected the high level of suspicion and mistrust which is still 
present among them. The provided analysis seems to point to the direction of the prevention in 
terms of education and mentality change as necessary steps for corruption combat 
improvement. The anti-corruption pyramid suggested in previous chapters provides sound 
arguments for the involvement of public servants as active participants in the public 
administration functioning. It aimed first to select people who are willing to pursue public 
goals and involves them as active part of the state institutions. This means that these people 
should be prone to follow the values which promote professionalism and in that environment, 
the enforcement of law should increase and punishment mechanism should improve since 
corruption would be perceived as a serious problem and as such more detectable because of the 
willingness of professionals to report misdeeds.  
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Appendix 5.1 
 
Table: GDP per capita  
Country 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 
Bulgaria  1.651  2.912  4.773  6.044  5.597 
Czechoslovakia  3.501  5.108  6.466  7.982  8.513 
Hungary   2.480  3.649  5.028  6.306  6.459 
Poland  2.447  3.215  4.428  5.740  5.113 
Romania  1.182  1.844  2.853  4.135  3.511 
Yugoslavia  1.428  2.370  3.945  6.297  5.646 
USSR  2.841  3.945  5.575  6.427  6.894 
UK 6.939 8.645 10.767 12.931 16430 
France 5.189 7.398 11.410 14.766 17.647 
USA 9.561 11.328 15.030 18.577 23.201 
Source: Maddison project 
 
Appendix 5.2 
 
Table: Number of citizen’s petitions to the Council per year 
Period Number of citizens petitions 
2003 296 
2004 572 
2005 332 
2006 273 
2007 252 
2008 240 
2009 180 
 2010 202 
2011 222 
2012 182 
Source: The Anti-corruption Council web-site 
 
Appendix 5.3 
 
Table: Complaints for the access to the information 
No./Year 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Accepted 619 510 564 894 933 
In 
total 
1416 2067 2625 2330 3335 
% 44% 25% 21% 38% 28% 
Source: Annual report of the Commissioner 
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Appendix 5.4 
 
QUESTIONNAIRE  
I part: On the questions below, please reply by choosing one of the statements provided: I 
strongly disagree, I disagree, I have no opinion, I agree and I strongly agree.  
1. In practice a recruitment for a job in public service goes through open competition                                                                        
2. In practice a recruitment for a job in public service goes through political parties                                                                      
3. In practice a recruitment for a job in public service goes through family/friendly ties                                                
4. In Serbia, a job in public service is one of the most desired ones        
5. A job in public service is desired because of the life tenure       
6. A job in public service is desired because of the privileges and prestige associated to it                                                                    
7. A job in public service is desired because of the opportunity to serve public interest                                                            
8. Atmosphere at work stimulates me to work scrupulously                                     
9. Diligent and accountable civil servants’ work is adequately rewarded in the Ministry                         
10. The culture of quasi-activity is present in the Ministry    
11. Civil servants care about public interest while performing their job                                                                 
12.  Civil servants are familiar with the Law on Free Access to Information of Public 
Importance  
13. The exchange of the information relevant for work flows without obstacles among the 
colleagues in the same department  
14. The exchange of the information relevant for work flows without obstacles among the 
colleagues in various departments 
15. As confidential is considered only the information which is as such prescribed by the 
Classified information Law  
16. The Commissioner for information of public importance and personal data protection is 
highly important institution for transparent work of public institutions  
17. Clients of the ministry are able to receive from it any information to which they are entitled 
to by law  
18. Civil servants treat clients with respect  
19. Civil servant is responsible for his work and potential mistakes made  
20. Number of processed files affects the grade which civil servant receives from the direct 
superior  
21. Complexity of the files processes are graded more than the number processed  
22. Compliance with the instructions of the superior significantly influences the grade of civil 
servant 
23. Civil servant is independent in decision-making process  
24. Civil service is depoliticized/professionalized  
25. Managers in the public administration are appointed according to the merit-based criteria as 
prescribed by the Law on civil servants  
26. Managers in the public administration are appointed as party members  
27. The work of managers is evaluated in accordance to the established criteria  
28. Competence of the candidate is crucial issue for the recruitment in public administration  
29. Civil servants respect legality principle in decision-making  
30. The ministry has clearly defined criteria for the control of the work of civil servants  
31. Corrupt civil servant are punished for their misdeeds 
32. Current Code of Ethics which regulates the behaviour of civil servants  is clearly defined  
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33. Special units for corruption combat within the ministries substantially contribute to the 
fight against corruption   
34. Every civil servant is obliged to report cases of corruption that he has knowledge about  
35. Strategy for corruption combat clearly defines  the ways in which state should approach 
fight against corruption  
36. Ministry Integrity plan, made upon the request of the Anti-corruption agency has correctly 
detected risks of corruption and as such it has provided adequate solutions for their 
neutralisation  
37. Disciplinary sanctions are always applied when necessary  
 
II part: general characteristics of the respondents 
 
1. Gender : male /female 
2. Level of education: high school / college / master / magisterium / Ph.D. 
3. Age:  а) 20-30      б) 30-40          ц) 40- 50        д) over 50 
4. For how long do you work in public administration: а) up to 5 years  б) up to 10 years  ц) 
up to 20  д) up to 30 and more 
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Appendix 5.6 
Table: Age and gender response differences 
Age/gender Mean 
20-40 (46) 3.17 
40-65(97) 3.13 
 
Women (93 ) 3.10 
Men (50 ) 3.21 
 
Appendix 5.7 
Graph: Distribution of responses by women 
 
 
Graph: Distribution of answers by men 
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Chapter 6: Conclusions and policy implications 
 
6.1. Introduction 
 
Discussion on corruption draws significant attention in present times, equally among 
the researchers and ordinary people. This does not come as a surprise since its effects are 
considered very harmful to society. The increased interest in corruption in last two decades 
came as a result of couple of changes that happened around the world. Collapse of socialist 
systems, the increased influence of media and globalization are marked as one of the main 
causes for a high rank of corruption on the international agenda. The definition of corruption 
which will be comprehensive enough to include various acts which are considered corrupt still 
does not exist. However, the one which is widely and commonly used by researcher and policy 
makers is that it presents a misuse of public office for private gains. Various researches show 
that corruption has harmful effects on the societies, especially on those with weak social 
institutions. Corruption is therefore seen as a complex phenomenon which should be tackled 
comprehensively. The discussion of corruption in the law and economics approach is mainly 
run under the veil of Public choice theory. This theory claims that public officials are rational 
self-maximiser and as such they aim to pursue their own agenda even though they should care 
for public interest. The closer analysis of the incentive mechanisms is in this respect made 
within the principal-agent model, introduced by Susan Rose-Ackerman in 1978. In this model 
citizens are seen as principals and public officials as agents. Since an agent is better informed 
than the principal, the main principal’s action is therefore to limit the opportunities which 
agents can abuse and gain benefits which according to the agreement belong to the principal. 
This could be achieved through various strategies of monitoring and sanctioning of an agent.  
Since corruption is recognised as transnational phenomenon numerous international 
actors, such as the UN, the OECD and the Council of Europe, took steps which they considered 
necessary in order to assist countries around the world in fight against it. Their anti-corruption 
policies adopted the above described principle-agent approach and as such created a repression 
-prevention-transparency model for corruption combat. The dominant aspect of this model 
presents deterrence since a variety of international conventions insist on criminalisation of 
various acts of power abuse. Based on this model, countries around the world adopted anti-
corruption strategies as part of their legal rules. However, the recent researches on the effects 
of this move show non impressive results. The argument that “one size does not fit all” is one 
of the main raised by the critics. The explanation for this claim, according to criticizers, comes 
from the fact that not all countries are the same because their institutional setting varies. The 
dominant approach asks for overreliance on the criminal justice system, judiciary and police, 
taking for granted their impartiality and effectiveness. However, this situation is more the 
exception than the rule in many countries around the world. The main problem of this approach 
according to some researcher lies in the fact that in these countries institutions do not function 
because, even though people condemn corruption, they engage in it because they lack trust in 
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other citizens and think that all the others are doing the same. This is identified as collective 
action problem as opposed to the principal-agent model.  
Among the countries which experience the problem of corruption, even though they 
follow the dominant anti-corruption trends, are transitional, post-socialist countries. To this 
group belong the countries which are emerging from centrally planned to an open market 
economy. To achieve this change the establishment of new institutions is the main goal and 
after the state’s collapse international financial institutions took the leading advisory role and 
promoted the immediate implantation of the ideas grounded in the neoclassical economy. 
However, the results of this approach revealed important shortcomings, of which increased 
corruption was one. This outcome amplified the voices of institutional economists who from 
the beginning argued for gradualist approach towards the institutional change. Their claims 
pointed out that the change of formal institutions is not difficult to achieve. It is enough to 
change the written laws according to the requirements. However, the informal institutions are 
those which stay for a long time in people as “mental models” and they could not be changed 
overnight. These claims ask for deeper analysis of the social systems and their mechanisms 
before engaging in a design of any reform policy.  
Following these claims, the conclusion might be that any sound anti-corruption policy 
implemented in post-socialist countries should take into account their idiosyncrasies which are 
the results of the previous regime. The closer look at socialism provides an interesting 
description in terms of its institutional setting, mentality of the individuals and their 
interrelation. Although in theory designed as a system which should increase wealth and 
cooperation among the people, socialism failed to fulfil its promise. In order to cover the 
failure, the system instead of making people free, imprisoned them figuratively and in large 
number of cases literally. As a result of the repression and distorted incentives, homo sovieticus 
was born. Imagined as a super hero, he ended up as a sceptical, amoral creature who sees 
nothing wrong in stealing from the state. In addition he has no trust in people outside its small 
circle and he has no trust in public authorities. If compared to homo economicus, it could be 
said that they both aim to maximise their wealth but homo economics does that by respecting 
the institutional framework of the game which channels its behaviour and coordinates it with 
other players (invisible hand of the market).  
This description is here taken as a starting point from which transitional countries 
departed on their journey. In the last two decades their achievements regarding the change 
vary. Some of them perform better than the others in many aspects including the fight against 
corruption as well, which TICPI shows. However, another index, the Global Corruption 
Barometer, shows that perception of corruption in civil service in these countries is still high. 
There is an indication that homo sovieticus changed to a certain extent but when all arguments 
are put together it is highly likely that he still lives in the civil service. Therefore the crucial 
question is what measures should be employed in order to change him and make him accept the 
values of the new system. This thesis aimed to answer this question in context of corruption 
combat improvement. The focus of this research was on the corruption of civil servants in post-
socialist countries. Therefore, the main research question posed was: What is the optimal 
enforcement design of anti-corruption policies for corruption combat in public 
administration of post-socialist countries?  The answer to this question aimed to suggest the 
model of anti-corruption policy whose costs and benefits for the society would be balanced 
Ana Jakovljević, LL.M 
258 
 
since the current approach has been shown as suboptimal with high costs for society and little 
benefits. Therefore, this thesis suggests that instead of dominant anti-corruption scheme 
repression-prevention-transparency, in the fight against corruption of civil servants in post-
socialist countries the new anti-corruption scheme structure-conduct-performance should be 
employed.  
6.2. Structure 
The first element of the paradigm, structure refers to the formal institutional setting of 
public administration. As described in the Chapter 2 it varies across societies depending on the 
general values according to which it operates. Three types of societies and their institutional 
settings of public administration were analysed in this thesis: socialist, capitalist and 
transitional. The three types are important for transitional countries in order to depict the whole 
process through which these countries are going. From socialism as a starting point, in 
transition their aim is full implementation of formal and informal institutional setting of 
capitalism. Even though one could think that with defined starting and end points the journey 
should not be that difficult, the situation of transitional countries provides a different 
conclusion. Although they all started from the same point, during the transition they took 
various paths because suggestions coming from a capitalist world differed. This differentiation 
is reflected in the literature on public administration in capitalist societies and shows a vivid 
discussion about which option, among the different structural organizations: Weberian 
bureaucracy, New Public Management, Neo Weberian State and Good governance, is the best 
solution for the fulfilment of public administration purpose. The variety of options for the final 
destination brought eve more confusion to people in transitional countries who were already 
confused by the state collapse. Therefore, the conclusions that reform the process of public 
administration in post-socialist countries did not produce substantial results, comes as no 
surprise. This brings us again to the claim that before pursuing of any reform, specific 
characteristic of certain country(ies) should be taken into account. This is especially important 
for the reform of public administration in post-socialist countries because its meaning during 
the socialist time was substantially different compared to the one in capitalist societies. Public 
administration is a very important aspect of the state’s organization and its functioning largely 
affects life of its citizens. In that respect corruption appears as the ultimate proof. In the 
literature on corruption administration is seen as one of the important sources for its creation. 
Behaviour of corrupt public administration is in general seen as deviation from the prescribed 
behaviour and as such should be treated with adequate means. This view is also nowadays 
widely accepted, at least formally, among transitional countries. 
 Putting all arguments together the sub-research question of the Chapter2 was: What is 
the optimal structure of public administration in post-socialist countries for improving 
corruption combat? In order to answer the question, the research started from the analysis of 
dominant strategies recommended for corruption combat: privatization, decentralization, 
deregulation, payment increase and establishment of special anti-corruption bodies. However, 
various researches show mixed and sometimes unsatisfying results of their implementation 
especially when applied in the context of post-socialist countries. One of the explanations for 
this outcome might lie in the fact that the majority of strategies for corruption combat in public 
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administration are coming from the capitalist societies which have well established public 
administration and values and in that context corruption presents rather exception than the rule. 
Principal agent model therefore should work because of principal’s ability and willingness to 
monitor and punish the wrongdoers. In post socialist society history of administration is 
substantially different as well as its characteristics and values. In that context corruption was 
rather the rule than the exception and there was no principal willing to monitor and punish. 
This implies that in these countries the “proper” public administration should be established in 
the first place. Public administration literature suggests that this could be achieved by 
implementing the principles of either Weberian bureaucracy or Neo Weberian State. The 
establishment of proper understanding of the values and the role of public administration 
should lead to the attitude which condemns corruption and treats it as deviating behaviour.  
Another aspect which is also considered crucial here relates to the structure of people 
employed in public administration. Public service motivation appears to be assumed in 
discussion about various types of public administration. This might be explained by the fact 
that in capitalist societies the distinction between public and private sector always existed and 
people were able to make choice among the two, based on their characteristics and personal 
preferences. However, socialism had no such distinction. Public administration beside civil 
service included public companies as well. Practically everybody worked for the state and 
directly or indirectly for the Socialist/Communist party because of non-existing alternative. 
From this perspective it appears crucial that in this transitional phase the recruitment and 
promotion processes should take into account the level of PSM of a particular candidate. This 
appears important since the first studies show the negative correlation between PSM and 
corruption.  
To conclude, the current structure of public administration in post-socialist countries is, 
according to the Global Corruption Barometer, suboptimal. Even though they all applied many 
formal changes the citizens still have perception of them as corrupt. In order to improve 
corruption combat these countries should implement the structure and values of NWS or 
Weberian bureaucracy. This in general should not induce high costs since majority of 
transitional countries formally had to comply with the EU requirements and adopt laws which 
promote merit based criteria for recruitment and promotion, legality as dominant principle of 
operation and professionalization without political influence. Some costs might be induced 
regarding the replacement of some of the NPM elements which are not included in the NWS 
approach. However, this aspect is open for future discussion. Finally, the selection of candidate 
should aim to employ those with high PSM in order to stress the importance of public goals 
and the role of public administration in pursuing it. This also should not be too costly for the 
administrations in post-socialist countries since many of them have established human resource 
offices and testing for PSM could be added to their task lists. Therefore, NWS or WB plus 
PSM provide optimal structure for corruption combat in post-socialist countries.  
6.3. Conduct 
The second element conduct, in the paradigm structure-conduct-performance, is here 
analysed through two aspects. The first targets the preferences and the second imposes 
constraints. Departing from the dominant Deterrence approach applied in cases of corruption 
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this thesis advocates the application of Responsive Regulation Approach, which combines 
Cooperative and Deterrence approach together. More precisely in one strategy, preferences are 
targeted and constraints are imposed. This mixed strategy is depicted in the anti-corruption 
pyramid constructed here for the post-socialist countries. As previously said this pyramid ranks 
the elements from the dominant anti-corruption approach repression-prevention-transparency 
because their values are not the same regarding the corruption combat in transitional countries. 
The pyramid puts first prevention, than transparency and finally repression.  
Anti-corruption pyramid 
 
 
The explanation for this argument lies in the specific characteristic which public 
administration of these countries possesses. More precisely, the penalties are imposed for the 
behaviour which deviates from the usual one and their aim is to deter people from committing 
offences in the future. Deterrence is also expensive method because it requires monitoring and 
processing wrongdoers in the way by which their rights are respected. If the deterrence 
approach is put in the context where corruption is not an exception but rather the rule, it is less 
likely that it might achieve a significant result. Since corruption is not stigmatized, it is more 
difficult for detection because parties in this secret agreement have no incentives to report it. 
This further means that without detection the prosecution is not possible as well as sanctions 
imposition. Therefore, prevention in terms of mentality change should be in the basis of any 
sound anti-corruption policy designed for post-socialist countries, like in the basis of anti-
corruption pyramid. Transparency should be in the middle, again as a soft method for 
influencing the mental model. Finally, when the necessary ground is established, repression 
could be used in its capacity and meaning. What could be observed here that the mixed strategy 
presented in the pyramid demands administration itself to engage in corruption combat, leaving 
criminal justice system as the ultimate weapon, used only for the very harmful misdeeds. With 
Deterrence: 
criminal 
sanctions 
Deterrence: 
adminsitrative 
sanctions 
Transparncy and 
accountability 
Propensity to corruption:            
culture 
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this self-control mechanism, administration should be able to build internal coherence and 
strength. There is no doubt that corruption harms societies in many ways and that policy 
makers should promote zero tolerance of corruption. However in case of transitional countries 
instead of the first best, for a while the second best solution should be applied which is 
suggested by the anti-corruption pyramid(s). Going one step back does not necessarily mean 
the failure but rather taking a run up for faster improvement.  
6.3.1. Targeting/Coordinating preferences 
 
Culture represents collective programing of mind of certain group of people according 
to which they express patterns of feeling, thinking and acting. This further means that culture is 
learned. In general culture embodies preferences towards certain behaviour. The essential for 
this thesis is considered the culture of homo sovieticus, an imaginary person who represents the 
personification of the values and ideas of socialist systems. Originally created in theory as a 
superb human being, during the time it became its antagonism. His characteristics are learned 
helplessness, amoral familism and culture of quasi-activity. Because of the system’s oppression 
he has no respect or trust in it and develops as a consequence doublethink system of operating. 
In this context he does not condemn corruption because sometimes it might be the only means 
of fulfilling his basic needs because of the existence of no others. The relation of homo 
sovieticus and corruption is very intuitive, however literature does not provide closer insights. 
In order to access its characteristics, some other well-established cultural aspects are employed 
here such as universalism and particularism, individualism and collectivism and power 
distance.  According to this differentiation, homo sovieticus is a particularistic, collectivistic 
person who accepts power differences, authorities and privileges. On the other hand, dominant 
anti-corruption strategies assume in their design a person with opposite characteristics, an 
universalist, individualist who does not accept power difference, authorities and privileges. In 
general it could be said that people in post-socialist countries are somewhere in between these 
two extremes. However, it appears that in public administration, due to its specific context in 
the past, the mentality leans towards the negative end of the line, more precisely towards the 
homo sovieticus.  
Regarding the discussion provided above the sub-research question imposed in this case 
was: How the preferences of civil servants should be targeted/coordinated in order to achieve 
the optimal level of corruption combat in public administration of post-socialist countries. 
The answer lies in the creation of expressive norms which should coordinate civil servants 
behaviour and adjust it to internalise values of universalism, individualism and low power 
distance. By shifting the equilibrium to desired behaviour the demand for extensive monitoring 
should decrease and its costs as well. Alongside the described cultural values the culture of 
openness and accountability should be promoted. It is essential to convey the message to public 
servants that any information which they possess is in the ownership of the public for whom 
they work, and not anymore for the Party and its interests.  
Practical implication of the first two layers of the pyramid lie within the structure of the 
public administration elaborated in the previous chapter. To remind the reader, regarding the 
values the institutions should be structure according to the Neo Weberian State (NWS) as the 
first best solution and regarding the structure of the individuals, they should pose Public 
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Service Motivation (PSM) as a necessary characteristic for high level performance. NWS 
gathers the best of traditional public administration and the New Public Management and 
human resource management (HRM) received greater attention under the auspice of the 
latter
778
. In the implementation of the anti-corruption pyramid they might play a crucial role. 
Since in the reform of public administration transitional countries followed the trends set by the 
international actors and mainly established the HRM offices the creation costs would not be 
induced by this suggestion. The analysis of their performance shows that their more active 
engagement is required in order to support “financial and social pressures for good 
governance”779. Table 6.1provides the overview for some of the HRM offices in post socialist 
countries.  
Table 6.1: HRM offices in transitional countries 
Country HRM office 
 name 
Jurisdiction over 
recruitment 
Transparency 
laws 
Accountability 
framework for 
managers 
Albania Department of Public 
Administration 
decentralised, entrusted 
to the ministries but 
slightly more 
standardized comparing 
to other Balkan 
countries 
Yes  Yes  
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 
Civil Service Agencies decentralised, entrusted 
to the ministries but 
slightly more 
standardized comparing 
to other Balkan 
countries 
Yes  Yes  
Croatia Central State Office for 
Administration 
decentralised, entrusted 
to the ministries 
Yes  Yes  
Czech Republic  Department for Effective 
Public Administration 
delegated to ministries 
with broadly 
comparable framework 
across all central 
government employees 
Yes  Yes  
Estonia Department of Public 
Administration and Public 
Service, 
along with other bodies 
managed by ministries 
and units/teams with 
significant differences 
across them. 
Yes  no general 
framework exists 
Hungary Centre of Human 
Resource Management for 
Public Administration 
managed by ministries 
with broadly 
comparable framework 
across all of central 
government 
Yes  no general 
framework exists 
FYR Macedonia Civil 
Service Agency 
decentralised, entrusted 
to the ministries but 
slightly more 
standardized comparing 
to other Balkan 
countries 
Yes  Yes  
Montenegro Human Resource 
Management Authority 
recruitment system is 
decentralised, entrusted 
to the ministries 
Yes  Yes but not 
implemented 
Poland Head of Civil Service, delegated to ministries Yes  Yes  
                                                          
778Brown, K. A. (2004): “Human Resource Management in the Public Sector”, Public Management Review, Vol. 
6, Issue 3, 2004, pp. 303–309 
779
Liebert, S., Condrey, S. E. and Goncharov, D. (eds.) (2013): Public Administration in Post-Communist 
Countries, CRC Press, 2013, pp. 350 
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supported by the 
Department of Civil 
Service 
with significant 
differences across them 
Serbia Human Resource 
Management Service 
recruitment system is 
decentralised, entrusted 
to the ministries 
Yes  Yes  
Slovenia Directorate for Public 
Sector 
decentralised, entrusted 
to the ministries with 
significant differences 
across them. 
 no general 
framework exists 
Slovakia No central HR body exists decentralised, entrusted 
to the ministries but 
with comparable 
framework across all 
central government 
Yes  no general 
framework exists 
Romania National Agency of Civil 
Servants 
Employment issues 
managed by ministries 
Yes   
Russia Ministry of Labour and 
Social Development 
decentralised, entrusted 
to the ministries with 
significant differences 
across them 
Yes  does not exist 
Source: OECD HRM country profile and SIGMA report for 2012 
 
The reports780show that HRM offices mainly have coordination and legislative role but 
the process of selection and recruitment is in large part delegated to the individual ministries, 
which as a consequence shows different practice regarding the standardization of employment 
conditions, performance appraisal and equal opportunities. Since they mainly have jurisdiction 
over the rules enactments, such as code of conduct, they might also take part in the designing 
of a cultural test on the values discussed in this thesis, which should assist ministries in the 
selection of candidates. One of the limitations mentioned regarding the cultural models is that 
one should not assume that in one country all people are the same. Therefore the system which 
targets those who pose the values opposite from ones promoted by the old system, should be 
promoted. However, these tests should be used only together with the tests which asses the 
knowledge and skills of the candidate required for the position that he applies to. Of course, 
this approach assumes implementation of merit-based criteria for the recruitment and 
promotion. All these factors combined together might be able to provide competent people 
with the values which support enforcement of public goals rather than individual interests. By 
promoting these values and introducing new people into the institutions their behaviour might 
affect those who are already employed and change their habits and perception of the work.  
Transparency and accountability of public administration in post socialist countries has 
had a difficult past. They started their journey from complete denial with the aim to reach the 
level of implementation necessary for good governance. This means that civil servants in these 
counters have to learn the real meaning of these terms and comply with them. In theory, people 
selected on the way in the first pyramid layer people should work transparently and poses the 
accountability as virtue. However, external mechanisms for control are necessary to be in 
place. The third column in the Table shows that all observed countries have in place necessary 
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Source: OECD Management Country Profile, available at: http://www.oecd.org/gov/pem/hrpractices.htm and 
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OECD 
Ana Jakovljević, LL.M 
264 
 
legal framework for improving transparency
781
. However, the implementation is mainly 
questionable. It is not realistic in this moment to provide an overview of the transparency 
mechanisms of the administration for each transitional country, this might be a subject of 
another research, but in the IT era variety of software are available which are able to provide 
better insights into the “black box” of civil service administration. For instance, if colleagues in 
particular sector are able to observe basic facts of the files which are processed in the 
department, the respected deadlines established by the law for decision making and so on, it 
would be easier to assess formal performance of each employee. Regular staff meetings should 
also contribute to the creation of the environment of openness and transparency. In this 
environment the accountability should be perceived as logical consequence and not terrifying 
and severe acts like the one conducted in the past mainly caused by the violation of ideological 
rules. The approach towards the accounting and accountability also has a cultural aspect. 
According to Hofstede
782
 accounting and management control systems are “manifestations of 
culture and reflect basic cultural assumptions”. He claims that his analysis is based on 
“impressions and conjectures” since they were not extensively studied in cultural context. 
Accountants are unlikely to “become heroes” in organizations but they have an important role 
because they determine the good and the bad guys by using device called “accountability” to 
hold someone personally responsible for the results. For instance, in individualistic cultures the 
information in the accounting system is taken more seriously than in collectivistic ones. In 
large power distance societies accounting systems are often used for the purpose of justifying 
the top power holders’ decisions. The system is also more detailed and theoretically based 
“pretending to derive from consistent general economic principles. This view supports previous 
suggestions for the necessity of creation of cultural environment which would promote 
universal values and care for public good.  
In the discussion on the first pyramid layer it was pointed out that cultural aspects 
should be taken into account in the recruitment process and that “new people” might bring new 
values to confront the old behaviour. However, in general the percentage of new people is 
usually small and therefore their behaviour should be supported by the incentive system which 
could be applied to all workers in order to successfully confront the old values. For this 
purpose the reward mechanisms might be established to promote the desired behaviour 
described in the two anti-corruption pyramid layers. Nevertheless, this system should be clearly 
defined and transparent in order to avoid any misuse. 
6.3.2. Putting constraints 
Another aspect of conduct element, besides coordinating preference, includes imposing 
constraints on human behaviour. In the anti-corruption pyramid they are located in the two top 
layers. In dominant anti-corruption framework, repression-prevention-transparency, the first 
component weighs more compared to two others. International conventions insist on 
criminalisation of various corrupt acts which countries signatures are expected to comply with. 
These requirements are understandable from the point of policy makers who usually declare 
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zero tolerance of corruption since it imposes severe consequences on societies impeding their 
development and living standard of citizens. However, using a criminal justice system is costly 
for the society and in some countries is hampered by corruption as well like the other 
institutions in the society.  This practically means that even though it is formally in charged for 
corruption combat, in reality is less likely that it actually complete its job. Transitional 
countries with weak economies and in general present systemic corruption fit to this 
description. Law and economics literature provides wide discussion on optimality of 
enforcement systems. Looking into this literature this thesis aimed to answer another sub-
research question: How constrains should be imposed in order to achieve the optimal level of 
corruption combat in public administration of post-socialist countries. 
Human beings behave as rational actors when deciding to commit a crime. They 
calculate benefits and costs of it, by taking into account probability of detection and conviction 
and severity of sanction. More precisely, when a civil servant in a post-socialist country 
engages in bribery he takes into account how likely would be the situation of the detection of 
his crime, would he be convicted and what would be the punishment. According to the current 
situation in majority of transitional countries accepting and giving bribe is prescribed as 
criminal sanction with mainly imprisonment sanction, although alternative exists which are 
aimed to apply in particular cases. The corrupt act in essence presents a secret agreement which 
parties have no incentives to revile due to the possibility of being criminally punished. The 
difficulty of detection might be even higher in post-socialist environment in which in the past 
corruption was not perceived as serious misconduct or deviation from the rules. Furthermore, 
even when it reaches the criminal court the safeguards of human rights imposed on the criminal 
justice system ask that act should be proved beyond reasonable doubt, which might be 
problematic in particular case since usually type of evidence used in investigation are not 
applicable here. For a more sophisticated investigation additional material resources might be 
required which usually transitional countries are not able to provide. Finally, if imprisonment 
as dominantly prescribed sanction is mainly imposed on a wrongdoer, society, already 
burdened with his act, now adds one more costs to the list. This description holds for a well-
functioning criminal justice system. However, the situation becomes even more difficult if it is 
itself burdened with corruption which is detected as a problem in many transitional countries. 
All these obstacles ask different approach than the internationally advocated one.  
In that respect it should be said that not all bribery acts are the same and civil servants 
have more characteristics of white collar criminals than the blue ones. These two facts are 
important for the designing of sound anti-corruption policy in post socialist countries. Bribe 
might be paid for two main reasons. In one a client has according to the law certain right but 
pays the bribe in order speed up the process and in another he pays to obtain the right to which 
he is not entitled to. The former case is here called legal bribery and the latter illegal. If costs of 
two are observed it could be seen that in legal bribery the bearer of the extra fee paid for 
corruption is client itself since the legal act produced upon his request in general has not 
negative consequences for the rest of the society. In a case of illegal bribery the situation is 
opposite. The beneficiaries are the parties involved in bribery and the cost bearer is society. In 
this case is sometimes even difficult to assess the total amount of costs because of no existence 
of a concrete victim. Transitional countries make no distinction in this regards but treat all acts 
from the perspective of giving and receiving bribes. 
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In order to improve corruption combat the suggestion for transitional countries is that 
cases of legal bribery should be sanctioned with administrative disciplinary sanction while 
illegal should be treated with criminal ones. The purpose of running an administrative 
procedure has goals of internalising costs and making people to comply with the rules. 
Criminal law has dominantly punitive character and aims to deter people from committing 
offences in the future. The former one compared to the latter has less strict procedural 
requirements, such as lower level of burden of proof which as a result simplifies procedure and 
less severe sanctions whose imposition is therefore less costly. These characteristic if applied 
to the context of post-socialist countries are likely to improve corruption combat for couple of 
reasons. Public administration in the past had specific meaning and corruption was highly 
tolerated, and therefore punishing corruption with administrative disciplinary sanctions for 
cases of legal corruption may serve the very important goal of conveying the message that the 
values system changed and that corruption is no longer modus operandi. Furthermore, 
punishing only civil servants and letting the other party free, the secrecy of agreement might be 
substantially disturbed which should as a result increase the detection of the bribery cases. 
Regarding costs, the whole procedure in this case would be run within the institution with no or 
very little costly sanctions. The range of the sanctions which could be employed is presented in 
the disciplinary anti-corruption pyramid. The idea here is that gradual application of 
disciplinary sanctions, which should correspond to the act committed besides punishing has an 
educational role for civil servants in post-socialist countries. This educational role is stressed 
with the application of shaming penalties which should improve the effects of administrative 
sanctions.  
 
 
Disciplinary anti-corruption pyramid 
 
 
Cases of illegal corruption based on the decision which breaks the law and which might 
produce large harm to the society should be criminalised. Since the agreement among the 
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parties is stronger in this case, the level of detection is even lower which also reduces the 
probability of sanctioning. In this case costs of criminal law enforcement might be sufficiently 
low compared to the costs induced by the act. However, in this case imprisonment should be, 
as the most expensive sanction, used as the last resort. The gradation of sanction in criminal 
anti-corruption pyramid goes from sanctions which are less expensive and provide higher 
returns to the society, to the more costly with lower or no returns. It was previously argued that 
civil servants possess characteristics of white collar criminals in terms of education, age and 
having a job. As such it would be more beneficiary for society to use their abilities for paying 
the damages instead of incarcerating them. Imprisonment is in cases, in which criminals should 
be removed from the society, like killers or rapists, besides its costs beneficial for the society. 
However, in cases of corruption, and particularly in non-wealthy countries often prescription 
and use of imprisonment in cases of bribery might be more costly than beneficial. Therefore, 
on a case by case basis, regarding the parties involved and the harm caused, the variety of 
sanctions from the pyramid, which in particular case might be efficient and effective, could be 
used. Another suggestion here is that the agreement among the parties could be broken by 
unequal penalties or providing an immunity for a bribe-giver.  
 
Criminal anti-corruption pyramid 
 
In conclusion, the answer to the sub-research question: How constraints should be 
imposed in order to achieve the optimal level of corruption combat in public administration 
of post-socialist countries is by differentiating the cases of bribery, to legal and illegal, and by 
applying two type of procedures, administrative and criminal, for punishing them. 
 
 
 
 
Ana Jakovljević, LL.M 
268 
 
6.4. Performance 
 
6.4.1. Current performance: Case study of the Republic of Serbia 
 
 For the case study in the qualitative research conducted in this thesis, the Republic of 
Serbia was taken since in the past was part of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. 
Yugoslavia followed the different path of socialism than the Soviet type. In the international 
arena it included neutrality in the Cold War and promotion of cooperation with everybody. In 
internal policy it promoted decentralisation, on political and industrial level, private ownership 
in agricultural and small business area and, important for this thesis, it for a while treated 
public servants as a special group compared to the other workers. The proclaimed openness 
and decentralisation diluted the fact that in the essence the system was authoritarian which 
broke up like all the other Soviet socialist systems. After the break up six countries were 
created which as republics were constituents of Yugoslavia: Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, 
Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia and Slovenia. Their economic performance in transition is 
graded differently from the external international factors, such as EU, which causes different 
status and treatment for the each of them. However, when public administration is observed the 
six countries show similar results. More precisely, the Global Corruption Barometer which 
measures perception of corruption in public administration shows that in all countries it is 
perceived as corrupt. Therefore, specific type of socialism and common problem of public 
administration, which for a while had special treatment as part of specificity of the socialist 
system, put Yugoslavia in the focus of this research. However, the single case study approach 
was chosen because of the assumption that common history and culture that countries shared in 
general provide similar mentality of civil servants in all countries. Serbia was selected based on 
the two facts: firs, the whole administration of socialist regime had its headquarters in 
Belgrade, which back then was the capital of Yugoslavia and is now the capital of Serbia; and 
second, it is the largest country among the others and as such might be more representative.  
 Serbia started transition in 1990’s but formal removal of socialist regime happened ten 
years later in “5th October Revolution”. After 2000 the Shock Therapy strategy was 
implemented in the reform of economic system. Public administration reform started as well at 
the same time and it followed international requirements and standards. This means that 
Weberian elements as well as NPM were implemented but not as a part of Neo Weberian State 
approach. It appears that Serbian policy makers just followed the trends promoted by 
international institutions whose views are in general influenced by the strongest states and their 
perception of the issues and practice. In this case some countries follow Weberian 
administration some other New Public Management, and in order to provide the all necessary 
help to societies which are going through a transformation they offer solutions which, 
according to their practice show results. However, it seems that sometimes the lack of 
knowledge of the specific characteristic and culture of particular countries or type of countries 
produces unexpected and unwanted results. This in the first place happened to the highly 
advocated Shock Therapy, which produced unpredicted outcomes eve thought the intentions of 
the proponents are made in a good faith. In this context, the applied reforms in transitional 
countries in the domain of public administration came as no surprise since many studies show, 
again, unsatisfying results. Finally, the same model and following story apply for the anti-
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corruption framework. In all three cases the results of the reforms applied in all three areas in 
Serbia are not an exception. 
 Regarding the fight against corruption studies show that citizens in Serbia see 
corruption as modus operandi of public administration. When civil servants are asked, they see 
themselves as generators of corruption but also they blame on the system and its structure. 
What is interesting is that they do not see themselves as part of the “will”, which should change 
the situation, but rather the “will” is located outside. When methods for corruption combat are 
discussed the two groups, citizens and civil servants, give different answers. The former argue 
for harsh penalties, while the latter argue for prevention. In a qualitative study run for the 
purpose of this research result, tie in in a way with some theoretical claims made. In the 
responses civil servants expressed mistrust and scepticism for the research because the 
questions asked were characterised as “delicate and potentially dangerous”. Therefore, they 
suspected that their replies might be used against them in the future. Even though the replies 
cannot be used for the strong support for the assumptions made, they still provide valuable 
information that trust is civil service in Serbia is missing which is in the context of reducing 
corruption one of the crucial elements. Therefore, the application of anti-corruption pyramid 
seems justified here since it first argues for capacity building and trust increase through 
prevention and transparency and in the second instance application of sanctioning system as a 
corrective measure for unwanted behaviour. These conclusions in general could be stretched to 
the countries of ex-Yugoslavia since public opinion in each of them regarding corruption and 
public administration is very similar and it is expressed through mass media, newspapers, 
television and internet, and in personal communication among people as well.  
 
6.4.2. Limitations and suggestions for further research  
One of the limitations of this study is that it discusses countries which beside their 
similar socialist past have actuality in which the relics of socialism in general vary. This 
implies particularly to the group of countries who are already members of the EU and those 
whose aim is to one day become part of that community. However, in the list of transitional 
countries are also those who have no such aspirations, such as Russia or Belarus who are also 
part of this research. Another important fact is also that the analyses made here not always had 
the same pool of countries because the data in some cases were missing and in some were 
difficult to obtain due to the language barrier since no English translation could be found. 
Therefore, the applicability of the theoretical framework may vary from country to country 
based on its particular circumstances and anti-corruption pyramids should be seen rather as a 
mechanism which is cost efficient and aimed to be effective in improving corruption combat. 
For instance some countries can recognize other cultural aspects as important in particular case, 
than those discussed here in the first layer of pyramid. Furthermore, some other administrative 
sanctions could be found more applicable than those suggested. In sum, the main message is 
that culture and informal institutions matter and their change do not follow the change of 
formal institutions. This should be kept in mind in designing of anti-corruption policies.  
Another limitation of this study is the use of one case study method. The main 
argument in that sense questions the application of the results gained in one study to the other 
cases which are considered similar. The main argument in that sense is that the attempt here 
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was to make a first step towards the research of the “black box” of post-socialist administration 
and to identify those elements which might be important for understanding causes of 
corruption. Consequently the knowledge gained should cause the finding of cure easier. This 
study should be interpreted in terms of Grounded theory which implies that further research is 
necessary for the creation of more accurate image.  
This thesis raised some issues and tried to connect various aspects relevant for 
corruption combat in post-socialist countries. Many claims demand more investigation in the 
future since their basis is either in the issues which are emerging in the literature, such as 
relation of the administration type and corruption, or are mentioned for the first time here, like 
punishment of certain types of corruption with administrative disciplinary sanctions. 
Economists usually do not like to go into the culture and preferences and are prone to criticize 
their use. However, lawyers tend to emphasize them as important aspects of human behaviour. 
As usual, the truth must be somewhere in between. This thesis has attempted to reconcile the 
two approaches in terms of corruption and further research is seen as necessary for argument 
support. 
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SUMMARY 
 
Corruption is, in the last two decades, considered as one of the biggest problems within 
the international community, which harms not only a particular state or society but the whole 
world. The discussion on corruption in law and economics approach is mainly run under the 
veil of Public choice theory and principal-agent model. This theory sees agents, politicians and 
bureaucrats, as rational self-maximisers who disregard public goals and as such should be 
monitored and sanctioned accordingly by the principal. In this context the policy makers 
should create incentive mechanism which imposes obstacles to corrupt behaviour. Based on 
this approach the strong international initiatives taken by the UN, the OECD and the Council of 
Europe, provided various measures and tools in order to support and guide countries in their 
combat against corruption. These anti-corruption policies created a repression -prevention-
transparency model for corruption combat. The dominant aspect of this model presents 
deterrence since variety of international convention insists on criminalisation of various acts of 
power abuse. Based on this model, countries around the world adopted anti-corruption 
strategies as part of their legal rules. Nevertheless, the recent researches on the effects of this 
move show non impressive results. The argument that “one size does not fit all” is one of the 
main raised by the critics. The explanation for this claim, according to criticizers, comes from 
the fact that not all countries are the same because their institutional setting varies. The 
dominant approach asks for overreliance on the criminal justice system, judiciary and police, 
taking for granted their impartiality and effectiveness. However, this situation is more 
exception than the rule in many countries around the world. The main problem of this approach 
according to some researcher lays in the fact that in these countries institution do not function 
because, even though people condemn corruption, they engage in it because they lack trust in 
other citizens and think that all the others are doing the same. This is identified as collective 
action problem as opposed to the principal-agent model. 
Among the countries which experience problems of corruption, even though they 
follow the dominant anti-corruption trends, are transitional, post-socialist countries. To this 
group belong the countries which are emerging from centrally planned to an open market 
economy. To achieve this change the establishment of new institutions is the main goal. After 
the state’s collapse international financial institutions took the leading advisory role and 
promoted the immediate implantation of the ideas grounded in the neoclassical economy. 
However, the results of this approach revealed important shortcomings, of which increased 
corruption was one. This outcome amplified the voices of institutional economists who from 
the beginning argued for gradualist approach towards the institutional change. Their claims 
pointed out that the change of formal institutions is not difficult to achieve. It is enough to 
change the written laws according to the requirements. However, the informal institutions are 
those which stay for a long time in people as “mental models” and they could not be changed 
overnight. These claims demand a deeper analysis of the social systems and their mechanisms 
before engaging in a design of any reform policy.  
Following these claims, the conclusion might be that any sound anti-corruption policy 
implemented in post-socialist countries should take into account their idiosyncrasies which are 
the results of the previous regime. The closer look to socialism provides an interesting 
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description in terms of its institutional setting, mentality of the individuals and their 
interrelation. Although in theory designed as a system which should increase wealth and 
cooperation among the people, socialism failed to fulfil its promise. In order to cover the 
failure, the system instead of making people free, imprisoned them figuratively and in large 
number of cases literally. As a result of the repression and distorted incentives, homo sovieticus 
was born. Imagined as a super hero, he ended up as a sceptical, amoral creature who sees 
nothing wrong in stealing from the state. In addition he has no trust in people outside its small 
circle and he has no trust in public authorities. If compared to homo economicus, it could be 
said that they both aim to maximise their wealth but homo economics does that by respecting 
the institutional framework of the game which channels its behaviour and coordinates it with 
other players (invisible hand of the market). This description is here taken as a starting point 
from which transitional countries departed on their journey. In the last two decades their 
achievements regarding the change vary. Some of them perform better than others in many 
aspects including the fight against corruption as well, which TICPI shows. However, another 
index, the Global Corruption Barometer, shows that perception of corruption in civil service in 
these countries is still high. There is an indication that homo sovieticus changed to a certain 
extent but when all arguments are put together it is highly likely that he still lives in civil 
service.  
If this idiosyncrasy is taken into account the suggestion in this thesis is that in the cases 
of corruption combat in public administration in post-socialist countries, instead of dominant 
anti-corruption scheme repression-prevention-transparency, corruption combat should be 
improved through the implementation of a new one, structure-conduct-performance. This 
scheme in its first element, the structure, includes the type of public administration which 
should be implemented because it curbs corruption the best way. Analysis provided a view 
which puts the Neo Weberian State as the first best and Weberian administration as the second 
best solution. The second element, the conduct, should be treated according to the Responsive 
Regulationtheory. This theory says that the regulators are more able to speak softly when they 
carry big sticks. More precisely, the more sanctions can be kept in the background, the more 
regulation can be transacted through moral suasion, and the more effective the regulation will 
be. Based on it an anti-corruption pyramid if implemented might provide the optimal results. 
This pyramid aims to coordinate human’s preferences, propensity to corruption based in 
cultural specificities and transparency and accountability, and to put constraints on unwanted 
behavior by imposing administrative and criminal sanctions. Regarding relevant cultural 
aspects pyramid addresses: universalism and particularism, individualism and collectivism, and 
power distance. The imposition of sanctions is further regulated by disciplinary anti-corruption 
pyramid and criminal anti-corruption pyramid whose implementation is based on the type of 
the corrupt act in question:  if it is “legal” then the former pyramid should be applied and if it is 
“illegal” the latter one. Finally, if the first two elements are implemented the anti-corruption 
performance should be improved. This new “pyramid approach”, suggested to post-socialist 
countries, asks public administration itself to engage in corruption combat, leaving criminal 
justice system as the ultimate weapon, used only for the very harmful misdeeds. With this self-
control mechanism, administration should be able to build internal coherence and strength. 
There is no doubt that corruption harms societies in many ways and that policy makers should 
promote zero tolerance to corruption. However in the case of transitional countries instead of 
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the first best, for a while the second best solution should be applied which is suggested by the 
anti-corruption pyramid(s). Going one step back does not necessarily mean failure but rather 
taking a run at faster improvement. 
 
